中小上市公司治理与成长性的关系研究
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摘要
随着中国资本市场的进一步发展，中小上市公司已发展成为中国企业的主力军和优秀代表，是中国国民经济的重要组成部分。研究中小上市公司治理具有描述和解释中国经济、政治体制改革过程的典型性，具有揭示和预测中国市场经济发展状况的前瞻性，具有体现和标志中国国民经济发展水平的代表性。公司治理的核心在于保证公司的财产安全、科学决策和高效经营。对于上市公司而言，为了提升公司绩效和可持续发展能力，以吸引更多的投资者，必然要关注治理状况的改善、在行业中的地位、科学决策机制的完善等问题。公司成长性是公司治理水平和健全与否的直接而有效的反应，良好的公司治理必然与公司持续健康的发展相联系。可以说，公司治理的合理性、有效性是提高公司成长性的必要条件。从这个意义上讲，本文关于公司治理与公司成长性的研究选题具有时代紧迫性及重要的理论价值和现实意义。
本文选取中国中小上市公司治理与成长性的关系作为研究对象，采用辩证分析方法、实证分析法、计量经济学分析方法，在中小企业理论、成长理论和公司治理理论的基础上，通过分析我国中小企业的成长和公司治理现状及进行国际比较，剖析公司治理对中小企业成长性的作用。
本文在运用委托代理理论构建了中小企业公司治理与成长性关系模型的基础上，用主成分分析法建立由1个一级指标、4个二级指标、14个三级指标构成的中小上市公司成长性评价体系，并对我国214家中小上市公司从2002年到2005年的成长性进行了排名。然后，分别从股权治理、债权治理、董事会治理和管理层激励等四个维度研究它们与中小上市公司成长之间的关系，通过描述性统计和回归分析，得到以下结论：
1．股权治理方面的研究发现股权集中度与公司成长性无相关关系；国有控股公司的股权比例与成长性存在正相关关系；对于国有控股公司，第一大股东对公司经营状况影响最大，第二至第五大股东持股比例合计与公司成长性存在微弱的负相关关系；对于民营公司，第一大股东持股比例与公司成长性负相关。
2．债权治理方面的研究中，我们建立了债权治理指数F的评价体系，研究发现规模较大的国有企业治理排名位于前列；F指数与公司成长性存在显著的倒U型关系；偿债能力的提高伴随公司的低成长；债务融资与公司成长显著正相关；债务期限与公司成长性有微弱的正相关关系，债务期限结构不平衡；债务类型单一，银行借款融资占绝对地位；资产期限与公司成长性有微弱的负相关关系，资产期限结构不平衡。
3．董事会治理方面的研究发现董事会规模、独立董事和执行董事比例、董事会受教育程度与公司后期成长性呈显著的正相关关系；董事会平稳性指数与公司当期成长性存在倒U型关系；股东单位高管人员在公司董事会兼任执行董事与公司成长性负相关；两职状态对公司成长性没有产生显著作用。
4．管理层激励方面的研究发现年度薪金是公司重要的激励机制，对公司成长性有较高的敏感性影响；高管持股比例较低，与公司成长性存在U型关系；实际在上市公司领薪的高管人数与成长性正相关；公司规模、财务杠杆、行业属性显著影响着公司成长性和管理层激励的关系。
最后，本文提出有利于实现我国中小上市公司持续成长的公司治理政策建议，包括政府管理、投资融资、财政税收、人力资源、激励机制、市场环境等方面，并指出我国企业公司治理的改革应该从过去的强调股权多元化向今后的强调董事会的规范建设上来。从理论上讲，这将有助于弥补国内外在该研究领域的不足，完善和发展中小企业成长理论及公司治理理论：在实践方面，这将有助于制定出完善我国中小上市公司治理的有效政策措施，促进我国中小上市公司更高、更快、更好的成长。
The core of corporate governance is for ensuring the scientific decision and the efficient operation. The level of corporate governance is essential for competetivity and we should focus on the improvement and perfection mechanism to attract investors, improve performance and sustainable development. The growth is directly related to governance level and good governance is bound to promote healthy development. We can say that the sustainability and effectiveness is essential for improving the growth. As Chinese capital market develops further, the listed SMEs are becoming the main force and good representatives of all SMEs. Studies on the listed SMEs should be prospective and representative. So the paper chooses a popular topic and both theoretically and practically meaningful.
