基于公司权力视角的财务治理结构研究
|
摘要
作为财务治理核心的财务治理结构,是公司财务与公司治理交叉渗透的产物,肩负着公司财务方面和治理方面的双重使命,成为当前学术界和实务界广泛关注的焦点问题。然而,近年来中国资本市场频繁发生的大股东侵占挪用上市公司资金、大股东欺诈中小投资者、上市公司虚假陈述、信息披露违规误导、市场操纵等违法违纪现象,严重阻碍了资本市场的发展,损害了投资者的权益。造成目前我国上市公司财务舞弊和大肆圈钱行为的根本原因是,公司内外均缺乏有效的投资者利益保护机制,公司财务治理失控,财务治理主体缺位,财务治理结构不合理。
面对严峻的现实我们不得不承认,影响公司财务运作效率的关键性因素,其实并不是财务的技术性方法,而是技术背后的权力较量和制度安排,即公司自身的权力结构及与此相关的法人财产权在公司内部的配置,也就是公司财务治理权(也即财权,包括财务决策权、财务执行权和财务监督权)如何在财务治理主体之间进行合理的配置,而现有的研究对财务治理权的界定还并不十分明确,划分并不十分全面。为此,本文从引入O-SEA权力模型着手,以一种追根溯源的方式来定义公司权力,描绘出一幅公司权力在各种财务治理主体之间对称动态分布的全景图形,以期对优化财务治理结构和提高财务治理效率有所裨益。
本文按照“提出问题——基础理论概述——分析问题——解决问题”的研究思路,在行文结构安排上分为:研究背景及意义;研究内容;理论支撑;模型引入;分类应用分析;完善对策。全文以公司权力配置为核心,结合具体财务治理结构分析,有针对性地提出改善对策和建议:第一,把握O-SEA权力之间的转化,提出了构造稳定性的权力治理结构;第二,针对我国监事会与独立董事并存的二元财务监督机构的特点,提出了基于不同理念的职能定位、组建O-SEA权力主体参与的监事会以及建立独立的独立董事选聘机制三点建议。
Financial governance structure is the core of financial governance, coming from the combination of corporate governance and corporate finance. So, it responds two different tasks: governance and finance, which makes it a focus between academe and practice. However, in recent years the phenomenons of law and discipline violations such as the major shareholders misappropriating and embezzling funds of listed companies, large shareholders frauding medium and small investors, false statements of listed companies, information disclosure violations and misleading, market manipulation happen frequently in China's capital market, which is a serious impediment to the development of capital markets and undermine investors interests. The fundamental reason of the current financial fraud and behavior of big enclosing money of China's listed companies is that there are lack of effective protection mechanisms for investors both inside or outside the companies, corporate financial governance is out of control, absence of the financial govemance subject and financial governance structure is irrational.
Faced with the grim reality we have to admit that the critical factors affecting the efficiency of financial operations, in fact, are not the financial and technical methods, but the competitions of power and institutional arrangements behind the technology, namely the company's own power structure and the configuration of the relevant legal property rights within the company, that is how we make rational allocation of the corporate financial governance right (ie financial authority, including financial decision-making power, financial executive power and the financial supervision) along the financial govemance subjects, while the existing research has not yet define the corporate financial governance right clearly and the division is not very comprehensive. For this reason, this paper begins with introducing the O-SEA power model, defines corporate power in a way of tracing the source and sketches out a panorama of symmetric distribution of the corporate power along the differrent financial govemance subjects, with a view to help to optimize the financial governance structure and improve the financial governance efficiency.
The thesis follows the researching mentality of“proposing the problem—summarizing basic theory—analyzing the problem—solving the problem”, and it is consisted of the following five parts: resarching background and practical significance, researching content, theories related to financial governance, introducing the O-SEA power model, classification analysis, improvement measures. Combined with analysis of specific financial governance structure, the thesis concentrates on the corporate power configuration and puts forward measures and suggestions to perfect financial governance structure and improve the efficiency of financial governance: first, grasp the conversion between the O-SEA power and propose to construct a stable governance structure of power; second, for the characteristic of the dual financial oversight bodies including board of supervisors and independent directors, put forward three suggestions: locate the function based on different concepts,formate the board of supervisors including O-SEA power objects and establish an independent mechanism to select the independent directors.
