中央企业公司治理研究
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摘要
时间追溯到上世纪末，世界上各个主要经济体都取得了相当程度的发展，形成了一种无国界的经济发展方式，有效的促使各国公司治理的深刻探索。其中，他们各自所蕴含的原因不尽相同，但是这种全球化视野的关注却使人们警醒：完善公司治理的建立是保持公司长期竞争优势的关键。其主要作用体现在三个方面：其一，制度性保证了股东利益在代理人行为模式中的充分体现；其二，监督机制的形成；其三，激励机制保证了社会利益的实现。这些都是现代市场经济体系高效、有序运行的微观基础。
我国中央企业公司治理研究是公司治理问题研究的重要课题之一。它源于中央企业在社会发展中所具有的举足轻重的地位和在维护国家安全、支撑国民经济健康稳定发展方面所发挥的重要作用。对近十年中央企业竞争力的分析表明，其保持良好的可持续发展态势，不论从资产规模、盈利能力，还是抗风险能力、企业竞争力等方面，都取得了长足的进步，充分体现了其所应有的重要地位和国家责任。但是随着中央企业快速成长，其所面临的公司治理问题也越发复杂，完善中央企业公司治理的需求越发迫切，企业长期稳定发展的制度基础还不稳固。《中华人民共和国企业国有资产法》从制度层面给予了保证。《十七大报告》中明确提出了国有企业改革的具体目标：完善国有企业所有制结构，深化股份制改革，完善法人治理结构……。
本文基于公司治理理论的研究成果，立足于我国在改革开放进程中，中央企业发展中出现的新情况、新问题以及面临的新挑战，对我国中央企业公司治理委托—代理的有效模式进行了研究，将中央企业公司治理研究分解为治理基本理论分析、现状与问题分析、绩效评价分析和构建思考四个子课题，进行剖析论证，建构完整的中央企业公司治理模式。
在基本理论分析部分，辨析了中央企业的概念，阐述了中央企业发展的历史沿革，分析了国外主要公司治理的基本框架，从中央企业特有的委托—代理关系、外部约束机制分析、多属性综合评价等三个方面构建了中央企业公司治理的基本理论架构，为后续部分的研究奠定了理论基础。
对中央企业公司治理的现状与问题分析表明：中央企业董事会在试点工作进展过程中取得了一定的成果，对于公司治理的完善起到了促进作用。但是还存在委托—代理关系不明确、董事会职权缺位明显、运作不规范、董事长定位不清、内部人控制问题、董事工作绩效和薪酬管理体系尚未开始建立等问题；中央企业外派监事会工作促进了企业完善经营管理，推动了企业的改革发展，但是还存在监事会成员的身份无法与其职位对称、监督力量有限、监事会会议程序不明确、人力资源管理体系不科学、内部监事独立性低、没有建立外派监事会与外部董事正常的沟通机制等问题。
对中央企业公司治理绩效的评价表明：中央企业集团公司治理绩效属刚及格的水平，说明中央企业集团的公司治理还有很多地方需要改进和提升。从细节方面看，主要存在以下诸问题：部分企业董事长的权力凌驾于董事会之上、大部分企业董事会的议事规则和工作程序不明确、内部董事来源结构单一；绝大多数企业的公司章程中根本未提到监事会的议事规则、绝大部分被访人员认为对监事会人员的激励措施不具有可操作性、大部分被访的专职监事对自己的未来感到迷茫；大部分公司的高管未实现市场化选聘、外部董事与监事会成员之间的交流机制不健全。
本文在建立双层委托代理关系的基础上，构建了中央企业分权制衡的公司治理。从外部治理环境，董事会、内部监事会、经理层三者之间权责和沟通机制制度化等方面提出了相应的对策建议，为中央企业进一步提升综合竞争力奠定基础，对于中央企业公司治理完善的参数式测度、定量分析等方面提供了参考。
Since the nineteen nineties start, in the process of economic globalizationaccelerates the development background, corporate governance practice all overthe world have changed greatly. Although the corporate governance reform invarious countries for different reasons, but the corporate governance concernsare reflected a general consensus: the construction of a sound corporategovernance is to maintain the company's long-term competitive advantage, itsmain function is to guarantee the agent according to the shareholders of thecompany act in the interests of agents, and effective supervision, encourageenterprises to more effective to create wealth for society, is the modern marketeconomic system, the microcosmic foundation of efficient and orderly operation.
