基于博弈论的中国转轨时期银企关系研究
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摘要
银行和企业是国民经济中的两个重要的经济主体，银企关系不仅关系到银行与企业的效率和风险，而且也关系到整个社会的经济增长和波动。随着经济体制的变迁，银企关系对经济发展的影响越来越大，因此，研究银企关系具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文主要运用博弈论的方法研究银行和企业的关系问题，特别是指我国国有商业银行和国有企业的关系问题。
首先，对银行和企业的产生、银行在经济中的作用、银企关系的发展历程、银企关系的几种模式、银企关系的理论研究以及我国银企关系发展的几个阶段和存在的问题进行了概述性总结。归纳了博弈论的基本模型，并对博弈论的基本模型在银企关系中的应用进行了研究。
其次，分析了在转轨经济时期的经济运行特征，探讨了银企关系的演变及其基本特征。依据政府是否进行干预的前提，对转轨经济时期的银企关系进行分析，由此得出政府的行为对银行和企业的博弈行为产生重要影响。并对转轨经济时期的银企关系的正面和负面经济效应进行了评价。
再次，运用逆向选择理论和道德风险理论，对转轨经济时期的银企关系进行了博弈分析，针对银行和企业间存在的逆向选择和道德风险，建立了防范逆向选择和道德风险的博弈模型，在一定程度可以减轻逆向选择和道德风险的影响。但是，这些模型要受到国家经济运行环境和法律法规环境的约束。
第四，从博弈论的角度，分析银企博弈对通货紧缩的影响。国有企业的低效率和大面积亏损给银行的不良资产埋下了隐患。面对企业的贷款不能按期归还，在法律保障不足的条件下，银行的最佳办法就是不追缴企业未按时归还的贷款，由此，给出不良资产的博弈论解释。在大量不良资产和政府控制金融风险的条件下，银行只有“惜贷”。而“惜贷”企业即使有很多的好项目也不容易贷到款，投资减少，企业债务升值，银行更多的贷款难以收回，成为不良资产，对通货紧缩趋势的形成起到了推波助澜的作用，加剧了通货紧缩的程度。分析了银企的行为对通货紧缩的影响以及在通货紧缩条件下银行和企业的行为选择。
Bank and enterprise are two important equities in an economy. The relation of bank and enterprise relates to not only their efficiencies and risks, but also whole national economic growth and fluctuation. With the changes of economic system, the relation's influence to economic development becomes more and more bigger. Hence, the research of the bank-enterprise relation has vital theoretical and practical significance.This paper focuses on the bank-enterprise relation, especially the relation of China's national commercial banks and national enterprises.Firstly, it summarizes the bank and enterprise's origins, the role of banks in an economy, the developmental course of the bank-enterprise relation, the several modes of bank-enterprise relation, the theoretical research about this relation, and the development phases and problems of China's bank-enterprise relation. The fundamental models of game theory are also summarized and its application in this relation is discussed.Secondly, economic characteristics of transition economy is analyzed, the bank-enterprise relation's evolvements and its basic characteristics are discussed. According to whether the government interfere or not, the bank-enterprise relation in transition economy era is analyzed; the conclusion that the government's behaviors has critical influences on the games of banks and firms is drawn; the positive and negative effects of the bank-enterprise relation in transition economy era are evaluated.Thirdly, this paper applies adverse selection and moral risks theory into game theoretic analysis of the bank-enterprise relation in transition economy era. The game theory model to prevent the adverse selection and moral risks is constituted. The effects of adverse selection and moral risks could be alleviated to a certainty, but its role is subject to the limitation of national economic environment and legal environment.Fourthly, from the point of game theory, the effect of game of banks and firms on deflation is analyzed. State owned enterprises' low efficiencies and extensive losses laid hidden troubles to banks' non-performed assets. Facing the circumstance that firms can't refund the loans and lacking of sufficient legal safeguards, banks' best choice is not seeking to refund the enterprises' non-performed loans. This gives a
game theory explanation for banks' non-performed assets. On the condition of mass non-performed assets and government's severe measures to control financial risks, banks have to grudge credits. Even the good projects can't get loans; investments decrease; the debts of firms go up; more loans can't be repaid, which become the non-performed assets. It furthers the formation of deflation trend and aggravates deflation. Banks' and firms' behaviors effect on deflation and banks' and firms' behavioral selection in term of deflation are also analyzed.
