产业效应视角下中国企业兼并问题实证研究
|
摘要
企业兼并(Mergers & Acquisitions简称M&A)是公司重组的重要形式,对于国家产业与经济结构调整,有着十分重要意义。我国的企业兼并活动从上个世纪八十年代末期开始出现,随着国内市场经济的步伐和资本市场的发展呈现出逐渐加剧的趋势。企业兼并作为一种企业要素资源调整的重要方式,对于优化产业结构,提高资源配置效率,实现经济可持续发展具有重要的现实意义。
但是也应当注意到,由于我国正处于转轨经济时期,市场机制还不健全,企业兼并活动具有特殊性,如:兼并活动中短期行为和投机性行为严重,虚假兼并和财务性兼并活动较为突出,这必然影响我国兼并活动的实际效果,甚至掩盖了兼并的实质性经济意义。有鉴于此,本文从产业效应视角,以经济效益问题为核心,通过严格而科学的筛选,选取了1994年到2003年期间1000个左右的企业兼并样本,从多视角研究了兼并企业的经济效益,如:不同兼并主体(主并方和被并方)、不同参照系(大盘和板块因素)、产业效应(产业类型、产业周期和兼并类型)、时间效应(短期、中期和长期)等,这些研究成果在时间跨度、问题的广度和宽度上都超过了以往的研究,从而有利于全面和科学地认识我国转轨经济时期的企业兼并活动,主要研究内容包括:
(1)第一章简要阐述了本研究的理论和现实意义,企业兼并的概念、模式和经验;并结合我国企业兼并的实际情况,确定了本文研究的几个关键性问题。
(2)第二章主要分析了我国企业兼并现状和阶段性、普遍性和特殊性,并重点实证分析了影响我国企业兼并的宏观因素和产业因素。
(3)由于企业兼并的一个核心问题是经济效益,所以本文运用大量的篇幅来研究企业兼并的经济效益,第三、四、五章分别运用股价绩效法、财务绩效法和数据包络算法(DEA)评价三种手段,从不同的视角来分析企业兼并的经济效益;同时,这三个方面的研究还具有依次递进的层次关系,股价绩效研究法下的结论通过财务绩效法得到进一步阐述,而数据包络算法评价则是对财务绩效法所发现的报表性重组嫌疑结论的确认。
(4)鉴于企业兼并的经济效益较差的事实,且没有明显证据表明上市公司的兼并活动是追求产业效应,而国内的企业兼并活动却快速增加的事实,第六章针对兼并动机进行了实证分析,提出我国兼并的两元动机理论,即在正常体制条件下追求规模化和效率化经营,而在转轨体制特定条件下追求局部和短期利益最大化;并就产业链视角的兼并动机问题进行了分析。
(5)第七章分析了通过兼并活动达到规模化和效率化经营的必要性,结合我国产业结构现状,分析了其存在的问题和成因,认为我国企业通过兼并活动追求规模效应具有紧迫感,并就转轨经济时期规模效应和社会福利改进的一致性进行了理论分析,同时选取四个典型产业进行了案例研究。
在上述研究内容中,本文采取实证研究范式,借助产业经济学、统计学、财务会计和数据包络算法等相关工具,基于过去十年企业兼并的数据和资料,通过大量的数据运算,针对我国企业兼并产业效应的时机、动机、经济和社会效益等方面进行较为全面的分析,主要创新性包括:
(1)企业兼并时机的研究。在宏观层面,我国企业兼并活动与宏观经济和经济自由度具有正相关性,而与股票指数的相关性较弱;在产业层面,资本密集型和Tobins’Q较高的产业发生企业兼并的频率较高,而产业成长性和产业收益率对兼并频率没有影响。
(2)企业兼并动机的研究。我国当前的企业兼并具有”两元”动机,一种是在正常体制条件下追求规模化和效率化经营,这可以视为是一种战略性动机;第二种是在转轨体制下追求局部和短期利益最大化,这是一种战术性动机;由于我国国有经济在国民经济中占有很大比重,所以政府应当结合市场经济规律对企业兼并活动进行必要的干预,以引导兼并活动达到追求产业效应的目的。
(3)企业兼并经济效益的研究。在事件研究法下,短期股价绩效较好而长期股价绩效却较差,横向和纵向兼并的股价绩效较好而混和兼并的股价绩效较差;从产业特征来分析,市场集中度高、高新技术产业和具有国际竞争力的产业主并方的股价绩效较好;进入壁垒较高产业被并方的股价绩效较好。在财务绩效研究法下,兼并企业的财务绩效在兼并当年迅速改善,而在兼并后一年却显著下降,在兼并后短期内财务指标的迅速变化说明兼并企业存在报表重组的嫌疑,其中被并方尤为明显;借助DEA方法对兼并企业效率评价的结果证实了被并方企业具有特别明显的报表性重组特征。
(4)企业兼并社会效益的研究。针对我国企业规模较小,而效率差别较大的现状,通过非对称市场结构模型和产业链视角的兼并理论分析了兼并活动的社会效益情况,并就产业链视角下的企业兼并问题进行了研究;同时选取了汽车、家电、钢铁和啤酒等行业进行了案例分析。
实证研究既可以检验兼并理论,又可以指导兼并实践,对于实践性很强的企业兼并问题,实证研究显得尤为重要,本文的实证研究成果主要包括以下创新点:
(1)企业兼并产业效应的研究。主要内容包括:(a)兼并时机方面,资本密集型和Tobins’Q较高的产业发生企业兼并的频率较高;(b)兼并动机方面,分析了追求短期经济利益的战术性动机和追求产业整合的战略性动机;(c)兼并经济绩效方面,分析了影响股价绩效和财务绩效的产业效应因素;
(2)企业兼并的经济效益研究。本文即研究了兼并的短期效益,也研究了兼并的长期效益,认为兼并的短期经济效益较好,但长期经济效益却相对差,这不仅表现的股价绩效上,也表现的财务绩效方面;对于造成这种现象的原因,本文从过高的控制权转移收益和财务报表的虚假性重组两个方面进行了深入分析。
(3)企业兼并的转轨经济特征研究。从我国企业兼并活动与发达国家企业兼并活动的对比来看,认为我国处于西方第一次兼并浪潮过程中,且具有明显得转轨经济特征,这种特征在兼并时机、动机、经济和社会效益等各个方面都有所体现。
总之,本文从我国企业兼并的实际情况出发,针对转轨经济时期企业兼并活动进行了较为系统的研究,并在此基础上提出了若干意见和建议,这即有利于我们科学地认识和把握当前的企业兼并活动,同时也有利于合理制定相关的政策和措施,具有一定的学术和现实意义。
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A), a form of corporations’restructuring, plays an important role in China’s industries and economic structure adjustment. Since the end of 80s in 20th centuary, M&A in China is growing vigarously with the growth of domestic economy and capital market. As a tool to optimize industrial structure and increase the efficiency of resource alloction, M&A in China has a substansive impact on the sustainable growth for China’s economy.