The study targets are the listed SMEs and we use ways of the dialectics analysis, the empirical analysis, the econometrics analysis to study the effect of governance on the growth through international comparison on the basis of the SMEs theory, the growth theory, and the company governance theory. The model about the relation between the SMEs governance and the growth based on the principal-agency theory offers necessary theory basis. Then we establish an indicator system having one first-level indicator, four second-level indicators, fourteen third-level indicators based on the analysis of principal component and empirically study the growth. Then we empirically study the relationship between the growth and corporate governance from four dimensions of the equities govemance, creditor's right governance, the board governance and the management incentive, and reach conclusions as following.
1. The relation between the growth and the share concentration doesn't present an inverse U shape. The equities ratio held by state-owned companies is positive related to the growth. The largest shareholder affects the operation greatly for state-owned companies. The sum of top five equities ratios except the largest one is negative related to the growth. The largest equities are significantly negative related to the growth.
2. We find that large state-owned companies are in the top thecreditor's right governance bulletin board using the creditor's right governance in our study. There is a significant inverse U shape representing the relation between the indicator F and the growth. The improvement of repaying comes with worse growth. The level of obligation is significantly positive related to the growth. The time limit of obligation is a little positive related to the growth. The time limit of obligation is unbalanced. The obligation type is simple and the borrowings from banks are the most. The time limit of assets is a little negative related to the growth. The time limit of assets is unbalanced.
3. The study on the board governance finds that the board scale, the ratio of independent directors and managing directors and the level of directors' knowledge are significantly positive related to the growth. There is an inverse U-shape between the balance-stable indicator and the growth, and the growth is on the peak when the indicator is 0.6. The occupation of managing directors from parent companies can bring negative growth. The integration of power from directors and managers has no effect on the growth.
4. The study on management incentive finds that the annual pay is the most important incentive mechanism and is greatly sensitive to the growth. There is a U-shape relation between the growth and the low ratio of managers' equities. The number of managers who receive payment in parent companies is positive related to the growth. The company scale, finance level and industry affect the growth significantly.
At last we provide with political advice about macro-government, investment, finance, taxes, human resource, incentive mechanisms, macro-environment and so on. Theoretically it will make up for the lack of researches on the theme, perfect and develop the SMEs theory, growth theory and governance theory. Practically it will help make effective policies in order to promote the growth of the SMEs better.
本文选取中国中小上市公司治理与成长性的关系作为研究对象，采用辩证分析方法、实证分析法、计量经济学分析方法，在中小企业理论、成长理论和公司治理理论的基础上，通过分析我国中小企业的成长和公司治理现状及进行国际比较，剖析公司治理对中小企业成长性的作用。
本文在运用委托代理理论构建了中小企业公司治理与成长性关系模型的基础上，用主成分分析法建立由1个一级指标、4个二级指标、14个三级指标构成的中小上市公司成长性评价体系，并对我国214家中小上市公司从2002年到2005年的成长性进行了排名。然后，分别从股权治理、债权治理、董事会治理和管理层激励等四个维度研究它们与中小上市公司成长之间的关系，通过描述性统计和回归分析，得到以下结论：
1．股权治理方面的研究发现股权集中度与公司成长性无相关关系；国有控股公司的股权比例与成长性存在正相关关系；对于国有控股公司，第一大股东对公司经营状况影响最大，第二至第五大股东持股比例合计与公司成长性存在微弱的负相关关系；对于民营公司，第一大股东持股比例与公司成长性负相关。
2．债权治理方面的研究中，我们建立了债权治理指数F的评价体系，研究发现规模较大的国有企业治理排名位于前列；F指数与公司成长性存在显著的倒U型关系；偿债能力的提高伴随公司的低成长；债务融资与公司成长显著正相关；债务期限与公司成长性有微弱的正相关关系，债务期限结构不平衡；债务类型单一，银行借款融资占绝对地位；资产期限与公司成长性有微弱的负相关关系，资产期限结构不平衡。
3．董事会治理方面的研究发现董事会规模、独立董事和执行董事比例、董事会受教育程度与公司后期成长性呈显著的正相关关系；董事会平稳性指数与公司当期成长性存在倒U型关系；股东单位高管人员在公司董事会兼任执行董事与公司成长性负相关；两职状态对公司成长性没有产生显著作用。
4．管理层激励方面的研究发现年度薪金是公司重要的激励机制，对公司成长性有较高的敏感性影响；高管持股比例较低，与公司成长性存在U型关系；实际在上市公司领薪的高管人数与成长性正相关；公司规模、财务杠杆、行业属性显著影响着公司成长性和管理层激励的关系。
