我国上市公司盈余质量研究：影响因素与经济后果分析
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摘要
随着经济的发展,企业制度和组织形式不断地完善,从最初的业主制企业和合伙制企业逐步转变为现代公司制企业。公司的规模不断发展壮大,成为国民经济重要的微观主体,特别是证券市场的兴起,不仅将社会上的闲散资金集中起来,加快了资金的流动和使用效率,同时也为企业发展拓展了筹资空间,解决了企业发展中的资金不足问题。
我国证券市场形成于20世纪90年代初期,在二十多年的发展过程中,逐步成长壮大,发挥着投资、筹资和定价等功能,已经成为国民经济的“晴雨表”。据统计,截止2009年底,我国上市公司达到1677家,其中在深交所上市的公司为830家,总市值超过59283亿元,上交所上市公司为847家,总市值达到184655.23亿元。①可以说,证券市场的蓬勃发展,为我国经济的发展和企业的成长提供了充足的资金。然而,资本市场对资源配置的效率如何?是否已经将有限的资本配置给了更好的上市公司?本文将从公司盈余质量的角度,对这些问题展开研究,并依据研究结论提出相应的政策建议。
一、研究目的
随着企业组织形式转变为现代公司制企业,这些公司制企业呈现出一些共同的特点,同时也带来了相应的问题。现代公司制企业明显呈现出所有权和经营权相分离,股权较为分散的特点。
正如Coase(1937)在《企业的性质》一文中指出的那样,企业存在的根本目的是为了降低交易费用,从而用权威取代价格机制。在企业中,会计信息特别是盈余信息发挥着重要的作用。根据会计目标的受托责任观和决策有用观,企业的盈余信息对于股东、投资者、供应商和政府部门等利益相关者各方都具有十分重要的意义,但是前提是企业财务报表中提供的这些盈余信息必须是真实的。由于企业所处的行业和自身发展状况不同,会计准则和会计政策在规定上为企业操纵盈余留下了一定的空间。在现实中,企业操纵盈余,降低盈余质量的情况也屡见不鲜。美国安然公司的会计假账案和施乐公司的财务诈骗案,我国的银广夏、德隆系列和中航油案件等,从根本上说都是盈余操纵的结果。这对证券市场和投资者造成了巨大的损失,给国家和社会经济发展也带来了危害,也使企业自身经营发展陷入了困境,其最终结果必然是整个社会稀缺的资源不能得到有效的利用,整个社会经济效率低下。
伯利和米恩斯于1932年出版的《现代公司与私有产权》一书中明确指出,由于公司所有权和经营权的分离,股权结构进一步分散,公司的控制权将转移到管理者手中,这将损害资本所有者的利益。由于所有权和经营权相分离,作为公司所有者的委托人和作为经营者的代理人之间不可避免的产生了委托代理问题,这将引发经理层的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”,损害出资人的利益。随着研究的进一步深入,不少学者(La Porta et al.)指出,伯利和米恩斯发现的股权过度分散的状况仅存在于美国等少数国家,而在东南亚等国家,股权则是较为集中的(Faccio and Lang,2002)。大股东可能利用他们的控股地位侵占中小股东的利益,而这种状况在世界范围内的现象更加普遍。公司治理机制作为企业成员之间的关系合约,在保证企业利益相关者之间权利的平衡以及促使公司做出科学的战略决策方面能够发挥重要的作用。
根据Oliver Hart在《公司治理理论与启示》中的论述,公司治理存在的两个前提条件是：一,组成企业的各个成员之间存在严重的委托代理问题；二,由于存在较高的代理费用,委托代理问题不能通过签订完备的合约加以解决。现代公司制企业中,作为公司所有者的全体股东、股东大会的执行机构——董事会以及负责企业日常生产经营的管理层之间存在复杂的委托代理关系；同时,由于现实的不确定性和难以预测性,通过签订完备的契约明确各方的权利和义务是不可能的。即使能够签订完备的契约约束各方的行为,交易费用也是巨大的。因此,在现实中,为了降低交易成本,我们会采用不完全合约的形式。不完全合约对目标、原则、处理问题的对策、决策权的分配和争端解决机制进行规定,而不对行为的详细内容达成协议。公司治理机制是按照公司法和公司规章制定的,具备了不完全合约的特征。
因此,改善公司治理机制,能够降低企业各组成成员之间的信息不对称,从而达到提高公司盈余质量的目的。
提高公司的盈余质量,使利益相关者能够获得公司充分、真实的决策信息,能够优化整个社会的资源配置效率。由于委托代理关系的存在和信息的不对称性,作为企业外部人的中小股东等利益相关者很难获得公司真实的盈余信息,这不利于各方做出正确的决策。而高质量的盈余信息能够真实的反应企业的财务状况和经营成果,更有利各方做出正确的决策,将有限的资源配置给效率更高的企业,从而有利于提高资源的配置效率。
因此,本文将从公司治理机制的角度研究盈余质量的影响因素,找出提高公司盈余质量的治理要素,为研究盈余质量的经济后果奠定基础；接下来,本文将从资源配置效率的角度进一步研究公司盈余质量的经济后果,为盈余质量的提高提供理论依据和政策支持。
二、研究内容
通过上面的分析,本文安排了七个章节对提出的问题进行分析,以实现研究目的。
第一章为导论。本章为开篇章节,在本章中首先论述了本文的研究主题和目的,接着陈述了本文的研究思路,然后说明了本文中主要用到的研究方法和本文的创新点,最后从总体上提出了本文的结构安排。
第二章为理论基础。在本章中,首先对本文中出现的关键概念——公司治理机制、盈余质量和资源配置效率等进行了界定,并给出相应的衡量方法,为后面的实证研究做好准备；接着从会计目标的角度提出了盈余的信息观、契约观和资源配置观,并从理论上分析公司治理机制、盈余质量和资源配置效率三者之间的关系。
第三章为文献综述。在本章中,从影响公司盈余质量的公司内部治理机制和外部治理机制两个方面对国内外的文献进行了综述,为后面实证分析影响公司盈余质量的影响因素提供理论依据,主要从公司盈余质量分别对投资效率和筹资效率的影响对文献进行综述；接着评述了盈余质量的经济后果——资源配置效率方面的文献,为后面实证研究盈余质量的经济后果奠定基础。
第四章为公司内部治理机制与盈余质量的分析。本章中,我们从公司内部治理机制的构成出发,分别从公司的所有权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励三个方面进行研究。首先,我们依据以前的研究成果和理论分析,提出了六个假设；接下来进行研究设计,我们搜集了我国沪深两市2004-2009年A股上市公司的数据为样本,定义了本章中需要用到的变量,采用修正的DD模型衡量公司的盈余质量,设计模型对提出的六个假设进行了实证分析和检验,为了检验结论的稳健性,我们还利用了修正的Jones模型衡量公司的盈余质量,进行了稳健性检验；最后,为本章的研究小结。