China’s economy, however, is in its trasition period. The marekt mechanism has not been perfect yet. Thus some specilities lies in: the shortsightedness and speculation in M&A, fake mergers and financial mergers. These do harm to the actural effect on M&A.Based on such considerations, the dissertation use the well prepared sample to study the economic effect of M&A from the viewpoint of industry layer, focusing on the actual results. The sample ranges from 1994 to 2000, totally 1000 or so with the consideration of diffenrent M&A agents, different benchmarks, industries and time range, etc. In terms of time range, width and depth, the dissertation behaves better than before and helps understand better China’s M&A during trasition economy. The main body includes:
a) In Chapter 1, the theoretical and empirical importance of the study have been illustrated, followed by the defination, models and experience of M&A. Based on the actual M&A in China, the rearch questions are proposed.
b) Chapter 2 deals with the current characteristics in China’s M&A with the emphasis on the empirical analysis of micro and macro factors effecting China’s M&A.
c) The core is the economic effects; thus the dissertation arrange 3 chapters coping with this. Stock price performance, financial performance and DEA are three methods utilized respectively in the 3rd, 4th and 5th chapters. Besides the three methods accordingly analyze the result, with the next one follow the one before giving a more convincible answer.
d) The fact is that the performance of China’s M&A is rather underscore. No apparent proof has illustrated the mergers running for industrial effects and the events are increasing. The 6th chapter does empirical analysis of the motivations for M&A and initiates motivation theory of two dimensions, that is to pursue scale of economy and efficient operation. And during transition period, the enterprises will go for restrictive and shortsighted revenue maximized. The analysis of motivation from the perspective of industrial chain is done as well.
e) Chapter 7 finds out the problems and reasons behind the current industrial structure and analyze the necessity of scale of economy and efficient operation. At the same time four case analysis have been used to do some welfare analysis.
The research methods in the dissertation include: empirical analysis, industrial economy, statistics, finance and DEA. The time range is as long as ten years. The innovative contributions:
a) M&A timing. In the macro layer, M&A is positively related to economy and freedom and weak related with stock index. From the industrial view, capital intensive and high Tobin’s industries merge frequently while growth and revenue has no impact on M&A frequency.
b) M&A motivation. Two-dimensional motivations currently are on the one hand, pursuing scale of economy and efficiency is a strategic one; on the other going for restrictive and shortsighted revenue is a tactic one. Because the state-owned enterprises have a good stake in China’s economy, our government should intervene M&A in line with the discipline of market economy and induce the results to the exact purpose.
c) M&A Performance. Under event study, short-term stock price performance is better while long-term one is worse relatively. Horizontal and vertical mergers do well while mixed one bad. Industries with high market concentration, high-techs and international competitiveness do well. And in the industries with high entrance barrier, the merged side performed better. Under financial performance study, the merger year has a good result and falls substantively one year later. The suspicious purpose in the financial report in the merged side appears itself for the quick change and this has been proved by the method of DEA.
d) M&A welfare effect. In terms of small scale and efficiency gap in China’s enterprises, the M&A welfare effect is analyzed as well from the view of asymmetric market structure and industrial chain. Cases are in automobiles, electricity appliances, steel and beer industries.
In all, the innovative contributions in the dissertation:
a) M&A industrial effect analysis. The specific fields are that the motivation with capital intensive and high Tobin’s will result in more frequent mergers; price and financial performance together; industrial chain and asymmetric viewpoint for the M&A welfare effect analysis.
b) Short-term and long-term analysis. M&A performs well in short time, while underperform in future both in stock and financial report. The reason behind is analyzed; over transfer of control and fake report are studied.
c) In combination with the transition economy characteristics. Compared with mature westerns, China is in the wave of the first part of theirs. And these are explicitly unique China’s M&A.
Based on the empirical M&A facts, the systematic analysis is done in China’s M&A during transition economy. Several proposals and policy is well founded proposed. The academic and empirical importance is manifested itself in the dissertation.
但是也应当注意到,由于我国正处于转轨经济时期,市场机制还不健全,企业兼并活动具有特殊性,如:兼并活动中短期行为和投机性行为严重,虚假兼并和财务性兼并活动较为突出,这必然影响我国兼并活动的实际效果,甚至掩盖了兼并的实质性经济意义。有鉴于此,本文从产业效应视角,以经济效益问题为核心,通过严格而科学的筛选,选取了1994年到2003年期间1000个左右的企业兼并样本,从多视角研究了兼并企业的经济效益,如:不同兼并主体(主并方和被并方)、不同参照系(大盘和板块因素)、产业效应(产业类型、产业周期和兼并类型)、时间效应(短期、中期和长期)等,这些研究成果在时间跨度、问题的广度和宽度上都超过了以往的研究,从而有利于全面和科学地认识我国转轨经济时期的企业兼并活动,主要研究内容包括:
(1)第一章简要阐述了本研究的理论和现实意义,企业兼并的概念、模式和经验;并结合我国企业兼并的实际情况,确定了本文研究的几个关键性问题。
(2)第二章主要分析了我国企业兼并现状和阶段性、普遍性和特殊性,并重点实证分析了影响我国企业兼并的宏观因素和产业因素。
(3)由于企业兼并的一个核心问题是经济效益,所以本文运用大量的篇幅来研究企业兼并的经济效益,第三、四、五章分别运用股价绩效法、财务绩效法和数据包络算法(DEA)评价三种手段,从不同的视角来分析企业兼并的经济效益;同时,这三个方面的研究还具有依次递进的层次关系,股价绩效研究法下的结论通过财务绩效法得到进一步阐述,而数据包络算法评价则是对财务绩效法所发现的报表性重组嫌疑结论的确认。
(4)鉴于企业兼并的经济效益较差的事实,且没有明显证据表明上市公司的兼并活动是追求产业效应,而国内的企业兼并活动却快速增加的事实,第六章针对兼并动机进行了实证分析,提出我国兼并的两元动机理论,即在正常体制条件下追求规模化和效率化经营,而在转轨体制特定条件下追求局部和短期利益最大化;并就产业链视角的兼并动机问题进行了分析。
(5)第七章分析了通过兼并活动达到规模化和效率化经营的必要性,结合我国产业结构现状,分析了其存在的问题和成因,认为我国企业通过兼并活动追求规模效应具有紧迫感,并就转轨经济时期规模效应和社会福利改进的一致性进行了理论分析,同时选取四个典型产业进行了案例研究。
在上述研究内容中,本文采取实证研究范式,借助产业经济学、统计学、财务会计和数据包络算法等相关工具,基于过去十年企业兼并的数据和资料,通过大量的数据运算,针对我国企业兼并产业效应的时机、动机、经济和社会效益等方面进行较为全面的分析,主要创新性包括:
(1)企业兼并时机的研究。在宏观层面,我国企业兼并活动与宏观经济和经济自由度具有正相关性,而与股票指数的相关性较弱;在产业层面,资本密集型和Tobins’Q较高的产业发生企业兼并的频率较高,而产业成长性和产业收益率对兼并频率没有影响。
(2)企业兼并动机的研究。我国当前的企业兼并具有”两元”动机,一种是在正常体制条件下追求规模化和效率化经营,这可以视为是一种战略性动机;第二种是在转轨体制下追求局部和短期利益最大化,这是一种战术性动机;由于我国国有经济在国民经济中占有很大比重,所以政府应当结合市场经济规律对企业兼并活动进行必要的干预,以引导兼并活动达到追求产业效应的目的。
(3)企业兼并经济效益的研究。在事件研究法下,短期股价绩效较好而长期股价绩效却较差,横向和纵向兼并的股价绩效较好而混和兼并的股价绩效较差;从产业特征来分析,市场集中度高、高新技术产业和具有国际竞争力的产业主并方的股价绩效较好;进入壁垒较高产业被并方的股价绩效较好。在财务绩效研究法下,兼并企业的财务绩效在兼并当年迅速改善,而在兼并后一年却显著下降,在兼并后短期内财务指标的迅速变化说明兼并企业存在报表重组的嫌疑,其中被并方尤为明显;借助DEA方法对兼并企业效率评价的结果证实了被并方企业具有特别明显的报表性重组特征。
(4)企业兼并社会效益的研究。针对我国企业规模较小,而效率差别较大的现状,通过非对称市场结构模型和产业链视角的兼并理论分析了兼并活动的社会效益情况,并就产业链视角下的企业兼并问题进行了研究;同时选取了汽车、家电、钢铁和啤酒等行业进行了案例分析。
实证研究既可以检验兼并理论,又可以指导兼并实践,对于实践性很强的企业兼并问题,实证研究显得尤为重要,本文的实证研究成果主要包括以下创新点:
(1)企业兼并产业效应的研究。主要内容包括:(a)兼并时机方面,资本密集型和Tobins’Q较高的产业发生企业兼并的频率较高;(b)兼并动机方面,分析了追求短期经济利益的战术性动机和追求产业整合的战略性动机;(c)兼并经济绩效方面,分析了影响股价绩效和财务绩效的产业效应因素;
(2)企业兼并的经济效益研究。本文即研究了兼并的短期效益,也研究了兼并的长期效益,认为兼并的短期经济效益较好,但长期经济效益却相对差,这不仅表现的股价绩效上,也表现的财务绩效方面;对于造成这种现象的原因,本文从过高的控制权转移收益和财务报表的虚假性重组两个方面进行了深入分析。
(3)企业兼并的转轨经济特征研究。从我国企业兼并活动与发达国家企业兼并活动的对比来看,认为我国处于西方第一次兼并浪潮过程中,且具有明显得转轨经济特征,这种特征在兼并时机、动机、经济和社会效益等各个方面都有所体现。
总之,本文从我国企业兼并的实际情况出发,针对转轨经济时期企业兼并活动进行了较为系统的研究,并在此基础上提出了若干意见和建议,这即有利于我们科学地认识和把握当前的企业兼并活动,同时也有利于合理制定相关的政策和措施,具有一定的学术和现实意义。
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A), a form of corporations’restructuring, plays an important role in China’s industries and economic structure adjustment. Since the end of 80s in 20th centuary, M&A in China is growing vigarously with the growth of domestic economy and capital market. As a tool to optimize industrial structure and increase the efficiency of resource alloction, M&A in China has a substansive impact on the sustainable growth for China’s economy.