首先，对银行和企业的产生、银行在经济中的作用、银企关系的发展历程、银企关系的几种模式、银企关系的理论研究以及我国银企关系发展的几个阶段和存在的问题进行了概述性总结。归纳了博弈论的基本模型，并对博弈论的基本模型在银企关系中的应用进行了研究。
其次，分析了在转轨经济时期的经济运行特征，探讨了银企关系的演变及其基本特征。依据政府是否进行干预的前提，对转轨经济时期的银企关系进行分析，由此得出政府的行为对银行和企业的博弈行为产生重要影响。并对转轨经济时期的银企关系的正面和负面经济效应进行了评价。
再次，运用逆向选择理论和道德风险理论，对转轨经济时期的银企关系进行了博弈分析，针对银行和企业间存在的逆向选择和道德风险，建立了防范逆向选择和道德风险的博弈模型，在一定程度可以减轻逆向选择和道德风险的影响。但是，这些模型要受到国家经济运行环境和法律法规环境的约束。
第四，从博弈论的角度，分析银企博弈对通货紧缩的影响。国有企业的低效率和大面积亏损给银行的不良资产埋下了隐患。面对企业的贷款不能按期归还，在法律保障不足的条件下，银行的最佳办法就是不追缴企业未按时归还的贷款，由此，给出不良资产的博弈论解释。在大量不良资产和政府控制金融风险的条件下，银行只有“惜贷”。而“惜贷”企业即使有很多的好项目也不容易贷到款，投资减少，企业债务升值，银行更多的贷款难以收回，成为不良资产，对通货紧缩趋势的形成起到了推波助澜的作用，加剧了通货紧缩的程度。分析了银企的行为对通货紧缩的影响以及在通货紧缩条件下银行和企业的行为选择。
Bank and enterprise are two important equities in an economy. The relation of bank and enterprise relates to not only their efficiencies and risks, but also whole national economic growth and fluctuation. With the changes of economic system, the relation's influence to economic development becomes more and more bigger. Hence, the research of the bank-enterprise relation has vital theoretical and practical significance.This paper focuses on the bank-enterprise relation, especially the relation of China's national commercial banks and national enterprises.Firstly, it summarizes the bank and enterprise's origins, the role of banks in an economy, the developmental course of the bank-enterprise relation, the several modes of bank-enterprise relation, the theoretical research about this relation, and the development phases and problems of China's bank-enterprise relation. The fundamental models of game theory are also summarized and its application in this relation is discussed.Secondly, economic characteristics of transition economy is analyzed, the bank-enterprise relation's evolvements and its basic characteristics are discussed. According to whether the government interfere or not, the bank-enterprise relation in transition economy era is analyzed; the conclusion that the government's behaviors has critical influences on the games of banks and firms is drawn; the positive and negative effects of the bank-enterprise relation in transition economy era are evaluated.Thirdly, this paper applies adverse selection and moral risks theory into game theoretic analysis of the bank-enterprise relation in transition economy era. The game theory model to prevent the adverse selection and moral risks is constituted. The effects of adverse selection and moral risks could be alleviated to a certainty, but its role is subject to the limitation of national economic environment and legal environment.Fourthly, from the point of game theory, the effect of game of banks and firms on deflation is analyzed. State owned enterprises' low efficiencies and extensive losses laid hidden troubles to banks' non-performed assets. Facing the circumstance that firms can't refund the loans and lacking of sufficient legal safeguards, banks' best choice is not seeking to refund the enterprises' non-performed loans. This gives a
game theory explanation for banks' non-performed assets. On the condition of mass non-performed assets and government's severe measures to control financial risks, banks have to grudge credits. Even the good projects can't get loans; investments decrease; the debts of firms go up; more loans can't be repaid, which become the non-performed assets. It furthers the formation of deflation trend and aggravates deflation. Banks' and firms' behaviors effect on deflation and banks' and firms' behavioral selection in term of deflation are also analyzed.
引文
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