农村小型水利设施的农户投入行为与激励研究
|
摘要
全文以促进农村小型水利的有效供给为目标,以农村小型水利供给的体制演进为背景,以公共品供给理论、制度变迁理论、行为经济学理论、激励理论为框架,基于农户的行为的视角,分析农户参与小型农村水利设施的效用,分析影响农户投入行为的因素,剖析农户需求表达的不同模式,探讨如何对农户投入意愿进行激励,并在此基础上提出对策和建议。
1.研究的主要内容
(1)对本文需要借鉴的一般理论进行梳理,包括公共物品供给理论、制度变迁理论、行为经济学理论、激励理论以及社会资本理论；对相关文献进行综述与评价,主要侧重于国家——乡村社会视角的水利供给,小型水利建设的制度变迁以及水利设施需求的实证因素。
(2)根据小型水利的公共品属性、以农户的行为为视角,从农户投入特征,投入主体的博弈等方面对小型水利的供给进行经济学分析。
(3)对重庆小型水利工程的供给体制演进梳理与分析,划分体制演进的四个阶段,对各个历史时期的特征、投入情况以及主要成就进行概括,总结经验与教训,从历史逻辑的角度探寻现行供给体制存在的问题及困难。
(4)以近五年参与过小型水利设施投入的农户为样本,运用排序二元选择模型,对影响农户投入效用的因素进行了分析与讨论,体现农户对水利投入所获回报的主观评价。
(5)基于静态博弈理论建立模型,根据农户投入的两种不同形式区分投资行为与投工行为,采取二元选择模型进行回归分析,并对实证的结果进行讨论
(6)分析当前农户在小型水利建设中投入需求显示的三种主要模式：主动接触型需求显示、强人替代型需求显示以及投票型需求显示。
(7)研究农户行为的激励问题,基于“效价—手段—期望”的框架,从资金支持、工具性完善与社会偏好培育三个途径,全面分析显性激励与隐性激励手段。
2.研究的主要结论
(1)政府与农户的责权重建是农村准公共品有效供给的关键。小型水利是在一定地域范围内具有公共资源与俱乐部物品双重性质的准公共物品,并且具有较强的外部性与垄断性。合作供给小型水利所需要的激励机制、成本分摊、组织动员以及关系协调等实现集体行动的条件在大集体生产方式下能够实现自然满足,但在家庭经营取代大集体生产之后,上述问题并未得到有效的制度安排,带来的直接后果是小型水利建设的下滑,进而影响到农业生产、城乡统筹发展、国家粮食安全及生态安全等。兴建小型水利设施既是农户切身利益的需要,也是政府职责所在。在政府加大投入的基础上,尊重与引导农户的投入意愿,实现政府与农户在小农水建设上合理的权责重建是实现小农水有效供给的关键。
(2)农户对现有水利建设投入的回报普遍感到满意,但相比最初投入的积极性,仍然有所不足。农业收入比例、用水量、是否参与管理、意见是否起作用、文化程度影响农户投入的效用。农业收入比例越高,农户的满意度越高；用水量越大,农户的满意程度越高；参与管理的农户满意度明显高于未参与管理的；农户对水利建设方案的意见越起作用,农户的满意度越高,文化程度较高的农户满意度较高。
(3)劳动力价格,组织者能力、社区非农收入水平、政府出资力度、水利建设的效用、文化程度影响农户的出资意愿；水田面积、现有设施是否够用、社区非农收入水平、文化程度影响农户的出工意愿。实证结果表明,在农民收入逐渐提高,以及政府对小农水投资与奖补比例不断上升,农民实际投入相对下降的背景下,收入已不再成为影响农户投入的一个主要因素。劳动力价格的上涨,使农户更倾向于出资的投入方式,且家庭中主要劳动力价格越高,就越愿意出资。农户与农户之间,农户与政府之间存在着明显的博弈行为。在文化水平较低的群体中,对于水利设施的重要性和使用价值的认识还不够因而投入意愿较低。当前影响农户出工与出资意愿的因素存在着较大的差别,农户在进行出资决策时较多地考虑价格因素以及效用,并且表现出对政府投资的明显依赖,其行为模式更符合“理性小农”；只有当水利对农户比较重要时,农户才考虑出工,且水田面积越大,现有设施越不能满足需求,农户就越愿意出工,而几乎不考虑其他因素,在出工决策上表现得更象“生存小农”。
(4)政府可以通过对小农水建设进行资金支持、制度支持实现对农户投入意愿的显性激励,也可以通过引导或培育公平感、道德情感和社会资本等社会偏好以增强农户投入行为的隐性激励。目前,政府的资金支持比例已经与大部分农户主观期望相匹配,应该在现有的成本分摊比例下扩大受益范围,惠及更多水利投资项目。全面改进项目决策制度、资金监管制度、水利设施的产权制度、组织制度以及水权制度,提供良好的制度环境,有助于激励农户的投入行为。大多数农户对公平的态度是“相机抉择对等者”,搭便车的现象对农民公平感有明显的负面影响。农户存在为社会福利进行支付的潜在动机,但水利并不是农户自愿捐赠的优先选择。社会网络仍在一定程度上影响着村民的行为,为农户的合作带来正向的激励。
(5)农户需求存在多元化的显示方式。主动接触型需求显示的动机来自于对现状的强烈不满,需求显示的真实性、一致性很强。提供畅通的信息传递渠道有助于消除主动接触的动机：强人替代型需求显示有着较高的效率,但大多数村庄不具备实现这种需求显示方式的条件,此外,还存在强人“寻租”以及将自愿的需求显示让渡转化为强制的需求显示让渡的隐忧；公共财政转移支付资源的相对充足是投票型需求显示得以实现的前提条件,但由于乡村干部在规则提供与空间控制中占主导地位,村民的需求无法真实显示,成为精英控制的表达；在村民需求与精英阶层分歧不大的条件下,表现出高效率的特征：但如果存在较大的分歧,精英的控制则会损害村民的权益,甚至导致事实上的不合作。
3.可能的创新点
建立了一个效用——行为——需求显示——集体行动的框架来描述个人行为与集体行动的关系,选择农户行为的视角对小型水利设施的联合供给进行了分析。不同于以往的研究中将农户的公共品供给决策视为理性假定下一个效用函数的思路,在考虑农户个体异质性、社会偏好的基础上,引入近年来农民收入结构变化、社区非农收入水平不平衡发展,劳动力价格上升以及年近来政府投入的增加等因素进行分析,得出了较为可靠的实证结论,并探讨显性与隐性的双重激励途径,为农村小型水利设施的有效供给提供参考。
Inorder to enhance the investment behavior for peasant households to promote the construction of small size water conservancy facilities(SWCFs), under the background of the system evolution of the rural public goods supply, based on public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics, motivation theories, social capital theories, this research focused on the peasant households' behavior, analyzed general influencing factors on the investment behavior, discussed the way to stimulate the investment behavior, dissected the different display patterns for their demand, and put forward a countermeasure and suggestion.
The main contents:
1. Carding general theories which this research need to refer to, including public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics,motivation theories and social capital theories. Summarizing and reviewing related articles, particularly emphasize on the state-rural society relationship and empirical factors which were affecting the water conservancy facilities demand.
2. According to the public goods attribute of small water conservancy, based on the farmer behavior perspective, analyzed the behavior characters and game play of farmers on small water conservancy facilities supply.
3. Teasing and analyzing the system evolution of the rural minisize water conservancy facilities in Chongqing by four stages, smmerizing the characteristic, condition and main achievements in each historical periods, summing up experience and lesson, exploring the exsisting problems and difficulties of the supply system in operation viewed of the historical point.