China’s economy, however, is in its trasition period. The marekt mechanism has not been perfect yet. Thus some specilities lies in: the shortsightedness and speculation in M&A, fake mergers and financial mergers. These do harm to the actural effect on M&A.Based on such considerations, the dissertation use the well prepared sample to study the economic effect of M&A from the viewpoint of industry layer, focusing on the actual results. The sample ranges from 1994 to 2000, totally 1000 or so with the consideration of diffenrent M&A agents, different benchmarks, industries and time range, etc. In terms of time range, width and depth, the dissertation behaves better than before and helps understand better China’s M&A during trasition economy. The main body includes:
a) In Chapter 1, the theoretical and empirical importance of the study have been illustrated, followed by the defination, models and experience of M&A. Based on the actual M&A in China, the rearch questions are proposed.
b) Chapter 2 deals with the current characteristics in China’s M&A with the emphasis on the empirical analysis of micro and macro factors effecting China’s M&A.
c) The core is the economic effects; thus the dissertation arrange 3 chapters coping with this. Stock price performance, financial performance and DEA are three methods utilized respectively in the 3rd, 4th and 5th chapters. Besides the three methods accordingly analyze the result, with the next one follow the one before giving a more convincible answer.
d) The fact is that the performance of China’s M&A is rather underscore. No apparent proof has illustrated the mergers running for industrial effects and the events are increasing. The 6th chapter does empirical analysis of the motivations for M&A and initiates motivation theory of two dimensions, that is to pursue scale of economy and efficient operation. And during transition period, the enterprises will go for restrictive and shortsighted revenue maximized. The analysis of motivation from the perspective of industrial chain is done as well.
e) Chapter 7 finds out the problems and reasons behind the current industrial structure and analyze the necessity of scale of economy and efficient operation. At the same time four case analysis have been used to do some welfare analysis.
The research methods in the dissertation include: empirical analysis, industrial economy, statistics, finance and DEA. The time range is as long as ten years. The innovative contributions:
a) M&A timing. In the macro layer, M&A is positively related to economy and freedom and weak related with stock index. From the industrial view, capital intensive and high Tobin’s industries merge frequently while growth and revenue has no impact on M&A frequency.
b) M&A motivation. Two-dimensional motivations currently are on the one hand, pursuing scale of economy and efficiency is a strategic one; on the other going for restrictive and shortsighted revenue is a tactic one. Because the state-owned enterprises have a good stake in China’s economy, our government should intervene M&A in line with the discipline of market economy and induce the results to the exact purpose.
c) M&A Performance. Under event study, short-term stock price performance is better while long-term one is worse relatively. Horizontal and vertical mergers do well while mixed one bad. Industries with high market concentration, high-techs and international competitiveness do well. And in the industries with high entrance barrier, the merged side performed better. Under financial performance study, the merger year has a good result and falls substantively one year later. The suspicious purpose in the financial report in the merged side appears itself for the quick change and this has been proved by the method of DEA.
d) M&A welfare effect. In terms of small scale and efficiency gap in China’s enterprises, the M&A welfare effect is analyzed as well from the view of asymmetric market structure and industrial chain. Cases are in automobiles, electricity appliances, steel and beer industries.
In all, the innovative contributions in the dissertation:
a) M&A industrial effect analysis. The specific fields are that the motivation with capital intensive and high Tobin’s will result in more frequent mergers; price and financial performance together; industrial chain and asymmetric viewpoint for the M&A welfare effect analysis.
b) Short-term and long-term analysis. M&A performs well in short time, while underperform in future both in stock and financial report. The reason behind is analyzed; over transfer of control and fake report are studied.
c) In combination with the transition economy characteristics. Compared with mature westerns, China is in the wave of the first part of theirs. And these are explicitly unique China’s M&A.
Based on the empirical M&A facts, the systematic analysis is done in China’s M&A during transition economy. Several proposals and policy is well founded proposed. The academic and empirical importance is manifested itself in the dissertation.
引文
① 参见吴晓求等:《公司兼并原理》,2 页,北京,中国人民大学出版社,2002。
① 《产业结构问题研究》,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997 年, 4-5 页
① 参见 肖腾文等,《中国上市公司的回顾与评价》,载《中国证券报》,2000-05-24
① 见《中国兼并评论》,东方高圣投资顾问公司,清华大学出版社,2004,(第一册)
①李健、王小卫编著,《出路—郎咸平引爆“国企改革”大辩论》,经济日报出版社,2004 年 11 月
① 网址:http://www.bd.net.cn/mrjj/text/analysis/ZBA/ZBA51201.TXT
[1] Bengt Holmstrom, Steven N Kaplan. Corporate governance and merger activity in the United States: Making sense of the 1980s and 1990s , The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Spring 2001.Vol.15, Iss. 2;
[2] Weston, J.F., The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large Firms, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953, Chapter 5.
[3] Mcgahan, Anita M., 1999, The Performance of U.S Corpo rations: 1981 - 1994, The Journal of Industrial Economics, December, No. 4, pp. 373-398.
[4] Markham, Jesse W., “Survey of Evidence and Findings on Mergers,” Business Concentration and Price Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955.
[5] Melicher, R.W., J.Ledolter, and L.D’Antonio, “A Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Merger Activity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, August 1983, pp.423-430.
[6] Becketti, S., “Corporate Mergers and the Business Cycle,” Economic Review, 71, Federal Reserve Band of Kansas City, May 1986, pp.13-26.
[7] Golbe, Devra L., and Lawrence J. White, “A Time Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy,” mimeo., Presented at National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Mergers and Acquisitions, February 1987.
[8]“A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy,” Chapter 9 in Alan J.Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp.265-309.
[9] Shughart, W.F., II, and R.O. Tollison, “The Random Character of Merger Activity,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, Winter 1984, pp.500-509.
[10] Mitchell, Mark L., and J.Harold Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics, 41, June 1996, pp.193-229.