面对严峻的现实我们不得不承认,影响公司财务运作效率的关键性因素,其实并不是财务的技术性方法,而是技术背后的权力较量和制度安排,即公司自身的权力结构及与此相关的法人财产权在公司内部的配置,也就是公司财务治理权(也即财权,包括财务决策权、财务执行权和财务监督权)如何在财务治理主体之间进行合理的配置,而现有的研究对财务治理权的界定还并不十分明确,划分并不十分全面。为此,本文从引入O-SEA权力模型着手,以一种追根溯源的方式来定义公司权力,描绘出一幅公司权力在各种财务治理主体之间对称动态分布的全景图形,以期对优化财务治理结构和提高财务治理效率有所裨益。
本文按照“提出问题——基础理论概述——分析问题——解决问题”的研究思路,在行文结构安排上分为:研究背景及意义;研究内容;理论支撑;模型引入;分类应用分析;完善对策。全文以公司权力配置为核心,结合具体财务治理结构分析,有针对性地提出改善对策和建议:第一,把握O-SEA权力之间的转化,提出了构造稳定性的权力治理结构;第二,针对我国监事会与独立董事并存的二元财务监督机构的特点,提出了基于不同理念的职能定位、组建O-SEA权力主体参与的监事会以及建立独立的独立董事选聘机制三点建议。
Financial governance structure is the core of financial governance, coming from the combination of corporate governance and corporate finance. So, it responds two different tasks: governance and finance, which makes it a focus between academe and practice. However, in recent years the phenomenons of law and discipline violations such as the major shareholders misappropriating and embezzling funds of listed companies, large shareholders frauding medium and small investors, false statements of listed companies, information disclosure violations and misleading, market manipulation happen frequently in China's capital market, which is a serious impediment to the development of capital markets and undermine investors interests. The fundamental reason of the current financial fraud and behavior of big enclosing money of China's listed companies is that there are lack of effective protection mechanisms for investors both inside or outside the companies, corporate financial governance is out of control, absence of the financial govemance subject and financial governance structure is irrational.
Faced with the grim reality we have to admit that the critical factors affecting the efficiency of financial operations, in fact, are not the financial and technical methods, but the competitions of power and institutional arrangements behind the technology, namely the company's own power structure and the configuration of the relevant legal property rights within the company, that is how we make rational allocation of the corporate financial governance right (ie financial authority, including financial decision-making power, financial executive power and the financial supervision) along the financial govemance subjects, while the existing research has not yet define the corporate financial governance right clearly and the division is not very comprehensive. For this reason, this paper begins with introducing the O-SEA power model, defines corporate power in a way of tracing the source and sketches out a panorama of symmetric distribution of the corporate power along the differrent financial govemance subjects, with a view to help to optimize the financial governance structure and improve the financial governance efficiency.
The thesis follows the researching mentality of“proposing the problem—summarizing basic theory—analyzing the problem—solving the problem”, and it is consisted of the following five parts: resarching background and practical significance, researching content, theories related to financial governance, introducing the O-SEA power model, classification analysis, improvement measures. Combined with analysis of specific financial governance structure, the thesis concentrates on the corporate power configuration and puts forward measures and suggestions to perfect financial governance structure and improve the efficiency of financial governance: first, grasp the conversion between the O-SEA power and propose to construct a stable governance structure of power; second, for the characteristic of the dual financial oversight bodies including board of supervisors and independent directors, put forward three suggestions: locate the function based on different concepts,formate the board of supervisors including O-SEA power objects and establish an independent mechanism to select the independent directors.
引文
