美国宪法解释的原意主义研究
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摘要
宪法解释理论的研究已经成为宪法学者所关注的前沿问题,也是中国宪法学亟待解决的重大课题。任何解释都离不开方法的指导与制约,方法是保证解释客观性的手段,因此宪法解释方法的研究应当成宪法解释学的核心问题。国内宪法解释方法的研究刚刚起步,而美国宪法解释方法的研究由于成文宪法的性质以及大量宪法解释实践的需求已经伴随着美国宪政进程日臻成熟与体系化。美国宪法解释中关于原意主义的争论一直持续至今,原意主义者不仅与非原意主义者进行论战,原意主义者内部也是观点迥异。因此,以原意主义方法论作为切入点,就可以全面理解把握美国宪法解释理论与方法。本文对美国原意主义方法论进行了系统的全方位的分析与论证。首次提出了原意主义的类型划分,梳理了原意主义的发展历史,具体阐述原初理解理论和文本主义理论,分析原意主义的正当性基础以及原意主义针对质疑所做的辩驳,从而揭示了原意主义维护民主与法治的积极意义以及自身的理论局限性,对于中国宪法解释方法论的完善具有一定程度上的填补空白之效。本文内容主要由以下六个部分组成。
第一章对原意主义的概念进行阐释。本文认为,应当将原意主义定位为一种宪法判决理论,或者说司法化的宪法解释理论。原意主义理论经历了从原初意图理论,到原初含义理论,再到语义学原意主义的发展脉络。尽管原意主义者之间存在分歧,但他们所共享的核心主张就是,应当根据制宪者的原初意图以及宪法文本的原初含义来解释宪法。根据对于先例的重视程度、对于解释目标的态度可以将原意主义划分为强硬原意主义与柔性原意主义、严格原意主义与温和原意主义。当代原意主义最重要的两个类别则是原初文本主义和原初意图主义。最合理的原意主义类型应当是综合原初文本主义和原初意图主义二者优势的温和形式的原意主义。
第二章梳理了原意主义在美国宪法解释理论与实践中的发展演变。第一阶段是从建国时期一直到19世纪晚期,不证自明的文本原意主义一直占据宪法解释的正统地位。第二阶段开始于20世纪早期,随着反抗形式主义革命以及现代司法权力的兴起,原意主义遭遇边缘化并逐渐衰落。第三阶段是自从20世纪80年代,新政联盟的分裂以及新的保守政治运动的再现,为沉寂多年的原意主义的复苏提供了政治空间。尽管1987年里根总统对原意主义者博克的提名遭到了参议院的否决,但是不可否认的是原意主义理论经过稳步发展达到了一个高峰,并且朝着精细化、复合化的方向发展,保持着经久不衰。通过分析原意主义在美国宪法理论以及宪法判决实践中的源头及其发展脉络,我们可以清晰地发现原意主义理论的发展演变与美国宪政发展历程密切相关,与宪法存身于其中的社会的整体变革、政治运动的发展以及道德观念的变迁密切相关。
第三章具体分析了两种典型的原意主义理论。博克的原初理解理论强调,只有原初理解才能满足任何宪法判决理论为了具有民主的合法性所必须满足的标准,只有这一方法才符合美国共和制度的设计。原因在于,原初理解理论要求法官探求制宪者意图和宪法文本在获得批准时公众的理解,并且原初理解理论还可以指引法官在原则的推导、界定以及适用三个方面同时做到中立,以此确保法官权威的合法性。斯卡里亚的文本主义既不是严格解释主义,也不是文本虚无主义,而是对文本的合理解释。宪法解释的重大分歧不在于制宪者意图与客观含义之间,而是在于原初含义与当下含义之间。斯卡里亚批判了“活的宪法”这种宪法进化论的主张,并认为原意主义是一种脱离法官个人偏好的历史标准,一种更能适应司法审查体系的解释方法。
第四章从四个方面分析了原意主义的正当性基础。首先,原意主义的正当性来源于人民主权原则的要求。宪法强调的是“人民对有限政府的同意”,司法部门被设计成人民具体意志的实施者,因此司法部门只能通过客观地适用这些在制宪时人民就同意的原则来获取权威。原意主义方法还有助于化解“反多数主义难题”,通过维护宪法的权威来促进民主的价值。其次,原意主义的正当性来源于成文宪法的要求。宪法的成文性内在地要求固定化与确定性,因此宪法在通过之时其含义就已经固定下来,法官不能做出根据制宪者的意图没有被成文宪法所认可的解释。成文宪法是法律文件,具有根本法的地位,必然要求解释者根据宪法的原意,以法律的方式对它进行解释。宪法作为法律文本承载着作者意图。宪法解释者只有严格寻求文本作者的理性和意图,才能保证解释结果的客观性。再次,原意主义的正当性来源于分权与制衡机制的要求。分权制衡机制要求不经民主选举产生的法官应当遵从制宪者的原初意图,不僭越司法权的界限,否则将会埋下法官“造法”的火种。最后,原意主义的正当性来源于宪法的中立原则的要求。司法审查权力本身应当是严格“司法性的”,司法部门应当充分尊重其他政府部门在它们的宪法权力范围内所做出的决策。法官无权改变法律或宪法。宪法必须按照制宪者的原初意图或者宪法的原初含义进行解释,因此法官必须选择那些能够中立适用的原则,这是防止宪法过度政治化的屏障。
第五章分析了原意主义遭遇的质疑以及做出的辩驳。首当其冲的质疑就是,由于原意主义方法有赖于精密的历史研究,而历史资料一定程度上的匮乏以及法官的历史研究能力的有限性造成在实践中难以确定制宪者的原意以及宪法文本的原意。原意主义者认为,这样的质疑只是说明了历史研究的难度,并不能直接导致原意主义不可行的结论。第二,是基于民主视角的质疑。1787年宪法存在诸多民主性缺陷,而且修宪程序极其繁琐。如果再要求强制遵守制宪者的原初意图的话,那就是用“过去的死人之手治理国家”。而根据潜在主权论,原意主义并非简单或者武断地将死者的政治偏好强加给活着的人,它确认了主权的连续性,而且保留下了主权在现代的再次表达机制。第三,是基于文本不确定性论的质疑。所有文本不确定论不同程度地解构了作者对文本的控制与剥夺,消解了固定而确切的文本意义。为了维护法治传统,原意主义担负起“反解构”的理论使命,指出对于文本不确定性的弥补并非宪法解释的任务,而是属于政治部门的宪法阐释的范畴。第四,是基于分权与制衡机制的质疑。司法能动主义主张,法院在政治生活中发挥着实质性的和积极的政策导向作用,法官可以根据社会现实和实际需要进行创造性解释。原意主义则主张,司法权只是一种判断权,最高法院要保持对宪法的忠诚就应当遵从立法和行政等由选举产生的政治机关所做出的法律和政策,尽量避免将法官个人的价值判断适用到判决之中。原意主义与司法能动主义之争的实质在于对司法权在宪政体制中的恰当角色的不同认识。需要强调的是,过分强化司法能动主义倾向将会给法院带来沉重的政治负担,侵蚀其自身存在的基础。法院应当寻求在司法克制框架下的适当的能动。此外,非原意主义者还提出了制宪者本身并未要求解释者忠诚于原意以及宪法文本中含有反原意主义的条款等质疑,原意主义者基于自身立场做出了辩驳。
第六章对原意主义理论进行全面综合的评析。原意主义理论是对宪法解释客观性的一种追求,遵循原意主义解释方法,可以保障判决的可预测性和法的安定性价值。从原意主义维护人民主权理论、坚持宪法文本权威性的理论内涵而言,原意主义也是符合宪政框架下民主与法治的目的的宪法解释理论。其局限性在于：过度强调法律的确定性,丧失宪法解释应有的灵活性,忽视了解释者的主观价值判断、社会现实因素、普通法的造法传统对宪法判决的影响。原意主义与非原意主义之争的实质在于先定约束与后代民主的关系、宪法解释的客观性与创造性的关系、宪法的稳定性与适应性的关系。没有任何一种解释理论能够单独解说法院的解释实践,法院的解释实践也没有遵循任何一种解释理论。法院在宪法解释的过程中,不仅要遵循宪法文本、制宪者意图、宪法先例、制宪历史,还要考虑社会现实的合理需求、公共政策以及道德伦理,实现宪法解释的客观性与创造性的融合迁就,既维护宪法文本的权威性与稳定性,又能使宪法与时俱进,适应不断变化的社会需求。
The research on constitutional interpretation has been the frontier of constitutional theory and the significant problem which is necessary to be resolved for the Chinese constitutional theory urgently. Interpretation is connected with the instruction and restriction of interpretation methodology, since methodology can make sure the objectivity of interpretation. Therefore, the research on constitutional interpretation methodology should be the core problem of constitutional interpretation theory. The domestic research on constitutional interpretation methodology has just put the show on the road, however, the American research on constitutional interpretation methodology has become mature and systematical on the basis of the nature of the written constitution and abundant demands of constitutional interpretation practice. The debate over originalism in American constitutional interpretation has been enduring up to the present. Originalists have been arguing against nonoriginalists, however, originalists cannot agree with each other. From the point of view of originalism, we can grasp the American constitutional interpretation theories and methods roundly. The author makes a comprehensive and systematical analysis and argumentation of originalism. The paper enumerates the varieties of originalism for the first time, traces the historical development of originalism, expounds original understanding and textualism, illustrates originalism's legitimacy and originalism's refutation towards the criticism, and elucidates originalism's posivtive senses of maintaining democracy and rule of law, and its theoretical limitstions. The research may make progress towards the perfection of the Chinese constitutional interpretation methodology. The paper contains six chapters.
Chapter 1 expounds the concept of originalism. Originalism should be defined as a theory of how judges should decide constitutional cases, or a sort of judicial constitutional interpretation theory. Originalism has evolved from original intent, original meaning into semantic originalism. Originalists of all sorts share a core conviction that the Supreme Court is bound to adhere to the framers'original intent and the Constitution's original meaning in interpreting the Constitution. We can divide originalism into strong originalism and originalism, strict originalism and moderate originalism according to the role of precedent and different attitudes towards interpretive objectives. The two important varieties of originalism are referred to as original textualism and original intentionalism. The most defensible form of originalism should be a sort of moderate originalism which combines the advantages of original textualism and original intentionalism together.
Chapter 2 traces the historical development of originalism in American constitutional interpretation theory and practice. From the founding era to the late nineteenth-century, axiomatic textual originalism remained as the orthodoxy constitutional interpretation methodology. After the early twentieth-century, the modern intellectual revolt against formalism and the rise of modern judicial power brought on the marginalization and eclipse of originalism. Since the New Deal coalition disintegrated and the new conservative political movement emerged in 1980s, these changes created the political space for the reemergence of originalism. Although President Reagon's nomination of Robert H. Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court in June 1987 was vetoed by the Senate, originalism reached a climax with the steady development and became a more subtle and complex doctrine unfailingly. We can discover clearly that the evolution of originalism is much connected with the American developing history of constitutionalism, the profound combination of social holistic revolution, political movement development and moral conception's vicissitudes through the analysis of originalism's origin and evolutionary period in the American constitutional theory and constitutional adjudication practice.
Chapter 3 expounds the two typical originalism theories. Bork insisted that only the approach of original understanding met the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy. Only that approach is consonant with the design of the American Republic. Bork's original understanding approach requests judges to search the framers' intent and the Constitution's meaning understood at the time of the law's enactment. The philosophy of original understanding is capable of supplying neutrality in all three respects in deriving, defining and applying principle so as to make sure the legitimacy of the authority of judges. Scalia's textualism is neither strict constructionism nor textual nihilism. Textualism is a sort of reasonable construction methodology. The Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers' intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original meaning and current meaning. Scalia criticized "the living constitution" as an evolutionary approach, and proposed that originalism is a sort of historic standard without judges' own prejudice, and at the same time is compatible with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.
Chapter 4 analyzes the legitimacy foundation of originalism from the four respects. First of all, the legitimacy of originalism is derived from the demand of popular sovereignty. The Constitution emphasizes "the people's consent on the limited government", and the judiciary is set up as the enforcer of the people's concrete will. Therefore, the judiciary can only apply these principles on the basis of the consent of the people at the time of enactment objectively so as to obtain its authority. Originalism is helpful to resolve the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" and improve democracy by maintaining the authority of the Constitution. Secondly, the legitimacy of originalism is derived form the demand of the written constitution. The written nature of the constitution indicates stability and determinability inherently, so the meaning of the Constitution has been fixed at the time of enactment. Courts cannot make an interpretation which was forbidden by the written Constitution according to the framers' intent. The written Constitution is a law document as the fundamental law, and this fact requests interpreters to interpret the Constitution by the law method according to the original meaning. The Constitution as a legal text embodies the author's intent. The interpreters of the Constitution have to explore the reason and intention of the author of the text strictly so as to assure the objectivity of the interpretive results. Thirdly, the legitimacy of originalism is derived from the demand of the separation and balance of powers. The separation and balance of powers requests the non-elected courts to adhere to the original intent of the framers and not to arrogate the limits of the judiciary power, or else it would make the hidden trouble of judge-made law. Lastly, the legitimacy of originalism is derived from the demand of the constitutional neutral principle. The power of judicial review should be the judicial power strictly, and the judiciary should pay careful respect to the other branches' decision in their ranges of authority. Courts have no authority to change the law or the Constitution. The Constitution must be interpreted according to the original intent of the framers and the original meaning of the Constitution, so the courts must choose the neutral principles in order to prevent the Constitution from being politicized excessively.