[11] Ellert, J.C., “Antitrust Enforcement and the Behavior of Stock Prices,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1975.
[12] Stillman, R.S., “Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, April 1983, pp.225-240.
[13] Comment, Robert, and Gregg A.Jarrell, “Corporate Focus and Stock Returns,” Journal of Finanace Economics, 37, January 1995, pp.67-87.
[14] Berger, Philip G., and Eli Ofek, “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value,” Journal of Finance Economics, 37, January 1995, pp.39-65.
[15] Auerbach,A.J., and D. Reishus, “The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisition,” Chapter 4 in A.J. Auerbach, ed., Mergers & Acquisitions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988b, pp.69-85.
[16] Ginsburg, M.D., “Taxing Corporate Acquisitions,” Tax Law Review, 38, 1983, pp.177-319.
[17] Hayn, C., “Tax Attributes as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions,” Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 1989, pp.727-733.
[18] Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu, and Richard S. Ruback, “Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers?” Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 1992, pp.135-175.
[19] Agrawal Anup, Jeffrey F.Jaffe, and Gershon N.Mandelker, “The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly,” Journal of Finance, 47, September 1992, pp.1605-1621.
[20]Jensen Michael C., “Takeover: Folklore and Science,” Harvard Business Review, November 1984
[21] Rohatyn, Felix G., “Needed: Restraints on the Takeover Mania,” Challenge,29, May-June 1986
[22] Jensen, M.C., and R.S.Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 1983, pp.5-50.
[23] Jarrell, G.A., J.A.Brickley, and J.M.Netter, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980,” Journal of Economics Perspectives, 2, Winter 1988, pp.49-68.
[24] Bradley, M., Anand Desai, and E.Han Kim, “Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 21, 1988, pp.3-40.
[25] Berkovitch, Elazar, and M.P.Narayanan, “Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, September 1993, pp.347-362.
[26]Linn S.C and J.A Switzer, “Are Cash Acquisitions Associated with Better Postcombination Operating Performance than Stock Acquisition?” Journal of Financial Economics 25, 2001
[27]Shelifer A. , and R. Vishny 2002,”Stock Market Driven Acquisitions,” Forthcoming Journal of Financial Economics
[28]John T., Christopher F . , Atreya Chakraborty , Waves and persistence in merger and acquisition activity, Economics Letters 70 (2001) 237–24
[29]Bruner, R.F. 2002, “Doer M&A Pay: A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker”, Working Paper.
[30]Meeks, G. Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the Gains From Merger, Cambridge (1977): Cambridge University Press.
[31]Mueller, D. “Mergers and Market Share,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (No. 2, May 1985): 259-267.
[32]Mueller, D. The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, Cambridge (1980): Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
[33] Ravenscraft, D. and F.M. Scherer. “Life After Takeovers,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 36 (No. 2, December 1987): 147-156.
[34]Ravenscraft, D. and F.M. Scherer. Mergers, Sell-Offs, & Economic Efficiency, Washington D.C. (1987): The Brookings Institute.
[35]Charnes , A. , S. Haag , P. Jaska , and J . Semple , 1992 ,“Sensitivity of Efficiency Classifications in the Additive Model of Data Envelopment Analysis”, Journal of Systems Science 23 ,789 —798。
[36]Grabowski Rangan(1995) ,“The Role of Takeovers in Increasing efficiency.”Managerial and Decision Economics , pp. 61 -74.
[37] Amihud, Y., and B. Lev., “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers,” Bell Journal of Economics. 12(Autumn 1981), 605-617.
[38] Asquith, P.; R. Bruner; and D. Mullins, Jr. “Merger Returns and the Form of Financing,” Proceedings of the Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices 34(No. 1, May 1987):115-146.
[39]Asquith, P.; R. Bruner; and D. Mullins, Jr. “The Gains to Bidding Firms From Merger,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (No. 1, April 1983): 121-139.
[40] Asquith, P.; R. Bruner; and D. Mullins, Jr. “The Gains to Bidding Firms From Merger,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (No. 1, April 1983): 121-139.
[41] Barclay, M.J. and J.B. Warner. "Stealth Trading and Volatility: Which Trades Move Prices?" Journal of Financial Economics, 34, 1993, pp. 281-305.
[42] Berkovitch, Elazar, and M.P. Narayanan, “Motives for takeovers: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Finacial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, September 1983, pp.347-362
[43] Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E.H. Kim. “The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?” Journal of Financial Economics 11(Nos. 1-4, April 1983) 183-206.
[44] Bradley, M.; A. Desai; and E.H. Kim. “Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 21 (No. 1, May 1988): 3-40.
[45] Byrd, J. and K. Hickman. “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence From Tender Offer Bids,” Journal of Financial Economics, 32 (No. 2 October 1992): 195-214.
[46] Caves, R. “Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency,” International Journalof Industrial Organization, 7 (No. 1 March 1989): 151-174.
[47] Chatterjee, R. and G. Meeks. “The Financial Effects of Takeover: Accounting Rates of Return and Accounting Regulation,” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23 (No. 5/6, July 1996): 851-868.
[48] Cotter, J., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner. “Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth during Tender Offers?,” Journal of Financial Economics, 43: 195–218 (1997).
[49] DeLong, G., “Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers,” Journal of Financial Economics, 59 (No. 2, February 2001) 221-252.
[50] Dennis, D. and J. McConnell, “Corporate mergers and security returns,” Journal of Financial Economics, 16 (No. 2, June 1986) 143-187.
[51]Dickerson, A.; H. Gibson; and E. Tsakalotos. “The Impact of Acquisitions on Company Performance: Evidence From a Large Panel of U.K. Firms,” Oxford Economic Papers, 49 (No. 3, July 1997): 344-361.
[52]Dodd, P. and R. Ruback, “Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 5, (No. 3, December 1977): 351-374.
[53] Doeswijk,Ronald Q.and Hemmo S. K. Hemmes, 1999,Mergers and Acquisitions: Reaction of Price and Earnings Estimates―― Synergies are cited by managers, but hard to find. Working Paper.
[54] Eckbo, B.E., “Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics 11(No. 1-4, April 1983) 241-274.
[55]Eckbo, E. and K. Thorburn. “Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35 (No. 1, March 2000): 1-25.
[56]Franks, J.; R. Harris; and S. Titman. “The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 29 (No. 1, March 1991): 81-96.
[57] Gaughan, P.A., 1994. Readings in Mergers and Acquisitions . Basil Blackwell.
[58]Roll Richard, “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”, Journal of Business, 59, April 1986, 197-216
[59]Schwert, G.W. “Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions,” Journal of Financial Economics, 41 (No. 2, June 1996): 153-162.
[60] Servaes, H. “Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers,” Journal of Finance, 46 (No. 1, March 1991): 409-419.
[61]Seth, A. “Sources of Value Creation in Acquisitions: An Empirical Investigation,” Strategic Management Journal, 11 (No. 6, 1990): 431-446.
[62]Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. “Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process,” Journal of Economic
[63] Shleifer, A., and L.H. Summers, “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,” Chapter2 in A.J. Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
[64]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, “Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments.” Journal of Financial Economics, 25 (November 1989), 123-139
[65] Sirower, M.L. and S.F. O’Byrne. "The Measurement of Post-Acquisition Performance: Toward a Value-Based Benchmarking Methodology." Journal of Corporate Finance, 11-2, 1998, pp. 107-121.
[66] Sirower, M.L.. The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition Game. New York: Free Press, 1997.
[67] Smith, R. and J. Kim. “The Combined Effects of Free Cash Flow and Financial Slack on Bidder and Target Stock Returns,” Journal of Business, 67 (No. 2, April 1994): 281-310.
[68]Varaiya N. and K. Ferris. “Overpaying in Corporate Takeover: The Winner’s Curse,” Financial Analysts Journal, 43 (No. 3, May/June 1987): 64-70.
