非政府组织参与WTO争端解决机制的法律问题研究
摘要
WTO争端解决机制是在GATT争端解决机制的基础上建立和发展起来的,它的建立为快速解决WTO成员国间的贸易争端提供了一条行之有效的准司法途径。WTO成员方一直是WTO争端解决机制的参与主体,非成员方通常被排斥在外。非政府组织的兴起给传统的国际法律秩序带来了重要影响和挑战,许多非政府组织不断提出以“法庭之友”的身份参与争端解决程序,提交“法庭之友”意见书,试图影响专家组和上诉机构的裁决。目前对于专家组和上诉机构能否接受或考虑非政府组织以“法庭之友”身份提交的书面陈述在实践方面和理论方面均有一定的分歧。因此研究非政府组织参与WTO争端解决机制的价值、参与的方式等问题,具有一定的理论意义和实践意义。
本文采用了文献分析、实证分析、价值分析、比较分析等方法,对非政府组织参与WTO争端解决机制的价值、方式及制度障碍等问题进行了系统性研究和全面论述。首先,对非政府组织和“法庭之友”进行了界定。然后,通过对非政府组织参与WTO争端解决的实证分析和价值分析,表明非政府组织在WTO争端解决中的地位逐步提升。非政府组织的参与能够充分表达公众意见,缓解信息不对称,有助于提高专家组和上诉机构的办案质量和效率,对实现全球经济法治和宪政有重要作用。在此基础上,对非政府组织的参与方式展开研究,非政府组织以诉讼主体的身份直接参与WTO争端机制解决存在理论和制度上的障碍,存在一定的不合理性,而以“法庭之友”的身份参与是比较合理的,但专家组和上诉机构接受未经请求的“法庭之友”意见书不具备合法性,缺乏充分的法理依据;上诉机构解释权的行使造成了WTO成员方实质性利益的损害,程序缺乏正当性。非政府组织以“法庭之友”的身份参与WTO争端解决机制应在维护WTO成员国的主权与争端解决机构的司法独立之间寻求平衡,即WTO各成员方通过谈判的方式协调各方的立场,对DSU规则进行修订,具体的程序性规则则由争端解决机构或上诉机构进行制定。
WTO dispute settlement mechanism is built and developed on the basis of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism ,which offers an effective way for rapidly selltling the trade dispute occuring between WTO members. WTO members are always the main body in WTO dispute settlement mechanism and non-members are usually excluded. The rise of NGOs brings important influence and challenge to international legal order. Many NGOs continue to participate in the dispute settlement process as amicus curiae, and submitted amicus curiae briets, trying to influence the judges of WTO Dispute Settle Body. At present opinions differ considerably in practice and in theory as to whether the Panel and the Appellate Body can accept or consider amicus curiae briets. Therefore,it is significant to research on the value of non-governmental organizations’participating in the dispute settlement process and the form from both theory and practice.
This thesis makes a systematic and comprehensive study of the values、forms and system obstacles of NGOs’participating in WTO disputes settlement by the methods as literature analysis, empirical analysis, value analysis and comparative analysis. Firstly, NGOs and“amicus curiae”are defined. Then, It shows that the NGOs’legal status upgrades gradually by analysing the practice and the values of NGOs’participating in WTO disputes settlement. NGOs’participating in can express the public opinions sufficiently and resolves information asymmetry, helping improve the quality of the judges. It plays an important role in realizing the whole world economy rule by law and the constitution. Based on that, research on the forms of NGOs’participating in is carried out . The analysis takes the view that it is not reasonable that NGOs participates in WTO dispute settlement system as lawsuit main body because there are some theoretical obstacles and system obstacles. It is reasonable that NGOs participates in WTO dispute settlement system as amicus curiae, but, comes the conclusion that the actions of the Panel and the Appellate Body have no legal ground in the WTO rule system, and the interpretation of the Appellate Body lacks of legitimacy and procedural due process. WTO dispute settlement mechanism must seek the balance between the sovereignty of WTO members and judicial independent. The amendment of DSU should be done by negotiations among WTO members, and the Specific procedural rules can be work out by WTO Dispute settlement Body or the Appellate Body.