①Alchian和Dcmsetz(1972)批判了那种以命令或权威来标示企业的思想(Coase,1937),并指出企业的本质特征在于企业是一个拥有剩余索取权的“中心签约人”(the centralized contractual agent)。这之后,企业理论的研究基本上被定格为对“剩余索取权”的安排上,即使后来的“剩余控制权”(residual rights of control)来标识企业性质的不完全合约理论最终落脚点,仍然还是“剩余收入”和“剩余索取权”——无非它所强调这种权利是通过与人力资本相关联的剩余控制权而获得(Grossman & Hart,1986,Hart & Morre,1990;Hart,1995)“控制权和剩余索取权应该如何安排”已经成为企业理论的主流框架,而且又以研究“剩余索取权”的分配为重点。参见杨瑞龙、杨其静,“专用性、专有性与企业制度”,《经济研究》【J】,2001年第3期,P84-93。
①王广亮,《基丁权力的企业契约形成与变迁研究》【D】,吉林人学博士论文,2006年。
①Schleifer,A. and R. W. Vishny:1997,A Survey of Corporate Governance,The Journal of Finance LII(2),P8。
②Hart,0.,and Moore,J.,1999,“Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”,Review of Economic Studies,vol.66,P134。
③杨其静,《企业家的企业理论》【M】,北京:中国人民人学出版社,2005年版,P210。
①何自力,“论公司权力结构与公司治理”,《经济学家》【J】,1998年第3期,P68-74;程宗璋,“董事会权能与公司法人治理结构”,《南通师范学院学报》(哲社版)【J】,2001年6月第17卷,第2期,P128-132。
①杨瑞龙、杨其静,“专用性,专有性与企业制度”,《经济研究》【J】,2001年第3期,P84-93。
①Ranjan.G.R.,and zingales,L.,“Power in a Theory of The Firm”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,vol.113,No.2(May,1998),P388-432。
②转引自丁春贵,基于利益相关者治理的公司监事会制度研究【J】《,安徽大学学报》,2007年第3期,P132-133。
[1] Jesen M.,and Meckling W.,Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360
[2] Aghion, P. and Bolton P.,An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies,1992,59:473-494
[3] Aghion P,and Tirole J.,“Formal and real authority in organizations”,Journal of Political Economy,1997,105,(1):l-29
[4] Freeman,R.E.1984. Strategic management:A stakeholder approach,Boston MA: pitman
[5] Blair,Margaret,Ownership and control: Rethinking Corporate Governance For 2lst Century, Washington:the Brookings institution,1995,108-121
[6]杨瑞龙,周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用.北京:经济科学出版社,2000,11-50
[7]李维安.公司治理学.北京:高等教育出版社,2005,50-85
[8]李伟.基于资本治理理论的企业所有权安排——股东至上理论与利益相关者理论的逻辑统一.中国工业经济,2005:122-128
[9]叶正茂.组织人力资本论——人力资本理论的拓展研究与应用.上海:复旦大学出版社,2007,10-19
[10]伍中信.现代公司财务治理理论的形成与发展.会计研究,2005,(10):13-18
[11]伍中信,曹越,张荣武.财务动态治理论纲.财经理论与实践,2007,(2):78-81
[12]衣龙新.公司财务治理理论.北京:清华大学出版社,2005,55-68
[13]宋献中.合约理论与财务行为分析.广州:广东人民出版社,2001,74-92
[14]林钟高,徐虹.财务冲突及其纾解:一项基于契约理论的分析.会计研究,2006,(6):8-14
[15]冯巧根.财务范式新论.上海:立信会计出版社,2000,218-220
[16]黄菊波,杨小舟.上市公司治理结构与财务治理相关问题研究.财政研究,2003,(2):16
[17]李心合.关于财务理论若干问题研究.财经研究,2001,(1):46-51
[18]杨淑娥,金帆.关于公司财务治理问题的思考.会计研究,2002,(12):51-55
[19] Alchian and Demsetz, Production.Information Costs and Economic Organization, American Economic Review,1972:777-795
[20] Cheung, S“The Contractual Nature of the Firm”,Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26:1-21
[21]杨小凯,黄有光.专业化与经济组织.北京:经济科学出版社,1999,38-50
[22] Williamson O.E., The Economic Institutions of capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting, New York Free Press,1985,60-74
[23] Rajan R.G.,Zingales L.,Power in a Theory of the Firm,the Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998:113
[24]杨其静.企业家的企业理论.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005,5
[25] Hart,O.,Firm,Contracts and Financial Structure,Oxford University Press,1995,3-10
[26]休谟.人性论(下).关文运译,商务印书馆,1996,534-535
[27]刘元春.权力与企业治理结构——种马克思的动态宏观分析框架.教学与研究,2005,(3):12
[28]凡勃伦.企业论.北京:商务印书馆,1963,88-91
[29] Vanek Jaroslav,The general theory of labor managed market economic,Ithaca,New York:Cornell University Press,1970,112-120
[30] Maglin ,S.A,“Knowledge and Power”.in F.Stephen ed,The Economics of Organization and Labor,1984:22-28
[31]王广亮.基于权力的企业契约形成与变迁研究.吉林大学博士论文,2006:43-48
[32] John Roberts and Eric Van den steen, Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance. Stanford Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA94305-5015 USA
[33]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联出版社,1996, 117-119
[34] Schleifer,A.and R.W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of Finance ,1997,LII(2):737-783
[35] Hart,O.,and Moore,J.“Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”,Review of Economic Studies, 1999,vol.66:34
[36]何自力.论公司权力结构与公司治理.经济学家,1998,(3):50-53
[37]徐向艺,张晓峰.企业权力的来源、O-SEA分类与公司治理.软科学, 2007, (12): 68-73