Chapter 5 analyzes originalist's refution towards the criticism which they encountered. The first criticism is based on the view of methodology. Originalism isnot workable in practice because of the scarce historical materials and the courts' limited ability of making historical research. Originalists think that this kind of criticism testifies the difficulty of the historical research only, and cannot reach the conclusion that originalism isnot workable directly. The second criticism is based on the view of democracy. The 1787 Constitution has many democratic defects and the constitution amending procedure is very complex. If originalism forces the courts to adhere to the original intent of the framers under this circumstance, it is the dead hand controlling the country. According to the potential sovereignty, originalism doesnot impose the political prejudice of the dead on the alive simply and arbitrarily, and retains the recurrent expressive system of the sovereignty in the modern time so as to assure the continuity of the sovereignty. The third criticism is based on the text as indeterminate. All the arguments of the indeterminate text deconstruct the author's control on the text more or less, destroys the stable and determinate meaning of the text. In order to maintain the tradition of rule of law, originalism undertakes the theoretical mission of "anti-deconstruction". Originalism thinks that the remedy of the textual indeterminacy isnot the errand of constitutional interpretation, but the duty of constitutional construction of the political departments. The fourth criticism is based on the view of the separation and balance of powers. Judicial activists insist that the Court should play a sort of substantial and active policy-oriented role in the political life, and the courts should make creative interpretation according to social reality and real needs. Originalism thinks that the judicial power is the power of decision, so the Court should obey the law and policy made by the political departments with the loyalty to the Constitution and prevent the justices from applying their value determination into decisions. The nature of the debate between originalism and judicial activism lies in the different opinions about the proper role of the judicial power in the constitutional system. Excessively judicial activist role will bring the Court a heavy political burden, erode the foundation of its legitimacy. The Court should implement moderate judicial activism in the framework of judicial restraint. Additionally, nonoriginalists have proposed that the framers themselves did not expect their own intentions to control subsequent interpretation of the Constitution and there are anti-originalist clauses in the Constitution. Originalists make powerful refutation from their own standpoints.
Chapter 6 makes an overall and comprehensive evaluation of originalism. Originalism is the pursuit of objectivity. Adherence to the originalist interpretational method can assure the predictability of the decisions and the invariability of the law. Since originalism is aimed to maintain the popular sovereignty and the authority of constitutional text, it is the constitutional interpretation theory which conforms with democracy and the rule of law in the constitutional system. The theory of Originalism has also its own limitations. Originalism emphasizes the determinability so excessively that constitutional interpretation is deprived of flexibility. At the same time, originalism ignores three factors' influence to the constitutional interpretation, such as interpreters' subjective value determination, social reality, and the common law tradition of judge-made law. The essence of the debate between originalism and nonoriginalism is the relationship between predeterminate obligation and subsequent democracy, the relationship between the objectivity of constitutional interpretation and the creativity of constitutional interpretation, the relationship between stability and adaptability. Any exclusive interpretation theory cannot solely define the Court's interpretive practice, and simultaneously the Court's interpretive practice hasnot followed any exclusive interpretive theory. The Court not only adheres to constitutional text, the framers' intent, constitutional precedent and constitutional history, but also considers the reasonable demands of the social reality, public policies and moral ethics so as to realize accommodation of the objectivity and creativity of constitutional interpretation. In doing so, the Court can maintain the authority and stability of the Constitutional text, at one time make the Constitution adaptive to the various social demands.
第一章对原意主义的概念进行阐释。本文认为,应当将原意主义定位为一种宪法判决理论,或者说司法化的宪法解释理论。原意主义理论经历了从原初意图理论,到原初含义理论,再到语义学原意主义的发展脉络。尽管原意主义者之间存在分歧,但他们所共享的核心主张就是,应当根据制宪者的原初意图以及宪法文本的原初含义来解释宪法。根据对于先例的重视程度、对于解释目标的态度可以将原意主义划分为强硬原意主义与柔性原意主义、严格原意主义与温和原意主义。当代原意主义最重要的两个类别则是原初文本主义和原初意图主义。最合理的原意主义类型应当是综合原初文本主义和原初意图主义二者优势的温和形式的原意主义。
第二章梳理了原意主义在美国宪法解释理论与实践中的发展演变。第一阶段是从建国时期一直到19世纪晚期,不证自明的文本原意主义一直占据宪法解释的正统地位。第二阶段开始于20世纪早期,随着反抗形式主义革命以及现代司法权力的兴起,原意主义遭遇边缘化并逐渐衰落。第三阶段是自从20世纪80年代,新政联盟的分裂以及新的保守政治运动的再现,为沉寂多年的原意主义的复苏提供了政治空间。尽管1987年里根总统对原意主义者博克的提名遭到了参议院的否决,但是不可否认的是原意主义理论经过稳步发展达到了一个高峰,并且朝着精细化、复合化的方向发展,保持着经久不衰。通过分析原意主义在美国宪法理论以及宪法判决实践中的源头及其发展脉络,我们可以清晰地发现原意主义理论的发展演变与美国宪政发展历程密切相关,与宪法存身于其中的社会的整体变革、政治运动的发展以及道德观念的变迁密切相关。
第三章具体分析了两种典型的原意主义理论。博克的原初理解理论强调,只有原初理解才能满足任何宪法判决理论为了具有民主的合法性所必须满足的标准,只有这一方法才符合美国共和制度的设计。原因在于,原初理解理论要求法官探求制宪者意图和宪法文本在获得批准时公众的理解,并且原初理解理论还可以指引法官在原则的推导、界定以及适用三个方面同时做到中立,以此确保法官权威的合法性。斯卡里亚的文本主义既不是严格解释主义,也不是文本虚无主义,而是对文本的合理解释。宪法解释的重大分歧不在于制宪者意图与客观含义之间,而是在于原初含义与当下含义之间。斯卡里亚批判了“活的宪法”这种宪法进化论的主张,并认为原意主义是一种脱离法官个人偏好的历史标准,一种更能适应司法审查体系的解释方法。
第四章从四个方面分析了原意主义的正当性基础。首先,原意主义的正当性来源于人民主权原则的要求。宪法强调的是“人民对有限政府的同意”,司法部门被设计成人民具体意志的实施者,因此司法部门只能通过客观地适用这些在制宪时人民就同意的原则来获取权威。原意主义方法还有助于化解“反多数主义难题”,通过维护宪法的权威来促进民主的价值。其次,原意主义的正当性来源于成文宪法的要求。宪法的成文性内在地要求固定化与确定性,因此宪法在通过之时其含义就已经固定下来,法官不能做出根据制宪者的意图没有被成文宪法所认可的解释。成文宪法是法律文件,具有根本法的地位,必然要求解释者根据宪法的原意,以法律的方式对它进行解释。宪法作为法律文本承载着作者意图。宪法解释者只有严格寻求文本作者的理性和意图,才能保证解释结果的客观性。再次,原意主义的正当性来源于分权与制衡机制的要求。分权制衡机制要求不经民主选举产生的法官应当遵从制宪者的原初意图,不僭越司法权的界限,否则将会埋下法官“造法”的火种。最后,原意主义的正当性来源于宪法的中立原则的要求。司法审查权力本身应当是严格“司法性的”,司法部门应当充分尊重其他政府部门在它们的宪法权力范围内所做出的决策。法官无权改变法律或宪法。宪法必须按照制宪者的原初意图或者宪法的原初含义进行解释,因此法官必须选择那些能够中立适用的原则,这是防止宪法过度政治化的屏障。
第五章分析了原意主义遭遇的质疑以及做出的辩驳。首当其冲的质疑就是,由于原意主义方法有赖于精密的历史研究,而历史资料一定程度上的匮乏以及法官的历史研究能力的有限性造成在实践中难以确定制宪者的原意以及宪法文本的原意。原意主义者认为,这样的质疑只是说明了历史研究的难度,并不能直接导致原意主义不可行的结论。第二,是基于民主视角的质疑。1787年宪法存在诸多民主性缺陷,而且修宪程序极其繁琐。如果再要求强制遵守制宪者的原初意图的话,那就是用“过去的死人之手治理国家”。而根据潜在主权论,原意主义并非简单或者武断地将死者的政治偏好强加给活着的人,它确认了主权的连续性,而且保留下了主权在现代的再次表达机制。第三,是基于文本不确定性论的质疑。所有文本不确定论不同程度地解构了作者对文本的控制与剥夺,消解了固定而确切的文本意义。为了维护法治传统,原意主义担负起“反解构”的理论使命,指出对于文本不确定性的弥补并非宪法解释的任务,而是属于政治部门的宪法阐释的范畴。第四,是基于分权与制衡机制的质疑。司法能动主义主张,法院在政治生活中发挥着实质性的和积极的政策导向作用,法官可以根据社会现实和实际需要进行创造性解释。原意主义则主张,司法权只是一种判断权,最高法院要保持对宪法的忠诚就应当遵从立法和行政等由选举产生的政治机关所做出的法律和政策,尽量避免将法官个人的价值判断适用到判决之中。原意主义与司法能动主义之争的实质在于对司法权在宪政体制中的恰当角色的不同认识。需要强调的是,过分强化司法能动主义倾向将会给法院带来沉重的政治负担,侵蚀其自身存在的基础。法院应当寻求在司法克制框架下的适当的能动。此外,非原意主义者还提出了制宪者本身并未要求解释者忠诚于原意以及宪法文本中含有反原意主义的条款等质疑,原意主义者基于自身立场做出了辩驳。
第六章对原意主义理论进行全面综合的评析。原意主义理论是对宪法解释客观性的一种追求,遵循原意主义解释方法,可以保障判决的可预测性和法的安定性价值。从原意主义维护人民主权理论、坚持宪法文本权威性的理论内涵而言,原意主义也是符合宪政框架下民主与法治的目的的宪法解释理论。其局限性在于：过度强调法律的确定性,丧失宪法解释应有的灵活性,忽视了解释者的主观价值判断、社会现实因素、普通法的造法传统对宪法判决的影响。原意主义与非原意主义之争的实质在于先定约束与后代民主的关系、宪法解释的客观性与创造性的关系、宪法的稳定性与适应性的关系。没有任何一种解释理论能够单独解说法院的解释实践,法院的解释实践也没有遵循任何一种解释理论。法院在宪法解释的过程中,不仅要遵循宪法文本、制宪者意图、宪法先例、制宪历史,还要考虑社会现实的合理需求、公共政策以及道德伦理,实现宪法解释的客观性与创造性的融合迁就,既维护宪法文本的权威性与稳定性,又能使宪法与时俱进,适应不断变化的社会需求。
The research on constitutional interpretation has been the frontier of constitutional theory and the significant problem which is necessary to be resolved for the Chinese constitutional theory urgently. Interpretation is connected with the instruction and restriction of interpretation methodology, since methodology can make sure the objectivity of interpretation. Therefore, the research on constitutional interpretation methodology should be the core problem of constitutional interpretation theory. The domestic research on constitutional interpretation methodology has just put the show on the road, however, the American research on constitutional interpretation methodology has become mature and systematical on the basis of the nature of the written constitution and abundant demands of constitutional interpretation practice. The debate over originalism in American constitutional interpretation has been enduring up to the present. Originalists have been arguing against nonoriginalists, however, originalists cannot agree with each other. From the point of view of originalism, we can grasp the American constitutional interpretation theories and methods roundly. The author makes a comprehensive and systematical analysis and argumentation of originalism. The paper enumerates the varieties of originalism for the first time, traces the historical development of originalism, expounds original understanding and textualism, illustrates originalism's legitimacy and originalism's refutation towards the criticism, and elucidates originalism's posivtive senses of maintaining democracy and rule of law, and its theoretical limitstions. The research may make progress towards the perfection of the Chinese constitutional interpretation methodology. The paper contains six chapters.
Chapter 1 expounds the concept of originalism. Originalism should be defined as a theory of how judges should decide constitutional cases, or a sort of judicial constitutional interpretation theory. Originalism has evolved from original intent, original meaning into semantic originalism. Originalists of all sorts share a core conviction that the Supreme Court is bound to adhere to the framers'original intent and the Constitution's original meaning in interpreting the Constitution. We can divide originalism into strong originalism and originalism, strict originalism and moderate originalism according to the role of precedent and different attitudes towards interpretive objectives. The two important varieties of originalism are referred to as original textualism and original intentionalism. The most defensible form of originalism should be a sort of moderate originalism which combines the advantages of original textualism and original intentionalism together.