本文采用了文献分析、实证分析、价值分析、比较分析等方法,对非政府组织参与WTO争端解决机制的价值、方式及制度障碍等问题进行了系统性研究和全面论述。首先,对非政府组织和“法庭之友”进行了界定。然后,通过对非政府组织参与WTO争端解决的实证分析和价值分析,表明非政府组织在WTO争端解决中的地位逐步提升。非政府组织的参与能够充分表达公众意见,缓解信息不对称,有助于提高专家组和上诉机构的办案质量和效率,对实现全球经济法治和宪政有重要作用。在此基础上,对非政府组织的参与方式展开研究,非政府组织以诉讼主体的身份直接参与WTO争端机制解决存在理论和制度上的障碍,存在一定的不合理性,而以“法庭之友”的身份参与是比较合理的,但专家组和上诉机构接受未经请求的“法庭之友”意见书不具备合法性,缺乏充分的法理依据;上诉机构解释权的行使造成了WTO成员方实质性利益的损害,程序缺乏正当性。非政府组织以“法庭之友”的身份参与WTO争端解决机制应在维护WTO成员国的主权与争端解决机构的司法独立之间寻求平衡,即WTO各成员方通过谈判的方式协调各方的立场,对DSU规则进行修订,具体的程序性规则则由争端解决机构或上诉机构进行制定。
WTO dispute settlement mechanism is built and developed on the basis of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism ,which offers an effective way for rapidly selltling the trade dispute occuring between WTO members. WTO members are always the main body in WTO dispute settlement mechanism and non-members are usually excluded. The rise of NGOs brings important influence and challenge to international legal order. Many NGOs continue to participate in the dispute settlement process as amicus curiae, and submitted amicus curiae briets, trying to influence the judges of WTO Dispute Settle Body. At present opinions differ considerably in practice and in theory as to whether the Panel and the Appellate Body can accept or consider amicus curiae briets. Therefore,it is significant to research on the value of non-governmental organizations’participating in the dispute settlement process and the form from both theory and practice.
This thesis makes a systematic and comprehensive study of the values、forms and system obstacles of NGOs’participating in WTO disputes settlement by the methods as literature analysis, empirical analysis, value analysis and comparative analysis. Firstly, NGOs and“amicus curiae”are defined. Then, It shows that the NGOs’legal status upgrades gradually by analysing the practice and the values of NGOs’participating in WTO disputes settlement. NGOs’participating in can express the public opinions sufficiently and resolves information asymmetry, helping improve the quality of the judges. It plays an important role in realizing the whole world economy rule by law and the constitution. Based on that, research on the forms of NGOs’participating in is carried out . The analysis takes the view that it is not reasonable that NGOs participates in WTO dispute settlement system as lawsuit main body because there are some theoretical obstacles and system obstacles. It is reasonable that NGOs participates in WTO dispute settlement system as amicus curiae, but, comes the conclusion that the actions of the Panel and the Appellate Body have no legal ground in the WTO rule system, and the interpretation of the Appellate Body lacks of legitimacy and procedural due process. WTO dispute settlement mechanism must seek the balance between the sovereignty of WTO members and judicial independent. The amendment of DSU should be done by negotiations among WTO members, and the Specific procedural rules can be work out by WTO Dispute settlement Body or the Appellate Body.
引文
1那力.非政府国际组织发展现状,国际资料信息,2002,(3):26.
1 http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/, 2008年3月24日访问.
1李铁城.世纪之交的联合国.人民出版社,2002:380.
2王绍光.多元与统一:第三部门国际比较研究.浙江人民出版社,1999:17.
3杨广.国际组织概念分析.国际论坛,2003:105.
4莱斯特.M.萨拉蒙.全球公民社会——非营利部门视界.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002:3.
1王名.非营利组织管理概论.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002:2.
1吕微平.WTO争端解决机制中“法庭之友”的实践及影响初探.福建论坛.人文社会科学版,2006,2:97.
2赵海峰,高立忠.论国际司法程序中的法庭之友制度.比较法研究,2007,3:69.
1 Appellate Body Report.United States—Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products.WT/DS58/AB/R,12th October,1998,102-110.
1 WT/DS138/AB/R,page 39.
2 WT/DS135/AB/R,para.52.
1 WT/GC/M/60.22 November 2000.
2 WT/GC/M/60.22 November 2000.
1罗正文.WTO专家组的组成及其改进.南通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,3(23):38.
1李育东,宋岭.论贸易自由与环境保护的博弈和融合.石河子大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,10(20):52.
1陈建.国际贸易与劳工标准——世贸组织焦点问题探讨.国际贸易问题,2000,6.
1金晓晨.WTO争端解决机制下私人诉权的探讨,法学杂志,2003,24(2):31.
2武兰芳.非政府间国际组织的国际法律人格限制性评析,华北电力大学学报(社会科学版),2007,4:71.
3王铁崖.国际法.北京:法律出版社,1995:65.
1詹宁斯瓦茨.奥本海国际法(第一卷第一分册),中国大百科全书出版社,1995:10.
1 August Reinisch,Christina Irgel.The Participation of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Non-State Actors and International Law, 2001:143.
1参见孔庆峰,张萌.论WTO争端解决机制对发展中成员方的意义,东岳论丛,2006,(27)3:64.
1 US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Repot of the Appellate Body[R].adopted on 6 November 1998,WT/DS58/AB,para 88.
1李浩培.条约法概论.北京:法律出版社,1988:426.
1 W Friendam.Legal Theory(the fifth edition)[M].Columbia University Press,1967:334.
2朱志晟.WTO制度创新中的“司法”角色定位.法商研究,2004,5:71.
1朱志晟.WTO制度创新中的“司法”角色定位.法商研究,2004,(5):65.
2王彦志,郝秀辉.非政府组织与世界贸易组织争端解决机制.法制与社会发展,2003,6:140.
