电力行业激励机制研究
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摘要
本文是在我国电力体制改革如火如荼的背景下形成的。作为传统的垄断行业，电力行业是我国十五、十一五期间改革的焦点行业之一。从2002年正式实施《电力体制改革方案》，电力体制改革方案的总体目标是：打破垄断，引入竞争，提高效率，降低成本，健全电价机制，优化资源配置，促进电力发展，推进全国联网，构建政府监管下的政企分开、公平竞争、开放有序、健康发展的电力市场体系。从生产过程上可以把电力行业分为发电、输配电、售电三个环节。目前，电力行业体制改革已取得了阶段性成果。行业的结构性拆分已经完成，发电环节已经引入竞争，电力紧张局面得到缓解。输配电环节和售电环节还是处于垄断状态，政府对这两个环节进行严格的规制管理。但是，从现在的发展情况看，电力行业体制改革不尽如人意，进展缓慢，各环节面临的困难很多：发电环节存在固定资产投资规模不受控制，上网电价定价机制存在诸多问题；输配电环节存在激励机制不到位，电网可靠性和安全性严重滞后，投资缺乏资金等问题；售电环节存在销售价格定价机制不能反映激励机制要求的问题。诸多问题的关键原因之一在于激励机制设计不合理。本文主要运用激励规制理论分析了我国电力行业的改革模式。电力行业的三个主要环节，即发电、输配电和售电端，都有着区别于其它环节的显著的特点，针对这些特点，在信息不对称条件下，本文分别展开分析，力求提出解决各个环节在改革过程中出现的困难和问题的一些思路和政策主张，为我国对电力行业实施有效规制提供理论依据。
发电端最大的困难在于固定资产投资规模和上网电价定价问题。在信息不对称条件下，被规制者边际成本和固定成本是私人信息，本文运用Jean-Jacques
Laffont和Dayid Martimort(2002)里的类型依赖理论建立了激励规制模型分析最优投资规模，并得出了一般性的结论，在信息不对称条件下，只要规制者将发电的投资规模控制在一定范围内，就可以达到社会最优状态。为解决发电行业准入的逆向选择问题，本文提出通过公开的投资规模信号进行甄别，鼓励效率高的投资商进入发电行业。同时，根据目前我国在发电环节实行两部制电价政策的实际情况，指出两部制电价的优势和劣势，并提出用拍卖的方式对两部制电价政策进行改进。目前我国现行的两部制电价政策可能会导致投资过量，利用招标拍卖方
This thesis is under condition that the electricity industry reform has occured all over our country. The electricity industry is traditional monopoly industry and also focal industry in "tenth five year" and "eleventh five year" scheme. Our country has performed "the electricity system reform scheme" from 2002 year. The electricity system reform scheme' s goal is : breaking monopoly, inducing competition, enhancing efficiency, reducing cost, healthy tariff mechanism, optimal resource adjustment, promotion of the electricity development, network in the whole country. From the point of view of production flow, the electricity industry includes three patches: generating, transmitting and switching, selling. At present, the electricity system reform has achieved good result. Our country has finished the structural split of the electricity industry. Generating patch has already import competition,and shortage of the electricity has appeased. At the same time, transmitting and switching, selling patches are in natural monopoly and the government has gone on a tight regulatory management on the two patches.But, from the point of view of present instance, the electricity system reform has not succeeded, and moved slowly, and every patch has many difficulties. Generating patch: fixed assets investment scale out of control, the power network ariff mechanism has many shortcoming. Transmitting and switching patch: motivation mechanism has not worked, the reliability and security of the network has been largely behind the world level, short of investment. Selling patch: the sale price mechanism can not satisfy motivation mechanism needs. One of the important reason is immoderate incentive mechanism design. This thesis analyzes the electricity industry reform mode by new regulatory economics. The electricity industry has three
发电端最大的困难在于固定资产投资规模和上网电价定价问题。在信息不对称条件下，被规制者边际成本和固定成本是私人信息，本文运用Jean-Jacques
Laffont和Dayid Martimort(2002)里的类型依赖理论建立了激励规制模型分析最优投资规模，并得出了一般性的结论，在信息不对称条件下，只要规制者将发电的投资规模控制在一定范围内，就可以达到社会最优状态。为解决发电行业准入的逆向选择问题，本文提出通过公开的投资规模信号进行甄别，鼓励效率高的投资商进入发电行业。同时，根据目前我国在发电环节实行两部制电价政策的实际情况，指出两部制电价的优势和劣势，并提出用拍卖的方式对两部制电价政策进行改进。目前我国现行的两部制电价政策可能会导致投资过量，利用招标拍卖方
This thesis is under condition that the electricity industry reform has occured all over our country. The electricity industry is traditional monopoly industry and also focal industry in "tenth five year" and "eleventh five year" scheme. Our country has performed "the electricity system reform scheme" from 2002 year. The electricity system reform scheme' s goal is : breaking monopoly, inducing competition, enhancing efficiency, reducing cost, healthy tariff mechanism, optimal resource adjustment, promotion of the electricity development, network in the whole country. From the point of view of production flow, the electricity industry includes three patches: generating, transmitting and switching, selling. At present, the electricity system reform has achieved good result. Our country has finished the structural split of the electricity industry. Generating patch has already import competition,and shortage of the electricity has appeased. At the same time, transmitting and switching, selling patches are in natural monopoly and the government has gone on a tight regulatory management on the two patches.But, from the point of view of present instance, the electricity system reform has not succeeded, and moved slowly, and every patch has many difficulties. Generating patch: fixed assets investment scale out of control, the power network ariff mechanism has many shortcoming. Transmitting and switching patch: motivation mechanism has not worked, the reliability and security of the network has been largely behind the world level, short of investment. Selling patch: the sale price mechanism can not satisfy motivation mechanism needs. One of the important reason is immoderate incentive mechanism design. This thesis analyzes the electricity industry reform mode by new regulatory economics. The electricity industry has three