Chapter 2 traces the historical development of originalism in American constitutional interpretation theory and practice. From the founding era to the late nineteenth-century, axiomatic textual originalism remained as the orthodoxy constitutional interpretation methodology. After the early twentieth-century, the modern intellectual revolt against formalism and the rise of modern judicial power brought on the marginalization and eclipse of originalism. Since the New Deal coalition disintegrated and the new conservative political movement emerged in 1980s, these changes created the political space for the reemergence of originalism. Although President Reagon's nomination of Robert H. Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court in June 1987 was vetoed by the Senate, originalism reached a climax with the steady development and became a more subtle and complex doctrine unfailingly. We can discover clearly that the evolution of originalism is much connected with the American developing history of constitutionalism, the profound combination of social holistic revolution, political movement development and moral conception's vicissitudes through the analysis of originalism's origin and evolutionary period in the American constitutional theory and constitutional adjudication practice.
Chapter 3 expounds the two typical originalism theories. Bork insisted that only the approach of original understanding met the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy. Only that approach is consonant with the design of the American Republic. Bork's original understanding approach requests judges to search the framers' intent and the Constitution's meaning understood at the time of the law's enactment. The philosophy of original understanding is capable of supplying neutrality in all three respects in deriving, defining and applying principle so as to make sure the legitimacy of the authority of judges. Scalia's textualism is neither strict constructionism nor textual nihilism. Textualism is a sort of reasonable construction methodology. The Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers' intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original meaning and current meaning. Scalia criticized "the living constitution" as an evolutionary approach, and proposed that originalism is a sort of historic standard without judges' own prejudice, and at the same time is compatible with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.
Chapter 4 analyzes the legitimacy foundation of originalism from the four respects. First of all, the legitimacy of originalism is derived from the demand of popular sovereignty. The Constitution emphasizes "the people's consent on the limited government", and the judiciary is set up as the enforcer of the people's concrete will. Therefore, the judiciary can only apply these principles on the basis of the consent of the people at the time of enactment objectively so as to obtain its authority. Originalism is helpful to resolve the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" and improve democracy by maintaining the authority of the Constitution. Secondly, the legitimacy of originalism is derived form the demand of the written constitution. The written nature of the constitution indicates stability and determinability inherently, so the meaning of the Constitution has been fixed at the time of enactment. Courts cannot make an interpretation which was forbidden by the written Constitution according to the framers' intent. The written Constitution is a law document as the fundamental law, and this fact requests interpreters to interpret the Constitution by the law method according to the original meaning. The Constitution as a legal text embodies the author's intent. The interpreters of the Constitution have to explore the reason and intention of the author of the text strictly so as to assure the objectivity of the interpretive results. Thirdly, the legitimacy of originalism is derived from the demand of the separation and balance of powers. The separation and balance of powers requests the non-elected courts to adhere to the original intent of the framers and not to arrogate the limits of the judiciary power, or else it would make the hidden trouble of judge-made law. Lastly, the legitimacy of originalism is derived from the demand of the constitutional neutral principle. The power of judicial review should be the judicial power strictly, and the judiciary should pay careful respect to the other branches' decision in their ranges of authority. Courts have no authority to change the law or the Constitution. The Constitution must be interpreted according to the original intent of the framers and the original meaning of the Constitution, so the courts must choose the neutral principles in order to prevent the Constitution from being politicized excessively.
Chapter 5 analyzes originalist's refution towards the criticism which they encountered. The first criticism is based on the view of methodology. Originalism isnot workable in practice because of the scarce historical materials and the courts' limited ability of making historical research. Originalists think that this kind of criticism testifies the difficulty of the historical research only, and cannot reach the conclusion that originalism isnot workable directly. The second criticism is based on the view of democracy. The 1787 Constitution has many democratic defects and the constitution amending procedure is very complex. If originalism forces the courts to adhere to the original intent of the framers under this circumstance, it is the dead hand controlling the country. According to the potential sovereignty, originalism doesnot impose the political prejudice of the dead on the alive simply and arbitrarily, and retains the recurrent expressive system of the sovereignty in the modern time so as to assure the continuity of the sovereignty. The third criticism is based on the text as indeterminate. All the arguments of the indeterminate text deconstruct the author's control on the text more or less, destroys the stable and determinate meaning of the text. In order to maintain the tradition of rule of law, originalism undertakes the theoretical mission of "anti-deconstruction". Originalism thinks that the remedy of the textual indeterminacy isnot the errand of constitutional interpretation, but the duty of constitutional construction of the political departments. The fourth criticism is based on the view of the separation and balance of powers. Judicial activists insist that the Court should play a sort of substantial and active policy-oriented role in the political life, and the courts should make creative interpretation according to social reality and real needs. Originalism thinks that the judicial power is the power of decision, so the Court should obey the law and policy made by the political departments with the loyalty to the Constitution and prevent the justices from applying their value determination into decisions. The nature of the debate between originalism and judicial activism lies in the different opinions about the proper role of the judicial power in the constitutional system. Excessively judicial activist role will bring the Court a heavy political burden, erode the foundation of its legitimacy. The Court should implement moderate judicial activism in the framework of judicial restraint. Additionally, nonoriginalists have proposed that the framers themselves did not expect their own intentions to control subsequent interpretation of the Constitution and there are anti-originalist clauses in the Constitution. Originalists make powerful refutation from their own standpoints.
Chapter 6 makes an overall and comprehensive evaluation of originalism. Originalism is the pursuit of objectivity. Adherence to the originalist interpretational method can assure the predictability of the decisions and the invariability of the law. Since originalism is aimed to maintain the popular sovereignty and the authority of constitutional text, it is the constitutional interpretation theory which conforms with democracy and the rule of law in the constitutional system. The theory of Originalism has also its own limitations. Originalism emphasizes the determinability so excessively that constitutional interpretation is deprived of flexibility. At the same time, originalism ignores three factors' influence to the constitutional interpretation, such as interpreters' subjective value determination, social reality, and the common law tradition of judge-made law. The essence of the debate between originalism and nonoriginalism is the relationship between predeterminate obligation and subsequent democracy, the relationship between the objectivity of constitutional interpretation and the creativity of constitutional interpretation, the relationship between stability and adaptability. Any exclusive interpretation theory cannot solely define the Court's interpretive practice, and simultaneously the Court's interpretive practice hasnot followed any exclusive interpretive theory. The Court not only adheres to constitutional text, the framers' intent, constitutional precedent and constitutional history, but also considers the reasonable demands of the social reality, public policies and moral ethics so as to realize accommodation of the objectivity and creativity of constitutional interpretation. In doing so, the Court can maintain the authority and stability of the Constitutional text, at one time make the Constitution adaptive to the various social demands.
引文
①范进学：《从规范分析宪法学到宪法解释学》,《河南省政法管理干部学报学报》2005年第2期。
②范进学、杨阿妮：《宪法解释学：作为宪法方法论的学问》,《浙江学刊》2009年第5期。
③韩大元：《中国宪法学方法论的学术倾向与问题意识》,《中国法学》2008年第1期。
① See William J. Michael, The Original Understanding of Original Intent: A Textual Analysis, Ohio Northern University Law Review 201 (2000).
① Edwin Meese Ⅲ, Address before the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C, July 9,1985.
② William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.25.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 1-35.
① Thomas Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" 27 Stanford Law Review (1975),p.706, n.9.
② John Hart Ely, "Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility," Indiana Law Journal 53 (1978), pp. 399-448.
③ Thomas Grey, "The Constitution as Scripture," Stanford Law Review 37 (1984), p.1.
①范进学：《美国宪法解释方法论之辨思》,《现代法学》2006年第5期。
② Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 204, n.1.
① Steven D. Smith, "Law Without Mind," Michigan Law Review 88 (1989), p.106.
② Raoul Berger, "New Theories of Constitutional 'Interpretation'," p.2. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky. "The Constitution Is Not'Hard Law':The Bork Rejection and the Future of Constitutional Jurisprudence," Constitutional Commentary 6 (1989), p.31.
③ Note, "In Defense of the Framers' Intent:Civic Virtue, the Bill of Rights and the Framers' Science of Politics," Virginia Law Review 75 (1989), p.1312. Cf. Fallon, "A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation," p.1209.
④ John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.l. Cf. Maltz, "The Failure of Attacks on Originalism," p.43. J Clifford Wallace, "Whose Constitution? An Inquiry into the Limits of Constitutional Interpretation," in Essays on Changing Interpretaion of the Constitution, ed. by Joseph F. McNamara and Lissa Roche (Hillsdale, Mich:Hillsdale College Press.1987). p.2.
⑤ John Valauri, "The Varieties of Constitutional Theory: A Comment on Perry and Hoy," Northern Kentucky Law Review 15 (1988), p.500. Cf. Robert W. Bennett, "Objectivity in Constitutional Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132 (1984), pp.445-46; Robert N. Clinton, "Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 'This constitution'," Iowa Law Review 72 (1987), p.180.
① John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1971), p.8.
①[美]詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法解释与判例》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第67-68页。
② Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1977), p.7.
① Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p.205.
② U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Guidelines on Constitutional Litigations, p.3, WashingtonD.C.,1988.转引自赵晓力：《美国宪法的原旨解释》,载《宪法与公民》,赵晓力编辑,上海人民出版社2004年版,第383页。
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.143.
④ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.38.
① Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism,Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policv.2004. p.2. University Press of Kansas,1999, p.35.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review,
③ District of Columbia v. Heller (June 26,2008).
① Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No.07-24, November 22,2008.
②陈弘毅：《普通法权限中的宪法解释》,施嵩译,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
③对于美国宪法解释的原意主义概念的梳理,国内学界基本已达成共识。参见张翔：《美国宪法解释理论中的原旨主义》,《山东社会科学》2005年第7期。范进学：《美国宪法解释方法论之辨思》,《现代法学》2006年第5期。
① James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 7(1893),p.140.
② Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, Harvard University Press, 1988, p.22.
③ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), p.230.
④ James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 7(1893), pp.143-44.
① Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil",57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 861, (1989).
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.155-59.
③ Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press,1921, pp.149-50.
④历史学家们现在广泛认同最高法院1871年所做的Knox v. Lee案判决推翻了1870年的Hepburn v. Griswold案判决,确立了国会发行纸币的权力,而这是违背制宪者的原初意图的。
⑤美国宪法第一条第八款规定“国会有权管制……各州之间的……商业”,国会的这项权力现在被视为几乎不加限制地规制任何它所希望事情的权力。宪法历史学者广泛认为,这种扩张性解读也是违背商贸条款的原初意图的。
⑥如1954年的布朗诉教育委员会案推翻了公共教育中的种族隔离,1954年的Boiling诉Sharpe案裁决认为国会命令的在哥伦比亚特区公共学校实行种族隔离违反了隐含在第五修正案正当程序条款中的关于平等保护的保障,1948年的Shelley诉Kramer案推翻了种族限制的住房合同,1944年的Smith v. Allwright案认定白人初选违宪,1966年的Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections案宣布州人头税无效,1967年的Loving v. Virginia案推翻反对种族通婚的州法律。
⑦ See, e.g., Reed v. Reed,404 U.S.71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson,411 U.S.677 (1973).
⑧ Gideon v. Wainwright案要求对犯有重罪的贫困刑事被告人实行免费的法律援助；1966年的Miranda v. Arizona案要求警方在审问之前通知犯罪嫌疑人基本的程序权利；1968年的Duncan v. Louisiana案合并了第六修正案的陪审团审判的保障。
① Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p.204.
② Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 222.
① Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 223.
① Reynolds v. U. S.,98 U. S. (8 Otto) 145 (1879)支持适用一项联邦法律,该法律禁止其宗教信仰允许一夫多妻婚姻的摩门教徒的多配偶制。
② Jehovah's Witness v. King County Hospital,390 U. S.598 (1968)支持一项允许法院在父母拒绝为子女输血的情况下可以强制儿童入院治疗的立法。
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992,pp.26-27.
④ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), p.232.
① Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Harvard University Press,1986, pp.321-324.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.29.
② Raoul Berger, "Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary", Maryland Law Review 40 (1981), p.26.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.30.
① Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press,1978. p.136.
② Michael Moore, "A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation", Southern California Law Review 58 (1985), p.341.
③ Raoul Berger, "Original Intentions in Historical Perspective", George Washington Law Review 54 (1986), pp. 113-20.
④ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), pp.259-60.
① See, Antonin Scalia, "Originalism:the Lesser Evil," University of Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989), pp.856,863; Robert Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica:The political Seduction of the Law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.163.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, pp.32-34.
③ Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 237.
① Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks,1994, pp.141-42.
② Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction of Laws,2d ed. St. Paul. Minn.: West,1991, pp.445-446.
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, pp.27-28.
① Cass Sunstein, "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State", Harvard Law Review 103 (1989), pp.430-32.
② See Richard A. Posner, "Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution," Case Western Reserve Law Review 37 (1986-87), pp.189-90.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992,pp.47-51.
①詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法判例与解释》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第68-70页
②詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法判例与解释》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第70页。
③ Thomas Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Boston: Little Brown,1883, p.38. Henry Campbell Black, Handbood on American Constitutional Law,3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:West Publishing Co.,1910), p.30.
④ See, Dred Scott v. Sanford,60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404 (1856); Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today,13th rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press,1974), p.1.
⑤ See Jacobus ten Broeck, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, (Berkeley: University of California Press,1951), p.87.
⑥ Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders'Design, pp.70-71.
⑦ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), pp.246-47.
⑧ Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 214.