最后，本文提出有利于实现我国中小上市公司持续成长的公司治理政策建议，包括政府管理、投资融资、财政税收、人力资源、激励机制、市场环境等方面，并指出我国企业公司治理的改革应该从过去的强调股权多元化向今后的强调董事会的规范建设上来。从理论上讲，这将有助于弥补国内外在该研究领域的不足，完善和发展中小企业成长理论及公司治理理论：在实践方面，这将有助于制定出完善我国中小上市公司治理的有效政策措施，促进我国中小上市公司更高、更快、更好的成长。
The core of corporate governance is for ensuring the scientific decision and the efficient operation. The level of corporate governance is essential for competetivity and we should focus on the improvement and perfection mechanism to attract investors, improve performance and sustainable development. The growth is directly related to governance level and good governance is bound to promote healthy development. We can say that the sustainability and effectiveness is essential for improving the growth. As Chinese capital market develops further, the listed SMEs are becoming the main force and good representatives of all SMEs. Studies on the listed SMEs should be prospective and representative. So the paper chooses a popular topic and both theoretically and practically meaningful.
The study targets are the listed SMEs and we use ways of the dialectics analysis, the empirical analysis, the econometrics analysis to study the effect of governance on the growth through international comparison on the basis of the SMEs theory, the growth theory, and the company governance theory. The model about the relation between the SMEs governance and the growth based on the principal-agency theory offers necessary theory basis. Then we establish an indicator system having one first-level indicator, four second-level indicators, fourteen third-level indicators based on the analysis of principal component and empirically study the growth. Then we empirically study the relationship between the growth and corporate governance from four dimensions of the equities govemance, creditor's right governance, the board governance and the management incentive, and reach conclusions as following.
1. The relation between the growth and the share concentration doesn't present an inverse U shape. The equities ratio held by state-owned companies is positive related to the growth. The largest shareholder affects the operation greatly for state-owned companies. The sum of top five equities ratios except the largest one is negative related to the growth. The largest equities are significantly negative related to the growth.
2. We find that large state-owned companies are in the top thecreditor's right governance bulletin board using the creditor's right governance in our study. There is a significant inverse U shape representing the relation between the indicator F and the growth. The improvement of repaying comes with worse growth. The level of obligation is significantly positive related to the growth. The time limit of obligation is a little positive related to the growth. The time limit of obligation is unbalanced. The obligation type is simple and the borrowings from banks are the most. The time limit of assets is a little negative related to the growth. The time limit of assets is unbalanced.
3. The study on the board governance finds that the board scale, the ratio of independent directors and managing directors and the level of directors' knowledge are significantly positive related to the growth. There is an inverse U-shape between the balance-stable indicator and the growth, and the growth is on the peak when the indicator is 0.6. The occupation of managing directors from parent companies can bring negative growth. The integration of power from directors and managers has no effect on the growth.
4. The study on management incentive finds that the annual pay is the most important incentive mechanism and is greatly sensitive to the growth. There is a U-shape relation between the growth and the low ratio of managers' equities. The number of managers who receive payment in parent companies is positive related to the growth. The company scale, finance level and industry affect the growth significantly.
At last we provide with political advice about macro-government, investment, finance, taxes, human resource, incentive mechanisms, macro-environment and so on. Theoretically it will make up for the lack of researches on the theme, perfect and develop the SMEs theory, growth theory and governance theory. Practically it will help make effective policies in order to promote the growth of the SMEs better.
引文
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