4. Analyzing and discussing main factors that influencing the peasants'utility by Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit regression. This part of research used the sample of peasant households that invested in SWCFs in resent five vears.
5. Analyzing by binary logit regression of the investment willingness by money and labor respectively. This research is modeling on account of the static game theory, screening main factors that affects the peasant households' investment willingness.
6. Researching the incentive problem on the peasant households'behavior. This part of research analyzing both explicit and implicit motivation by ways of financial support, instrument perfection and social preference cultivation based on the framework of model "V-I-E".
7. Analyzing three main pattern of the demand display, which including initiative contacting, strongman substitution expression, and voting.
Conclusion:
1. The key point of the effective supply for the rural quasi-public goods is that the reconstruction of rights and obligations between the government and the peasant households. SWCFs are quasi-public goods which has strong externality and monopoly with double nature of public resource and club goods in certain territorial scope. The motivation mechanism, cost apportionments, relationship coordination, organization and mobilization in the cooperated supply are satisfied under the production mode of big collective. However, when the households management replaced the collective production, these problems have not institutional arranged effectively., result in glide of construction of SWCFs, following bad influence on agriculture, urban-rural integration, food security and ecological safety. The construction of SWCFs are not only pressing needs of peasant households, but also duty-bound of the government. The key point of the effective supply for SWCFs is that, to increase the government investment, to respect and ductlead the willingness of peasants, to reconstruction of rights and obligations between them.
2. Farmers were generally satisfied with the returns on existing water conservancy construction investment, but is still lacking compared to the initial investment's enthusiasm, Agricultural income ratio, water use, whether to participate in the management, whether the views work, degree of education are influencing factors. The higher the proportion of agricultural income, farmers satisfaction is higher; The more of water consumption, the greater the famers'satisfaction; Farmers who participated in the management is more satisfied than who were not involved in management; Farmers whose views of the water conservancy construction project is worked are more satisfied; farmers with higher education whose satisfaction is higher.
3. The ability of organizers, non-agricultural income level of community, government funded dynamics, utility of water conservancy construction, and education degree influence farmer's intention to input money; area of paddy field, adequacy of existing facilities, non-agricultural income level of community and education degree influence famers intention to input labor. The empirical results show that, as the income of the farmers is increasing gradually, and the government investment ratio to the SWCFs is rising, income has not become one of the main factors affecting peasant investment. As labour costs rising, farmers tend to capital investment, and the price of main labor in the family is higher, the more willing to invest money. There is a game Among farmers and between farmers and the government. The lower educated groups has less understanding of the importance of water conservancy facilities and keep low investment willingness. There's big difference between the influencing factor of capital or labour investment. more farmers to consider price factor and utility in theFor capital investment decision-making, they consider more price and utility factors, and behaves more like "Rational Peasant"; only when the water facilities is important, famers consider to input labour, and almost not consider of other factors, as behaves more like "moral famers".
4. There are two ways for the government to motivate farmers willingness:the explicit motivation, including financial support and institutional support; the implicit motivation, by guiding or cultivating thesocial preference, such as sense of fairness, moral emotion and social capital. The government financial support is at present matched with the majority of peasants' subjective expectation, demonstrating the importance to expand investment range in the existing cost sharing proportion, and benefit more water conservancy project. Comprehensive improvement of institutions such as decision-making system, financial supervision system, property rights system, organization system and the water rights system is helpful to enhance peasants' willingness. Most of the peasants is " discretioner " on fairness, so hitchhike phenomenon has a significant negative impact. Farmers have the potential motive to pay for social welfare, but the SWCFs is not prior in their donation lists. Social networks are still in a certain extent influence the behavior, and encourage the farmers cooperative.
5. Forms of willingness expression in construction of SWCFs is diversified. Initiative contacting comes from strong discontent with the status quo, with high authenticity and strong consistency. Broaden expression channels contribute to the eliminating the motivation for initiative contacting. Strongman substitution expression is with high efficiency, but most of the villages do not have such conditions. In addition, Possibility of "Rent-seeking" and mandatory substitution expression is notable. The relative adequacy of public financial transfer payment resources is the precondition of the realization of the voting expression, however the rural cadres are domaint in the rules and space control to suppress the villagers expression, as for the expression of "Elite-control".This form is high efficient in case the divergence is between the villagers and the elite is little, but when big differences occurs, elite control will damage the rights of villagers, or even lead the break of cooperation.
Innovation:
Established a frame of utility-behavior-demand display-collective action to describe the relationship between person and collective, and alanyzed the joint-supply of SWCFs from the perspective of peasants' behavior. Be differ from existing research which consider the famers' supply decision of public goods as a utility function submit to the hypothesis of rationality, this research considered individual heterogeneity and social preference, and introduced factors as income structure changes, uneven development of non-agriculture income level of community, rising of labour price and increase of government investment in recent years, arrived at reliable conclusion, discussed methods of motivation, and to refer to effective supply of SWCFs.
1.研究的主要内容
(1)对本文需要借鉴的一般理论进行梳理,包括公共物品供给理论、制度变迁理论、行为经济学理论、激励理论以及社会资本理论；对相关文献进行综述与评价,主要侧重于国家——乡村社会视角的水利供给,小型水利建设的制度变迁以及水利设施需求的实证因素。
(2)根据小型水利的公共品属性、以农户的行为为视角,从农户投入特征,投入主体的博弈等方面对小型水利的供给进行经济学分析。
(3)对重庆小型水利工程的供给体制演进梳理与分析,划分体制演进的四个阶段,对各个历史时期的特征、投入情况以及主要成就进行概括,总结经验与教训,从历史逻辑的角度探寻现行供给体制存在的问题及困难。
(4)以近五年参与过小型水利设施投入的农户为样本,运用排序二元选择模型,对影响农户投入效用的因素进行了分析与讨论,体现农户对水利投入所获回报的主观评价。
(5)基于静态博弈理论建立模型,根据农户投入的两种不同形式区分投资行为与投工行为,采取二元选择模型进行回归分析,并对实证的结果进行讨论
(6)分析当前农户在小型水利建设中投入需求显示的三种主要模式：主动接触型需求显示、强人替代型需求显示以及投票型需求显示。
(7)研究农户行为的激励问题,基于“效价—手段—期望”的框架,从资金支持、工具性完善与社会偏好培育三个途径,全面分析显性激励与隐性激励手段。
2.研究的主要结论
(1)政府与农户的责权重建是农村准公共品有效供给的关键。小型水利是在一定地域范围内具有公共资源与俱乐部物品双重性质的准公共物品,并且具有较强的外部性与垄断性。合作供给小型水利所需要的激励机制、成本分摊、组织动员以及关系协调等实现集体行动的条件在大集体生产方式下能够实现自然满足,但在家庭经营取代大集体生产之后,上述问题并未得到有效的制度安排,带来的直接后果是小型水利建设的下滑,进而影响到农业生产、城乡统筹发展、国家粮食安全及生态安全等。兴建小型水利设施既是农户切身利益的需要,也是政府职责所在。在政府加大投入的基础上,尊重与引导农户的投入意愿,实现政府与农户在小农水建设上合理的权责重建是实现小农水有效供给的关键。
(2)农户对现有水利建设投入的回报普遍感到满意,但相比最初投入的积极性,仍然有所不足。农业收入比例、用水量、是否参与管理、意见是否起作用、文化程度影响农户投入的效用。农业收入比例越高,农户的满意度越高；用水量越大,农户的满意程度越高；参与管理的农户满意度明显高于未参与管理的；农户对水利建设方案的意见越起作用,农户的满意度越高,文化程度较高的农户满意度较高。