[69] Varaiya, N., “A Test of Roll’s Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers,” Working Paper, Dallas TX: Southern Methodist University, School of Business, 1985.
[70]Walker, M. , “Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-firm Shareholder Wealth,” Financial Management, 29(No. 1, Spring 2000) 53-66.
[71]Wier, P. “The Costs of Antimerger Lawsuits: Evidence from the Stock Market” Journal of Financial Economics 11(Nos. 1-4, April 1983): 207-225.
[72] 弗雷德.威斯通《接管、重组与公司治理》,东北财经大学出版社,2000 年 10 月
[73] M.E.波特,《多样化经营:没有观念的公司》《哈佛经理》,1987.4
[74] 郑英隆,《国外企业兼并和分解交织》《经济管理》,1996.12
[75] 毛定祥,《上市公司兼并规律的实证分析》运筹与管理, 2002 年 02 期
[76]翁轶丛,陈宏民等,《基于网络外部性的企业 R&D 行为与兼并研究》系统工程 2002 年 01 期
[77] 冯益湘,《上市公司重组绩效的实证研究》湖南商学院学报,2001 年 03 期
[78]冯益湘,《上市公司重组方式与业绩的实证研究》湖南商学院学报,2002 年 03 期
[79]袁德利,《上市公司资产重组效益的实证研究》经济师,2002 年 06 期
[80]李东,袁萍,上市公司资产重组绩效的实证分析,江苏统计,2001,4
[81]蔡运海《我国上市公司资产重组效应的实证分析》西安金融 1999 年 10 期
[82]王惠娟《资产重组绩效的实证研究》南方金融,2001 年 04 期
[83]陈信元,张田余《资产重组的市场反应—1997 年沪市资产重组实证分析》经济研究 1999年
[84] 谭志浩,蒋美云,《股价对重组信息反应机制的实证分析》浙江统计 1998 年 09 期
[85]陆国庆,《中国上市公司资产重组的产业效应分析——对 1999 年度沪市的实证分析》经济科学 2001 年 01 期
[86]余终隐:《“保 T 派”十宗罪来源》21 世纪经济报道 2003 年 02 月 20 日。
[87]张新,《并购重组是否创造价值》,上证联合研究课题出版,2003,网站 www.zhangxin.org
[88]管强,《关联交易内幕》,中国工商联合出版社,2003 年 1 月
[89] 原红旗、吴星宇,资产重组对财务业绩影响的实证研究,上海证券报,1998,8,26
[90]万潮领、储诚忠、李翔、袁国良,《重组之花结出什么果——沪深股票市场公司重组绩效实证研究》,《上海证券报》,2001年01月09日
[91]冯根福、吴林江,《我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究》,《国研信息》,2001年12月
[92]郭来生,《1998年沪深上市公司资产重组绩效实证分析》,《大鹏证券研究》,1999年11月
[93]檀向球,《沪市上市公司资产重组绩效实证研究》,《中国证券报》,1998年9月28日
[94]林炳文,银行并购与效率之分析:SFC 与 DEA 方法比较,产业经济研究,2004 年第一期 [95 ]姚淑娟. 台湾银行业水平并购的效率效果[D] . 朝阳科技大学财务金融研究所硕士论,2001. [96 ]李心丹 朱洪亮 张 兵等,基于DEA 的上市公司并购效率研究,经济研究,2003年第10期 [97 ]朱宝宪、王怡凯,2002 :《1998 年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析》, 《经济研究》第11 期。
[98] 郑京海、刘小玄、Arne Bigsten : ,2002《1980 —1994 期间中国国有企业的效率、技术进步和最佳实践》,《经济学》(季刊) 第1 卷第3期。
[99] 魏权龄,评价相对有效性的 DEA 方法,中国人民大学出版社,1987
[100] 魏后凯 著,《市场竞争.经济绩效与产业集中》,[M],经济管理出版社,北京,2003
[101] 小宫隆太郎、奥野正宽、铃村兴太郎编,《日本的产业政策》[M],国际文化出版公司,1988
[102] 魏后凯,《中国制造业集中与市场结构分析》[J],管理世界,2002 年第 4 期
[103] 中国企业评价协会、管理世界中国企业评价中心,《1995 年度中国 500 家最大工业企业及行业 50 家评价》[J],管理世界,1995 年 5 期
[104] 殷醒民,《中国工业增长模式的实证研究》[M],上海:立信会计出版社,1996
[105] 殷醒民,《企业购并的金融经济学解释》,上海财经大学出版社,1999 [106 东方高圣投资顾问公司编著,《中国并购评论》[M],清华大学出版社,北京,2003 年
[107]弗雷德.威斯通《接管、重组与公司治理》 [M] ,东北财经大学出版社,2000 年 10 月
[108]潘晓军,陈宏民,《网络企业纵向并购的模型分析》,预测 2002 年 01 期
[109]翁轶丛,陈宏民,《基于网络外部性的技术标准控制策略与企业兼并》系统工程理论方法应用 2001 年 03 期
[110]张军,陈宏民,《开放经济下的企业兼并与政府政策分析》,湖南经济管理干部学院学报 1999 年 01 期
[111]陈宏民,《开放经济环境下企业兼并引起的利益冲突》,上海交通大学学报 1998 年 03 期
[112]张地生,陈宏民等,《开放经济环境中的横向兼并》 上海交通大学学报 2001 年 06 期
[113]邓荣霖,郭武文,《企业兼并中的管理问题》南开管理评论 1999 年 04 期
[114]徐学民,汪涛,徐金发,《企业兼并整合管理的实证研究及启示——评 GECapital 成功的兼并整合管理》中国软科学 2000 年 03 期
[115]高见,陈韵玮,《中国证券市场资产重组效应分析》,经济科学,2000 年第 1 期
[116]李善民,陈玉罡,《上市公司兼并收购的财富效应》,经济研究,2002 年 11 期
[117]梁国勇,企业购并动机和购并行为研究,经济研究,No.8,1997,pp.40-46.
[118]张军,需求、规模效应与中国国有工业的亏损:一个产业组织的方法,经济研究,No.6,1998,pp.11-19.
[119]泰勒尔著,张维迎等译,产业组织理论,中国人民大学出版社,1997 年
[120]李健、王小卫编著,《出路—郎咸平引爆“国企改革”大辩论》,经济日报出版社,2004.11
[121]肖腾文等,《中国上市公司的回顾与评价》,载《中国证券报》,2000-05-24
[122]《中国兼并评论》,东方高圣投资顾问公司,清华大学出版社,2004,(第一册)
[123]Audretsch, D.B. The Determinants of Conglomerate Mergers, American Economist 33,52-60,1989
[124]Christensen,H.K. and Montgomery,C.A. Corpotate Economic performance:Diversification Strategy versus Market Structure, Strategic Management Journal 2, 327-343,1981
[125]Gregor A., Mark M., and Erik S.,New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Volume 15,,Spring 2001
[126]Hunt,J.W, Changing Pattern of Acquisition Behaviuor in Takeovers and the Consequences for Acquisition Process, Strategic Management Journal 11,69-77,1990
[127]Melicher, R.W., J.Ledolter, and L.D’Antonio, “A Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Merger Activity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, August 1983, pp.423-430.
