基于复杂网络的海洋排污权配置及其交易机制研究
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摘要
本文对海洋排污权的配置及交易进行了规范研究和实例研究。首先构建了排污网络,为将来排污权交易市场的建设提供平台；其次构建了流域初始排污权的层级分配模型,包括基于动态规划的流域功能区间排污权分配及基于市场机制的功能区内排污主体间排污权分配；然后出于降低排污权交易成本的考虑,提出了适用我国现阶段国情的基于复杂关系网络的排污权交易；最后对排污权交易的技术激励效应进行了探讨。
通过研究,获得了以下研究成果和研究结论。
1、整合福利优化原则及经济性原则,构建了功能区间初始排污权分配模型,并提出基于公平性原则的利益补偿方法。通过相关模型分析得到以下研究结论：
(1)居民根据边际危害等于边际收入效用与边际消费效用来决定最优初始排污权削减量。如果减少单位初始排污权削减量所带来的危害的增加量大于所带来的收入的减少量以及消费效用的减少量,居民愿意削减全部的初始排污权削减权限。反之,居民削减初始排污权量为零。
(2)居民出售单位初始排污权削减权限的价格越高,增加单位可分配初始排污权所导致的居民消费效用的增加量越大,则可分配初始排污权量越大。且存在一个价格的阈值,当价格大于该阈值时,居民会出售所有的排污权削减权限,也就是说初始排污权削减量为零,此时可分配初始排污权量最大。
(3)提出均权调整系数,如果经过该系数调整后的各功能区初始排污权公平分配量完全相等,则各功能区达到绝对的均衡。公平性分配的目标是最小化各功能区间经均权调整系数调整后的公平分配量之间的差异的平方和。
(4)排污权利用效率高的功能区将获得更多的排污权；此外单位排污权的价值越大,排污权利用效率高的功能区分配的排污权越大。
2、构建了基于市场机制的排污主体间初始排污权分配模型,相关结论如下
(1)均衡条件下单位污水处理价格等于排污权价格,且企业购买排污权数量等于外包污水处理量。排污权价格越高,则企业治污量越大,购买排污权数量以及外包污水处理量越小。
(2)污水处理机构的最优污水处理量与排污权价格也就是污水处理价格成正比,与政府给予污水处理机构的单位治污补贴成正比。
(3)基于模型提出政府部门制定排污权价格的四种目标,分别是排污权市场出清、实现优于允许排放量的各类污染排放量、充分利用污水处理机构的治污能力以及福利最大化。
3、提出了基于复杂关系网络的排污权交易的执行步骤及交易模型。
(1)只有有效传播大于文中所给传播临界值时,买方节点的购买信息才能够在网络中进行有效的传播,否则买方节点的购买信息无法大规模传播。
(2)定义了买方与各卖方间的最短交易路径,并为各交易路径排序,从而给出潜在交易节点的集合,这样有效地缩小了信息搜索的范围,从而降低交易成本。
(3)基于交易双方是否存在竞争及交易是否需要中间组织两个维度给出了排污权交易的四类模型。重点研究非竞争性条件下的交易模型,探讨了交易双方合作及不合作条件下的交易,并给出了各自情况下的最优交易量及最优交易价格。
4、探讨了排污权交易的技术激励效应,研究了企业如何将有限的研发资金投入到绿色生产技术及末端污染治理技术研发中去以实现效益最大化,结论如下：
(1)产品的价格应不小于产品的边际生产成本与边际排污收费之和；收益率、边际生产技术研发投入带来的成本降低以及边际生产技术研发投入带来的信用销售收入之和不得低于单位研发投入排污费用削减；排污费用不得高于企业的单位治污成本。
(2)详细分析了模型中各系数对排污企业污染削减量、生产技术研发投资及末端污染治理技术研发投资决策的影响。
5、此外对排污网络的拓扑结构进行了研究,并在第三章中综合运用UCINET、Pajek及MATLAB软件,构建了青岛市内四区排污网络,并证明了排污网络具有复杂网络特有的小世界特性及无标度特性。
6、在案例部分中给出了渤海环境污染的基本状况,并以2008年统计数据为基础对小清河流域的初始排污权分配进行了研究,给出居民初始排污权最优削减量以及在两功能区间的最优分配方案。同时还得知为实现均衡,政府须将单位污染带来的危害保持在一个合理的范围内。
The dissertation adopts normative research and empirical research on allocation and trading of ocean emission permits. Firstly, the dissertation constructs pollution network, which can provide platform for emission trading in the future; Secondly, a hierarchical allocation model about initial emission permits is proposed; Thirdly, the dissertation researches how to trade emission permits based on complex relationship network; finally, the dissertation researches on technology incentives of emission trading policy.