①参见王希：《原则与妥协——美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京大学出版社2000年版,第90页。参见纪念美国宪法颁布200周年委员会编：《美国公民与宪法》,劳娃、许旭译,清华大学出版社2006年版,第99页。
② Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137,176 (1803).
③ Annals of Congress, V,p.776.
①参见王希：《原则与妥协——美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京大学出版社2000年版,第62-63页。参见纪念美国宪法颁布200周年委员会编：《美国公民与宗教》,清华大学出版社2006年版,第71页。
② The Federalist-No.10 (Madison), p.62.
① Remarks of Rep. Roger Sherman (Aug.13,1789), quoted in Joseph Gales and W.W. Seaton. comps. The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States (Annals of Congress),42 vols.
① Earl Maltz, "Foreword:The Appeal of Originalism," 1987 Utah Law Review (1987), pp.802-804.
② Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), p.249.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.85.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.86.
① Robert Bork,The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the Law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.163.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.87.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992,pp.2-3.
②亚里士多德：《修辞学》,罗念生译,三联书店1996年版,第24页。
③ St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3 vols. (New York:Benzinger Bros.,1947), Ⅱ-Ⅱ, q.120, a,1.
① Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law, VII, p.459.
② William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, facsimile of 1769 ed.,4 vols. (Chicago Press,1979) 1,91,59,61.
① Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press,1969), pp.168-69.
② Rutgers v. Waddington, Mayor's Court of New York (1784).
③ Julirs Goebel, Jr., and Joseph H. Smith, ed., The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary,5 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press,1964-1981), Ⅰ, Chap.3.
④ James Wilson, "Lectures on the Law," in The Works of James Wilson, ed. by Robert McCloskey,2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1967), Ⅰ, p.75.
⑤ Albert E. Bergh ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,20 vols. (Washington, D. C.:Jefferson Memorial Association,1907), X V, p.449.
⑥ Letters and Other Writings of James Madsion,4 vols. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott,1865), III, p.245.
①汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版,第391页。
② James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law iew 7 (1893), p.140.
③ Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction of Laws,2d ed. St. Paul. Minn.:West,1911, pp.20-21.
① Howard Gillman, "The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of 'the Living Constitution' in the Course of American State-Building", Studies in American Political Development 11(1997): 191-247,203.
① Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press 2005, p18.
② Kermit L. Hall, The supreme Court and Judicial Review in American History, American Historical Association, 1985, p.13.
③ Ogden v. Saunders,12 Wheat.213,332 (1827).
①宪法第一条第八款规定“国会可以制定为行使上述各项权力和由本宪法授予合众国政府或其任何部门或官员的一切其他权力所必要和适当的所有法律”。这一条款为联邦政府权力的扩张提供了可能性。
② McCulloch v. Maryladn,17 U. S.316,415.
③ Quoted in Cerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch V. Maryland, Stanford University Press 1969, at 168-169.
④ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, at 20.
① Dred Scott v. Sandford,19 How.393,405.
② Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,3 vols. Hilliard,Gray 1833,1:383.
③ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, p.22.
④ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, p.22.
①参见任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上——美国最高法院的历史轨迹》,中国法制出版社2007年版,第168页。
② Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,1878),68.
③ Arthur W. Machen Jr., "The Elasticity of the Constitutuion," pts, I and II, Harvard Law Review 14 (1900-01); 200-216.
①美国宪法中的“正当程序条款”,涉及两个修正案。第一个出现于第五修正案,其规定“任何人,不经过正当法律程序,不得被剥夺生命、自由或财产”,是针对联邦政府而言的；第二个存在于第十四修正案,是针对各州的。对“正当程序”条款的解释一般包括以下两个层面：第一,联邦和各州的行为必须符合一定的法律程序,这种解释被称为“程序性正当程序”；第二,即使程序合法,联邦和各州的行为也不能损害公民的生命、自由、财产,这种解释被称为“实体性正当程序”。转引自任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上——美国最高法院的历史轨迹》,中国法制出版社2007年版,第178页。
② Lochner v. New York,198 U. S.45 (1905).
③ G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2000),4,36-37, 233,272.
① Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 25-27.
② Robert S. Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1982.
③ Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Collected Legal Paper,,New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe,1920, p.239.
④ Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, reprinted in part in The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, pp. 51-52.
① Brian Leiter, "Legal Realism" in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Dennis Patterson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1996),265-69.
② Walter W. Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927):303-9.
③ Felix Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (New York:Harcourt, Brace,1933),244-45.
④ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman @Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1992, pp.2-3.
① Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Contract", Yale Law Journal 18 (1909), p.467.
②[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第6-7页。
③ Mooris R. Cohen, The Faith of a Liberal (New York: Henry Holt,1946), p.176.
④ Louis B.Boudin, Government By Judiciary,2 vols.(New York:William Godwin,1932), Ⅰ, p.463.
⑤ Benjamin Hoadly, Sermon on "The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ," March 31,1717, in The Works of Benjamin Hoadly,3 vols. (London,1773).
① Karl Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Constructed," Vanderbilt Law Review 3 (1950), p.400.
②这种区分具有古老的历史渊源。中世纪法学家通常区分mens legis,即根植于法律字词本身恰当含义的法律意图与ratio legis即法律的目的或最终理由以及mens legislatoris即立法者主观意欲表达的意图。
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, p.11.
①Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,290 U.S.398,442-43(1934).
②United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.299,316(1941).
①Roscoe Pound,"A Survey of Social Interests",Harvard Law Review 57(1943).
②[美]本杰明.卡多佐:《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第101-102页.
① "A 'Fireside Chat' Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary, Washington, DC, March 9,1937," in Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt,1937 (New York: Macmillan, 1941),122-33,132,127,130.
② Homer Cummings, "The American Constitutional Method", December 18,1935, in Selected Papers of Homer Cummings, ed.
③ Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,290 U.S.443 (1934).
①West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,300 U.S.379,390(1937).
②Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S.111(1942).
①任东来：《改变美国宪政历史的一个脚注》,《读书》2005年第9期。
② U. S. v. Carolene Products Co.,304 U. S.144,152 n4 (1938); Martin M. Shapiro, "The Constitution and Economic Rights," in Essays on the Constitution of the United States, ed. M. Judd Harmon (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,1978), p74-98.
③ Palko v. Connecticut,302 U. S.319,325 (1937).
①Blaisdell,453,449.
②West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,300 U.S.379,390(1937).
① Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.40.
② Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution (Princeton, N. J.:Princeton University Press,1989), pp.3-4.
③ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 1-35.
④ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.6.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 8-10.
② Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.30.
③ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.3.
④ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.6.
⑤ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.3-4.
⑥ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 10-11.
⑦ Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press,1978, pp.131-49.
① Thomas Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" Stanford Law Review 27 (1975), p.713.
② Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cambridge Mass.:Harvard Press,1977, chs 14 and 17.
③ Ibid.,52-116,419-27; 117-33.
① Ibid.,407.
② Paul Brest, "Berger v. Brown, et al.," New York Times Book Review, December 11,1977,10-11,44.
③ Ronald Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle." 56 New York Universitv Law Review (1981) 478
④ Raoul Berger, "Mark Tushnet's Critique of Interpretivism," 57 George Washington Law Review (1983),544.
① Herman Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law? American Constitutionalism in Historical Perspective (Lanham, MD:Rowman and Littlefield,1998),226.
① Robert Bork, "The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights" [speech delivered November 18,1985], San Diego Law Review 23 (1986):823-32,827,828,826.
② Ibid.,826-27,829.
③ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press,140-41.
① Gangi, "An Intentionist's Critique," 253-57.
② William Rehnquist, "The Notion of a Living Constitution," Texas Law Review 54 (1976):693-706,695.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,47-61,152-59,217.
② Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics:A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press,191.
① Keith E. Whittington, " The New Originalism," 8, paper presented at the American Association of Law Schools Conference On Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C., June 2002.
② Maltz, Rethinking, passim.
③ Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Harvard University Press, 1996, at 13.
④ Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, Knopf 1996. Intentions," Philosophical Review 78(1969):147-77.
⑤ E. D.Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation, Yale University Press 1967. H. p.Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and
⑥ Wittgenstein, Investigations,293,337.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,59,99.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,96.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), pp. 1-35.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.2.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.3-4.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.10-11.
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.6.
④ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.5.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.139-141.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.143.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law. Simon & Schuster.1990. p.144.
② Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,88 Colum. L.Rev.723,725-27.
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990,p.145.
④ Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.137,177-79 (1803).
① Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,73 Harv. L. Rev.1 (1959).见78-84页。
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.146.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.146
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.146—147.
② Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,90 Yale L.J.1063,1091-92 (1981).
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law,Simon & Schuster, 1990,pp.147-151.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law,simon & Schuster, 1990,p.151.
③ Shelley v. Kraemer,334 U.S 1(1948),151-53.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), pp. 1-35.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.151-153.
① P. Bator, P.Mishkin, D.Meltzer&D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (3d ed.1988) quoting 1. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention (1911),154.
② Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No.78, (C.Rossiter ed.1961),465-66.
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.154-155.
④ Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,88 Colum. L.Rev (1988),727.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law,Simon & Schuster, 1990,p.155.
② Helvering v. Hallock,309 U.S.106,119(1940).
①Antonin Scalia,Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.Cin.L.Rev.861(1989).
②Robert Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica:the Political Seduction of the law,Simon & Schuster,1990,pp.155-159.
③F.Frankfurter,The Commerce Clause 80-81(1937).
①[美]卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第79-80页。
② James M. Landis. A Note on "Statutory Interpretation".43 Harv. L. Rev.886 (1930).
③ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.21.
① Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.16.
② Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.17.
③ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997,17,25.
④ Conroy v. Aniskoff,507 U.S.511,519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
① Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.23.
① Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, pp.' 23-25.
②施嵩：《美国宪法解释理论与实践中的原意主义——基于美国宪政发展的历程》,《法律方法》第九卷,陈金钊主持,山东人民出版社2009年版,第156页。
③参见范进学：《斯卡里亚宪法解释方法论及其评析》,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
① McCulloch v. Maryland,17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
② Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p38.
③ Antonin. Scalia, A Thoery of Constitution Interpretaiton, speech at Catholic University of America,10/18/96.
① Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4,1836), in Kermit L. Hall et al., American Legal Histoy,317,317-18 (1991).
① Trop v. Dulles,356 U.S.86,101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
② Fortunatus Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes, with American Notes and Additions by Platt Potter,122 (Albany, N.Y.1871).
③ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p41.
④徐振东：《宪法解释的哲学》,法律出版社2006年版,第254页。
⑤ "Scalia talks up' originalsim' in UVM speech", by David Associated Press, published: October 9,2004, website: http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041009/NEWS/410090381/1002
①焦宝乾：《文本论：一种法律文本解释方法的学说考察》,载《法律方法》第一卷,陈金钊主持,山东人民出版社2002年版,第100-103页。
②徐振东：《宪法解释的哲学》,法律出版社2006年版,第244-245页。
① see United States v. Bass,404 U.S.336,347-49(1971).
② See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,471 U.S.759,766.68(1985).
③ see Robert C. Reed & Co.v. Krawill Mach.Corp.,359 U.S.297,304-05(1959).
④ see Tcherepnin v. Knight,389 U.S.332,336(1967).
⑤ see United States v Nordic Village,Inc.,503 U.S.30,33,34(1992).
①McCulloch v. Maryland,17 U.S.(4 Wheat.)316,407(1819).
① Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court: How the Choice of Supreme Court Justices Shapes Our History, New York: Random House,1985, p.45.
② Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil",57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849 (1989).
① Myers v. United States,272 U.S.52,118 (1926).
① Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil",57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849 (1989).
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.152-153.
①[美]L.亨金：《权利的时代》,信春鹰、吴玉章、李林译,知识出版社1997年版,第108页。
②[法]托克维尔：《论美国的民主》,董果良译,商务印书馆1988年版,第64页。
③[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第7页。
④[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第113页。
⑤[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第195页。
⑥[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第240页。
⑦ Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.(1 Cranch)137,176-177(1803).
⑧[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第393页。
① Robert H. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1997), at 2.3.
② Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution,27 S. Tex. L. J.455,465 (1986).
③ See Michael J.Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Rebecca L. Brown, Girardeau A.Spann: Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, p111.
①[美]亚历山大·M.比克尔：《最小危险部门——政治法庭上的最高法院》,姚中秋译,北京大学出版社2007年版,第17页。
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.201.
③[美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第115页。
①范进学：《美国宪法解释：“麦迪逊两难”之消解》,《法律科学》2006年第3期。
② Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, University of Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989), p.862.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.150-155.
② Greald Stourzh, Fundamental Laws and Individual Rights in 18th Century Constitution, from The American Foundings, Essays on the Formation of the Constitution, Edited by J.Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy, and Ken Masugi, (Greenwood Press, Inc.,1988), pp.181-182.转引自钱福臣：《美国宪政生成的深层背景》,法律出版社2005年版,第175页。
① Randy E. Bamett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, Loy. L.Rev 45 (1999), pp.629-643.
②黎作恒：《美国宪法成文形式的历史渊源》,《现代法学》2004年第2期。
① T.M.Cooley et al, Constiutitonal History of the United States as Seen in the Development of American Law,1889, pp.6-7/
② E.C.S. Wade and G.G.Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law, p.4.