(3)劳动力价格,组织者能力、社区非农收入水平、政府出资力度、水利建设的效用、文化程度影响农户的出资意愿；水田面积、现有设施是否够用、社区非农收入水平、文化程度影响农户的出工意愿。实证结果表明,在农民收入逐渐提高,以及政府对小农水投资与奖补比例不断上升,农民实际投入相对下降的背景下,收入已不再成为影响农户投入的一个主要因素。劳动力价格的上涨,使农户更倾向于出资的投入方式,且家庭中主要劳动力价格越高,就越愿意出资。农户与农户之间,农户与政府之间存在着明显的博弈行为。在文化水平较低的群体中,对于水利设施的重要性和使用价值的认识还不够因而投入意愿较低。当前影响农户出工与出资意愿的因素存在着较大的差别,农户在进行出资决策时较多地考虑价格因素以及效用,并且表现出对政府投资的明显依赖,其行为模式更符合“理性小农”；只有当水利对农户比较重要时,农户才考虑出工,且水田面积越大,现有设施越不能满足需求,农户就越愿意出工,而几乎不考虑其他因素,在出工决策上表现得更象“生存小农”。
(4)政府可以通过对小农水建设进行资金支持、制度支持实现对农户投入意愿的显性激励,也可以通过引导或培育公平感、道德情感和社会资本等社会偏好以增强农户投入行为的隐性激励。目前,政府的资金支持比例已经与大部分农户主观期望相匹配,应该在现有的成本分摊比例下扩大受益范围,惠及更多水利投资项目。全面改进项目决策制度、资金监管制度、水利设施的产权制度、组织制度以及水权制度,提供良好的制度环境,有助于激励农户的投入行为。大多数农户对公平的态度是“相机抉择对等者”,搭便车的现象对农民公平感有明显的负面影响。农户存在为社会福利进行支付的潜在动机,但水利并不是农户自愿捐赠的优先选择。社会网络仍在一定程度上影响着村民的行为,为农户的合作带来正向的激励。
(5)农户需求存在多元化的显示方式。主动接触型需求显示的动机来自于对现状的强烈不满,需求显示的真实性、一致性很强。提供畅通的信息传递渠道有助于消除主动接触的动机：强人替代型需求显示有着较高的效率,但大多数村庄不具备实现这种需求显示方式的条件,此外,还存在强人“寻租”以及将自愿的需求显示让渡转化为强制的需求显示让渡的隐忧；公共财政转移支付资源的相对充足是投票型需求显示得以实现的前提条件,但由于乡村干部在规则提供与空间控制中占主导地位,村民的需求无法真实显示,成为精英控制的表达；在村民需求与精英阶层分歧不大的条件下,表现出高效率的特征：但如果存在较大的分歧,精英的控制则会损害村民的权益,甚至导致事实上的不合作。
3.可能的创新点
建立了一个效用——行为——需求显示——集体行动的框架来描述个人行为与集体行动的关系,选择农户行为的视角对小型水利设施的联合供给进行了分析。不同于以往的研究中将农户的公共品供给决策视为理性假定下一个效用函数的思路,在考虑农户个体异质性、社会偏好的基础上,引入近年来农民收入结构变化、社区非农收入水平不平衡发展,劳动力价格上升以及年近来政府投入的增加等因素进行分析,得出了较为可靠的实证结论,并探讨显性与隐性的双重激励途径,为农村小型水利设施的有效供给提供参考。
Inorder to enhance the investment behavior for peasant households to promote the construction of small size water conservancy facilities(SWCFs), under the background of the system evolution of the rural public goods supply, based on public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics, motivation theories, social capital theories, this research focused on the peasant households' behavior, analyzed general influencing factors on the investment behavior, discussed the way to stimulate the investment behavior, dissected the different display patterns for their demand, and put forward a countermeasure and suggestion.
The main contents:
1. Carding general theories which this research need to refer to, including public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics,motivation theories and social capital theories. Summarizing and reviewing related articles, particularly emphasize on the state-rural society relationship and empirical factors which were affecting the water conservancy facilities demand.
2. According to the public goods attribute of small water conservancy, based on the farmer behavior perspective, analyzed the behavior characters and game play of farmers on small water conservancy facilities supply.
3. Teasing and analyzing the system evolution of the rural minisize water conservancy facilities in Chongqing by four stages, smmerizing the characteristic, condition and main achievements in each historical periods, summing up experience and lesson, exploring the exsisting problems and difficulties of the supply system in operation viewed of the historical point.
4. Analyzing and discussing main factors that influencing the peasants'utility by Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit regression. This part of research used the sample of peasant households that invested in SWCFs in resent five vears.
5. Analyzing by binary logit regression of the investment willingness by money and labor respectively. This research is modeling on account of the static game theory, screening main factors that affects the peasant households' investment willingness.
6. Researching the incentive problem on the peasant households'behavior. This part of research analyzing both explicit and implicit motivation by ways of financial support, instrument perfection and social preference cultivation based on the framework of model "V-I-E".
7. Analyzing three main pattern of the demand display, which including initiative contacting, strongman substitution expression, and voting.
Conclusion:
1. The key point of the effective supply for the rural quasi-public goods is that the reconstruction of rights and obligations between the government and the peasant households. SWCFs are quasi-public goods which has strong externality and monopoly with double nature of public resource and club goods in certain territorial scope. The motivation mechanism, cost apportionments, relationship coordination, organization and mobilization in the cooperated supply are satisfied under the production mode of big collective. However, when the households management replaced the collective production, these problems have not institutional arranged effectively., result in glide of construction of SWCFs, following bad influence on agriculture, urban-rural integration, food security and ecological safety. The construction of SWCFs are not only pressing needs of peasant households, but also duty-bound of the government. The key point of the effective supply for SWCFs is that, to increase the government investment, to respect and ductlead the willingness of peasants, to reconstruction of rights and obligations between them.
2. Farmers were generally satisfied with the returns on existing water conservancy construction investment, but is still lacking compared to the initial investment's enthusiasm, Agricultural income ratio, water use, whether to participate in the management, whether the views work, degree of education are influencing factors. The higher the proportion of agricultural income, farmers satisfaction is higher; The more of water consumption, the greater the famers'satisfaction; Farmers who participated in the management is more satisfied than who were not involved in management; Farmers whose views of the water conservancy construction project is worked are more satisfied; farmers with higher education whose satisfaction is higher.
3. The ability of organizers, non-agricultural income level of community, government funded dynamics, utility of water conservancy construction, and education degree influence farmer's intention to input money; area of paddy field, adequacy of existing facilities, non-agricultural income level of community and education degree influence famers intention to input labor. The empirical results show that, as the income of the farmers is increasing gradually, and the government investment ratio to the SWCFs is rising, income has not become one of the main factors affecting peasant investment. As labour costs rising, farmers tend to capital investment, and the price of main labor in the family is higher, the more willing to invest money. There is a game Among farmers and between farmers and the government. The lower educated groups has less understanding of the importance of water conservancy facilities and keep low investment willingness. There's big difference between the influencing factor of capital or labour investment. more farmers to consider price factor and utility in theFor capital investment decision-making, they consider more price and utility factors, and behaves more like "Rational Peasant"; only when the water facilities is important, famers consider to input labour, and almost not consider of other factors, as behaves more like "moral famers".
4. There are two ways for the government to motivate farmers willingness:the explicit motivation, including financial support and institutional support; the implicit motivation, by guiding or cultivating thesocial preference, such as sense of fairness, moral emotion and social capital. The government financial support is at present matched with the majority of peasants' subjective expectation, demonstrating the importance to expand investment range in the existing cost sharing proportion, and benefit more water conservancy project. Comprehensive improvement of institutions such as decision-making system, financial supervision system, property rights system, organization system and the water rights system is helpful to enhance peasants' willingness. Most of the peasants is " discretioner " on fairness, so hitchhike phenomenon has a significant negative impact. Farmers have the potential motive to pay for social welfare, but the SWCFs is not prior in their donation lists. Social networks are still in a certain extent influence the behavior, and encourage the farmers cooperative.