According to relevant researches, some outcomes and conclusions are made.
First, construct allocation model of initial permits among function zones. The model integrates welfare optimization principle with economical efficiency principle. It also contains interest compensation mechanism based on fairness principle. Through analyzing the model, the dissertation gets some conclusions. To begin with, the residents will make emission permit abatement decision based on the principle that margin pollution damage equals to margin consumption utility and margin income utility. Residents will abate the most if margin pollution damage is larger than margin consumption utility and margin income utility. Residents will abate zero if the opposite is true. Additionally, quantity of distributable initial permits is positive relation with price of emission abatement and with residents consumption utility increase under per increase of distributable initial permit. There exists a threshold that if the price of emission abatement is larger than it, residents will abate zero initial permits. Moreover, an adjustment coefficient is given. Objective of fair allocation is to achieve minimum total differences among fair allocation quantity adjusted by the adjustment coefficient. Finally, function zones that use permits more effective will gain more allocation. And the larger the value of per permit, the more allocation function zones that use permits more effective can get.
Second, construct allocation model of initial permits among polluters based on market mechanism and draw some conclusions. To begin with, under equilibrium, sewage treatment price must be equal to emission permit price, and polluters will buy the same quantity of emission permits as quantity of outsourcing sewage treatment. Quantity of inner pollution abatement is positive to emission permit price. Quantity of outsource sewage treatment and emission permit purchase are negative to emission permit price. Additionally, pollution quantity that sewage treatment plants decide to treat is positive to emission permit price and unit amount of government's subsidy. Moreover, four objectives of the government are proposed, and then government can set the price of emission permits.
Third, propose executive steps and trade model of emission permit trading based on complex relationship network and draw some conclusions. To begin with, permits purchase information of the buyer can spread extensively only if effective propagation is large than the given propagation threshold. Additionally, shortest trading path is defined. With help of the definition, we can gain the potential trading nodes, bringing reduction of transaction costs. Moreover, the dissertation proposes four kinds of model based on whether there exists competition between the buyer and the seller and whether they need intermediate organization. The dissertation pays more attention to researching on model that there isn't competition between the buyer and the seller. And then the dissertation researches on optimal trading quantity and optimal trading price.
Four, discuss technology incentive effect of emission trading policy. It is mainly about how to allocate limited R&D investments to green production technology and terminal pollution abatement technology in order to maximize benefits. According to research, the dissertation draws some conclusions. Firstly, product price should be larger than margin production cost and margin pollution fee. Pollution fee should be less than inner pollution abatement costs. Sum of yield return, sales revenue that is from investment in technology R&D, and cost reduction that is from investment in technology R&D should be larger than margin pollution fee reduction that is from investment in technology R&D. Moreover, the dissertation analyzes what affect pollution abatement quantity, and optimal R&D investment in green production technology and in terminal pollution abatement technology in detail.
Five, the dissertation researches on topological structure of pollution network and constructs pollution network of four urban districts of Qingdao. And with help of UCINET, Pajek, and MATLAB, the dissertation verifies that small-world feature and scale-free feature are characteristic of pollution network.