③W.I.詹宁斯：《法与宪法》,恭祥瑞、侯健译,三联书店1997年版,第117页。
①[美]约瑟夫·斯托里：《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版,第158页。
②Thomas Cooley,A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations(Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1868, pp.54-55.
③参见[美]约瑟夫.斯托里:《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版,第128—132页.
① John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.3.
② Michael J.Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Rebecca L. Brown, Girardeau A. Spann:Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, p 113.
① Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.137,176-77 (1803).
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review,
University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.57-58.
① Nathamel Chipman, Principles of Government (Burlington, VT:Edward Smith,1833), at 254.
②参见范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第140-141页。
③参见洪汉鼎：《诠释学——它的历史和当代发展》,人民出版社2001年版,第74页。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆2007年版,第391页。
①参见[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆2007年版,第392页。
①参见William Burnham:《英美法导论》,林利芝译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第169-171页。
②参见张千帆：《西方宪政体系(上册·美国宪法)》,中国政法大学出版社2004年版,第74-76页。
③[美]阿奇博尔德·考克斯：《法院与宪法》,田雷译,北京大学出版社2006年版,第160-161页。
① James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 7 (1893), p.144.
Baldwin v. Missouri,281 U.S., at 595.
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.297,303 (1976).
① West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,319 U.S.624,632(1943).
① Edwin Meese Ⅲ, "Interpreting the Constitution", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.16.
② William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, pp.23-34.
③ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Original Meaning Jurisprudence:A Sourcebook, WashingtonD.C.,1987,p.26.参见赵晓力：《美国宪法的原旨主义》,载赵晓力执行主编：《宪法与公民》,上海人民出版社2004年版,第390页。
① Robert H.Bork, "Address at the University of San Diege Law School", in the Great Debate (Washington, D.C.: Federalist Society,1986), at 45.
② Gralia, "'Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on Bork", Stanford Law Review 44 (1992),1020.
① H.L.A.Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,1961, p124.
② H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", in H.L.A. Hart. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press,1983, p.71.
③[美]德沃金：《认真对待权利》,信春鹰、吴玉章译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版,第41页。
④范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第136页。
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Menaing, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.41-43.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Menaing, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.5-6.
① Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principle of Constitutional Law,73 Harvard Law Review (1959).
①赫伯特·威克斯勒：《走向宪法的中立原则》,张千帆译,载张千帆组织编译的《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》,法律出版社2005年版,第34页。
②赫伯特·威克斯勒：《走向宪法的中立原则》,张千帆译,载张千帆组织编译的《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》,法律出版社2005年版,第51页。
①参见赫伯特·威克斯勒：《走向宪法的中立原则》,张千帆译,载张千帆组织编译的《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》,法律出版社2005年版,第52-54页。
② Smith v. Allwright,321 U.S.649(1944).
③ Shelly v. Kraemer,334 U.S.1(1948)；Barrows v.Jackson,346 U.S.249(1953).
④ Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S.483(1954).
⑤张千帆教授在《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》一书第63页的脚注86中认为,“关于白人初选和歧视性租约的两类案件都涉及到政府行为(state action)问题,因为作为社会团体的政党和私人地产的拥有者都不是国家机构,因而在原则上不是宪法诉讼的适格被告。”笔者认为这一注解犯了两个错误。一是state action应是州行为而非政府行为。第十四修正案针对各州提出了“不得制定或实施限制合众国公民的特权或豁免权的任何法律”,限制的是州行为而非政府行为。二是司法审查的适格条件(stnading)要求联邦法院所审查的所有案件的原告必须证明被告造成原告明确的实际损害和法律损害,且原告与争议的结果有非常密切的个人关联。被告只是造成原告损害结果的个人或机构,并不限制于国家机构。
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, Simon & Schuster,1990, at 4,5,9.
① Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.176.
② Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.300.
③ Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, in Interpreting the Constitution:the Debate over Originallintent, edited by Jack N.Rakove, Northeastern University Press 1990, at 199.
① Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press,1985, p.36.
①[美]德沃金：《法律帝国》,李常青译,中国大百科全书出版社1996年版,第299页。
② Michael S.Moore, "The Semantics of Judging", Sourthern California Law Review 54 (1981), p.265-266.
③ Mark Tushnet, "The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers", Buffalo Law Review 36 (1987), p.221; Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constituion, New York:Praeger,1987, p.51. Cf. Sunstein, "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State", pp.427,433.
④ Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes, Boston:Little Brown,1985, p.37.
① Richard S. Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions: Three Objections and Responses", Northwestern University Law Review 82 (1988), p.249.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.84.
③[美]德沃金：《法律帝国》,李常青译,中国大百科全书出版社1996年版,第286页。
④ Federal Energy Administration v. Alaonquin SNG, Inc.,426 U.S.548,564 (1976); National Association of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Service,462 U.S.810,832n.28 (1983).
① See, generally, Berger, Government by Judiciary, pp.134-156; Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? "pp.5-139.
② Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p.214.
③[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《原则问题》,张国清译,江苏人民出版社2005年版,第43页。
① Huston, The Creation of the Constitution:The Integrity of the Documentary Record, Texas Law Review 65 (1986), p.34.
②[美]卡尔·范·杜伦：《伟大的预演：美国宪法草拟和批准的故事》,赵盾译,美国驻华大使馆新闻文化处1985年版,第17页。
③ Huston, The Creation of the Constitution:The Integrity of the Documentary Record, Texas Law Review 65 (1986), p.36.
④ See Leonard Levy, Original Intent and the Framers'Constitution, New York:Macmillian,1988, pp.292-94. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.17; Chester J. Antieau, "Constitutional Construction:A Guide to the Principles and Their Application," Notre Dame Lawyer 51 (1976), p.363.
① Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,72 VA. L. Rev.1237,1250-51 (1986).
② Velasquez v. Frapwell,160 F.3d 389,393 (7th Cir,1998).
③参见范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第143页。
① Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of Constitution, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp.12-13
① Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:Politics and Ideas in the Making of Constitution, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp.14-16.
②参见[美]肯尼思·W·汤普森编：《宪法的政治理论》,张志铭译,三联书店1997年版,第4-5页。
① Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:Politics and Ideas in the Making of Constitution, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp.19-21
① Paul Brest, "Berger v. Brown, et al", New York Times Book Review, December 11,1977. Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, pp.100-107. Larry Simon, "The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be justified?" California Law Review 73.(1984):1487.
①参见[美]罗伯特·A.达尔：《美国宪法的民主批判》,佟德志译,东方出版社2007年版,第15-18页。
① Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L.Rev.204,229 (1980).
② Michael J. Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe. Jr., Rebecca L.Brown, Girardeau A. Spann, Constiuttional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, pp.120-120.
① Stephen Carter, "Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text:A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle," Yale Law Journal 94 (1985), p.842.
②参见[美]罗伯特·A.达尔：《美国宪法的民主批判》,佟德志译,东方出版社2007年版,第128-129页。
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.195-196.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.129-130.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.132.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.136.
① Thomas Jefferson, "Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions" (1789) and letter of September 7,1803, Writings, edited by Merrill Peterson (New York, Library of America,1984), pp.959,962,1402.
① James Madison, Letter of February 4,1790, in The Papers of James Madison, vol.13, edited by Charles Hobson and Robert Rutland (Charottesville, University Press of Virginia,1981), p.22.
②[美]史蒂芬·霍姆斯：《先定约束与民主的悖论》,载[美]埃尔斯特、[挪]斯莱格斯塔德编：《宪政与民主——理性与社会变迁研究》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,三联书店出版社1998年版,第265页。
①张首映：《西方二十世纪文论史》,北京大学出版社1999年版,第112页。
②王先霈：《文学批评原理》,华中师范大学出版社1999年版,第75页。
③王岳川：《作者之死与文本欢欣》,《文学自由谈》1998年第4期,第77页。
①[法]罗兰·巴特：《作者之死》,载《罗兰·巴特随笔选》,怀宇译,百花文艺出版社2007年版,第103页。
②[法]罗兰·巴特：《作者之死》,载《罗兰·巴特随笔选》,怀宇译,百花文艺出版社2007年版,第300、307页。
③米歇尔·福柯：《作者是什么?》,逢真译,载《后现代主义的突破：外国后现代主义理论》,敦煌文艺出版社1996年版,第270-272页。
①罗兰·巴尔特：《S/Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版,第70页。
②罗兰·巴尔特：《S/Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版,第51页。
③罗兰·巴尔特：《S/Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版,第51页。
④[美]费什：《文学在阅读中：感受文体学》,王逢振编：《最新西方文论选》,漓江出版社1991年版,第74页。
⑤[美]费什：《文学在阅读中：感受文体学》,王逢振编：《最新西方文论选》,漓江出版社1991年版,第57页。
①[美]简·汤普金斯：《读者反应批评》,文化艺术出版社1989年版,第100页。
②[美]费什：《文学在阅读中：感受文体学》,王逢振编：《最新西方文论选》,漓江出版社1991年版,第69页。
①[德]伽达默尔：《真理与方法(上卷)》,洪汉鼎译,上海译文出版社2004年版,第4-8页。
②[德]伽达默尔：《真理与方法(下卷)》,洪汉鼎译,上海译文出版社2004年版,第498页。
③ Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.89-91.
①W·K·维姆塞特·比尔兹利：《感受谬误》,赵毅衡编：《新批评文集》,中国社会科学出版社1988年版,第228页。
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.161.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.162.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.94.
③ Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.98-99.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.103-104.
②谢晖：《法律的意义追问——诠释学视野中的法哲学》,商务印书馆2003年版,第176页。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版,第391页。
① Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism:Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Secutity?, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.13-14.
②[美]阿奇博尔德·考克斯：《法院与宪法》,田雷译,北京大学出版社2006年版,第142页。
③ Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism:Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security?, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.18-19.
①任东来：《改变美国宪政历史的一个脚注》,《读书》2005年第9期。
② Anthony Lewis: The Legacy of the Warren Court, in Bernard Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective, Oxford University Press,1996, p.406.
③任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上》,中国法制出版社2007年版,第458-459页。
①[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国最高法院史》,毕洪海等译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版,第301页。
② William J.Brennan, Jr., "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, pp.23-34.
① Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.483,494-495(1954).
①参见[美]莫顿·J·霍维茨：《沃伦法院对正义的追求》,信春鹰、张志铭译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第148-151页。
② John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, pp.45-47.
① Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and.New, Virginia Law Review, Vol.55, No.3, pp.422-423.
② West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,319 U.S.624,638 (1943).
③ Roe v. Wade,410 U.S.113 (1973).基本案情如下：1970年,一位化名为杰恩·罗伊的妇女把其所在县的检察长亨利·韦德告上法庭,指控德克萨斯州的堕胎禁令侵犯了她的“隐私权”,要求联邦法院宣布该法违宪,并下令禁止韦德继续执行该法。德州刑法规定,除了依照医嘱而为拯救母亲生命进行堕胎之外,其他一切堕胎均为刑事犯罪。1973年,最高法院以6：3的多数意见裁定德州刑法禁止堕胎的规定过于宽泛地限制妇女的选择权,侵犯了第十四修正案的正当程序条款所保护的个人自由。
① Baker v. Carr,369 U.S.(1962),186.
①参见李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》,商务印书馆1999年版,第505-506页。William Burnham:《英美法导论》,林利芝译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第154-155页。
② Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism:Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security?, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.73-75.
① Arthur S.Miller, "In Defense of Judicial Activism", in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, ed. Stephen C. Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, Lexington Books,1982, pp.173-177.
② Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism: Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Secutity? Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.27-30.
①参见[美]桑斯坦：《就事论事——美国最高法院的司法最低限度主义》,泮伟江、周武译,北京大学出版社2007年版,第294-295页,第316-319页。
①方流芳：《罗伊判例：关于司法和政治分界的争辩——堕胎和美国宪法第14修正案的司法解释》,载《比较法研究》1998年第1期。
②[美]路易斯·享金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,三联书店1996年版,第115页。
③[美]博登海默：《法理学：法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年版,第587页。
①随着司法审查呈现出很强“公法”倾向,在这一发展过程中决定案件双方争议的意义或者说重点就退至幕后,人们的注意力越来越集中到案件的立法层面。司法能动主义的一个显著特征是司法权力的领域可以大大超越个案的范围。通过扩大集团诉讼、扩大宣告性判决以及为反对政府行为的诉讼提供慷慨的资助等方式,现代最高法院(经常在国会的支持下)已经减少了传统上对接近司法权的条件限制,从而使寻求司法保护变得越来越容易。
② Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent," Harvard Law Review 98 (1985), pp.885-948.
③ Ronald Dworkin, "The Bork Nomination," New York Review of Books (August 13,1987), p.3, n.1.
④ Mark Tushnet, "The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers,"Buffalo Law Review 36 (1987), p.219.
① H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,98 Harvard Law Review (1985),895-896.
② H.Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,98 Harvard Law Review (1985),898.
① Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritche (Sep.15,1821), reprinted in The Original Understanding of Original Intent, supra note, at 936.
② H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,98 Harvard Law Review (1985),899.
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc,1992,pp.67-71.
①詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法判例与解释》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第145页。
② Sherry, The Founders'Unwritten Constitution,54 U. CHI.L.Rev.1127,1145-46 (1987).
① Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S.479 (1965).
② Slaughterhouse Cases,83 U.S.36 (1873).
③ John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.23.