China's central Enterprise Inc governance research is the problem ofcorporate governance is one of the important tasks, which originated from thecentral enterprises in the development of the society and the role of play adecisive role in the maintenance of national security, support national economyhealth, stable development of great responsibility. For nearly ten years of centralenterprises competitiveness analysis shows that, the good state of sustainabledevelopment, no matter from the asset scale, profit ability, or the ability to resistrisks, enterprise the respect such as competition ability, obtained great progress,fully reflects its important position and state responsibility. But as the centralenterprises to grow rapidly, the problem of corporation governance is becomingmore and more complicated, perfect central Enterprise Inc corporate governanceneeds even more pressing, long-term and stable development of the enterprisesystem is not a solid basis."The people's Republic of China EnterpriseState-owned Assets Law" from the perspective of system to guarantee."report"in put forward clearly the reform of state-owned enterprises and specific target:"perfect and state-owned enterprise ownership structure, deepening theshareholding system reform, perfecting the corporate governance structure...".
In this paper, based on the theory of corporate governance research results,based on our country in the process of reform and opening up, the central enterprise development in the new situation, new problem, new challenge, ourcountry central Enterprise Inc governance of principal-agent model to study theeffective. The central Enterprise Inc governance research into management ofbasic theory analysis, analysis of the current situation and problem analysis,performance evaluation and Thinking on the construction of four projects,analyze, to construct complete central management of Enterprise Inc.
The basic theory analysis of central enterprises, the concept of centralenterprises, expounds the development history, analyzes the foreign Principalcompany corporate governance framework, from the central businesscharacteristic the principal-agent relationship, the external constraint mechanismanalysis, multiple attribute comprehensive evaluation from three aspects such asconstructing the central Enterprise Inc administers the basic theoreticalframework, for the subsequent part of the study has laid a theoretical basis.
On the central status and problem analysis of Enterprise Inc governanceshows: central enterprise board in pilot job progress process has obtained someachievements, for the improvement of corporate governance has played a role inpromoting. But there are still a principal-agent relationship is not clear, thecapacity of the board of directors are deficient, run non-standard, President fixedposition is not clear, the internal control problems, director of performance andsalary management system has not yet begun to build wait for a problem; thecentral enterprises expatriate supervisors will work to promote the enterprises toimprove management, promote enterprise reform and development, but the thereis a member of the board of supervisors identity to positions symme trical,supervision of power limited, the meeting of the board of supervisors proceduresare not clear, human resources management system science, the independence ofthe internal low, did not build the external board of supervisors and externaldirectors normal communication mechanism.
On the central Enterprise Inc governance performance evaluation shows:the central corporate governance performance is just to pass the level, the centralenterprise group company management there are many areas that needimprovement and upgrade. From the details, mainly have the following problems.Part of company president power over a board on top of the board of directors ofthe company, most of the rules of procedure and the working procedures are not clear, internal director source construction is single; the overwhelming majorityof enterprises in the company constitution does not mention the rules ofprocedure of the board of supervisors, the vast majority of respondents think thatthe member of staff incentive measures do not have the operation sex, mostfull-time supervisors were interviewed about their future confused; mostexecutives did not achieve the market selection, outside directors and membersof the board of supervisors between exchange mechanism is not per fect.