Six, in the case study, the dissertation summarizes basic conditions of generalized Bohai sea area. And it also researches on initial emission permits allocation of Xiaoqing River. Optimal emission permits abatement quantity and optimal allocation project are also given.
Researches in the dissertation help to develop and perfect emission permits trading theory in our country. Conclusions also instruct implementation of emission permits trading in our country.
通过研究,获得了以下研究成果和研究结论。
1、整合福利优化原则及经济性原则,构建了功能区间初始排污权分配模型,并提出基于公平性原则的利益补偿方法。通过相关模型分析得到以下研究结论：
(1)居民根据边际危害等于边际收入效用与边际消费效用来决定最优初始排污权削减量。如果减少单位初始排污权削减量所带来的危害的增加量大于所带来的收入的减少量以及消费效用的减少量,居民愿意削减全部的初始排污权削减权限。反之,居民削减初始排污权量为零。
(2)居民出售单位初始排污权削减权限的价格越高,增加单位可分配初始排污权所导致的居民消费效用的增加量越大,则可分配初始排污权量越大。且存在一个价格的阈值,当价格大于该阈值时,居民会出售所有的排污权削减权限,也就是说初始排污权削减量为零,此时可分配初始排污权量最大。
(3)提出均权调整系数,如果经过该系数调整后的各功能区初始排污权公平分配量完全相等,则各功能区达到绝对的均衡。公平性分配的目标是最小化各功能区间经均权调整系数调整后的公平分配量之间的差异的平方和。
(4)排污权利用效率高的功能区将获得更多的排污权；此外单位排污权的价值越大,排污权利用效率高的功能区分配的排污权越大。
2、构建了基于市场机制的排污主体间初始排污权分配模型,相关结论如下
(1)均衡条件下单位污水处理价格等于排污权价格,且企业购买排污权数量等于外包污水处理量。排污权价格越高,则企业治污量越大,购买排污权数量以及外包污水处理量越小。
(2)污水处理机构的最优污水处理量与排污权价格也就是污水处理价格成正比,与政府给予污水处理机构的单位治污补贴成正比。
(3)基于模型提出政府部门制定排污权价格的四种目标,分别是排污权市场出清、实现优于允许排放量的各类污染排放量、充分利用污水处理机构的治污能力以及福利最大化。
3、提出了基于复杂关系网络的排污权交易的执行步骤及交易模型。
(1)只有有效传播大于文中所给传播临界值时,买方节点的购买信息才能够在网络中进行有效的传播,否则买方节点的购买信息无法大规模传播。
(2)定义了买方与各卖方间的最短交易路径,并为各交易路径排序,从而给出潜在交易节点的集合,这样有效地缩小了信息搜索的范围,从而降低交易成本。
(3)基于交易双方是否存在竞争及交易是否需要中间组织两个维度给出了排污权交易的四类模型。重点研究非竞争性条件下的交易模型,探讨了交易双方合作及不合作条件下的交易,并给出了各自情况下的最优交易量及最优交易价格。
4、探讨了排污权交易的技术激励效应,研究了企业如何将有限的研发资金投入到绿色生产技术及末端污染治理技术研发中去以实现效益最大化,结论如下：
(1)产品的价格应不小于产品的边际生产成本与边际排污收费之和；收益率、边际生产技术研发投入带来的成本降低以及边际生产技术研发投入带来的信用销售收入之和不得低于单位研发投入排污费用削减；排污费用不得高于企业的单位治污成本。
(2)详细分析了模型中各系数对排污企业污染削减量、生产技术研发投资及末端污染治理技术研发投资决策的影响。
5、此外对排污网络的拓扑结构进行了研究,并在第三章中综合运用UCINET、Pajek及MATLAB软件,构建了青岛市内四区排污网络,并证明了排污网络具有复杂网络特有的小世界特性及无标度特性。
6、在案例部分中给出了渤海环境污染的基本状况,并以2008年统计数据为基础对小清河流域的初始排污权分配进行了研究,给出居民初始排污权最优削减量以及在两功能区间的最优分配方案。同时还得知为实现均衡,政府须将单位污染带来的危害保持在一个合理的范围内。
The dissertation adopts normative research and empirical research on allocation and trading of ocean emission permits. Firstly, the dissertation constructs pollution network, which can provide platform for emission trading in the future; Secondly, a hierarchical allocation model about initial emission permits is proposed; Thirdly, the dissertation researches how to trade emission permits based on complex relationship network; finally, the dissertation researches on technology incentives of emission trading policy.