① Thomas C.Grey, "Do we Have an Unwritten Constitution?" 27 Stan. L. Rev.703 (1975).
② Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 117 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork), p.249. Reprinted in Randy E. Barnett, ed., The Rights Retained by The People, vol.2, George Mason University Press,1993, p.441.
③ Griswold v, Connecticut,381 U.S.479 (1965).
①[美]约瑟夫·斯托里：《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版,第574页。
①贾敬华：《视域融合的法哲学的现实分析》,《法制与社会发展》2006年第3期。
②[美]伯尔曼：《法律与革命——西方法律传统的形成》,贺卫方、高鸿钧、张志铭、夏勇译,中国大百科全书出版社1993年版,第45-46页。
①王彬：《美国宪法解释中的原旨主义》,《河南广播电视大学学报》2009年第1期。
①陆自荣：《“价值无涉”与“价值关联”：韦伯思想中的一对张力》,《西安交通大学学报》2005年第2期。
①[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《法律的成长：法律科学的悖论》,董炯、彭冰译,中国法制出版社商务印书馆2000年版,第13、90-91页。
② Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution, Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987, pp.343-345.
①[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆2000年版,第5-6页。
②[美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第121页。
③ Richard A. Posner, "Bork and Beethoven", Stanford Law Review, Vol.42, No.6(1990), p.1371.
④ Richard A. Posner, "Bork and Beethoven", Stanford Law Review, Vol.42, No.6(1990), pp.1372,1380..
⑤[美]理查德·波斯纳：《法官如何思考》,苏力译,北京大学出版社2009年版,第247页。
①韩大元、张翔：《试论宪法解释的界限》,载韩大元主编《现代宪法解释基本理论》,中国民主法制出版社2006年版,第169页。
②朱瑞祥：《美国联邦最高法院判例史程》,台北黎明文化事业股份公司1984年版,第354页。
③ Southern Pacific Co.v. Jensen,244 U.S.205,at 221(1916).转引自美]E·博登海默：《法理学-法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年版,第584-585页。
④[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆2000年版,第4-7页。
①范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第25页。
② Michael J.Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Rebecca L. Brown, Girardeau A.Spann:Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, p 100.
③本文认为,从宪法解释方法论角度来看,“活的宪法”解释方法与原意主义解释方法相互对立,而从法院在司法审查中的立场进行区分,则为司法能动主义与原意主义所主张的司法克制主义相互对立。
④ William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.23.
① William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.24-25.
② William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.26.
③ William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.29.
① John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.103.
① Laurence H Tribe, "The Puzzling Persistence of process-Based Constitutional Theories," 59 Yale Law Journal (1980),1063,1065,1067.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.23-24.
③[美]德沃金：《原则问题》,张国清译,江苏人民出版社2005年版,第70页。
①参见陈弘毅：《当代西方法律解释学初探》,载梁治平主编的《法律解释问题》,法律出版社1998年版,通信处15页。
②参见[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《自由的法：对美国宪法的道德解读》,刘丽君译,上海人民出版社2001年版,第12-13页。
③ Keith E.Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism": The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, The Review of Politics, Vol.62, No.2, (2000).
①[美]理查德·波斯纳：《法理学问题》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版,第29页。
②[美]理查德·波斯纳：《超越法律》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版,第4页。
③[美]理查德·波斯纳：《道德与法律理论的疑问》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版,第263-264页。
① Richard A. Posner, "Bork and Beethoven", Stanford Law Review, Vol.42, No.6(1990),1368,1374,1375.
②徐爱国、李桂林、郭义贵：《西方法律思想史》,北京大学出版社2002年版,第286页。
③ Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Menaing, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.33-34.
④ Laurence Tribe, Michal, On Reading the Constitutional Law, Harvard University Press,1991, pp.24-30.
① Walter F Murphy et al, American Constitutional Interpretation (Westbury, NY:Foundation Press,2nd ed 1995) at 384.
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1.[美]基思·E·惠廷顿：《宪法解释：文本含义、原初意图与司法审查》,杜强强、刘国、柳建龙译,中国人民大学出版社2006年版。
2.[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦：《就事论事——美国最高法院的司法最低限度主义》,泮伟江、周武译,北京大学出版社2007年版。
3.[美]亚历山大·M.比克尔：《最小危险部门——政治法庭上的最高法院》,姚中秋译,北京大学出版社2007年版。
4.[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京大学出版社2007年版。
5.[美]保罗·布莱斯特、桑福·列文森、杰克·巴尔金、阿基尔·阿玛：《宪法决策的过程：案例与材料》(第四版·上册),张千帆、范亚峰、孙雯译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
6.[美]保罗·布莱斯特、桑福·列文森、杰克·巴尔金、阿基尔·阿玛：《宪法决策的过程：案例与材料》(第四版·下册),陆符嘉、周青风、张千帆、沈根明译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
7.[美]布鲁斯·阿克曼：《我们人民：宪法的根基》,孙力、张朝霞译,法律出版社2004年版。
8.[美]科恩：《论民主》,聂崇信、朱秀贤译,商务印书馆1988年版。
9.[美]约翰·哈特·伊利：《民主与不信任——关于司法审查的理论》,朱中一、顾运译,法律出版社2003年版。
10.[美]克里斯托弗·沃尔夫：《司法能动主义——自由的保障还是安全的威胁?》,黄金荣译,中国政法大学出版社2004年版。
11.[英]亨利·萨姆奈·梅因：《古代法》,高敏、瞿慧虹译,九州出版社2007年版。
12.[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版。
13.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《认真对待权利》,信春鹰、吴玉章译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版。
14.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《原则问题》,张国清译,江苏人民出版社2005年版。
15.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《法律帝国》,李常青译,中国大百科全书出版社1996年版。
16.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《自由的法：对美国宪法的道德解读》,刘丽君译,上海人民出版社2001年版。
17.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《至上的美德：平等的理论与实践》,冯克利译,江苏人民出版社2003年版。
18.[美]小卢卡斯·A·鲍威：《沃伦法院与美国政治》,欧树军译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
19.[美]莫顿·J·霍维茨：《沃伦法院对正义的追求》,信春鹰、张志铭译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
20.[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国最高法院史》,毕洪海、柯翀、石明磊译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
21.[美]罗伯特·麦克洛斯基著、桑福德·列文森增订：《美国最高法院》(第三版),任东来、孙雯、胡晓进译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
22.[美]布赖恩·H.比克斯：《牛津法律理论词典》,邱昭继、马得华、刘叶深、冉杰、鲁强译,法律出版社2007年版。
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24.[美]安东尼·G·阿姆斯特丹姆：《关注美国法律》,于兆波、李莹、李艳荣译,吉林人民出版社2004年版。
25.[德]伯恩·魏德士：《法理学》,丁小春、吴越译,法律出版社2003年版。
26.[德]卡尔·拉伦茨：《法学方法论》,陈爱娥译,商务印书馆2005年版。
27.[德]伽达默尔：《真理与方法》,洪汉鼎译,上海译文出版社2004年版。
28.[美]波斯纳：《法理学问题》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
29.[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆2000年版。
30.[美]詹姆士·安修：《美国宪法解释与判例》，黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版。
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33.[美]波斯纳：《法理学问题》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
34.[美]博登海默：《法理学：法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版。
35.[美]罗斯科·庞德：《普通法的精神》,唐前宏等译,法律出版社2001年版。
36.[美]罗尔斯：《正义论》,何怀宏等译,中国社会科学出版社年2005版。
37.[美]伯尔曼：《法律与宗教》,梁治平译,三联书店1991年版。
38.[美]埃尔曼：《比较法律文化》,贺卫方、高鸿钧译,三联书店1990年版。
39.[德]哈贝马斯：《在事实与规范之间：关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论》,童世骏译,三联书店2003年版。
40.[英]拉兹：《法律的权威》,朱峰译,法律出版社2005年版。
41.[美]波斯纳：《联邦法院挑战与改革》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
42.[美]波斯纳：《超越法律》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版。
43.[美]波斯纳：《法律理论的前沿》,武欣、凌斌译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
44.[法]德里达：《论文字学》,汪堂家译,上海译文出版社1999年版。
45.[法]福柯：《规训与惩罚》,刘北成等译,三联书店出版社1999年版。
46.[法]福柯：《权力的眼睛》,严峰译,上海人民出版社1997年版。
47.[德]阿图尔·考夫曼：《后现代法哲学——告别演讲》,米健译,法律出版社2003年版。
48.[德]伽达默尔：《哲学解释学》,夏镇平、宋建平译,上海译文出版社1994年 版。
49.[德]海德格尔：《存在与时间》,陈嘉映、王庆节译,三联书店1999年版。
50.[德]海德格尔：《海德格尔选集》,孙周兴选编,上海三联书店1996年版。
51.[美]埃尔斯特、[挪]斯莱格斯塔德主编：《民主与宪政》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,三联书店1997年版。
52.[美]沃浓·路易·帕灵顿：《美国思想史》,陈永国、李增、郭乙瑶译,吉林人民出版社2002年版。
53.[美]C·H·麦基文：《宪政古今》,翟小波译,贵族人民出版社2004年版。
54.[美]爱德华·S·考文：《美国宪法的“高级法”背景》,强世功译,三联书店1997年版。
55.[英]维尔：《宪政与分权》,苏力译,三联书店1997年版。
56.[美]卡尔·J·弗里德里希：《超验正义：宪政的宗教之维》,周勇、王丽芝译,梁治平校,三联书店1997年版。
57.[美]约翰·邓恩主编：《民主的历程》,林猛等译,吉林人民出版社1999年版。
58.[美]斯科特·戈登：《控制国家：西方宪政的历史》,应奇等译,江苏人民出版社2001年版。
59.[美]A·L·考夫曼：《卡多佐》,张守东译,法律出版社2001年版。
60.[美]潘恩：《潘恩选集》,马清槐等译,商务印书馆1981年版。
61.[美]杰罗姆·巴伦、托马斯·迪恩斯：《美国宪法概论》,刘瑞祥等译,中国社会科学出版社1995年版。
62.[英]F·F·哈耶克：《法律、立法和自由》,邓正来等译,中国大百科全书出版社2003年版。
63.[英]F·F·哈耶克：《自由秩序原理》,邓正来译,三联书店1997年版。
64.[美]路易斯·亨金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,三联书店1996年版。
65.[美]阿兰·S·罗森鲍姆编：《宪政的哲学之维》,郑戈、刘茂林译,三联书店2001年版。
66.[美]希尔斯曼：《美国是如何治理的》,北京商务印书馆1986年版。
67.[美]罗斯科·庞德：《通过法律的社会控制,法律的任务》,沈宗灵、董世忠译, 商务印书馆1984年版。
68.[美]罗斯科·庞德：《法律史解释》,邓正来译,中国法制出版社2002年版。
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70.[美]史蒂文·J·伯顿：《法律和法律推理导论》,张志铭、解兴权译,中国政法大学出版社1998年版。
71.[美]约翰·M·康利、威廉·M·欧巴尔：《法律、语言与权力》,程朝阳译,’法律出版社2007年版。
72.[美]卡尔·范·杜伦：《伟大的预演：美国宪法草拟和批准的故事》,美国驻华大使馆新闻文化处出版社,1985年10月香港第1版。
73.[美]拉里·亚历山大： 《宪政的哲学基础》,付子堂、文正邦、赵明等译校,中国政法大学出版社2007年版。
74.[美]约瑟夫·斯托里： 《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版。
75.[英]H·L·A·哈特： 《法律、自由与道德》,支振锋译,法律出版社2006年版。
76.[美]安德雷·马默主编： 《法律与解释》,张卓明、徐宗立等译,法律出版社2006年版。
77.[法]卢梭： 《社会契约论》,何光武译,商务印书馆2003年版。
78.[美]劳伦斯·H.却伯、麦克尔·C.多尔夫： 《解读宪法》,陈林林、储智勇译,上海三联书店出版社2007年版。
79.[美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦： 《法律推理与政治冲突》,金朝武等译,法律出版社2004年版。
80.[美]本杰明·N·卡多佐：《法律的成长：法律科学的悖论》,彭冰译,中国法制出版社2002年版。
81.[美]斯蒂芬·L·埃尔金、[美]卡罗尔·爱德华·索乌坦编：《新宪政论——为美好的社会设计政治制度》,周叶谦译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
82.[美]肯尼思·W·汤普森编：《宪法的政治理论》,张志铭译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