[128]Trautwein,F. Mergers Motives and Merger prescriptions, Strategic Management Journal 11,283-296,1990
[129]Yagil,J. Mergers and Macro-economic Factors, Review of Financial Economics 5,181-190,1996
[130]G.J.施蒂格勒著,潘振明译,产业组织与政府管制,上海人民出版社,1996 年
[131]埃尔赫南.赫尔普曼,保罗.R.克鲁格曼著,市场结构和对外贸易――报酬递增、不完全竞争和国际贸易,上海三联书店,1993 年
[132]迈克尔.波特著,陈小悦译,竞争战略,华夏出版社,1997 年 迈克尔.波特著,陈小悦译,竞争优势,华夏出版社,1997 年
[133]丹尼斯.卡尔顿等著,黄亚钧等译,现代产业组织(上、下),上海人民出版社, 1998 年
[134]张维迎著,博弈论与信息经济学,上海人民出版社,三联书店,1996 年
[135]佟福全著,第五次浪潮:企业并购与产权重组,中国民航出版社,1999 年
[136]郭永清主编,企业兼并与收购实务,东北财经大学出版社,1998 年
[137]沈志渔,国外企业的并购对我国的启示,中国工业经济,1997 年第 9 期
[138]王强,王浣尘,陈宏民,开放经济下企业间的横向兼并,系统工程理论方法应用,1997,6(4):10-14
[139]杨小勇,我国企业资产重组成功率低的原因及对策,贵州民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2003,5,p94-96
[140]李善民,朱滔,陈玉罡等,兼并公司与目标公司配对组合绩效的实证分析,经济研究,2004,6,p85-90
[141]吴冬梅,中西企业兼并动机理论比较研究,当代财经,1998,9,p47-52
[142]王志坚,李波,企业兼并动机分析,企业经济,2001,9,p49-51
[143]王春,齐艳秋,关于企业兼并动机的理论研究,当代财经,2001,7,p40-44
[144]张军、陈宏民, 企业兼并与产业重组策略, 系统工程学报,14:2(1999),pp152-155
[145]张军、陈宏民, 企业兼并与产品定价策略, 系统工程理论与实践,Vol 20,No4,pp42-47
[146]贾红睿、何新宇、陈宏民, 企业兼并理论研究进展,《预测》,2000 年第一期
[147]贾红睿、张地生、陈宏民, 差异化产品厂商战略兼并行为研究,《 系统工程理论方法应用》,2000(1)
[148]贾红睿、陈宏民、张地生,企业横向兼并与 WTO, Systems Engineering_ Systems Science and Complexity Research, Research Information Ltd, 2000
[149]张地生、陈宏民、贾红睿, 开放经济环境中的横向兼并, 上海交通大学学报,35:6(2001),909-913
[150]张地生,陈宏民,横向兼并动机分析, 管理工程学报,15:4(2001)
[151]张地生,陈宏民, 同质产品市场的社会福利计量方法,系统工程,19:1(2001),34-38
[152]翁轶丛、陈宏民, 基于网络外部性的企业研发行为与兼并研究, 系统工程,20:1(2002),51-55
[153]翁轶丛、陈宏民, 网络效应下的企业横向兼并与价格竞争, 上海交通大学学报,36:4(2002),574-577
[154]Anming Zhang Hongmin Chen, Horizontal Mergers in a Liberalizing World Economy, Pacific Economic Review, Vol.7 No.2, June 2002
① 《产业结构问题研究》,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997 年, 4-5 页
① 参见 肖腾文等,《中国上市公司的回顾与评价》,载《中国证券报》,2000-05-24
① 见《中国兼并评论》,东方高圣投资顾问公司,清华大学出版社,2004,(第一册)
①李健、王小卫编著,《出路—郎咸平引爆“国企改革”大辩论》,经济日报出版社,2004 年 11 月
① 网址:http://www.bd.net.cn/mrjj/text/analysis/ZBA/ZBA51201.TXT
[1] Bengt Holmstrom, Steven N Kaplan. Corporate governance and merger activity in the United States: Making sense of the 1980s and 1990s , The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Spring 2001.Vol.15, Iss. 2;
[2] Weston, J.F., The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large Firms, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953, Chapter 5.
[3] Mcgahan, Anita M., 1999, The Performance of U.S Corpo rations: 1981 - 1994, The Journal of Industrial Economics, December, No. 4, pp. 373-398.
[4] Markham, Jesse W., “Survey of Evidence and Findings on Mergers,” Business Concentration and Price Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955.
[5] Melicher, R.W., J.Ledolter, and L.D’Antonio, “A Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Merger Activity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, August 1983, pp.423-430.
[6] Becketti, S., “Corporate Mergers and the Business Cycle,” Economic Review, 71, Federal Reserve Band of Kansas City, May 1986, pp.13-26.
[7] Golbe, Devra L., and Lawrence J. White, “A Time Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy,” mimeo., Presented at National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Mergers and Acquisitions, February 1987.
[8]“A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy,” Chapter 9 in Alan J.Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp.265-309.
[9] Shughart, W.F., II, and R.O. Tollison, “The Random Character of Merger Activity,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, Winter 1984, pp.500-509.
[10] Mitchell, Mark L., and J.Harold Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics, 41, June 1996, pp.193-229.
[11] Ellert, J.C., “Antitrust Enforcement and the Behavior of Stock Prices,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1975.
[12] Stillman, R.S., “Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, April 1983, pp.225-240.
[13] Comment, Robert, and Gregg A.Jarrell, “Corporate Focus and Stock Returns,” Journal of Finanace Economics, 37, January 1995, pp.67-87.
[14] Berger, Philip G., and Eli Ofek, “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value,” Journal of Finance Economics, 37, January 1995, pp.39-65.
[15] Auerbach,A.J., and D. Reishus, “The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisition,” Chapter 4 in A.J. Auerbach, ed., Mergers & Acquisitions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988b, pp.69-85.
[16] Ginsburg, M.D., “Taxing Corporate Acquisitions,” Tax Law Review, 38, 1983, pp.177-319.
[17] Hayn, C., “Tax Attributes as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions,” Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 1989, pp.727-733.
[18] Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu, and Richard S. Ruback, “Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers?” Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 1992, pp.135-175.
[19] Agrawal Anup, Jeffrey F.Jaffe, and Gershon N.Mandelker, “The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly,” Journal of Finance, 47, September 1992, pp.1605-1621.
[20]Jensen Michael C., “Takeover: Folklore and Science,” Harvard Business Review, November 1984
[21] Rohatyn, Felix G., “Needed: Restraints on the Takeover Mania,” Challenge,29, May-June 1986
[22] Jensen, M.C., and R.S.Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 1983, pp.5-50.
[23] Jarrell, G.A., J.A.Brickley, and J.M.Netter, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980,” Journal of Economics Perspectives, 2, Winter 1988, pp.49-68.
[24] Bradley, M., Anand Desai, and E.Han Kim, “Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 21, 1988, pp.3-40.
[25] Berkovitch, Elazar, and M.P.Narayanan, “Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, September 1993, pp.347-362.
[26]Linn S.C and J.A Switzer, “Are Cash Acquisitions Associated with Better Postcombination Operating Performance than Stock Acquisition?” Journal of Financial Economics 25, 2001
[27]Shelifer A. , and R. Vishny 2002,”Stock Market Driven Acquisitions,” Forthcoming Journal of Financial Economics
[28]John T., Christopher F . , Atreya Chakraborty , Waves and persistence in merger and acquisition activity, Economics Letters 70 (2001) 237–24
[29]Bruner, R.F. 2002, “Doer M&A Pay: A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker”, Working Paper.
[30]Meeks, G. Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the Gains From Merger, Cambridge (1977): Cambridge University Press.
[31]Mueller, D. “Mergers and Market Share,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (No. 2, May 1985): 259-267.
[32]Mueller, D. The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, Cambridge (1980): Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
[33] Ravenscraft, D. and F.M. Scherer. “Life After Takeovers,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 36 (No. 2, December 1987): 147-156.
[34]Ravenscraft, D. and F.M. Scherer. Mergers, Sell-Offs, & Economic Efficiency, Washington D.C. (1987): The Brookings Institute.