According to relevant researches, some outcomes and conclusions are made.
First, construct allocation model of initial permits among function zones. The model integrates welfare optimization principle with economical efficiency principle. It also contains interest compensation mechanism based on fairness principle. Through analyzing the model, the dissertation gets some conclusions. To begin with, the residents will make emission permit abatement decision based on the principle that margin pollution damage equals to margin consumption utility and margin income utility. Residents will abate the most if margin pollution damage is larger than margin consumption utility and margin income utility. Residents will abate zero if the opposite is true. Additionally, quantity of distributable initial permits is positive relation with price of emission abatement and with residents consumption utility increase under per increase of distributable initial permit. There exists a threshold that if the price of emission abatement is larger than it, residents will abate zero initial permits. Moreover, an adjustment coefficient is given. Objective of fair allocation is to achieve minimum total differences among fair allocation quantity adjusted by the adjustment coefficient. Finally, function zones that use permits more effective will gain more allocation. And the larger the value of per permit, the more allocation function zones that use permits more effective can get.
Second, construct allocation model of initial permits among polluters based on market mechanism and draw some conclusions. To begin with, under equilibrium, sewage treatment price must be equal to emission permit price, and polluters will buy the same quantity of emission permits as quantity of outsourcing sewage treatment. Quantity of inner pollution abatement is positive to emission permit price. Quantity of outsource sewage treatment and emission permit purchase are negative to emission permit price. Additionally, pollution quantity that sewage treatment plants decide to treat is positive to emission permit price and unit amount of government's subsidy. Moreover, four objectives of the government are proposed, and then government can set the price of emission permits.
Third, propose executive steps and trade model of emission permit trading based on complex relationship network and draw some conclusions. To begin with, permits purchase information of the buyer can spread extensively only if effective propagation is large than the given propagation threshold. Additionally, shortest trading path is defined. With help of the definition, we can gain the potential trading nodes, bringing reduction of transaction costs. Moreover, the dissertation proposes four kinds of model based on whether there exists competition between the buyer and the seller and whether they need intermediate organization. The dissertation pays more attention to researching on model that there isn't competition between the buyer and the seller. And then the dissertation researches on optimal trading quantity and optimal trading price.
Four, discuss technology incentive effect of emission trading policy. It is mainly about how to allocate limited R&D investments to green production technology and terminal pollution abatement technology in order to maximize benefits. According to research, the dissertation draws some conclusions. Firstly, product price should be larger than margin production cost and margin pollution fee. Pollution fee should be less than inner pollution abatement costs. Sum of yield return, sales revenue that is from investment in technology R&D, and cost reduction that is from investment in technology R&D should be larger than margin pollution fee reduction that is from investment in technology R&D. Moreover, the dissertation analyzes what affect pollution abatement quantity, and optimal R&D investment in green production technology and in terminal pollution abatement technology in detail.
Five, the dissertation researches on topological structure of pollution network and constructs pollution network of four urban districts of Qingdao. And with help of UCINET, Pajek, and MATLAB, the dissertation verifies that small-world feature and scale-free feature are characteristic of pollution network.
Six, in the case study, the dissertation summarizes basic conditions of generalized Bohai sea area. And it also researches on initial emission permits allocation of Xiaoqing River. Optimal emission permits abatement quantity and optimal allocation project are also given.
Researches in the dissertation help to develop and perfect emission permits trading theory in our country. Conclusions also instruct implementation of emission permits trading in our country.
引文
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