第五章为公司外部治理机制与盈余质量。在本章中,我们首先利用了李扬等(2005)编著的地区金融生态环境指数,作为公司外部治理机制的衡量。按照理论分析和提出假设、变量定义和模型设计、实证检验和分析等程序对公司外部治理机制和盈余质量之间的关系进行研究,最后对该章进行小结。
第六章为公司盈余质量与资源配置效率。在本章中,我们研究了从资源配置效率角度研究盈余质量的经济后果。由于资源配置效率的范围较为宽泛,我们着重从公司投资效率和筹资成本进行分析,运用实证分析方法,我们研究了公司盈余质量和资源配置效率之间的关系,最后是本章的小结。
第七章为研究结论、启示与不足。在本章中,我们首先总结了本文的研究结论,接着依照研究所得结论对优化公司内部和外部治理机制,提高公司盈余质量,进而提高资源配置效率给出了相应的政策建议,最后对本文研究中存在的问题和不足进行说明并提出了未来的研究思路和方向。
三、研究结论
本文通过以上的内容安排,得到了如下研究结论：
(1)优化公司内部治理机制能够提高公司盈余质量。从公司所有权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励三个方面对公司盈余质量的的研究,我们认为优化公司内部治理机制能够从根本上提高公司的盈余质量。
(2)外部治理机制对公司盈余质量造成了一定的影响。从公司所处的地区金融生态环境出发,研究公司外部治理机制对公司盈余质量的影响,研究发现单纯优化外部治理机制并不能达到提高公司盈余质量的目的。
(3)公司盈余质量的提高有利于资源的优化配置。公司盈余质量的提高能够降低公司中存在的非效率投资问题,同时也能够降低公司的筹资成本,从而达到优化资源配置效率的目的。
四、研究创新
本文从盈余质量出发,研究了公司治理机制是如何影响盈余质量的,并进一步研究了公司盈余质量的经济后果——对公司投资效率和融资成本的影响。本文的创新之处在于：(1)在研究治理机制对公司盈余质量的影响时,本文对内部治理机制和外部治理机制两个方面进行了系统的研究。内部治理机制主要包括所有权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励等；在外部治理机制方面,将金融生态环境评价指标作为外部治理机制引入,研究了外部治理机制对公司盈余质量的影响。这不仅系统研究了内部治理机制对盈余质量的影响,还创造性的将衡量金融生态环境的指标作为外部治理机制引入,进一步丰富了公司治理机制与盈余质量的文献,有助于公司不断的改善内部治理机制,同时也为政府等相关部门优化外部治理环境,从整体上提升上市公司的盈余质量提供决策依据。(2)在研究盈余质量的经济后果时,系统考虑了其对公司投资决策和融资成本两个方面的影响,使我们能够从投资和筹资两个方面考察盈余质量的经济后果。在研究公司盈余质量对投资效率的影响时,利用Richardson (2006)的公司投资期望模型的残差的绝对值来衡量公司投资效率,拓宽了投资效率的衡量标准。(3)本文在研究盈余质量的影响因素及其经济后果时,综合了产权性质、外部金融生态环境等因素进行研究。研究认为,单纯优化外部治理机制不能提高公司的盈余质量,只有通过内部和外部治理机制的改善才能显著提高公司的盈余质量,这为系统考虑内部和外部治理机制的作用提供了理论依据；在研究盈余质量的经济后果时,也考虑产权性质的影响,这为我国进一步明晰产权,深化产权制度改革提供了理论支持。
With the development of economy, it is also improved of enterprises, which gradually transformed from the property owners and Partnerships into modern corporate enterprises. Companies continue to grow and develop to become the main micro-economic importance. The rise of the stock market not only gathers surplus funds to speed up the flow and efficiency, but also expands the funding space for enterprise to solve the problem of insufficient funding for them.
China's securities market was formed in 1990, which played roles of fund-raising, financing and pricing and other functions. It obviously has become the "barometer" for the national economy. There are 1677 listed companies which possess total market value more than in China in the end of 2009, the total market value of more than 243938 billion. Therefore, Securities market Provide adequate funding for the development of enterprises. However, has Securities market played roles of improving the efficiency of resource allocation and providing scarce resources to high-quality companies? We are trying to research this problem and to propose appropriate policy recommendations based on the conclusions we get before.
