中小企业融资担保体系研究
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摘要
中小企业的发展对于一国经济的持续发展发挥着至关重要的作用。但是,由于中小企业存在规模和竞争地位上的劣势,融资困难已成为制约中小企业发展的重要“瓶颈”。整个社会缺乏健全的中小企业融资担保体系又是“瓶颈”中的“瓶颈”。建立一个科学合理的中小企业融资担保体系,在政府的适度扶持下通过市场机制的作用为中小企业的融资进行担保,是解决中小企业融资难问题的切入点和突破口。
以往国内学者对中小企业担保机构的研究大都是从实践层面展开的,关于这方面的经济学理论解释尚不多见,本文根据“信贷配给”理论,做了这方面的一个尝试,以期能为以后的研究者提供一个新的视角。与大企业相比,中小企业属于高风险者,银行在向其贷款时面临着更高的信用风险,因此银行的应对措施是对中小企业实行“信贷配给”政策。融资担保在中小企业贷款中能发挥两个作用:①担保机构与银行共担风险,大大降低了银行面临的风险。②担保机构能够解决一部分信息不对称问题,提高中小企业的信用等级。在有担保机构参与的情况下,银行面临的风险降低了。在一定的利率水平下银行会扩大对中小企业的放贷规模,实现规模扩张和收益增加,中小企业筹集资金的难度也大大降低了。
本文通过对我国担保体系历史和现状的分析,指出了我国目前担保体系存在的问题,并且点出了政策性担保机构和商业性担保机构的缺陷。政策性担保机构:①资金支持体系薄弱。政府根本不可能在完成宏观调控和社会管理职能之后还有足够的财力在中小企业担保体系中起主导性作用。②政策性担保机构中行政干预过强,效率低下。商业性担保机构:①缺乏制约机制。在我国外部制约机制还没有建立起来的情况下,由于商业性担保机构缺乏一个有效地内部制约机制,机构在运营过程中面临着巨大的风险。②资金补偿机制失效导致担保机构承保能力减弱,一旦发生代偿就面临财务亏损或破产的危险。
鉴于前面两种担保形式存在缺陷,因此大力发展中小企业互助担保,是完善我国中小企业融资担保体系的有效方法。互助担保机构是由部分中小企业联合起来,利用成员自身资本作为贷款担保的企业间组织。它立足于中小企业本身的现状和前景,实行市场化和企业化运作,不以赢利为目的,具有利益共享,风险共担的特点,所以基本上能克服其他担保机构在资金补偿、运作机制、风险规避、经营规则和服务意识等方面存在的弊端,更好地满足中小企业融资担保的需要。本文的最后提出了一个基于互助担保机构的中小企业融资模型,并从互助担保机构的组织形式、担保基金的来源、业务范围及品种创新、合理设计风险控制思路和途径等几个方面详细阐述了如何建立、运营这个融资模式。
The development of small and medium enterprises plays a pivotal role in a country's sustained economic development. However, due to the existence of small and medium-sized scale, the inferior competitive position, financial difficulties in constraining the development of SMEs has become an important "bottleneck." The whole community not having a sound guarantee system for SMEs is the "bottleneck" of the "bottleneck." Scientific and reasonable to establish a guarantee system for SMEs, to support the Government through the appropriate role of market mechanisms for financing small and medium-sized credit guarantees to address the issue of financing small and medium-sized entry point and a breakthrough.
Scholars of the past, small and medium-sized domestic security agencies are the research carried out from the practical level, in this regard to explain the economic theory is still rare, the paper under the "credit rationing" theory, so that a try, with a view to future researchers to provide a new perspective. Compared with large enterprises, SMEs are high-risk, banks in their loans are faced with a higher credit risk, and the banks of the response to small and medium-sized implementation of "credit rationing" policy. Credit guarantee loans in small and medium-sized to play two roles:①security agencies and the banks risk and greatly reduce the risks faced by the bank.②Part of security agencies to solve the problem of information asymmetry and improve the credit rating of SMEs. Security sector participation in the circumstances, the bank reduced the risk of facing. A certain level of interest rates will be extended under the Bank's lending to small and medium-sized scale, achievement of the scale expansion and revenue increased, the difficulty of raising funds for SMEs are also greatly reduced.