In this paper, base on double principal-agents relationship, construction ofcentral enterprise decentralization and balance of corporate governance. Fromexternal governance environment, board of directors, board of supervisors,internal, manager layer within three between accrual and communicationmechanism system and put forward the corresponding countermeasures andsuggestions. For the central enterprises to further enhance the comprehensivecompetitiveness of foundation，To provide a reference for the central EnterpriseInc governance parameter measure, quantitative analysis.
我国中央企业公司治理研究是公司治理问题研究的重要课题之一。它源于中央企业在社会发展中所具有的举足轻重的地位和在维护国家安全、支撑国民经济健康稳定发展方面所发挥的重要作用。对近十年中央企业竞争力的分析表明，其保持良好的可持续发展态势，不论从资产规模、盈利能力，还是抗风险能力、企业竞争力等方面，都取得了长足的进步，充分体现了其所应有的重要地位和国家责任。但是随着中央企业快速成长，其所面临的公司治理问题也越发复杂，完善中央企业公司治理的需求越发迫切，企业长期稳定发展的制度基础还不稳固。《中华人民共和国企业国有资产法》从制度层面给予了保证。《十七大报告》中明确提出了国有企业改革的具体目标：完善国有企业所有制结构，深化股份制改革，完善法人治理结构……。
本文基于公司治理理论的研究成果，立足于我国在改革开放进程中，中央企业发展中出现的新情况、新问题以及面临的新挑战，对我国中央企业公司治理委托—代理的有效模式进行了研究，将中央企业公司治理研究分解为治理基本理论分析、现状与问题分析、绩效评价分析和构建思考四个子课题，进行剖析论证，建构完整的中央企业公司治理模式。
在基本理论分析部分，辨析了中央企业的概念，阐述了中央企业发展的历史沿革，分析了国外主要公司治理的基本框架，从中央企业特有的委托—代理关系、外部约束机制分析、多属性综合评价等三个方面构建了中央企业公司治理的基本理论架构，为后续部分的研究奠定了理论基础。
对中央企业公司治理的现状与问题分析表明：中央企业董事会在试点工作进展过程中取得了一定的成果，对于公司治理的完善起到了促进作用。但是还存在委托—代理关系不明确、董事会职权缺位明显、运作不规范、董事长定位不清、内部人控制问题、董事工作绩效和薪酬管理体系尚未开始建立等问题；中央企业外派监事会工作促进了企业完善经营管理，推动了企业的改革发展，但是还存在监事会成员的身份无法与其职位对称、监督力量有限、监事会会议程序不明确、人力资源管理体系不科学、内部监事独立性低、没有建立外派监事会与外部董事正常的沟通机制等问题。
对中央企业公司治理绩效的评价表明：中央企业集团公司治理绩效属刚及格的水平，说明中央企业集团的公司治理还有很多地方需要改进和提升。从细节方面看，主要存在以下诸问题：部分企业董事长的权力凌驾于董事会之上、大部分企业董事会的议事规则和工作程序不明确、内部董事来源结构单一；绝大多数企业的公司章程中根本未提到监事会的议事规则、绝大部分被访人员认为对监事会人员的激励措施不具有可操作性、大部分被访的专职监事对自己的未来感到迷茫；大部分公司的高管未实现市场化选聘、外部董事与监事会成员之间的交流机制不健全。
本文在建立双层委托代理关系的基础上，构建了中央企业分权制衡的公司治理。从外部治理环境，董事会、内部监事会、经理层三者之间权责和沟通机制制度化等方面提出了相应的对策建议，为中央企业进一步提升综合竞争力奠定基础，对于中央企业公司治理完善的参数式测度、定量分析等方面提供了参考。
Since the nineteen nineties start, in the process of economic globalizationaccelerates the development background, corporate governance practice all overthe world have changed greatly. Although the corporate governance reform invarious countries for different reasons, but the corporate governance concernsare reflected a general consensus: the construction of a sound corporategovernance is to maintain the company's long-term competitive advantage, itsmain function is to guarantee the agent according to the shareholders of thecompany act in the interests of agents, and effective supervision, encourageenterprises to more effective to create wealth for society, is the modern marketeconomic system, the microcosmic foundation of efficient and orderly operation.