5. Forms of willingness expression in construction of SWCFs is diversified. Initiative contacting comes from strong discontent with the status quo, with high authenticity and strong consistency. Broaden expression channels contribute to the eliminating the motivation for initiative contacting. Strongman substitution expression is with high efficiency, but most of the villages do not have such conditions. In addition, Possibility of "Rent-seeking" and mandatory substitution expression is notable. The relative adequacy of public financial transfer payment resources is the precondition of the realization of the voting expression, however the rural cadres are domaint in the rules and space control to suppress the villagers expression, as for the expression of "Elite-control".This form is high efficient in case the divergence is between the villagers and the elite is little, but when big differences occurs, elite control will damage the rights of villagers, or even lead the break of cooperation.
Innovation:
Established a frame of utility-behavior-demand display-collective action to describe the relationship between person and collective, and alanyzed the joint-supply of SWCFs from the perspective of peasants' behavior. Be differ from existing research which consider the famers' supply decision of public goods as a utility function submit to the hypothesis of rationality, this research considered individual heterogeneity and social preference, and introduced factors as income structure changes, uneven development of non-agriculture income level of community, rising of labour price and increase of government investment in recent years, arrived at reliable conclusion, discussed methods of motivation, and to refer to effective supply of SWCFs.
引文
[1]国家统计局,中国统计年鉴2012,http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexch.htm
[2]侯春梅,张志强,迟秀丽,《联合国世界水资源开发报告》呼吁加强水资源综合管理[J],地球科学进展,2006.11：1211-1214
[3]网易财经,http://money.163.com/13/0130/08/8MF3HV4000254IU4.html
[4]中华人民共和国水利部,2010中国水利统计年鉴[M],中国水利水电出版社,北京,2010.
[5]Binsmanger H, The policy Response of Agriculture, Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington D. C,1989:23.
[6]张宁,农村小型水利工程农户参与式管理及效率研究——以浙江省为例的实证分析[D],浙江大学,2007：3
[7]国家防讯抗旱总指挥部,中华人民共和国水利部,中国水旱灾害公报2011[M],北京：中国水利水电出版社,2011
[8]财政部、水利部联合出台《中央财政统筹从土地出让收益中计提的农田水利建设资金使用管理办法》,http://www.mwr.gov.cn/zwzc/czxx/201304/t20130419_434255.html
[9]重庆市农机水电局,重庆市水利志[M],第1版,重庆：重庆出版社,1996：3
[10]在线现代汉语词典,www.51240.com
[11]Samuelson. The pure theory of public expenditures [J]. Theory of Economics and Statistics. 1954(36):387
[12][美]萨缪尔森,诺德豪斯,经济学[M],第16版,北京：华夏出版社,2008：268
[13][比]吉恩·希瑞克斯,[英]加雷思·D·迈尔斯,中级公共经济学[M],第1版,上海：格致出版社,2011：74
[14][美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,集体行动的逻辑[M],第1版,上海：上海人民出版社,1994
[15]Comes, R. C., and Sandler, T.1996. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club goods. Carbridge University Press.
[16]Warr, p.1983. The private provision of public goods is independent of the distribution of income, Economic Letters 13:207-11.
[17]Berstorm, T. C., and Comes, R,1983. Independence of allocative efficiency from distribution in the theory of bublic goods. Journal of Public goods. Econometrica 51:1753-65
[18]Itaya, J,-I., de Meza, D., and Myles, G. D.2002. Income distribution, taxation and the private provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4:273-97
[19]Wicksell, A new Principle of Just Taxation, reprinted(1958) in R.A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock(eds) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (London,Macmillan) 81.
[20]彼德.M.杰克逊,公共部门经济学前沿问题[M],第1版,北京：中国税务出版社,2001：124
[21][美]康芒斯,制度经济学[M],第1版,北京：商务印书饭,1983：12
[22]D.诺斯,制度、制度变迁和经济绩效[M],第1版,上海：上海三联书店,1990,12-13
[23]刘凤梁,周业安,陈彦斌,行为经济学：理论与扩展[M],第1版,北京：中国经济出版社,2008.8：47
[24]尹钢,梁丽芝,行政组织学[M],第1版,北京：北京大学出版社,2005：154-155
[25]亚当·斯蜜,国富论[M],第1版,北京：华夏出版社,2005
[26]马歇尔,经济学原理(中译本)[M],第1版,北京：商务印书馆,1983
[27]科尔曼,社会理论的基础[M],第1版,北京：社会科学文献出版社,1990：330
[28]魏特夫,东方专制方义[M],第1版,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1989：18
[29][美]莫里斯·弗里德曼,中国东南的宗族组织[M],第1版,上海：上海人民出版社,2000：161-178
[30]郑振满,明清福建沿海农田水利制度与乡族组织[J],中国社会经济史研究,1987.4：38-45.
[31]黄宗智,中国研究的范式问题讨论[M],北京：社会科学文献出版社,2003：273
[32]罗兴佐,治水：国家介入与农民合作——荆门五村研究[D],华中师范大学,2005：16-66
[33]贺雪峰,乡村水利与农地制度创新——以荆门市划片承包调查为例[J],管理世界,2003：76-88
[34]罗兴佐,农村公共物品供给中的均衡[J],经济学家,2006.1：62-69
[35]时磊,由灌溉系统的崩溃到西部乡村社区的瓦解[J],贵州财经学院学报,2005.2
[36]柴玲,水资源利用的权力、道德与秩序——对晋南农村一个扬水站的研究[D],中央民族大学,2010：112-115
[37]刘芳、史晋川,组织关系视角下的农民合作组织行政科层化问题研究——以用水协会(WUA)的构建和发展为例[J],农业经济问题,2009.9：30-37
[38]廖弈,中国农村公共品供给制度变迁的宏观观察与求解[J],理论观察,2002.3：78-80
[39]李文,我国农村公共品供给分析[J],中央财经大学学报,2002.7：12-16
[40]樊宝洪,基于乡镇财政视角的农村公共产品供给研究[D],南京农业大学,2007。
[41]宋洪远等,中国乡村财政与公共管理研究[M],第1版,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004：5-6
[42]李梅华,我国农村小型水利设施融资模式研究[J],农业经济,2006.5：12-13
[43]孔祥智、涂圣伟,新农村建设中农户对公共物品的需求偏好及影响因素研究——以农田水利设施为例[J],农业经济问题,2006.10：10-15
[44]刘辉、陈思羽,农户参与小型农田水利建设意愿影响因素的实证分析——基于对湖南粮食主产区475户农户的调查[J],中国农村观察,2012.2：54-65
[45]王昕、陆迁,农村社区小型水利设施合作供给意愿的实证[J],中国人口资源与环境,2012.6：115-119
[46]徐丹丹、杨静、孟萧,北京农村公共品供给模式选择的实证分析——基于经济发展阶段的判断[J],农业经济问题,2009.6：81-85
[47]郑书耀,准公共品的私人供给研究[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2008：83-94
[48]李继刚,社区理性和市场理性——小农理性的演化[J],湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012.6：16-21
[49]刘文昕,龚欣,张元鹏,社会偏好的异质性、个人理性与合作捐献行为——基于公共品自愿捐献机制的实证研究[J],经济评论,2010.5：5-15
[50]汪崇金,聂左玲,岳军,个体异质性、预期与公共品自愿供给——来自中国的经济学实验证据[J],财贸经济,2012.8：
[51]周业安等,社会角色、个体异质性和公共品自愿供给[J],经济研究,2013.1：123-136
[52]周飞舟,从“汲取型”政权到“悬浮型”政权[J],社会学研究,2006.3：1
[53]樊宝洪,基于乡镇财政视角的农村公共产品供给研究[D],南京大学,2007：54
[54]张宁,陆文聪,董宏纪,中国农田水利管理效率及其农户参与性机制研究,自然资源学报,2012.3[J]：353-363
[55]倪细云,文亚青,农田水利基础设施建设的影响因素：陕西437户样本[J],改革,2011.10：85-91
[56]黎红梅,李明贤,集体水管理对农户水稻生产技术效率的影响研究-对湖北漳河灌区的实证分析[J],农业技术经济,2009.3：27-37
[57]丹尼斯·C·缪勒,公共选择理论[M],第1版,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999.4：24
[58]陈胜可,Spss统计分析从入门到精通[M],第1版,北京：清华大学出版社,2010.8：261
[59]涂圣伟,农民主动接触、需求偏好表达与农村公共物品供给效率改进,农业技术经济,2010.3：32-41
[60]贺雪峰,国家与农村社会互动的路径选择——兼论国家与农村社会双强关系的构建[J],浙江社会科学,1999.4：96-100
[61]宫哲元,集体行动逻辑视角下合作社原则的变迁[J],中国农村观察,2008.5：37-41
[62]王昕,陆迁,农村社区小型水利设施合作供给意愿的实证[J],中国人口.资源与环境,2012.6：115-119
[63]郑家喜,王姣,聂磊,政府农田水利项目风险管理研究[J],农业经济问题,2012.8：59-64.