[35]Charnes , A. , S. Haag , P. Jaska , and J . Semple , 1992 ,“Sensitivity of Efficiency Classifications in the Additive Model of Data Envelopment Analysis”, Journal of Systems Science 23 ,789 —798。
[36]Grabowski Rangan(1995) ,“The Role of Takeovers in Increasing efficiency.”Managerial and Decision Economics , pp. 61 -74.
[37] Amihud, Y., and B. Lev., “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers,” Bell Journal of Economics. 12(Autumn 1981), 605-617.
[38] Asquith, P.; R. Bruner; and D. Mullins, Jr. “Merger Returns and the Form of Financing,” Proceedings of the Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices 34(No. 1, May 1987):115-146.
[39]Asquith, P.; R. Bruner; and D. Mullins, Jr. “The Gains to Bidding Firms From Merger,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (No. 1, April 1983): 121-139.
[40] Asquith, P.; R. Bruner; and D. Mullins, Jr. “The Gains to Bidding Firms From Merger,” Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (No. 1, April 1983): 121-139.
[41] Barclay, M.J. and J.B. Warner. "Stealth Trading and Volatility: Which Trades Move Prices?" Journal of Financial Economics, 34, 1993, pp. 281-305.
[42] Berkovitch, Elazar, and M.P. Narayanan, “Motives for takeovers: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Finacial and Quantitative Analysis, 28, September 1983, pp.347-362
[43] Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E.H. Kim. “The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy?” Journal of Financial Economics 11(Nos. 1-4, April 1983) 183-206.
[44] Bradley, M.; A. Desai; and E.H. Kim. “Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 21 (No. 1, May 1988): 3-40.
[45] Byrd, J. and K. Hickman. “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence From Tender Offer Bids,” Journal of Financial Economics, 32 (No. 2 October 1992): 195-214.
[46] Caves, R. “Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency,” International Journalof Industrial Organization, 7 (No. 1 March 1989): 151-174.
[47] Chatterjee, R. and G. Meeks. “The Financial Effects of Takeover: Accounting Rates of Return and Accounting Regulation,” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23 (No. 5/6, July 1996): 851-868.
[48] Cotter, J., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner. “Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth during Tender Offers?,” Journal of Financial Economics, 43: 195–218 (1997).
[49] DeLong, G., “Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers,” Journal of Financial Economics, 59 (No. 2, February 2001) 221-252.
[50] Dennis, D. and J. McConnell, “Corporate mergers and security returns,” Journal of Financial Economics, 16 (No. 2, June 1986) 143-187.
[51]Dickerson, A.; H. Gibson; and E. Tsakalotos. “The Impact of Acquisitions on Company Performance: Evidence From a Large Panel of U.K. Firms,” Oxford Economic Papers, 49 (No. 3, July 1997): 344-361.
[52]Dodd, P. and R. Ruback, “Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 5, (No. 3, December 1977): 351-374.
[53] Doeswijk,Ronald Q.and Hemmo S. K. Hemmes, 1999,Mergers and Acquisitions: Reaction of Price and Earnings Estimates―― Synergies are cited by managers, but hard to find. Working Paper.
[54] Eckbo, B.E., “Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics 11(No. 1-4, April 1983) 241-274.
[55]Eckbo, E. and K. Thorburn. “Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35 (No. 1, March 2000): 1-25.
[56]Franks, J.; R. Harris; and S. Titman. “The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 29 (No. 1, March 1991): 81-96.
[57] Gaughan, P.A., 1994. Readings in Mergers and Acquisitions . Basil Blackwell.
[58]Roll Richard, “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”, Journal of Business, 59, April 1986, 197-216
[59]Schwert, G.W. “Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions,” Journal of Financial Economics, 41 (No. 2, June 1996): 153-162.
[60] Servaes, H. “Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers,” Journal of Finance, 46 (No. 1, March 1991): 409-419.
[61]Seth, A. “Sources of Value Creation in Acquisitions: An Empirical Investigation,” Strategic Management Journal, 11 (No. 6, 1990): 431-446.
[62]Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny. “Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process,” Journal of Economic
[63] Shleifer, A., and L.H. Summers, “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,” Chapter2 in A.J. Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
[64]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, “Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments.” Journal of Financial Economics, 25 (November 1989), 123-139
[65] Sirower, M.L. and S.F. O’Byrne. "The Measurement of Post-Acquisition Performance: Toward a Value-Based Benchmarking Methodology." Journal of Corporate Finance, 11-2, 1998, pp. 107-121.
[66] Sirower, M.L.. The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition Game. New York: Free Press, 1997.
[67] Smith, R. and J. Kim. “The Combined Effects of Free Cash Flow and Financial Slack on Bidder and Target Stock Returns,” Journal of Business, 67 (No. 2, April 1994): 281-310.
[68]Varaiya N. and K. Ferris. “Overpaying in Corporate Takeover: The Winner’s Curse,” Financial Analysts Journal, 43 (No. 3, May/June 1987): 64-70.
[69] Varaiya, N., “A Test of Roll’s Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers,” Working Paper, Dallas TX: Southern Methodist University, School of Business, 1985.