In this paper, a security system of our country's history and current situation analysis, pointing out that China's current problems in the security system, and pointed out that the policy of security agencies and commercial security agencies defects. Guarantee Agency policy:①weak financial support system. Government is simply not possible for the completion of macro-control and social management functions of the financial resources followed by adequate security systems in small and medium enterprises play a leading role.②Policy security agencies too much administrative interference and inefficiency. Commercial security institutions:①the lack of control mechanism. External control mechanism in our country has not yet been established, the security agencies as a result of the lack of commercial and internal constraints of an effective mechanism in the operation of the process faces enormous risks.②Financial compensation mechanism led to the underwriting capacity of security institutions weakened, in the event of compensation for financial losses or facing the risk of insolvency.
In view of the form in front of two security flaws, so to develop small and medium-sized mutual security, is to improve the financing of China's small and medium enterprises an effective way to guarantee system. Mutual aid is secured together by a number of small and medium enterprises, the use of members of their own capital as collateral for loans between the organizations of the enterprise. It is based on small and medium-sized status and prospects of its own, market and business operation, not for profit, with benefit-sharing, risk-sharing characteristics, so basically able to overcome the other security agencies in the financial compensation, the operating mechanism, risk aversion, management rules and service awareness of the drawbacks of the existence of such areas to better meet the needs of SME credit guarantee. This article concludes with a mutual security based on the financing model for small and medium-sized institutions and security agencies from the mutual form of organization, secured a source of funds, business scope and variety of innovation and reasonable risk control design ideas and approaches described in detail several aspects how to set up and operation of the financing model.
以往国内学者对中小企业担保机构的研究大都是从实践层面展开的,关于这方面的经济学理论解释尚不多见,本文根据“信贷配给”理论,做了这方面的一个尝试,以期能为以后的研究者提供一个新的视角。与大企业相比,中小企业属于高风险者,银行在向其贷款时面临着更高的信用风险,因此银行的应对措施是对中小企业实行“信贷配给”政策。融资担保在中小企业贷款中能发挥两个作用:①担保机构与银行共担风险,大大降低了银行面临的风险。②担保机构能够解决一部分信息不对称问题,提高中小企业的信用等级。在有担保机构参与的情况下,银行面临的风险降低了。在一定的利率水平下银行会扩大对中小企业的放贷规模,实现规模扩张和收益增加,中小企业筹集资金的难度也大大降低了。
本文通过对我国担保体系历史和现状的分析,指出了我国目前担保体系存在的问题,并且点出了政策性担保机构和商业性担保机构的缺陷。政策性担保机构:①资金支持体系薄弱。政府根本不可能在完成宏观调控和社会管理职能之后还有足够的财力在中小企业担保体系中起主导性作用。②政策性担保机构中行政干预过强,效率低下。商业性担保机构:①缺乏制约机制。在我国外部制约机制还没有建立起来的情况下,由于商业性担保机构缺乏一个有效地内部制约机制,机构在运营过程中面临着巨大的风险。②资金补偿机制失效导致担保机构承保能力减弱,一旦发生代偿就面临财务亏损或破产的危险。
鉴于前面两种担保形式存在缺陷,因此大力发展中小企业互助担保,是完善我国中小企业融资担保体系的有效方法。互助担保机构是由部分中小企业联合起来,利用成员自身资本作为贷款担保的企业间组织。它立足于中小企业本身的现状和前景,实行市场化和企业化运作,不以赢利为目的,具有利益共享,风险共担的特点,所以基本上能克服其他担保机构在资金补偿、运作机制、风险规避、经营规则和服务意识等方面存在的弊端,更好地满足中小企业融资担保的需要。本文的最后提出了一个基于互助担保机构的中小企业融资模型,并从互助担保机构的组织形式、担保基金的来源、业务范围及品种创新、合理设计风险控制思路和途径等几个方面详细阐述了如何建立、运营这个融资模式。
The development of small and medium enterprises plays a pivotal role in a country's sustained economic development. However, due to the existence of small and medium-sized scale, the inferior competitive position, financial difficulties in constraining the development of SMEs has become an important "bottleneck." The whole community not having a sound guarantee system for SMEs is the "bottleneck" of the "bottleneck." Scientific and reasonable to establish a guarantee system for SMEs, to support the Government through the appropriate role of market mechanisms for financing small and medium-sized credit guarantees to address the issue of financing small and medium-sized entry point and a breakthrough.