[64]组织化视角的乡村水利困境解读及破局—基于对荆门王桥村水利状况调查[J],中国农村水利水电,2012.4：8-17
[65]沈满洪,谢慧明,公共物品问题及其解决思路——公共物品理论文献综述,浙江大学学报(人文社会利学版)2009.11：133-144
[66]R.M.Isaac&J.M.W alker, the G roup Size Effects:Public Goods Provision:The Volumtary Contributions Mechanism, the Quarterly Journal of E conomics, Vol.103, N o.1(1988), pp. 179-200.
[67]J.A ndreoni, the Cooperation in Pnblie Goods E xperiments:Kidness or Confusion? The American E conom Review, Vol85, No.4 (1995), pp.891-904.
[68]C.D.Fraser, on the Provision of Exchidable Public Goods, the Journal of P nblic Economics, Vol.60 (1996), pp.111-130.
[69]Bruns, B. H. Participatory irrigation management in Indonesia:Lessons fromexperience and issues for the future [C]. Paper presented at the Indonesia National Workshop on Participatory Irrigation Management, sponsored by EDI/WB and FAO. November,1996:4-8
[70]Coase, R. The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1960(3):123 - 125
[71]David, K.&Hildebrand. The Method and Technique of Social Statistics [M].Published by Sage publisher,2000:342-343
[72]David, L. C., Ganapathi, R.&Margaret, R. et al. The cost of operating Rural Water
[73]Systems[J].North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics,1984(16):56-64
[74]Esther, W. D.&Ndalahwa, F. M. Public participation in integrated waterresources management: the case of Tanzania [J]. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth,2003(28):1009-1014
[75]Farrell, M. J. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency [J]. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A,1957,3(2):253-290
[76]Himmelberg, H.&Palia, H. Understanding the Determinants of ManagerialOwnership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,53(2): 353-384
[77]Holmstrom, K.&Milgrom, H. Multi-task Principal-Agent Analysis [J]. Journalof Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1999(5):245-521
[78]Hu, B. D. Estimation of Chinese agricultural production efficiencies with panel
[79]data [J]. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation,2005,17(2):475-484
[80]Jondrow, C. A., Lovely, I. S.&Materov, P, et al. On the Estimation of Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1982,19(23): 233-239
[81]Jones, D. C., Svejnar, J.&Zevi, A. Participation, Profit Sharing. Worker Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperatives[J].Economica,1985,52(2):449-465
[82]Jules, N.&Pretty, R. Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture [J]. World Development, 1995,8(23):1247-1263
[83]Kolavalli, S.&Atheeq, L. K. Groundwater Utilization in'Itvo Villages in West Bengal [M]. 1990:345-387
[84]Koopmans, T. C. An Analysis of Production as an Effcient Combination ofActivities. In Koopmans T. C. (Ed.) Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation[C], Cowles Commission for Research in Economics. Monograph Wiley, New York,1951,13:123-128
[85]Lovell, C. A. Production Frontiers and Productive Efficiency In Fried, Lovell and Schmidt S.S.(Eds.), The Measurement of Productive Efficiency:Techniquesand Applications [C]. Oxford University Press, New York,1993:3-67
[86]Ma, J. Z., Wang, X. S.&Edmunds, W. M. The characteristics of ground-water resources and their change under the impacts of human activity in the arid Northwest China-a case study of the Shiyang River Basin [J]. Journal of AridEnvironments,2005,61(2):277-295
[87]Mirta, M., Rbsa, B.&Jorge, C. et al., Irrigation waterdecentralized irrigation administration [J]. Irrigation and1998(12):67-83
[88]North, R.&Douglass, C. Institutional Change and Economic Performance (M].New York: Cambridge University Press; 1990:38-42
[89]North, R., Douglass, C.&Robert, T. The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System:A System:A theoretical Model闭.Journal of Economic History,1973(12):237-252
[90]Samuelson, P. A. A note on the pure theory of consumer behaviour [M].Ecomica,1938:5-61
[91]Schultz, T. W. Transforming traditional agriculture [M]. Yale University Press,New Haven, CT. 1964:32-72
[92]Shahbaz, M.&Lin, H. Piedad Moya. An assessment of collective action for pond management in Zhanghe Irrigation System China[刀.Agricultural Systems,2007(92):140-156
[93]Thomas, D.&Ely, R. Making differences Matter:A New Baradigm for Management Diversity [J]. Harvard Business Review,1996(9):233-254
[94]Vermillion, D. L. Garces Restrepo.Irrigation Management Transfer in Colombia:A Pilot experiment and Its Consequences[A]. Short Report Series on Locally
[95]Managed Irrigation. Colombo, SriLanka:llM,1996,5
[96]Werner, D.&Alex, K. Rural and Farming Systems Analyses [J]. Environmental Perspectives, 2000(16):182-190
[97]White, A. Conceptual Framework:Performance and Evolution of Property Rights and Collective Action. IFPRI:Washington. D. C.1995 (11):34-38
[98]Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism [M]. FreePree. NewYork,1994-2006 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.1985:471,
[99]Yukio, T.&Yohei. S. Farmers management irrigation districts in Japan:Assessding how fairness may contribute to sustainability [J]. Agricultural WaterManagement, 2005,4(77):196-209
[100]Zhang, Y H., Alexander, X. H,&Zehnder, J. B. Water scarcity, pricingmechanism and institutional reform in northern China irrigated agriculture [J].Agricultural Water Management, 2003(16):143 - 161
[101]蔡守华,詹万林,高中光,小型灌溉工程管理模式剖析与建议[J],节水灌溉,
[102]2004(3)：37-38
[103]常云昆,丁士军,对农户风险及其处理策略的分析[J],中国农村经济,2003.11：66-71
[104]陈氰朱克成和李玉松.农村水利管理模式理论研究[J]河海大学学报(自然科学版),2004.1：95-100
[105]陈美球,刘中婷和周丙娟等.农村生存发展环境与农民耕地利用行为的实证分析[J],中国农村经济,2006.2：49-54
[106]陈锡文,建设社会主义新农村农田水利建设如何加强[J],中国水利,2006.2：2-6
[107]陈锡文,新世纪的“三农”问题[J],上海农村经济,2003.8：5-7
[108]成升魁.2002中国资源报告[M],北京：商务印书馆,2003： 56-67
[109]迪南[美],水价改革与政治经济一世界银行水价改革理论与政策[M],北京：中国水利水电出版社,2003：34-38
[110]丁平,李瑾和李崇光等.借鉴公私合作模式推进我国灌溉管理权移交改革[J].农业经济问题,2005(10)：46-50
[111]董浩,王旭峰.农田水利建设促进效益农业发展的对策[J],中国农村水利水电,2002.12：15-19
[112]杜威漩,黄祖辉.我国灌溉管理制度与环境的冲突及整合[J],中国农村经济,2004.6：25-31
[113]段永红,杨名远.农田灌溉节水激励机制与效应分析[J],农业技术经济,2003.4：13-19
[114]厄尔·O·黑迪,约翰·L·狄龙[美],农业生产函数[M],北京：农业出版社,1991：34-47
[115]杨美丽,张建英,林枢吴,对构建和谐农村水利产权关系的理论探讨[J],科学与管理,2007.6：84-86.