3陈立虎.法庭之友陈述在WTO争端解决机制中的可接受性,法学家,2004,3:160.
1吕航.论WTO争端解决机制中的“法庭之友”意见问题,吉林大学硕士学位论文:32-33.
2 WTO Appellate Body report.Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,WTO DS 8/AB/R, ,Oct.4,1996. Page15.
1 PADIDEH,ALA’I.Judicial Lobbying at the WTO:The debate over the Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs and the US Experience[J].Fordham International Law Journal,Nov./Dec.2000.
1从理论上讲,非政府组织介入WTO争端解决过程的模式可以归结为三种可能的模式:(1)裁判机构主导式。(2)当事方主导模式。即“法庭之友”必须征得某一方或双方当事方的同意方可参加WTO争端解决。如美国的司法实践,即要求征得双方当事人的同意。(3)“法庭之友”主导式。即法庭之友享有启动程序的主导权,没有任何限制。
1参见DSU第17条第3款的规定。
2自1995年WTO成立到2004年底,在专家小组作出的95个裁决报告中有65个案件被提出了上诉,上诉率为68%,足见上诉机构的工作负荷已经很重。引自贺小勇.自制与开拓:WTO上诉机构管辖权的法律边界,法学,2006,1.
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1 http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/, 2008年3月24日访问.
1李铁城.世纪之交的联合国.人民出版社,2002:380.
2王绍光.多元与统一:第三部门国际比较研究.浙江人民出版社,1999:17.
3杨广.国际组织概念分析.国际论坛,2003:105.
4莱斯特.M.萨拉蒙.全球公民社会——非营利部门视界.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002:3.
1王名.非营利组织管理概论.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002:2.
1吕微平.WTO争端解决机制中“法庭之友”的实践及影响初探.福建论坛.人文社会科学版,2006,2:97.
2赵海峰,高立忠.论国际司法程序中的法庭之友制度.比较法研究,2007,3:69.
1 Appellate Body Report.United States—Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products.WT/DS58/AB/R,12th October,1998,102-110.
1 WT/DS138/AB/R,page 39.
2 WT/DS135/AB/R,para.52.
1 WT/GC/M/60.22 November 2000.
2 WT/GC/M/60.22 November 2000.
1罗正文.WTO专家组的组成及其改进.南通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,3(23):38.
1李育东,宋岭.论贸易自由与环境保护的博弈和融合.石河子大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,10(20):52.
1陈建.国际贸易与劳工标准——世贸组织焦点问题探讨.国际贸易问题,2000,6.
1金晓晨.WTO争端解决机制下私人诉权的探讨,法学杂志,2003,24(2):31.
2武兰芳.非政府间国际组织的国际法律人格限制性评析,华北电力大学学报(社会科学版),2007,4:71.
3王铁崖.国际法.北京:法律出版社,1995:65.
1詹宁斯瓦茨.奥本海国际法(第一卷第一分册),中国大百科全书出版社,1995:10.
1 August Reinisch,Christina Irgel.The Participation of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Non-State Actors and International Law, 2001:143.
1参见孔庆峰,张萌.论WTO争端解决机制对发展中成员方的意义,东岳论丛,2006,(27)3:64.
1 US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Repot of the Appellate Body[R].adopted on 6 November 1998,WT/DS58/AB,para 88.
1李浩培.条约法概论.北京:法律出版社,1988:426.
1 W Friendam.Legal Theory(the fifth edition)[M].Columbia University Press,1967:334.
2朱志晟.WTO制度创新中的“司法”角色定位.法商研究,2004,5:71.
1朱志晟.WTO制度创新中的“司法”角色定位.法商研究,2004,(5):65.
2王彦志,郝秀辉.非政府组织与世界贸易组织争端解决机制.法制与社会发展,2003,6:140.
3陈立虎.法庭之友陈述在WTO争端解决机制中的可接受性,法学家,2004,3:160.
1吕航.论WTO争端解决机制中的“法庭之友”意见问题,吉林大学硕士学位论文:32-33.
2 WTO Appellate Body report.Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,WTO DS 8/AB/R, ,Oct.4,1996. Page15.
1 PADIDEH,ALA’I.Judicial Lobbying at the WTO:The debate over the Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs and the US Experience[J].Fordham International Law Journal,Nov./Dec.2000.
1从理论上讲,非政府组织介入WTO争端解决过程的模式可以归结为三种可能的模式:(1)裁判机构主导式。(2)当事方主导模式。即“法庭之友”必须征得某一方或双方当事方的同意方可参加WTO争端解决。如美国的司法实践,即要求征得双方当事人的同意。(3)“法庭之友”主导式。即法庭之友享有启动程序的主导权,没有任何限制。
1参见DSU第17条第3款的规定。
2自1995年WTO成立到2004年底,在专家小组作出的95个裁决报告中有65个案件被提出了上诉,上诉率为68%,足见上诉机构的工作负荷已经很重。引自贺小勇.自制与开拓:WTO上诉机构管辖权的法律边界,法学,2006,1.
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