With the establishment of modern corporate system, there are many common characters appeared into them, including not only the separation of ownership and management rights but also dispersed ownership et al. In their famous book called < Modern Corporation and Private Property> which pressed in 1932, Berle and Means pointed that control of the company would be transferred to the hands of managers in United States, which would encroach the interests of capital owners. Because of the separation of ownership and management, principal-agent problem emerges, which will lead managers to "adverse selection" and "moral hazard"
With further research, many scholars such as La Porta, Faccio and Lang et al. believe that ownership is almost concentrated in other countries especially southeast Asia, which lead major shareholders to encroach minority shareholders by holding position. It is found that this is common in the world. As a contract between members in corporate, corporate governance can play roles to ensure the right balance between stakeholders and to prompt the company made scientific strategic decisions.
In his book called< Theory and Implications of Corporate Governance>,Oliver Hart considered that there are two prerequisites for the existence of corporate governance:first, it exits serious principal-agent problem among members composed of the business; second, it is impossible to solve the principal-agent problem by signing complete contract. Therefore, we should solve the principal-agent problem by signing incomplete contract which prescribes Objectives, principles, measures to the distribution of decision-making and dispute settlement mechanisms solve problems. Corporate governance possesses the characteristics of incomplete contract, which develops in accordance with company law and corporate regulations. Therefore, it is possible for us to coordinate the interests of all stakeholders in the company through corporate governance.
As Coase in his paper'The nature of the Firm"pointed out, the fundamental purpose of existence of the business is to reduce transaction costs by replacing the price mechanism with the authority. Accounting information especially earning information plays an important role in the enterprise, because earning information is important for the stakeholders such as Shareholders, investors, suppliers and government departments et al.. Earning information the stakeholders get from the enterprises must be true to help them make decision. However, some enterprise often manipulate earnings in order to provide lower earnings quality, which not only caused huge losses to stock market and investors, but also brought hazards to National and socio-economic development. Finally, it must lead enterprises into trouble because of scarce resources in the community can not be effectively used.