[116]傅奇蕾,陈炳山.对我国小型水利设施产权制度改革的探讨[J],枣庄学院学报,2007.4：88-90.
[117]申端锋,二十世纪农民合作逻辑的演变—从罗兴佐《治水：国家介入与农民合作》谈起[J],调研世界,2007.7：7-10.
[118]傅奇蕾,聊城市小型水利设施产权制度改革研究[D],山东农业大学,2007
[119]罗兴佐,对当前若千农田水利政策的反思[J],调研世界,2008(1)： 13-15
[120]温铁军,从西南大早反思我国农村水利投入方式[J],中国合作经济,2010(4)：8-9
[121]梁晓伟,李胜斌,吴继轩.从西南地区旱情看建设农业水利基础设施的紧迫性[J].经济 导刊,2010.4：11-12.
[122]杨忠礼,大力加强水利基础设施建设全面改善农村生产生活条件[J],水利天地,2010.9：19.
[123]王海伦,张立军,张丽华.东营市农村水利基础设施建设有关问题的思考[J].山东水利,2010.10：57-58.
[124]国务院发展研究中心“完善小型农田水利建设和管理机制研究”课题组,我国小型农田水利建设和管理机制：一个政策框架[J],改革,2011.8：5-9
[125]林辉煌,水利的依附性：水土关系视阈下的中国农田水利—基于湖北两个村庄的对比研究[J],中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2011.21：139-149
[126]黄有光,经济与快乐[M],大连：东北财经大学出版社,2000.6：69-78
[127]速水佑次郎,发展经济学[M],北京：社会科学出版社,2003.2：121-124
[128]巴泽尔,产权的经济分析[M],上海人民出版社,1997.6：20-43
[129]韩洪云,灌区农户的合作行为[J],中国农村观察,2002.4：56-61
[130]王广深,中国农村水利投融资机制的历史回顾与前瞻[J],社会科学,2012.1：47-57
[131]刘辉,陈思羽,农户参与小型农田水利建设意愿影响的因素的实证分析——基于对湖南省粮食主产区475户农户的调查[J],中国农村观察,2012.2：54-66
[132]潘宏亮,要素集聚视角下水利新技术产业化中政府行为分析,科技进步与对策,20]1.11：69-72
[133]王金霞,地下水灌溉系统产权制度创新、效率及政策——河北省小型水利工程的实证研究[D],中国农业科学院,2002.
[134]刘俊浩,农村社区农田水利建设组织动员机制研究[D],西南农业大学,2005.
[135]蒋俊杰,我国农村灌溉管理的制度分析(1949-2005)——以安徽省淠史杭灌区为例[D],复旦大学,2005.
[136]于平,我国农业灌溉用水管理体制研究[D],华中农业大学,2006.
[137]周晓平,小型农田水利工程治理制度与治理模式研究[D],河海大学,2007.
[138]刘小锋,基于农户视角的农村公共产品需求研究——以福建省为例[D],浙江大学,2009.
[139]孟德锋,农户参与灌溉管理改革的影响研究[D],南京农业大学,2009.
[140]王焕炎,制度、权力、思想——以明清时山陕乡村水利治理为例,吉林大学,2009.
[141]姜涛,中国农村基础设施公共投资与农业增长研究[D],华中科技大学,2009.
[142]黄永新,西部农村社区公共产品的农民自主治理——基于广西北部湾农村地区的调查[D],中央民族大学,2011
[2]侯春梅,张志强,迟秀丽,《联合国世界水资源开发报告》呼吁加强水资源综合管理[J],地球科学进展,2006.11：1211-1214
[3]网易财经,http://money.163.com/13/0130/08/8MF3HV4000254IU4.html
[4]中华人民共和国水利部,2010中国水利统计年鉴[M],中国水利水电出版社,北京,2010.
[5]Binsmanger H, The policy Response of Agriculture, Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington D. C,1989:23.
[6]张宁,农村小型水利工程农户参与式管理及效率研究——以浙江省为例的实证分析[D],浙江大学,2007：3
[7]国家防讯抗旱总指挥部,中华人民共和国水利部,中国水旱灾害公报2011[M],北京：中国水利水电出版社,2011
[8]财政部、水利部联合出台《中央财政统筹从土地出让收益中计提的农田水利建设资金使用管理办法》,http://www.mwr.gov.cn/zwzc/czxx/201304/t20130419_434255.html
[9]重庆市农机水电局,重庆市水利志[M],第1版,重庆：重庆出版社,1996：3
[10]在线现代汉语词典,www.51240.com
[11]Samuelson. The pure theory of public expenditures [J]. Theory of Economics and Statistics. 1954(36):387
[12][美]萨缪尔森,诺德豪斯,经济学[M],第16版,北京：华夏出版社,2008：268
[13][比]吉恩·希瑞克斯,[英]加雷思·D·迈尔斯,中级公共经济学[M],第1版,上海：格致出版社,2011：74
[14][美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,集体行动的逻辑[M],第1版,上海：上海人民出版社,1994
[15]Comes, R. C., and Sandler, T.1996. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club goods. Carbridge University Press.
[16]Warr, p.1983. The private provision of public goods is independent of the distribution of income, Economic Letters 13:207-11.
[17]Berstorm, T. C., and Comes, R,1983. Independence of allocative efficiency from distribution in the theory of bublic goods. Journal of Public goods. Econometrica 51:1753-65
[18]Itaya, J,-I., de Meza, D., and Myles, G. D.2002. Income distribution, taxation and the private provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4:273-97
[19]Wicksell, A new Principle of Just Taxation, reprinted(1958) in R.A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock(eds) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (London,Macmillan) 81.
[20]彼德.M.杰克逊,公共部门经济学前沿问题[M],第1版,北京：中国税务出版社,2001：124
[21][美]康芒斯,制度经济学[M],第1版,北京：商务印书饭,1983：12
[22]D.诺斯,制度、制度变迁和经济绩效[M],第1版,上海：上海三联书店,1990,12-13
[23]刘凤梁,周业安,陈彦斌,行为经济学：理论与扩展[M],第1版,北京：中国经济出版社,2008.8：47
[24]尹钢,梁丽芝,行政组织学[M],第1版,北京：北京大学出版社,2005：154-155
[25]亚当·斯蜜,国富论[M],第1版,北京：华夏出版社,2005
[26]马歇尔,经济学原理(中译本)[M],第1版,北京：商务印书馆,1983
[27]科尔曼,社会理论的基础[M],第1版,北京：社会科学文献出版社,1990：330
[28]魏特夫,东方专制方义[M],第1版,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1989：18
[29][美]莫里斯·弗里德曼,中国东南的宗族组织[M],第1版,上海：上海人民出版社,2000：161-178
[30]郑振满,明清福建沿海农田水利制度与乡族组织[J],中国社会经济史研究,1987.4：38-45.