引文
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2. Armstrong and Sappington, 2004, Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information , Journal of Regulation Economics, 26(1), 5-22
3. Armstrong, M, 2002, The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection, in Handbook of Telecommunications Economics: Volume I, ed. by M. Cave, S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang. North-Holland, Amsterdam
4. Armstrong. M , S.Cowan and J. vickes, 1994, Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
5. Averch, H. and L. Johnson, 1962, "Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint", American Economic Review 52.
6. Baron, D., and R. Myerson, 1982, Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs, Econometrica, 50(4), 911-930
7. Baumol, W. J., 1982, "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, " American Economic Review 72: PP . 1-15
8. Blanchard and Kremer, 1997, Disorganization, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 114 (4)
9. Bushnell.J. and S. Stoft , 1996, Electric Grid Investment Under a Contract Network Regime, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10:61-79
10. Castnheira and Roland, 2000, The Optimal Speed of Transition: A General Equilibriun Analysis, International Economic Review, Vol 41
11. Chadha and Corcelli, 1997, Fiscal Constraints and the Speed of Transition, Journal of Development Economics, Vol 52
12. Chao. H. P. and S. Peck, 1996, A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10(1):25-59
13. Derk Bunn, Issac Dyner, 1996, Systems simulation to support integrated energy analysis and liberalised planning[J]. Int. Trans. Op1. Res. (Vol. 3). p105-115
14. Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole, 1991, Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
15. Hay, D and D. Morris, 1991, Industrial Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press
16. Hurwicz, L., 1972, "On Informational Decentralized Systems," Decision and Organization, Radner, R. and C. B. McGuire, eds., in Honor of J. Marschak, (North-Holland), 297-336
17. Jehle. G and P. Reny, 2001, Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Second Edition. Addison-Wesley
18. Joskow P. L, 2003, Comments of Professor Paul L. Joskow on FERC SMD Order, working paper, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research(CEERP), MIT
19. Joskow P.L. and Tirole J, 2000, Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, NO. 3(Autumn 2000), pp. 450-87
20. Joskow P.L. and Tirole J, 2003, Merchant Transmission Investment, Working Paper, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research(CEERP), MIT
21. Laffont, J. J. and J., Tirole, 1987, "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economics, 95, pp. 921-937.
22. Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Press. (中译本：让—雅克·拉丰、让—梯若尔，1993：《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》 石磊、王永钦译，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，2004)
23. Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole, 1994, Access Pricing and Competition, European Economic Review, 38(9), 1673-1710
24. Laffont, J.-J., P. ReyandJ. Tirole, 1998b, Network Competition Ⅱ: Price Discrimination, Rand Journal of Economics 29(1): 38-56;
25. Laffont, J.-J., P. Rey and J. Tirole, 1998a, Network Competition Ⅰ: Overview and Non-discriminatory Pricing, Rand Journal of Economics 29(1): 1-37;
26. Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole, 1996, Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10(3), 227-256
27. Laffont, J-J., and Martimor D, 2002, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press (中译本：让—雅克·拉丰、大卫·马赫蒂摩，2002：《激励理论(第一卷)：委托——代理模型》，陈志俊等译，中国人民大学出版社)
28. Laffont, J.J. and Jean Tirole, 1986, "Using Cost Observations to Regulate Firms." Journal of Poli tical Economy. 94(3), pp. 614-641, June.
29. Laffont. J.-J., and J. Tirole, 2000, Competition in Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
30. Leautier, T.O, 2001, Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for Power, Journal of Regulatory Economics; 19: 1 27-54
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