83.[美]路易斯·亨金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
84.[美]朱迪丝·N·施克莱：《守法主义——法、道德和政治审判》,彭亚楠译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
85.[美]斯提芬·K·贝尼：《美国政治与政府》,宾龙译,河北大学法律系翻印。
86.[美]William Burnham:《英美法导论》,林利芝译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
87.[美]唐纳德J·布莱克：《法律的运作行为》,唐越、苏力译,中国政法大学出版社1994年版。
88.[美]詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯：《民治政府——美国政府与政治》,中国人民大学出版社2007年版。
89.[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《联邦法院：挑战与改革》,邓海平译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
90.[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《法官如何思考》,苏力译,北京大学出版社2009年版。
91.[美]埃尔斯特、[挪]斯莱格斯塔德主编：《宪政与民主——理性与社会变迁研究》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
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92.[美]彼得·G·伦斯特洛姆编：《美国法律辞典》,贺卫方等译,中国政法大学出版社1998年版。
93.[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国法律史》,王军等译,法律出版社2007年版。
94.[美]纪念美国宪法颁布200周年委员会编：《美国公民与宪法》,劳娃、许旭译,清华大学出版社2006年版。
95.[英]H. L. A.哈特：《法律的概念》,许家馨、李冠宜译,法律出版社2006年版。
96.[英]H. L. A.哈特：《法律、自由与道德》,支振锋译,法律出版社2006年版。
97.[美]简·汤普金斯：《读者反应批评》,文化艺术出版社1989年版。
98.[美]安德雷·马默主编：《法律与解释》,张卓明、徐宗立等译,法律出版社2006年版。
99.[美]肯尼思·w·汤普森编：《宪法的政治理论》,张志铭译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
100.[美]路易斯·亨金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1996年版。
101.[美]斯蒂芬·L·埃尔金卡罗尔·爱德华·索乌坦：《新宪政论》,周叶谦译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
102.[美]埃尔斯特[挪]斯莱格斯塔德：《宪政与民主—理性与社会变迁研究》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
103.[美]詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯：《民治政府—美国政府与政治》,吴爱明、李亚梅译,中国人民大学出版社2007年版。
104.[美]本杰明·N·卡多佐：《法律的成长：法律科学的悖论》,董炯、彭冰译,中国法制出版社2002年版。
105.[法]罗兰·巴特：《罗兰·巴特随笔选》,怀宇译,百花文艺出版社2007年版。
106.[法]罗兰·巴尔特：《S／Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版。
107.[美]伯尔曼：《法律与革命——西方法律传统的形成》,贺卫方、高鸿钧、张志铭、夏勇译,中国大百科全书出版社1993年版。
1.范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版。
2.范进学：《认真对待宪法解释》,山东人民出版社2007年版。
3.谢晖：《法律的意义追问——诠释学视野中的法哲学》,商务印书馆2003年版。
4.陈金钊主编：《法治与法律方法》,山东人民出版社2003年版。
5.韩大元等：《现代宪法解释基本理论》,中国民主法制出版社2006年版。
6.林来梵：《从宪法规范到规范宪法——规范宪法学的一种前言》,法律出版社2001年版。
7.徐秀义、韩大元主编：《现代宪法学基本原理》,中国人民公安大学出版社2001年版。
8.周伟：《宪法解释方法与案例研究——法律询问答复的视角》,法律出版社2007年版。
9.徐振东：《宪法解释的哲学》,法律出版社2006年版。
10.韩大元主编：《比较宪法—宪法文本与宪法解释》,中国人民大学出版社2008年版。
11.沈宗灵：《比较宪法—对八国宪法的比较研究》,北京大学出版社2002年版。
12.何勤华主编：《外国法制史》,法律出版社2006年版。
13.林立：《法学方法论与德沃金》,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
14.王希：《原则与妥协——美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京大学出版社2000年版。
15.任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上——美国最高法院的历史轨迹》,中国法制出版社2007年版。
16.任东来、陈伟、白雪峰：《美国宪政历程：影响美国的25个司法大案》,中国法制出版社2005年版。
17.赵晓力主编：《宪法与公民》,上海人民出版社2004年版。
18.何家弘主编：《当代美国法律》,社会科学文献出版社2001年版。
19.张乃根：《西方法哲学史纲》,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
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1.赵晓力：《美国宪法的原旨解释》,《宪法与公民》,上海人民出版社2004年版。
2.张翔：《美国宪法解释理论中的原旨主义》,《山东社会科学》2005年第7期。
3.侯学宾：《宪法解释中原旨主义的内在困境》,吉林大学2006年硕士学位论文。
4.范进学：《美国宪法解释方法论之辨思》,《现代法学》2006年第5期。
5.范进学：《美国宪法解释：“麦迪逊两难“之消解》,《法律科学》2006年第6期。
6.徐秀勇、马建平：《原意解释及其批判》,《天府新论》2006年6月。
7.范进学：《斯卡里亚宪法解释方法论及其评析》,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
8.饶志静：《原旨主义与美国宪法解释理论的论争》,《广西政法管理干部学院学报》2008年第1期。
9.韩大元、张翔：《试论宪法解释的客观性和主观性》,《法律科学》1999年第6期。
10.张翔：《分权制衡原则与宪法解释》,《法商研究》2002年第6期。
11.刘茂林：《中国宪法学的困境与出路》,《法商研究》2005年第1期。
12.任东来：《美国司法审查权的确立：马伯里诉麦迪逊案》,“公法网”,http://www.gongfa.com/rendlmabolisumaidixun.htm,2005年4月4日.
13.任东来：《改变美国宪政历史的一个脚注》,《读书》2005年第9期。
14.陈弘毅：《普通法权限中的宪法解释》,施嵩译,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
15.韩大元：《试论宪法解释的效力》,《山东社会科学》2005年第6期。
16.郑永流：《出释入造——法律诠释学及其与法律解释学的关系》,《法学研究》2002年第3期。
17.谢晖：《法律的作者》,《求是》2003年第5期。
18.陈兴良：《法律解释的基本理念》,《法学》1995年第5期。
19.桑本谦：《法律解释的困境》,《法学研究》2004年第5期。
20.朱苏力：《解释的难题：对几种法律文本解释方法的追问》,载梁治平编：《法律解释问题》,法律出版社1998年版。
21.疏义红：《法律解释方法的发现与归类》,《法商研究》2004年第2期。
22.陈金钊：《法律解释中的矛盾与选择》,《法商研究》2004年第2期。
23.张翔：《功能适当原则与宪法解释模式的选择》,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
24.夏泽祥、施嵩：《何谓宪法解释》,《山东社会科学》2005年第
25.徐振东：《客观主义和现实主义——美国判例制度下的宪法解释方法论》,《浙江社会科学》2006年第3期。
26.周健勇：《理解的困惑——论作者与读者的关系》,《宁夏党校学报》2004年第3期。
27.侯学华：《历史解释与美国宪法史学流派》,《西安交通大学学报》2005年12月。
28.陈金钊：《拯救客观性——关于法治方法的理论探索》,《法律科学》2001年第6期。
29.田成有：《重构还是超越法律解释的客观性探询——以德沃金和波斯纳的法律解释论为主》,《法制与社会发展》2003年第1期。
30.陈金钊：《法律解释学的转向与实用法学的第三条道路》,载陈金钊主编《法治与法律方法》,山东人民出版社2003年版。
31.陈弘毅：《当代西方法律解释学初探》,载梁治平主编《法律解释问题》,法律出版社1998年版。
32.杨建军：《法律语言的特点》,《西北大学学报》2005年第5期。
33.陈金钊、孙光宁：《“历史”的危机与“意义”的重生——法律解释中的历史方法(因素)》,《河南省政法管理干部学院学报》2006年第2期。
34.苗连营：《宪法解释的功能、原则及其中国图景》,《法律科学》2004年第6期。
35.谢晖：《法律的读者》,《政治与法律》2002年第6期。
36.左建辉、杨军：《在规范和现实之间——规范宪法学与宪法解释学之比较分析》,《保定师范专科学校学报》2007年第3期。
37.谢晖：《达致真理：诠释法律的憧憬》,《江苏行政学院学报》2002年第3期。
38.吴开明：《现代性哲学基础的反思——哈贝马斯对意识哲学范式的拒斥》,《厦门大学学报》2001年第3期。
39.陈金钊：《文义解释法律方法的优位选择》,《文史哲》2005年第6期。
40.廖美珍：《论法学的语言转向》,《社会科学战线》2006年第2期。
41.于兴中：《人工智能、话语理论与可辩驳推理》,载葛洪义主编《法律方法与法律思维(第3辑)》,中国政法大学2005年版。
42.丁伟：《美国宪法上的正当法律程序——一个历史的视角》,中国政法大学2005年博士论文。
43.刘慧英、任东来：《能动还是克制——一场尚无结果的美国司法辩论》,《美国研究》2005年第4期。
44.张翔：《祛魅与自足：政治理论对宪法解释的影响及其限度》,《政法论坛》2007年第7期.
45.郑贤君：《确立“法”上之力：宪法解释学的中国使命》,《山东社会科学》2005年第6期。
46.王金福：《什么是文本的“意义”?》,《江苏行政学院学报》2006年第5期。
47.谭融：《试析美国的司法能动主义》,《天津师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2003年第6期。
48.强世功：《文本、结构与立法原意——“人大释法”的法律技艺》,《中国社会科学》2007年第5期。
49.夏泽祥：《宪法解释：一种拯救中国宪法权威性的方法》,《法学论坛》2006年1月。
50.周伟：《宪法解释的方法体系》,《社会科学研究》2004年第5期。
51.郑贤君：《宪法解释是政治法律化的基本途径》,《法学杂志》2006年第1期。
52.王广辉：《宪法解释与宪法理解》,《中国法学》2001年第4期。
53.王书成：《宪法解释之前命题与方法》,《浙江学刊》2007年第3期。
54.周伟：《宪法解释中学说解释、历史解释和先例解释方法研究》,《南京师大学报(社会科学版)》2005年第3期。
55.郑贤君：《宪法文本分析：一种解释方法》,《法律科学》2008年第2期。
56.汪庆华：《宪法与人民——从布鲁斯·阿克曼〈我们人民：奠基〉谈起》,《政法论坛》2005年第6期。
57.范进学：《宪政与方法：走向宪法文本自身的解释》,《浙江学刊》2005年第2期。
58.庞凌：《法院如何寻求司法能动主义和克制主义的平衡》,《法律适用》2004年第1期。
59.胡锦光：《论审判权的界限》,《河南省政法管理干部学报》2003年第4期。
60.王岳川：《作者之死与文本欢欣》,《文学自由谈》1998年第4期。
61.范进学：《从规范分析宪法学到宪法解释学》,《河南省政法管理干部学报学报》2005年第2期。
62.范进学、杨阿妮：《宪法解释学：作为宪法方法论的学问》,《浙江学刊》2009年第5期。
63.韩大元：《中国宪法学方法论的学术倾向与问题意识》,《中国法学》2008年第1期。
64.王彬：《美国宪法解释中的原旨主义》,《河南广播电视大学学报》2009年第1期。
65.施嵩：《美国宪法解释理论与实践中的原意主义——基于美国宪政发展历程的考察》,《法律方法》第九卷,陈金钊主持,山东人民出版社2009年版。
66.韩大元、张翔：《试论宪法解释的界限》,载韩大元主编《现代宪法解释基本理论》,中国民主法制出版社2006年版。
67.贾敬华：《视域融合的法哲学的现实分析》,《法制与社会发展》2006年第3期。
68.陆自荣：《“价值无涉”与“价值关联”：韦伯思想中的一对张力》,《西安交通大学学报》2005年第2期。
②范进学、杨阿妮：《宪法解释学：作为宪法方法论的学问》,《浙江学刊》2009年第5期。
③韩大元：《中国宪法学方法论的学术倾向与问题意识》,《中国法学》2008年第1期。
① See William J. Michael, The Original Understanding of Original Intent: A Textual Analysis, Ohio Northern University Law Review 201 (2000).
① Edwin Meese Ⅲ, Address before the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C, July 9,1985.
② William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.25.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 1-35.
① Thomas Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" 27 Stanford Law Review (1975),p.706, n.9.
② John Hart Ely, "Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility," Indiana Law Journal 53 (1978), pp. 399-448.
③ Thomas Grey, "The Constitution as Scripture," Stanford Law Review 37 (1984), p.1.
①范进学：《美国宪法解释方法论之辨思》,《现代法学》2006年第5期。
② Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 204, n.1.
① Steven D. Smith, "Law Without Mind," Michigan Law Review 88 (1989), p.106.
② Raoul Berger, "New Theories of Constitutional 'Interpretation'," p.2. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky. "The Constitution Is Not'Hard Law':The Bork Rejection and the Future of Constitutional Jurisprudence," Constitutional Commentary 6 (1989), p.31.
③ Note, "In Defense of the Framers' Intent:Civic Virtue, the Bill of Rights and the Framers' Science of Politics," Virginia Law Review 75 (1989), p.1312. Cf. Fallon, "A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation," p.1209.
④ John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.l. Cf. Maltz, "The Failure of Attacks on Originalism," p.43. J Clifford Wallace, "Whose Constitution? An Inquiry into the Limits of Constitutional Interpretation," in Essays on Changing Interpretaion of the Constitution, ed. by Joseph F. McNamara and Lissa Roche (Hillsdale, Mich:Hillsdale College Press.1987). p.2.
⑤ John Valauri, "The Varieties of Constitutional Theory: A Comment on Perry and Hoy," Northern Kentucky Law Review 15 (1988), p.500. Cf. Robert W. Bennett, "Objectivity in Constitutional Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132 (1984), pp.445-46; Robert N. Clinton, "Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 'This constitution'," Iowa Law Review 72 (1987), p.180.
① John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1971), p.8.
①[美]詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法解释与判例》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第67-68页。
② Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1977), p.7.
① Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p.205.