Scholars of the past, small and medium-sized domestic security agencies are the research carried out from the practical level, in this regard to explain the economic theory is still rare, the paper under the "credit rationing" theory, so that a try, with a view to future researchers to provide a new perspective. Compared with large enterprises, SMEs are high-risk, banks in their loans are faced with a higher credit risk, and the banks of the response to small and medium-sized implementation of "credit rationing" policy. Credit guarantee loans in small and medium-sized to play two roles:①security agencies and the banks risk and greatly reduce the risks faced by the bank.②Part of security agencies to solve the problem of information asymmetry and improve the credit rating of SMEs. Security sector participation in the circumstances, the bank reduced the risk of facing. A certain level of interest rates will be extended under the Bank's lending to small and medium-sized scale, achievement of the scale expansion and revenue increased, the difficulty of raising funds for SMEs are also greatly reduced.
In this paper, a security system of our country's history and current situation analysis, pointing out that China's current problems in the security system, and pointed out that the policy of security agencies and commercial security agencies defects. Guarantee Agency policy:①weak financial support system. Government is simply not possible for the completion of macro-control and social management functions of the financial resources followed by adequate security systems in small and medium enterprises play a leading role.②Policy security agencies too much administrative interference and inefficiency. Commercial security institutions:①the lack of control mechanism. External control mechanism in our country has not yet been established, the security agencies as a result of the lack of commercial and internal constraints of an effective mechanism in the operation of the process faces enormous risks.②Financial compensation mechanism led to the underwriting capacity of security institutions weakened, in the event of compensation for financial losses or facing the risk of insolvency.
In view of the form in front of two security flaws, so to develop small and medium-sized mutual security, is to improve the financing of China's small and medium enterprises an effective way to guarantee system. Mutual aid is secured together by a number of small and medium enterprises, the use of members of their own capital as collateral for loans between the organizations of the enterprise. It is based on small and medium-sized status and prospects of its own, market and business operation, not for profit, with benefit-sharing, risk-sharing characteristics, so basically able to overcome the other security agencies in the financial compensation, the operating mechanism, risk aversion, management rules and service awareness of the drawbacks of the existence of such areas to better meet the needs of SME credit guarantee. This article concludes with a mutual security based on the financing model for small and medium-sized institutions and security agencies from the mutual form of organization, secured a source of funds, business scope and variety of innovation and reasonable risk control design ideas and approaches described in detail several aspects how to set up and operation of the financing model.
引文
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[2]Robert J Barro. The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1976,8(4):439-456
[3]J E Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information .American Economic Review, l981,7(4):393-410
[4] H. C. Wette. Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review. 1983(3):442-445
[5]David, Besanko. Secured Lending Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy im-placations and Empirical Results, The Economic Journa1,1991,10(4):458-471
[6]Yuk-Shee Chan, George Kanatas. Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreement, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,l985,17(1):84-95
[7]Li Wenli. Government loan, guarantee and grant programs: an evaluation. Federal reserve bank of Richmand Economic Quarterly,1998:42-46
[8]Meyer, Richard L. and Geetha Nagarajan. Comments on Sustainability of Credit Guarantee Systems. The Financier, Malyses of Capital and Money market Transactions. Special Issue on SME Credit Guarantee Schemes, 1997(2):100-104
[9]Levitsky J. Best Practice in Credit Guarantee Schemes. Paper presented at Round Table of Credit Guarantee Schemes. Inter American Bank, Washington DC, 1996:301-336.
[10]Llisteri J. ed. SME Credit Guarantee Schemes. The Financier, 4(2):5-112
[11]H. C. Weiss. Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note, The American Economic Review,1983(3):442-445
[12]Arnoud W.A.Boot, Anjan V.Thakor. Secure Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implication and Empirical Results, the Economic Journal .1991(101):458-472
[13]安合祥.民营企业融资和民间互助担保组织的培育[J].现代财经,2003
[14]陈乃醒.中小企业信用担保[M].南开大学出版社,2004
[15]陈柳钦,孙建平.我国中小企业信用担保体系的制度性缺陷分析及对策[J].人文杂志,2003:46-50
[16]陈文晖.中小企业信用担保体系国际比较[M].经济科学出版社,2002:71-83
[17]陈晓红.中小企业融资创新与信用担保[M].中国人民出版社,2003:123-186
[18]陈晓红,张卓琳.中小企业信用担保机构的框架设计[J].经济管理,2005(5):10-13
[19]曹凤岐.建立和健全中小企业信用担保体系[J].金融研究,2001(5):41-48
[20]方晓霞.中小企业信用担保:制度缺陷与发展对策[J].当代财经,2004(9):73-76
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