In order to optimize the efficiency of the allocation of social resources, we must raise the company's earnings quality, which can provide real earning information for stakeholders to make decision. Because of the existence of agency relationship and the information asymmetry, minority shareholders and other external stakeholders are difficult to obtain real earning information about the company. We need to optimize the company's internal and external governance mechanisms in order to improve the earning quality, which can reduce the principal-agent problem in company and cause enterprises provide true earning information. So stakeholder should make decision to invest surplus funds to companies with high efficiency and company can also use resources effectively in order to obtain more capital from investors, which can bring about optimal allocation of resources.
Previous studies have shown that corporate governance mechanisms can play roles in reducing agency costs, improving company performance, and optimizing resource allocation et al.. But the question that corporate governance is how to plays roles in optimizing the efficiency of resource allocation is not researched. Therefore, from the view of earnings quality, we want to research internal and external governance mechanisms is how to improve earnings quality. With the high earnings quality, we want to know whether the efficiency of resource allocation is optimized.
With the question we are confused and wanted to research, we plan to six chapters to analyze and research the question.
The first chapter is an introduction. In this chapter, firstly, we discuss the theme and significance of this paper; secondly, we provide the research process and the major findings; thirdly, we describe the main research methods used and the innovation of this paper; finally, we show the overall arranged structure in this paper.
The second chapter is theoretical basis. In this chapter, from the traditional information theory and views of contracts and the extended theory of the concept of resource allocation, we propose the function and role of earnings quality. Meanwhile, we give the definition of key concepts.
The third chapter is the literature review and theoretical basis. We reviewed the literature from three aspects, which are the relationship between internal corporate governance and earnings quality, the relationship between outer corporate governance and earnings quality and the relationship between earnings quality and efficiency of resource allocation. This literature and theoretical analysis set up the base for the research behind.
The fourth chapter is the analysis between internal governance mechanisms and earnings quality. We know that internal governance mechanisms obtain three main aspects, which are Ownership structure, board characteristics and management incentive. Firstly, we suggest six hypothesizes based on the analysis and literature; secondly, we collect data from 2004 to 2009 in the listed companies in the stock market of China to research by panel data regression in order to test hypotheses. Finally, we summarized this chapter.
The fifth chapter is the research on external governance mechanisms and earnings quality. In this chapter, at first, we defined index of regional financial ecological environment as a factor of external governance mechanisms. Then we propose hypothesis, define variables, design models and regress the variables by panel data successively. Finally, we get the conclusion of this chapter.
Chapter six is the economic result of earnings quality. In this chapter we are tying to find out whether high earnings quality can improve efficiency of resource allocation from invest efficiency of enterprises and financing efficiency. Then we propose hypothesis, define variables, design models and regress the variables by panel data successively. Finally, we summarized this chapter
Chapter seven is conclusions, implication and prospects. This is the last chapter of this paper. First, we summarized the conclusions we get before; and then we propose the policy recommendations according to conclusions; finally, we point out the lack of research in this paper and the field of future research.
This paper reached the following conclusions by the content of above arrangement:
(1) Optimization of internal governance mechanisms can improve the quality of earnings. We suggest that we take much importance to internal governance mechanisms including ownership structure, board characteristics and management incentive, which can play roles in high earnings quality.
(2) External governance mechanisms can influence earnings quality. As one factor of external governance mechanisms, we find that regional financial ecological environment cannot improve earnings quality alone.
(3) That improving the quality of corporate earnings is in favor of the optimal allocation of resources. We get the conclusion that improving earnings quality can reduce the inefficiency of investment, but also reduce the company's financing costs.
The main innovations of this paper are:
(1)In this paper, we research the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality, and then we also find out earnings quality cause economic consequences that is efficiency of resource allocation. It is said that earnings quality act as an intermediary between corporate governance and efficiency of resource allocation.
(2)Researching on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality, we consider not only internal corporate governance which includes ownership structure, board characteristics and management incentive, but also one factor of external corporate governance. First time, we think regional financial ecological environment as external corporate governance, which enrich the literature on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality. Meanwhile, we should systematically consider factors influencing earnings quality from internal and external corporate governance.