[31]黄宗智,中国研究的范式问题讨论[M],北京：社会科学文献出版社,2003：273
[32]罗兴佐,治水：国家介入与农民合作——荆门五村研究[D],华中师范大学,2005：16-66
[33]贺雪峰,乡村水利与农地制度创新——以荆门市划片承包调查为例[J],管理世界,2003：76-88
[34]罗兴佐,农村公共物品供给中的均衡[J],经济学家,2006.1：62-69
[35]时磊,由灌溉系统的崩溃到西部乡村社区的瓦解[J],贵州财经学院学报,2005.2
[36]柴玲,水资源利用的权力、道德与秩序——对晋南农村一个扬水站的研究[D],中央民族大学,2010：112-115
[37]刘芳、史晋川,组织关系视角下的农民合作组织行政科层化问题研究——以用水协会(WUA)的构建和发展为例[J],农业经济问题,2009.9：30-37
[38]廖弈,中国农村公共品供给制度变迁的宏观观察与求解[J],理论观察,2002.3：78-80
[39]李文,我国农村公共品供给分析[J],中央财经大学学报,2002.7：12-16
[40]樊宝洪,基于乡镇财政视角的农村公共产品供给研究[D],南京农业大学,2007。
[41]宋洪远等,中国乡村财政与公共管理研究[M],第1版,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004：5-6
[42]李梅华,我国农村小型水利设施融资模式研究[J],农业经济,2006.5：12-13
[43]孔祥智、涂圣伟,新农村建设中农户对公共物品的需求偏好及影响因素研究——以农田水利设施为例[J],农业经济问题,2006.10：10-15
[44]刘辉、陈思羽,农户参与小型农田水利建设意愿影响因素的实证分析——基于对湖南粮食主产区475户农户的调查[J],中国农村观察,2012.2：54-65
[45]王昕、陆迁,农村社区小型水利设施合作供给意愿的实证[J],中国人口资源与环境,2012.6：115-119
[46]徐丹丹、杨静、孟萧,北京农村公共品供给模式选择的实证分析——基于经济发展阶段的判断[J],农业经济问题,2009.6：81-85
[47]郑书耀,准公共品的私人供给研究[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2008：83-94
[48]李继刚,社区理性和市场理性——小农理性的演化[J],湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012.6：16-21
[49]刘文昕,龚欣,张元鹏,社会偏好的异质性、个人理性与合作捐献行为——基于公共品自愿捐献机制的实证研究[J],经济评论,2010.5：5-15
[50]汪崇金,聂左玲,岳军,个体异质性、预期与公共品自愿供给——来自中国的经济学实验证据[J],财贸经济,2012.8：
[51]周业安等,社会角色、个体异质性和公共品自愿供给[J],经济研究,2013.1：123-136
[52]周飞舟,从“汲取型”政权到“悬浮型”政权[J],社会学研究,2006.3：1
[53]樊宝洪,基于乡镇财政视角的农村公共产品供给研究[D],南京大学,2007：54
[54]张宁,陆文聪,董宏纪,中国农田水利管理效率及其农户参与性机制研究,自然资源学报,2012.3[J]：353-363
[55]倪细云,文亚青,农田水利基础设施建设的影响因素：陕西437户样本[J],改革,2011.10：85-91
[56]黎红梅,李明贤,集体水管理对农户水稻生产技术效率的影响研究-对湖北漳河灌区的实证分析[J],农业技术经济,2009.3：27-37
[57]丹尼斯·C·缪勒,公共选择理论[M],第1版,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999.4：24
[58]陈胜可,Spss统计分析从入门到精通[M],第1版,北京：清华大学出版社,2010.8：261
[59]涂圣伟,农民主动接触、需求偏好表达与农村公共物品供给效率改进,农业技术经济,2010.3：32-41
[60]贺雪峰,国家与农村社会互动的路径选择——兼论国家与农村社会双强关系的构建[J],浙江社会科学,1999.4：96-100
[61]宫哲元,集体行动逻辑视角下合作社原则的变迁[J],中国农村观察,2008.5：37-41
[62]王昕,陆迁,农村社区小型水利设施合作供给意愿的实证[J],中国人口.资源与环境,2012.6：115-119
[63]郑家喜,王姣,聂磊,政府农田水利项目风险管理研究[J],农业经济问题,2012.8：59-64.
[64]组织化视角的乡村水利困境解读及破局—基于对荆门王桥村水利状况调查[J],中国农村水利水电,2012.4：8-17
[65]沈满洪,谢慧明,公共物品问题及其解决思路——公共物品理论文献综述,浙江大学学报(人文社会利学版)2009.11：133-144
[66]R.M.Isaac&J.M.W alker, the G roup Size Effects:Public Goods Provision:The Volumtary Contributions Mechanism, the Quarterly Journal of E conomics, Vol.103, N o.1(1988), pp. 179-200.
[67]J.A ndreoni, the Cooperation in Pnblie Goods E xperiments:Kidness or Confusion? The American E conom Review, Vol85, No.4 (1995), pp.891-904.
[68]C.D.Fraser, on the Provision of Exchidable Public Goods, the Journal of P nblic Economics, Vol.60 (1996), pp.111-130.