[38] http://www.mmrc.net
[39]李维安,张耀伟.上市公司董事会治理与绩效倒U形曲线关系研究.经济理论与经济管理, 2004,(8):36-42
[40]丁春贵.基于利益相关者治理的公司监事会制度研究.安徽大学学报,2007,(3):132-133
[41]徐向艺.公司治理制度安排与组织设计.北京:经济科学出版社,2006,104-106
①王广亮,《基丁权力的企业契约形成与变迁研究》【D】,吉林人学博士论文,2006年。
①Schleifer,A. and R. W. Vishny:1997,A Survey of Corporate Governance,The Journal of Finance LII(2),P8。
②Hart,0.,and Moore,J.,1999,“Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”,Review of Economic Studies,vol.66,P134。
③杨其静,《企业家的企业理论》【M】,北京:中国人民人学出版社,2005年版,P210。
①何自力,“论公司权力结构与公司治理”,《经济学家》【J】,1998年第3期,P68-74;程宗璋,“董事会权能与公司法人治理结构”,《南通师范学院学报》(哲社版)【J】,2001年6月第17卷,第2期,P128-132。
①杨瑞龙、杨其静,“专用性,专有性与企业制度”,《经济研究》【J】,2001年第3期,P84-93。
①Ranjan.G.R.,and zingales,L.,“Power in a Theory of The Firm”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,vol.113,No.2(May,1998),P388-432。
②转引自丁春贵,基于利益相关者治理的公司监事会制度研究【J】《,安徽大学学报》,2007年第3期,P132-133。
[1] Jesen M.,and Meckling W.,Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360
[2] Aghion, P. and Bolton P.,An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies,1992,59:473-494
[3] Aghion P,and Tirole J.,“Formal and real authority in organizations”,Journal of Political Economy,1997,105,(1):l-29
[4] Freeman,R.E.1984. Strategic management:A stakeholder approach,Boston MA: pitman
[5] Blair,Margaret,Ownership and control: Rethinking Corporate Governance For 2lst Century, Washington:the Brookings institution,1995,108-121
[6]杨瑞龙,周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用.北京:经济科学出版社,2000,11-50
[7]李维安.公司治理学.北京:高等教育出版社,2005,50-85
[8]李伟.基于资本治理理论的企业所有权安排——股东至上理论与利益相关者理论的逻辑统一.中国工业经济,2005:122-128
[9]叶正茂.组织人力资本论——人力资本理论的拓展研究与应用.上海:复旦大学出版社,2007,10-19
[10]伍中信.现代公司财务治理理论的形成与发展.会计研究,2005,(10):13-18
[11]伍中信,曹越,张荣武.财务动态治理论纲.财经理论与实践,2007,(2):78-81
[12]衣龙新.公司财务治理理论.北京:清华大学出版社,2005,55-68
[13]宋献中.合约理论与财务行为分析.广州:广东人民出版社,2001,74-92
[14]林钟高,徐虹.财务冲突及其纾解:一项基于契约理论的分析.会计研究,2006,(6):8-14
[15]冯巧根.财务范式新论.上海:立信会计出版社,2000,218-220
[16]黄菊波,杨小舟.上市公司治理结构与财务治理相关问题研究.财政研究,2003,(2):16
[17]李心合.关于财务理论若干问题研究.财经研究,2001,(1):46-51
[18]杨淑娥,金帆.关于公司财务治理问题的思考.会计研究,2002,(12):51-55
[19] Alchian and Demsetz, Production.Information Costs and Economic Organization, American Economic Review,1972:777-795
[20] Cheung, S“The Contractual Nature of the Firm”,Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26:1-21
[21]杨小凯,黄有光.专业化与经济组织.北京:经济科学出版社,1999,38-50
[22] Williamson O.E., The Economic Institutions of capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting, New York Free Press,1985,60-74
[23] Rajan R.G.,Zingales L.,Power in a Theory of the Firm,the Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998:113
[24]杨其静.企业家的企业理论.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005,5
[25] Hart,O.,Firm,Contracts and Financial Structure,Oxford University Press,1995,3-10
[26]休谟.人性论(下).关文运译,商务印书馆,1996,534-535
[27]刘元春.权力与企业治理结构——种马克思的动态宏观分析框架.教学与研究,2005,(3):12
[28]凡勃伦.企业论.北京:商务印书馆,1963,88-91
[29] Vanek Jaroslav,The general theory of labor managed market economic,Ithaca,New York:Cornell University Press,1970,112-120
[30] Maglin ,S.A,“Knowledge and Power”.in F.Stephen ed,The Economics of Organization and Labor,1984:22-28
[31]王广亮.基于权力的企业契约形成与变迁研究.吉林大学博士论文,2006:43-48
[32] John Roberts and Eric Van den steen, Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance. Stanford Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA94305-5015 USA
[33]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:上海三联出版社,1996, 117-119
[34] Schleifer,A.and R.W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of Finance ,1997,LII(2):737-783
[35] Hart,O.,and Moore,J.“Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”,Review of Economic Studies, 1999,vol.66:34
[36]何自力.论公司权力结构与公司治理.经济学家,1998,(3):50-53
[37]徐向艺,张晓峰.企业权力的来源、O-SEA分类与公司治理.软科学, 2007, (12): 68-73
[38] http://www.mmrc.net
[39]李维安,张耀伟.上市公司董事会治理与绩效倒U形曲线关系研究.经济理论与经济管理, 2004,(8):36-42
[40]丁春贵.基于利益相关者治理的公司监事会制度研究.安徽大学学报,2007,(3):132-133
[41]徐向艺.公司治理制度安排与组织设计.北京:经济科学出版社,2006,104-106