(3)We systematically research the economic consequent of earnings quality from invest efficiency and financing efficiency. We also research the nature of the final controller in enterprise how to influence earnings quality and efficiency of resource allocation.
我国证券市场形成于20世纪90年代初期,在二十多年的发展过程中,逐步成长壮大,发挥着投资、筹资和定价等功能,已经成为国民经济的“晴雨表”。据统计,截止2009年底,我国上市公司达到1677家,其中在深交所上市的公司为830家,总市值超过59283亿元,上交所上市公司为847家,总市值达到184655.23亿元。①可以说,证券市场的蓬勃发展,为我国经济的发展和企业的成长提供了充足的资金。然而,资本市场对资源配置的效率如何?是否已经将有限的资本配置给了更好的上市公司?本文将从公司盈余质量的角度,对这些问题展开研究,并依据研究结论提出相应的政策建议。
一、研究目的
随着企业组织形式转变为现代公司制企业,这些公司制企业呈现出一些共同的特点,同时也带来了相应的问题。现代公司制企业明显呈现出所有权和经营权相分离,股权较为分散的特点。
正如Coase(1937)在《企业的性质》一文中指出的那样,企业存在的根本目的是为了降低交易费用,从而用权威取代价格机制。在企业中,会计信息特别是盈余信息发挥着重要的作用。根据会计目标的受托责任观和决策有用观,企业的盈余信息对于股东、投资者、供应商和政府部门等利益相关者各方都具有十分重要的意义,但是前提是企业财务报表中提供的这些盈余信息必须是真实的。由于企业所处的行业和自身发展状况不同,会计准则和会计政策在规定上为企业操纵盈余留下了一定的空间。在现实中,企业操纵盈余,降低盈余质量的情况也屡见不鲜。美国安然公司的会计假账案和施乐公司的财务诈骗案,我国的银广夏、德隆系列和中航油案件等,从根本上说都是盈余操纵的结果。这对证券市场和投资者造成了巨大的损失,给国家和社会经济发展也带来了危害,也使企业自身经营发展陷入了困境,其最终结果必然是整个社会稀缺的资源不能得到有效的利用,整个社会经济效率低下。
伯利和米恩斯于1932年出版的《现代公司与私有产权》一书中明确指出,由于公司所有权和经营权的分离,股权结构进一步分散,公司的控制权将转移到管理者手中,这将损害资本所有者的利益。由于所有权和经营权相分离,作为公司所有者的委托人和作为经营者的代理人之间不可避免的产生了委托代理问题,这将引发经理层的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”,损害出资人的利益。随着研究的进一步深入,不少学者(La Porta et al.)指出,伯利和米恩斯发现的股权过度分散的状况仅存在于美国等少数国家,而在东南亚等国家,股权则是较为集中的(Faccio and Lang,2002)。大股东可能利用他们的控股地位侵占中小股东的利益,而这种状况在世界范围内的现象更加普遍。公司治理机制作为企业成员之间的关系合约,在保证企业利益相关者之间权利的平衡以及促使公司做出科学的战略决策方面能够发挥重要的作用。
根据Oliver Hart在《公司治理理论与启示》中的论述,公司治理存在的两个前提条件是：一,组成企业的各个成员之间存在严重的委托代理问题；二,由于存在较高的代理费用,委托代理问题不能通过签订完备的合约加以解决。现代公司制企业中,作为公司所有者的全体股东、股东大会的执行机构——董事会以及负责企业日常生产经营的管理层之间存在复杂的委托代理关系；同时,由于现实的不确定性和难以预测性,通过签订完备的契约明确各方的权利和义务是不可能的。即使能够签订完备的契约约束各方的行为,交易费用也是巨大的。因此,在现实中,为了降低交易成本,我们会采用不完全合约的形式。不完全合约对目标、原则、处理问题的对策、决策权的分配和争端解决机制进行规定,而不对行为的详细内容达成协议。公司治理机制是按照公司法和公司规章制定的,具备了不完全合约的特征。
因此,改善公司治理机制,能够降低企业各组成成员之间的信息不对称,从而达到提高公司盈余质量的目的。
提高公司的盈余质量,使利益相关者能够获得公司充分、真实的决策信息,能够优化整个社会的资源配置效率。由于委托代理关系的存在和信息的不对称性,作为企业外部人的中小股东等利益相关者很难获得公司真实的盈余信息,这不利于各方做出正确的决策。而高质量的盈余信息能够真实的反应企业的财务状况和经营成果,更有利各方做出正确的决策,将有限的资源配置给效率更高的企业,从而有利于提高资源的配置效率。
因此,本文将从公司治理机制的角度研究盈余质量的影响因素,找出提高公司盈余质量的治理要素,为研究盈余质量的经济后果奠定基础；接下来,本文将从资源配置效率的角度进一步研究公司盈余质量的经济后果,为盈余质量的提高提供理论依据和政策支持。
二、研究内容
通过上面的分析,本文安排了七个章节对提出的问题进行分析,以实现研究目的。
第一章为导论。本章为开篇章节,在本章中首先论述了本文的研究主题和目的,接着陈述了本文的研究思路,然后说明了本文中主要用到的研究方法和本文的创新点,最后从总体上提出了本文的结构安排。
第二章为理论基础。在本章中,首先对本文中出现的关键概念——公司治理机制、盈余质量和资源配置效率等进行了界定,并给出相应的衡量方法,为后面的实证研究做好准备；接着从会计目标的角度提出了盈余的信息观、契约观和资源配置观,并从理论上分析公司治理机制、盈余质量和资源配置效率三者之间的关系。
第三章为文献综述。在本章中,从影响公司盈余质量的公司内部治理机制和外部治理机制两个方面对国内外的文献进行了综述,为后面实证分析影响公司盈余质量的影响因素提供理论依据,主要从公司盈余质量分别对投资效率和筹资效率的影响对文献进行综述；接着评述了盈余质量的经济后果——资源配置效率方面的文献,为后面实证研究盈余质量的经济后果奠定基础。
第四章为公司内部治理机制与盈余质量的分析。本章中,我们从公司内部治理机制的构成出发,分别从公司的所有权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励三个方面进行研究。首先,我们依据以前的研究成果和理论分析,提出了六个假设；接下来进行研究设计,我们搜集了我国沪深两市2004-2009年A股上市公司的数据为样本,定义了本章中需要用到的变量,采用修正的DD模型衡量公司的盈余质量,设计模型对提出的六个假设进行了实证分析和检验,为了检验结论的稳健性,我们还利用了修正的Jones模型衡量公司的盈余质量,进行了稳健性检验；最后,为本章的研究小结。