[69]Bruns, B. H. Participatory irrigation management in Indonesia:Lessons fromexperience and issues for the future [C]. Paper presented at the Indonesia National Workshop on Participatory Irrigation Management, sponsored by EDI/WB and FAO. November,1996:4-8
[70]Coase, R. The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1960(3):123 - 125
[71]David, K.&Hildebrand. The Method and Technique of Social Statistics [M].Published by Sage publisher,2000:342-343
[72]David, L. C., Ganapathi, R.&Margaret, R. et al. The cost of operating Rural Water
[73]Systems[J].North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics,1984(16):56-64
[74]Esther, W. D.&Ndalahwa, F. M. Public participation in integrated waterresources management: the case of Tanzania [J]. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth,2003(28):1009-1014
[75]Farrell, M. J. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency [J]. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A,1957,3(2):253-290
[76]Himmelberg, H.&Palia, H. Understanding the Determinants of ManagerialOwnership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,53(2): 353-384
[77]Holmstrom, K.&Milgrom, H. Multi-task Principal-Agent Analysis [J]. Journalof Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1999(5):245-521
[78]Hu, B. D. Estimation of Chinese agricultural production efficiencies with panel
[79]data [J]. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation,2005,17(2):475-484
[80]Jondrow, C. A., Lovely, I. S.&Materov, P, et al. On the Estimation of Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1982,19(23): 233-239
[81]Jones, D. C., Svejnar, J.&Zevi, A. Participation, Profit Sharing. Worker Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperatives[J].Economica,1985,52(2):449-465
[82]Jules, N.&Pretty, R. Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture [J]. World Development, 1995,8(23):1247-1263
[83]Kolavalli, S.&Atheeq, L. K. Groundwater Utilization in'Itvo Villages in West Bengal [M]. 1990:345-387
[84]Koopmans, T. C. An Analysis of Production as an Effcient Combination ofActivities. In Koopmans T. C. (Ed.) Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation[C], Cowles Commission for Research in Economics. Monograph Wiley, New York,1951,13:123-128
[85]Lovell, C. A. Production Frontiers and Productive Efficiency In Fried, Lovell and Schmidt S.S.(Eds.), The Measurement of Productive Efficiency:Techniquesand Applications [C]. Oxford University Press, New York,1993:3-67
[86]Ma, J. Z., Wang, X. S.&Edmunds, W. M. The characteristics of ground-water resources and their change under the impacts of human activity in the arid Northwest China-a case study of the Shiyang River Basin [J]. Journal of AridEnvironments,2005,61(2):277-295
[87]Mirta, M., Rbsa, B.&Jorge, C. et al., Irrigation waterdecentralized irrigation administration [J]. Irrigation and1998(12):67-83
[88]North, R.&Douglass, C. Institutional Change and Economic Performance (M].New York: Cambridge University Press; 1990:38-42
[89]North, R., Douglass, C.&Robert, T. The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System:A System:A theoretical Model闭.Journal of Economic History,1973(12):237-252
[90]Samuelson, P. A. A note on the pure theory of consumer behaviour [M].Ecomica,1938:5-61
[91]Schultz, T. W. Transforming traditional agriculture [M]. Yale University Press,New Haven, CT. 1964:32-72
[92]Shahbaz, M.&Lin, H. Piedad Moya. An assessment of collective action for pond management in Zhanghe Irrigation System China[刀.Agricultural Systems,2007(92):140-156
[93]Thomas, D.&Ely, R. Making differences Matter:A New Baradigm for Management Diversity [J]. Harvard Business Review,1996(9):233-254
[94]Vermillion, D. L. Garces Restrepo.Irrigation Management Transfer in Colombia:A Pilot experiment and Its Consequences[A]. Short Report Series on Locally
[95]Managed Irrigation. Colombo, SriLanka:llM,1996,5
[96]Werner, D.&Alex, K. Rural and Farming Systems Analyses [J]. Environmental Perspectives, 2000(16):182-190
[97]White, A. Conceptual Framework:Performance and Evolution of Property Rights and Collective Action. IFPRI:Washington. D. C.1995 (11):34-38
[98]Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism [M]. FreePree. NewYork,1994-2006 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.1985:471,
[99]Yukio, T.&Yohei. S. Farmers management irrigation districts in Japan:Assessding how fairness may contribute to sustainability [J]. Agricultural WaterManagement, 2005,4(77):196-209
[100]Zhang, Y H., Alexander, X. H,&Zehnder, J. B. Water scarcity, pricingmechanism and institutional reform in northern China irrigated agriculture [J].Agricultural Water Management, 2003(16):143 - 161
[101]蔡守华,詹万林,高中光,小型灌溉工程管理模式剖析与建议[J],节水灌溉,
[102]2004(3)：37-38
[103]常云昆,丁士军,对农户风险及其处理策略的分析[J],中国农村经济,2003.11：66-71
[104]陈氰朱克成和李玉松.农村水利管理模式理论研究[J]河海大学学报(自然科学版),2004.1：95-100
[105]陈美球,刘中婷和周丙娟等.农村生存发展环境与农民耕地利用行为的实证分析[J],中国农村经济,2006.2：49-54
[106]陈锡文,建设社会主义新农村农田水利建设如何加强[J],中国水利,2006.2：2-6
[107]陈锡文,新世纪的“三农”问题[J],上海农村经济,2003.8：5-7
[108]成升魁.2002中国资源报告[M],北京：商务印书馆,2003： 56-67
[109]迪南[美],水价改革与政治经济一世界银行水价改革理论与政策[M],北京：中国水利水电出版社,2003：34-38
[110]丁平,李瑾和李崇光等.借鉴公私合作模式推进我国灌溉管理权移交改革[J].农业经济问题,2005(10)：46-50
[111]董浩,王旭峰.农田水利建设促进效益农业发展的对策[J],中国农村水利水电,2002.12：15-19
[112]杜威漩,黄祖辉.我国灌溉管理制度与环境的冲突及整合[J],中国农村经济,2004.6：25-31
[113]段永红,杨名远.农田灌溉节水激励机制与效应分析[J],农业技术经济,2003.4：13-19
[114]厄尔·O·黑迪,约翰·L·狄龙[美],农业生产函数[M],北京：农业出版社,1991：34-47
[115]杨美丽,张建英,林枢吴,对构建和谐农村水利产权关系的理论探讨[J],科学与管理,2007.6：84-86.
[116]傅奇蕾,陈炳山.对我国小型水利设施产权制度改革的探讨[J],枣庄学院学报,2007.4：88-90.
[117]申端锋,二十世纪农民合作逻辑的演变—从罗兴佐《治水：国家介入与农民合作》谈起[J],调研世界,2007.7：7-10.
[118]傅奇蕾,聊城市小型水利设施产权制度改革研究[D],山东农业大学,2007
[119]罗兴佐,对当前若千农田水利政策的反思[J],调研世界,2008(1)： 13-15
[120]温铁军,从西南大早反思我国农村水利投入方式[J],中国合作经济,2010(4)：8-9
[121]梁晓伟,李胜斌,吴继轩.从西南地区旱情看建设农业水利基础设施的紧迫性[J].经济 导刊,2010.4：11-12.
[122]杨忠礼,大力加强水利基础设施建设全面改善农村生产生活条件[J],水利天地,2010.9：19.
[123]王海伦,张立军,张丽华.东营市农村水利基础设施建设有关问题的思考[J].山东水利,2010.10：57-58.
[124]国务院发展研究中心“完善小型农田水利建设和管理机制研究”课题组,我国小型农田水利建设和管理机制：一个政策框架[J],改革,2011.8：5-9
[125]林辉煌,水利的依附性：水土关系视阈下的中国农田水利—基于湖北两个村庄的对比研究[J],中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2011.21：139-149
[126]黄有光,经济与快乐[M],大连：东北财经大学出版社,2000.6：69-78
[127]速水佑次郎,发展经济学[M],北京：社会科学出版社,2003.2：121-124
[128]巴泽尔,产权的经济分析[M],上海人民出版社,1997.6：20-43
[129]韩洪云,灌区农户的合作行为[J],中国农村观察,2002.4：56-61
[130]王广深,中国农村水利投融资机制的历史回顾与前瞻[J],社会科学,2012.1：47-57
[131]刘辉,陈思羽,农户参与小型农田水利建设意愿影响的因素的实证分析——基于对湖南省粮食主产区475户农户的调查[J],中国农村观察,2012.2：54-66
[132]潘宏亮,要素集聚视角下水利新技术产业化中政府行为分析,科技进步与对策,20]1.11：69-72
[133]王金霞,地下水灌溉系统产权制度创新、效率及政策——河北省小型水利工程的实证研究[D],中国农业科学院,2002.
[134]刘俊浩,农村社区农田水利建设组织动员机制研究[D],西南农业大学,2005.
[135]蒋俊杰,我国农村灌溉管理的制度分析(1949-2005)——以安徽省淠史杭灌区为例[D],复旦大学,2005.
[136]于平,我国农业灌溉用水管理体制研究[D],华中农业大学,2006.
[137]周晓平,小型农田水利工程治理制度与治理模式研究[D],河海大学,2007.
[138]刘小锋,基于农户视角的农村公共产品需求研究——以福建省为例[D],浙江大学,2009.
[139]孟德锋,农户参与灌溉管理改革的影响研究[D],南京农业大学,2009.
[140]王焕炎,制度、权力、思想——以明清时山陕乡村水利治理为例,吉林大学,2009.
[141]姜涛,中国农村基础设施公共投资与农业增长研究[D],华中科技大学,2009.
[142]黄永新,西部农村社区公共产品的农民自主治理——基于广西北部湾农村地区的调查[D],中央民族大学,2011