[70]Walker, M. , “Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-firm Shareholder Wealth,” Financial Management, 29(No. 1, Spring 2000) 53-66.
[71]Wier, P. “The Costs of Antimerger Lawsuits: Evidence from the Stock Market” Journal of Financial Economics 11(Nos. 1-4, April 1983): 207-225.
[72] 弗雷德.威斯通《接管、重组与公司治理》,东北财经大学出版社,2000 年 10 月
[73] M.E.波特,《多样化经营:没有观念的公司》《哈佛经理》,1987.4
[74] 郑英隆,《国外企业兼并和分解交织》《经济管理》,1996.12
[75] 毛定祥,《上市公司兼并规律的实证分析》运筹与管理, 2002 年 02 期
[76]翁轶丛,陈宏民等,《基于网络外部性的企业 R&D 行为与兼并研究》系统工程 2002 年 01 期
[77] 冯益湘,《上市公司重组绩效的实证研究》湖南商学院学报,2001 年 03 期
[78]冯益湘,《上市公司重组方式与业绩的实证研究》湖南商学院学报,2002 年 03 期
[79]袁德利,《上市公司资产重组效益的实证研究》经济师,2002 年 06 期
[80]李东,袁萍,上市公司资产重组绩效的实证分析,江苏统计,2001,4
[81]蔡运海《我国上市公司资产重组效应的实证分析》西安金融 1999 年 10 期
[82]王惠娟《资产重组绩效的实证研究》南方金融,2001 年 04 期
[83]陈信元,张田余《资产重组的市场反应—1997 年沪市资产重组实证分析》经济研究 1999年
[84] 谭志浩,蒋美云,《股价对重组信息反应机制的实证分析》浙江统计 1998 年 09 期
[85]陆国庆,《中国上市公司资产重组的产业效应分析——对 1999 年度沪市的实证分析》经济科学 2001 年 01 期
[86]余终隐:《“保 T 派”十宗罪来源》21 世纪经济报道 2003 年 02 月 20 日。
[87]张新,《并购重组是否创造价值》,上证联合研究课题出版,2003,网站 www.zhangxin.org
[88]管强,《关联交易内幕》,中国工商联合出版社,2003 年 1 月
[89] 原红旗、吴星宇,资产重组对财务业绩影响的实证研究,上海证券报,1998,8,26
[90]万潮领、储诚忠、李翔、袁国良,《重组之花结出什么果——沪深股票市场公司重组绩效实证研究》,《上海证券报》,2001年01月09日
[91]冯根福、吴林江,《我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究》,《国研信息》,2001年12月
[92]郭来生,《1998年沪深上市公司资产重组绩效实证分析》,《大鹏证券研究》,1999年11月
[93]檀向球,《沪市上市公司资产重组绩效实证研究》,《中国证券报》,1998年9月28日
[94]林炳文,银行并购与效率之分析:SFC 与 DEA 方法比较,产业经济研究,2004 年第一期 [95 ]姚淑娟. 台湾银行业水平并购的效率效果[D] . 朝阳科技大学财务金融研究所硕士论,2001. [96 ]李心丹 朱洪亮 张 兵等,基于DEA 的上市公司并购效率研究,经济研究,2003年第10期 [97 ]朱宝宪、王怡凯,2002 :《1998 年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析》, 《经济研究》第11 期。
[98] 郑京海、刘小玄、Arne Bigsten : ,2002《1980 —1994 期间中国国有企业的效率、技术进步和最佳实践》,《经济学》(季刊) 第1 卷第3期。
[99] 魏权龄,评价相对有效性的 DEA 方法,中国人民大学出版社,1987
[100] 魏后凯 著,《市场竞争.经济绩效与产业集中》,[M],经济管理出版社,北京,2003
[101] 小宫隆太郎、奥野正宽、铃村兴太郎编,《日本的产业政策》[M],国际文化出版公司,1988
[102] 魏后凯,《中国制造业集中与市场结构分析》[J],管理世界,2002 年第 4 期
[103] 中国企业评价协会、管理世界中国企业评价中心,《1995 年度中国 500 家最大工业企业及行业 50 家评价》[J],管理世界,1995 年 5 期
[104] 殷醒民,《中国工业增长模式的实证研究》[M],上海:立信会计出版社,1996
[105] 殷醒民,《企业购并的金融经济学解释》,上海财经大学出版社,1999 [106 东方高圣投资顾问公司编著,《中国并购评论》[M],清华大学出版社,北京,2003 年
[107]弗雷德.威斯通《接管、重组与公司治理》 [M] ,东北财经大学出版社,2000 年 10 月
[108]潘晓军,陈宏民,《网络企业纵向并购的模型分析》,预测 2002 年 01 期
[109]翁轶丛,陈宏民,《基于网络外部性的技术标准控制策略与企业兼并》系统工程理论方法应用 2001 年 03 期
[110]张军,陈宏民,《开放经济下的企业兼并与政府政策分析》,湖南经济管理干部学院学报 1999 年 01 期
[111]陈宏民,《开放经济环境下企业兼并引起的利益冲突》,上海交通大学学报 1998 年 03 期
[112]张地生,陈宏民等,《开放经济环境中的横向兼并》 上海交通大学学报 2001 年 06 期
[113]邓荣霖,郭武文,《企业兼并中的管理问题》南开管理评论 1999 年 04 期
[114]徐学民,汪涛,徐金发,《企业兼并整合管理的实证研究及启示——评 GECapital 成功的兼并整合管理》中国软科学 2000 年 03 期
[115]高见,陈韵玮,《中国证券市场资产重组效应分析》,经济科学,2000 年第 1 期
[116]李善民,陈玉罡,《上市公司兼并收购的财富效应》,经济研究,2002 年 11 期
[117]梁国勇,企业购并动机和购并行为研究,经济研究,No.8,1997,pp.40-46.
[118]张军,需求、规模效应与中国国有工业的亏损:一个产业组织的方法,经济研究,No.6,1998,pp.11-19.
[119]泰勒尔著,张维迎等译,产业组织理论,中国人民大学出版社,1997 年
[120]李健、王小卫编著,《出路—郎咸平引爆“国企改革”大辩论》,经济日报出版社,2004.11
[121]肖腾文等,《中国上市公司的回顾与评价》,载《中国证券报》,2000-05-24
[122]《中国兼并评论》,东方高圣投资顾问公司,清华大学出版社,2004,(第一册)
[123]Audretsch, D.B. The Determinants of Conglomerate Mergers, American Economist 33,52-60,1989
[124]Christensen,H.K. and Montgomery,C.A. Corpotate Economic performance:Diversification Strategy versus Market Structure, Strategic Management Journal 2, 327-343,1981
[125]Gregor A., Mark M., and Erik S.,New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Volume 15,,Spring 2001
[126]Hunt,J.W, Changing Pattern of Acquisition Behaviuor in Takeovers and the Consequences for Acquisition Process, Strategic Management Journal 11,69-77,1990
[127]Melicher, R.W., J.Ledolter, and L.D’Antonio, “A Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Merger Activity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, August 1983, pp.423-430.
[128]Trautwein,F. Mergers Motives and Merger prescriptions, Strategic Management Journal 11,283-296,1990
[129]Yagil,J. Mergers and Macro-economic Factors, Review of Financial Economics 5,181-190,1996
[130]G.J.施蒂格勒著,潘振明译,产业组织与政府管制,上海人民出版社,1996 年
[131]埃尔赫南.赫尔普曼,保罗.R.克鲁格曼著,市场结构和对外贸易――报酬递增、不完全竞争和国际贸易,上海三联书店,1993 年
[132]迈克尔.波特著,陈小悦译,竞争战略,华夏出版社,1997 年 迈克尔.波特著,陈小悦译,竞争优势,华夏出版社,1997 年
[133]丹尼斯.卡尔顿等著,黄亚钧等译,现代产业组织(上、下),上海人民出版社, 1998 年
[134]张维迎著,博弈论与信息经济学,上海人民出版社,三联书店,1996 年
[135]佟福全著,第五次浪潮:企业并购与产权重组,中国民航出版社,1999 年
[136]郭永清主编,企业兼并与收购实务,东北财经大学出版社,1998 年
[137]沈志渔,国外企业的并购对我国的启示,中国工业经济,1997 年第 9 期
[138]王强,王浣尘,陈宏民,开放经济下企业间的横向兼并,系统工程理论方法应用,1997,6(4):10-14
[139]杨小勇,我国企业资产重组成功率低的原因及对策,贵州民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2003,5,p94-96
[140]李善民,朱滔,陈玉罡等,兼并公司与目标公司配对组合绩效的实证分析,经济研究,2004,6,p85-90
[141]吴冬梅,中西企业兼并动机理论比较研究,当代财经,1998,9,p47-52
[142]王志坚,李波,企业兼并动机分析,企业经济,2001,9,p49-51
[143]王春,齐艳秋,关于企业兼并动机的理论研究,当代财经,2001,7,p40-44
[144]张军、陈宏民, 企业兼并与产业重组策略, 系统工程学报,14:2(1999),pp152-155
[145]张军、陈宏民, 企业兼并与产品定价策略, 系统工程理论与实践,Vol 20,No4,pp42-47
[146]贾红睿、何新宇、陈宏民, 企业兼并理论研究进展,《预测》,2000 年第一期
[147]贾红睿、张地生、陈宏民, 差异化产品厂商战略兼并行为研究,《 系统工程理论方法应用》,2000(1)
[148]贾红睿、陈宏民、张地生,企业横向兼并与 WTO, Systems Engineering_ Systems Science and Complexity Research, Research Information Ltd, 2000
[149]张地生、陈宏民、贾红睿, 开放经济环境中的横向兼并, 上海交通大学学报,35:6(2001),909-913
[150]张地生,陈宏民,横向兼并动机分析, 管理工程学报,15:4(2001)
[151]张地生,陈宏民, 同质产品市场的社会福利计量方法,系统工程,19:1(2001),34-38
[152]翁轶丛、陈宏民, 基于网络外部性的企业研发行为与兼并研究, 系统工程,20:1(2002),51-55
[153]翁轶丛、陈宏民, 网络效应下的企业横向兼并与价格竞争, 上海交通大学学报,36:4(2002),574-577
[154]Anming Zhang Hongmin Chen, Horizontal Mergers in a Liberalizing World Economy, Pacific Economic Review, Vol.7 No.2, June 2002