第五章为公司外部治理机制与盈余质量。在本章中,我们首先利用了李扬等(2005)编著的地区金融生态环境指数,作为公司外部治理机制的衡量。按照理论分析和提出假设、变量定义和模型设计、实证检验和分析等程序对公司外部治理机制和盈余质量之间的关系进行研究,最后对该章进行小结。
第六章为公司盈余质量与资源配置效率。在本章中,我们研究了从资源配置效率角度研究盈余质量的经济后果。由于资源配置效率的范围较为宽泛,我们着重从公司投资效率和筹资成本进行分析,运用实证分析方法,我们研究了公司盈余质量和资源配置效率之间的关系,最后是本章的小结。
第七章为研究结论、启示与不足。在本章中,我们首先总结了本文的研究结论,接着依照研究所得结论对优化公司内部和外部治理机制,提高公司盈余质量,进而提高资源配置效率给出了相应的政策建议,最后对本文研究中存在的问题和不足进行说明并提出了未来的研究思路和方向。
三、研究结论
本文通过以上的内容安排,得到了如下研究结论：
(1)优化公司内部治理机制能够提高公司盈余质量。从公司所有权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励三个方面对公司盈余质量的的研究,我们认为优化公司内部治理机制能够从根本上提高公司的盈余质量。
(2)外部治理机制对公司盈余质量造成了一定的影响。从公司所处的地区金融生态环境出发,研究公司外部治理机制对公司盈余质量的影响,研究发现单纯优化外部治理机制并不能达到提高公司盈余质量的目的。
(3)公司盈余质量的提高有利于资源的优化配置。公司盈余质量的提高能够降低公司中存在的非效率投资问题,同时也能够降低公司的筹资成本,从而达到优化资源配置效率的目的。
四、研究创新
本文从盈余质量出发,研究了公司治理机制是如何影响盈余质量的,并进一步研究了公司盈余质量的经济后果——对公司投资效率和融资成本的影响。本文的创新之处在于：(1)在研究治理机制对公司盈余质量的影响时,本文对内部治理机制和外部治理机制两个方面进行了系统的研究。内部治理机制主要包括所有权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励等；在外部治理机制方面,将金融生态环境评价指标作为外部治理机制引入,研究了外部治理机制对公司盈余质量的影响。这不仅系统研究了内部治理机制对盈余质量的影响,还创造性的将衡量金融生态环境的指标作为外部治理机制引入,进一步丰富了公司治理机制与盈余质量的文献,有助于公司不断的改善内部治理机制,同时也为政府等相关部门优化外部治理环境,从整体上提升上市公司的盈余质量提供决策依据。(2)在研究盈余质量的经济后果时,系统考虑了其对公司投资决策和融资成本两个方面的影响,使我们能够从投资和筹资两个方面考察盈余质量的经济后果。在研究公司盈余质量对投资效率的影响时,利用Richardson (2006)的公司投资期望模型的残差的绝对值来衡量公司投资效率,拓宽了投资效率的衡量标准。(3)本文在研究盈余质量的影响因素及其经济后果时,综合了产权性质、外部金融生态环境等因素进行研究。研究认为,单纯优化外部治理机制不能提高公司的盈余质量,只有通过内部和外部治理机制的改善才能显著提高公司的盈余质量,这为系统考虑内部和外部治理机制的作用提供了理论依据；在研究盈余质量的经济后果时,也考虑产权性质的影响,这为我国进一步明晰产权,深化产权制度改革提供了理论支持。
With the development of economy, it is also improved of enterprises, which gradually transformed from the property owners and Partnerships into modern corporate enterprises. Companies continue to grow and develop to become the main micro-economic importance. The rise of the stock market not only gathers surplus funds to speed up the flow and efficiency, but also expands the funding space for enterprise to solve the problem of insufficient funding for them.
China's securities market was formed in 1990, which played roles of fund-raising, financing and pricing and other functions. It obviously has become the "barometer" for the national economy. There are 1677 listed companies which possess total market value more than in China in the end of 2009, the total market value of more than 243938 billion. Therefore, Securities market Provide adequate funding for the development of enterprises. However, has Securities market played roles of improving the efficiency of resource allocation and providing scarce resources to high-quality companies? We are trying to research this problem and to propose appropriate policy recommendations based on the conclusions we get before.