China's central Enterprise Inc governance research is the problem ofcorporate governance is one of the important tasks, which originated from thecentral enterprises in the development of the society and the role of play adecisive role in the maintenance of national security, support national economyhealth, stable development of great responsibility. For nearly ten years of centralenterprises competitiveness analysis shows that, the good state of sustainabledevelopment, no matter from the asset scale, profit ability, or the ability to resistrisks, enterprise the respect such as competition ability, obtained great progress,fully reflects its important position and state responsibility. But as the centralenterprises to grow rapidly, the problem of corporation governance is becomingmore and more complicated, perfect central Enterprise Inc corporate governanceneeds even more pressing, long-term and stable development of the enterprisesystem is not a solid basis."The people's Republic of China EnterpriseState-owned Assets Law" from the perspective of system to guarantee."report"in put forward clearly the reform of state-owned enterprises and specific target:"perfect and state-owned enterprise ownership structure, deepening theshareholding system reform, perfecting the corporate governance structure...".
In this paper, based on the theory of corporate governance research results,based on our country in the process of reform and opening up, the central enterprise development in the new situation, new problem, new challenge, ourcountry central Enterprise Inc governance of principal-agent model to study theeffective. The central Enterprise Inc governance research into management ofbasic theory analysis, analysis of the current situation and problem analysis,performance evaluation and Thinking on the construction of four projects,analyze, to construct complete central management of Enterprise Inc.
The basic theory analysis of central enterprises, the concept of centralenterprises, expounds the development history, analyzes the foreign Principalcompany corporate governance framework, from the central businesscharacteristic the principal-agent relationship, the external constraint mechanismanalysis, multiple attribute comprehensive evaluation from three aspects such asconstructing the central Enterprise Inc administers the basic theoreticalframework, for the subsequent part of the study has laid a theoretical basis.
On the central status and problem analysis of Enterprise Inc governanceshows: central enterprise board in pilot job progress process has obtained someachievements, for the improvement of corporate governance has played a role inpromoting. But there are still a principal-agent relationship is not clear, thecapacity of the board of directors are deficient, run non-standard, President fixedposition is not clear, the internal control problems, director of performance andsalary management system has not yet begun to build wait for a problem; thecentral enterprises expatriate supervisors will work to promote the enterprises toimprove management, promote enterprise reform and development, but the thereis a member of the board of supervisors identity to positions symme trical,supervision of power limited, the meeting of the board of supervisors proceduresare not clear, human resources management system science, the independence ofthe internal low, did not build the external board of supervisors and externaldirectors normal communication mechanism.
On the central Enterprise Inc governance performance evaluation shows:the central corporate governance performance is just to pass the level, the centralenterprise group company management there are many areas that needimprovement and upgrade. From the details, mainly have the following problems.Part of company president power over a board on top of the board of directors ofthe company, most of the rules of procedure and the working procedures are not clear, internal director source construction is single; the overwhelming majorityof enterprises in the company constitution does not mention the rules ofprocedure of the board of supervisors, the vast majority of respondents think thatthe member of staff incentive measures do not have the operation sex, mostfull-time supervisors were interviewed about their future confused; mostexecutives did not achieve the market selection, outside directors and membersof the board of supervisors between exchange mechanism is not per fect.
In this paper, base on double principal-agents relationship, construction ofcentral enterprise decentralization and balance of corporate governance. Fromexternal governance environment, board of directors, board of supervisors,internal, manager layer within three between accrual and communicationmechanism system and put forward the corresponding countermeasures andsuggestions. For the central enterprises to further enhance the comprehensivecompetitiveness of foundation，To provide a reference for the central EnterpriseInc governance parameter measure, quantitative analysis.
引文
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