With the establishment of modern corporate system, there are many common characters appeared into them, including not only the separation of ownership and management rights but also dispersed ownership et al. In their famous book called < Modern Corporation and Private Property> which pressed in 1932, Berle and Means pointed that control of the company would be transferred to the hands of managers in United States, which would encroach the interests of capital owners. Because of the separation of ownership and management, principal-agent problem emerges, which will lead managers to "adverse selection" and "moral hazard"
With further research, many scholars such as La Porta, Faccio and Lang et al. believe that ownership is almost concentrated in other countries especially southeast Asia, which lead major shareholders to encroach minority shareholders by holding position. It is found that this is common in the world. As a contract between members in corporate, corporate governance can play roles to ensure the right balance between stakeholders and to prompt the company made scientific strategic decisions.
In his book called< Theory and Implications of Corporate Governance>,Oliver Hart considered that there are two prerequisites for the existence of corporate governance:first, it exits serious principal-agent problem among members composed of the business; second, it is impossible to solve the principal-agent problem by signing complete contract. Therefore, we should solve the principal-agent problem by signing incomplete contract which prescribes Objectives, principles, measures to the distribution of decision-making and dispute settlement mechanisms solve problems. Corporate governance possesses the characteristics of incomplete contract, which develops in accordance with company law and corporate regulations. Therefore, it is possible for us to coordinate the interests of all stakeholders in the company through corporate governance.
As Coase in his paper'The nature of the Firm"pointed out, the fundamental purpose of existence of the business is to reduce transaction costs by replacing the price mechanism with the authority. Accounting information especially earning information plays an important role in the enterprise, because earning information is important for the stakeholders such as Shareholders, investors, suppliers and government departments et al.. Earning information the stakeholders get from the enterprises must be true to help them make decision. However, some enterprise often manipulate earnings in order to provide lower earnings quality, which not only caused huge losses to stock market and investors, but also brought hazards to National and socio-economic development. Finally, it must lead enterprises into trouble because of scarce resources in the community can not be effectively used.
In order to optimize the efficiency of the allocation of social resources, we must raise the company's earnings quality, which can provide real earning information for stakeholders to make decision. Because of the existence of agency relationship and the information asymmetry, minority shareholders and other external stakeholders are difficult to obtain real earning information about the company. We need to optimize the company's internal and external governance mechanisms in order to improve the earning quality, which can reduce the principal-agent problem in company and cause enterprises provide true earning information. So stakeholder should make decision to invest surplus funds to companies with high efficiency and company can also use resources effectively in order to obtain more capital from investors, which can bring about optimal allocation of resources.
Previous studies have shown that corporate governance mechanisms can play roles in reducing agency costs, improving company performance, and optimizing resource allocation et al.. But the question that corporate governance is how to plays roles in optimizing the efficiency of resource allocation is not researched. Therefore, from the view of earnings quality, we want to research internal and external governance mechanisms is how to improve earnings quality. With the high earnings quality, we want to know whether the efficiency of resource allocation is optimized.
With the question we are confused and wanted to research, we plan to six chapters to analyze and research the question.
The first chapter is an introduction. In this chapter, firstly, we discuss the theme and significance of this paper; secondly, we provide the research process and the major findings; thirdly, we describe the main research methods used and the innovation of this paper; finally, we show the overall arranged structure in this paper.
The second chapter is theoretical basis. In this chapter, from the traditional information theory and views of contracts and the extended theory of the concept of resource allocation, we propose the function and role of earnings quality. Meanwhile, we give the definition of key concepts.
The third chapter is the literature review and theoretical basis. We reviewed the literature from three aspects, which are the relationship between internal corporate governance and earnings quality, the relationship between outer corporate governance and earnings quality and the relationship between earnings quality and efficiency of resource allocation. This literature and theoretical analysis set up the base for the research behind.
The fourth chapter is the analysis between internal governance mechanisms and earnings quality. We know that internal governance mechanisms obtain three main aspects, which are Ownership structure, board characteristics and management incentive. Firstly, we suggest six hypothesizes based on the analysis and literature; secondly, we collect data from 2004 to 2009 in the listed companies in the stock market of China to research by panel data regression in order to test hypotheses. Finally, we summarized this chapter.
The fifth chapter is the research on external governance mechanisms and earnings quality. In this chapter, at first, we defined index of regional financial ecological environment as a factor of external governance mechanisms. Then we propose hypothesis, define variables, design models and regress the variables by panel data successively. Finally, we get the conclusion of this chapter.
Chapter six is the economic result of earnings quality. In this chapter we are tying to find out whether high earnings quality can improve efficiency of resource allocation from invest efficiency of enterprises and financing efficiency. Then we propose hypothesis, define variables, design models and regress the variables by panel data successively. Finally, we summarized this chapter
Chapter seven is conclusions, implication and prospects. This is the last chapter of this paper. First, we summarized the conclusions we get before; and then we propose the policy recommendations according to conclusions; finally, we point out the lack of research in this paper and the field of future research.
This paper reached the following conclusions by the content of above arrangement:
(1) Optimization of internal governance mechanisms can improve the quality of earnings. We suggest that we take much importance to internal governance mechanisms including ownership structure, board characteristics and management incentive, which can play roles in high earnings quality.
(2) External governance mechanisms can influence earnings quality. As one factor of external governance mechanisms, we find that regional financial ecological environment cannot improve earnings quality alone.
(3) That improving the quality of corporate earnings is in favor of the optimal allocation of resources. We get the conclusion that improving earnings quality can reduce the inefficiency of investment, but also reduce the company's financing costs.
The main innovations of this paper are:
(1)In this paper, we research the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality, and then we also find out earnings quality cause economic consequences that is efficiency of resource allocation. It is said that earnings quality act as an intermediary between corporate governance and efficiency of resource allocation.
(2)Researching on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality, we consider not only internal corporate governance which includes ownership structure, board characteristics and management incentive, but also one factor of external corporate governance. First time, we think regional financial ecological environment as external corporate governance, which enrich the literature on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality. Meanwhile, we should systematically consider factors influencing earnings quality from internal and external corporate governance.
(3)We systematically research the economic consequent of earnings quality from invest efficiency and financing efficiency. We also research the nature of the final controller in enterprise how to influence earnings quality and efficiency of resource allocation.
引文
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