② U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Guidelines on Constitutional Litigations, p.3, WashingtonD.C.,1988.转引自赵晓力：《美国宪法的原旨解释》,载《宪法与公民》,赵晓力编辑,上海人民出版社2004年版,第383页。
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.143.
④ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.38.
① Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism,Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policv.2004. p.2. University Press of Kansas,1999, p.35.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review,
③ District of Columbia v. Heller (June 26,2008).
① Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No.07-24, November 22,2008.
②陈弘毅：《普通法权限中的宪法解释》,施嵩译,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
③对于美国宪法解释的原意主义概念的梳理,国内学界基本已达成共识。参见张翔：《美国宪法解释理论中的原旨主义》,《山东社会科学》2005年第7期。范进学：《美国宪法解释方法论之辨思》,《现代法学》2006年第5期。
① James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 7(1893),p.140.
② Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, Harvard University Press, 1988, p.22.
③ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), p.230.
④ James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 7(1893), pp.143-44.
① Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil",57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 861, (1989).
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.155-59.
③ Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press,1921, pp.149-50.
④历史学家们现在广泛认同最高法院1871年所做的Knox v. Lee案判决推翻了1870年的Hepburn v. Griswold案判决,确立了国会发行纸币的权力,而这是违背制宪者的原初意图的。
⑤美国宪法第一条第八款规定“国会有权管制……各州之间的……商业”,国会的这项权力现在被视为几乎不加限制地规制任何它所希望事情的权力。宪法历史学者广泛认为,这种扩张性解读也是违背商贸条款的原初意图的。
⑥如1954年的布朗诉教育委员会案推翻了公共教育中的种族隔离,1954年的Boiling诉Sharpe案裁决认为国会命令的在哥伦比亚特区公共学校实行种族隔离违反了隐含在第五修正案正当程序条款中的关于平等保护的保障,1948年的Shelley诉Kramer案推翻了种族限制的住房合同,1944年的Smith v. Allwright案认定白人初选违宪,1966年的Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections案宣布州人头税无效,1967年的Loving v. Virginia案推翻反对种族通婚的州法律。
⑦ See, e.g., Reed v. Reed,404 U.S.71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson,411 U.S.677 (1973).
⑧ Gideon v. Wainwright案要求对犯有重罪的贫困刑事被告人实行免费的法律援助；1966年的Miranda v. Arizona案要求警方在审问之前通知犯罪嫌疑人基本的程序权利；1968年的Duncan v. Louisiana案合并了第六修正案的陪审团审判的保障。
① Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p.204.
② Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 222.
① Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 223.
① Reynolds v. U. S.,98 U. S. (8 Otto) 145 (1879)支持适用一项联邦法律,该法律禁止其宗教信仰允许一夫多妻婚姻的摩门教徒的多配偶制。
② Jehovah's Witness v. King County Hospital,390 U. S.598 (1968)支持一项允许法院在父母拒绝为子女输血的情况下可以强制儿童入院治疗的立法。
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992,pp.26-27.
④ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), p.232.
① Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Harvard University Press,1986, pp.321-324.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.29.
② Raoul Berger, "Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary", Maryland Law Review 40 (1981), p.26.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.30.
① Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press,1978. p.136.
② Michael Moore, "A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation", Southern California Law Review 58 (1985), p.341.
③ Raoul Berger, "Original Intentions in Historical Perspective", George Washington Law Review 54 (1986), pp. 113-20.
④ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), pp.259-60.
① See, Antonin Scalia, "Originalism:the Lesser Evil," University of Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989), pp.856,863; Robert Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica:The political Seduction of the Law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.163.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, pp.32-34.
③ Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 237.
① Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modern Judicial Review, Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks,1994, pp.141-42.
② Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction of Laws,2d ed. St. Paul. Minn.: West,1991, pp.445-446.
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, pp.27-28.
① Cass Sunstein, "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State", Harvard Law Review 103 (1989), pp.430-32.
② See Richard A. Posner, "Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution," Case Western Reserve Law Review 37 (1986-87), pp.189-90.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992,pp.47-51.
①詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法判例与解释》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第68-70页
②詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法判例与解释》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第70页。
③ Thomas Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Boston: Little Brown,1883, p.38. Henry Campbell Black, Handbood on American Constitutional Law,3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:West Publishing Co.,1910), p.30.
④ See, Dred Scott v. Sanford,60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,404 (1856); Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today,13th rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press,1974), p.1.
⑤ See Jacobus ten Broeck, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, (Berkeley: University of California Press,1951), p.87.
⑥ Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders'Design, pp.70-71.
⑦ Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), pp.246-47.
⑧ Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p. 214.
①参见王希：《原则与妥协——美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京大学出版社2000年版,第90页。参见纪念美国宪法颁布200周年委员会编：《美国公民与宪法》,劳娃、许旭译,清华大学出版社2006年版,第99页。
② Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137,176 (1803).
③ Annals of Congress, V,p.776.
①参见王希：《原则与妥协——美国宪法的精神与实践》,北京大学出版社2000年版,第62-63页。参见纪念美国宪法颁布200周年委员会编：《美国公民与宗教》,清华大学出版社2006年版,第71页。
② The Federalist-No.10 (Madison), p.62.
① Remarks of Rep. Roger Sherman (Aug.13,1789), quoted in Joseph Gales and W.W. Seaton. comps. The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States (Annals of Congress),42 vols.
① Earl Maltz, "Foreword:The Appeal of Originalism," 1987 Utah Law Review (1987), pp.802-804.
② Richard Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol.82 (1988), p.249.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.85.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.86.
① Robert Bork,The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the Law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.163.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.87.
① Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992,pp.2-3.
②亚里士多德：《修辞学》,罗念生译,三联书店1996年版,第24页。
③ St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3 vols. (New York:Benzinger Bros.,1947), Ⅱ-Ⅱ, q.120, a,1.
① Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law, VII, p.459.
② William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, facsimile of 1769 ed.,4 vols. (Chicago Press,1979) 1,91,59,61.
① Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press,1969), pp.168-69.
② Rutgers v. Waddington, Mayor's Court of New York (1784).
③ Julirs Goebel, Jr., and Joseph H. Smith, ed., The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary,5 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press,1964-1981), Ⅰ, Chap.3.
④ James Wilson, "Lectures on the Law," in The Works of James Wilson, ed. by Robert McCloskey,2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1967), Ⅰ, p.75.
⑤ Albert E. Bergh ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,20 vols. (Washington, D. C.:Jefferson Memorial Association,1907), X V, p.449.
⑥ Letters and Other Writings of James Madsion,4 vols. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott,1865), III, p.245.
①汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版,第391页。
② James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law iew 7 (1893), p.140.
③ Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction of Laws,2d ed. St. Paul. Minn.:West,1911, pp.20-21.
① Howard Gillman, "The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of 'the Living Constitution' in the Course of American State-Building", Studies in American Political Development 11(1997): 191-247,203.
① Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press 2005, p18.
② Kermit L. Hall, The supreme Court and Judicial Review in American History, American Historical Association, 1985, p.13.
③ Ogden v. Saunders,12 Wheat.213,332 (1827).
①宪法第一条第八款规定“国会可以制定为行使上述各项权力和由本宪法授予合众国政府或其任何部门或官员的一切其他权力所必要和适当的所有法律”。这一条款为联邦政府权力的扩张提供了可能性。
② McCulloch v. Maryladn,17 U. S.316,415.
③ Quoted in Cerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch V. Maryland, Stanford University Press 1969, at 168-169.
④ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, at 20.
① Dred Scott v. Sandford,19 How.393,405.
② Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,3 vols. Hilliard,Gray 1833,1:383.
③ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, p.22.
④ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, p.22.
①参见任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上——美国最高法院的历史轨迹》,中国法制出版社2007年版,第168页。
② Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,1878),68.
③ Arthur W. Machen Jr., "The Elasticity of the Constitutuion," pts, I and II, Harvard Law Review 14 (1900-01); 200-216.
①美国宪法中的“正当程序条款”,涉及两个修正案。第一个出现于第五修正案,其规定“任何人,不经过正当法律程序,不得被剥夺生命、自由或财产”,是针对联邦政府而言的；第二个存在于第十四修正案,是针对各州的。对“正当程序”条款的解释一般包括以下两个层面：第一,联邦和各州的行为必须符合一定的法律程序,这种解释被称为“程序性正当程序”；第二,即使程序合法,联邦和各州的行为也不能损害公民的生命、自由、财产,这种解释被称为“实体性正当程序”。转引自任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上——美国最高法院的历史轨迹》,中国法制出版社2007年版,第178页。
② Lochner v. New York,198 U. S.45 (1905).
③ G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2000),4,36-37, 233,272.
① Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics,2005 the Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 25-27.
② Robert S. Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1982.
③ Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Collected Legal Paper,,New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe,1920, p.239.
④ Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, reprinted in part in The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, pp. 51-52.
① Brian Leiter, "Legal Realism" in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Dennis Patterson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1996),265-69.
② Walter W. Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," American Bar Association Journal 13 (1927):303-9.
③ Felix Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (New York:Harcourt, Brace,1933),244-45.
④ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman @Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1992, pp.2-3.
① Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Contract", Yale Law Journal 18 (1909), p.467.
②[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第6-7页。
③ Mooris R. Cohen, The Faith of a Liberal (New York: Henry Holt,1946), p.176.
④ Louis B.Boudin, Government By Judiciary,2 vols.(New York:William Godwin,1932), Ⅰ, p.463.
⑤ Benjamin Hoadly, Sermon on "The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ," March 31,1717, in The Works of Benjamin Hoadly,3 vols. (London,1773).
① Karl Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Constructed," Vanderbilt Law Review 3 (1950), p.400.
②这种区分具有古老的历史渊源。中世纪法学家通常区分mens legis,即根植于法律字词本身恰当含义的法律意图与ratio legis即法律的目的或最终理由以及mens legislatoris即立法者主观意欲表达的意图。
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, p.11.
①Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,290 U.S.398,442-43(1934).
②United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.299,316(1941).
①Roscoe Pound,"A Survey of Social Interests",Harvard Law Review 57(1943).
②[美]本杰明.卡多佐:《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第101-102页.
① "A 'Fireside Chat' Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary, Washington, DC, March 9,1937," in Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt,1937 (New York: Macmillan, 1941),122-33,132,127,130.
② Homer Cummings, "The American Constitutional Method", December 18,1935, in Selected Papers of Homer Cummings, ed.
③ Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,290 U.S.443 (1934).
①West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,300 U.S.379,390(1937).
②Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S.111(1942).
①任东来：《改变美国宪政历史的一个脚注》,《读书》2005年第9期。
② U. S. v. Carolene Products Co.,304 U. S.144,152 n4 (1938); Martin M. Shapiro, "The Constitution and Economic Rights," in Essays on the Constitution of the United States, ed. M. Judd Harmon (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,1978), p74-98.
③ Palko v. Connecticut,302 U. S.319,325 (1937).
①Blaisdell,453,449.
②West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,300 U.S.379,390(1937).
① Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.40.
② Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution (Princeton, N. J.:Princeton University Press,1989), pp.3-4.
③ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 1-35.
④ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.6.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 8-10.
② Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.30.
③ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.3.
④ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.6.
⑤ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p.3-4.
⑥ Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), p. 10-11.
⑦ Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press,1978, pp.131-49.
① Thomas Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" Stanford Law Review 27 (1975), p.713.
② Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cambridge Mass.:Harvard Press,1977, chs 14 and 17.
③ Ibid.,52-116,419-27; 117-33.
① Ibid.,407.
② Paul Brest, "Berger v. Brown, et al.," New York Times Book Review, December 11,1977,10-11,44.
③ Ronald Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle." 56 New York Universitv Law Review (1981) 478
④ Raoul Berger, "Mark Tushnet's Critique of Interpretivism," 57 George Washington Law Review (1983),544.
① Herman Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law? American Constitutionalism in Historical Perspective (Lanham, MD:Rowman and Littlefield,1998),226.
① Robert Bork, "The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights" [speech delivered November 18,1985], San Diego Law Review 23 (1986):823-32,827,828,826.
② Ibid.,826-27,829.
③ Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press,140-41.
① Gangi, "An Intentionist's Critique," 253-57.
② William Rehnquist, "The Notion of a Living Constitution," Texas Law Review 54 (1976):693-706,695.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,47-61,152-59,217.
② Johnathan O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics:A Constitutional History, The Johns Hopkins University Press,191.
① Keith E. Whittington, " The New Originalism," 8, paper presented at the American Association of Law Schools Conference On Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C., June 2002.
② Maltz, Rethinking, passim.
③ Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Harvard University Press, 1996, at 13.
④ Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, Knopf 1996. Intentions," Philosophical Review 78(1969):147-77.
⑤ E. D.Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation, Yale University Press 1967. H. p.Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and
⑥ Wittgenstein, Investigations,293,337.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,59,99.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,96.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), pp. 1-35.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.2.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.3-4.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.10-11.
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.6.
④ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.5.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.139-141.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.143.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law. Simon & Schuster.1990. p.144.
② Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,88 Colum. L.Rev.723,725-27.
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990,p.145.
④ Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.137,177-79 (1803).
① Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,73 Harv. L. Rev.1 (1959).见78-84页。
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.146.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.146
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.146—147.
② Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,90 Yale L.J.1063,1091-92 (1981).
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law,Simon & Schuster, 1990,pp.147-151.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law,simon & Schuster, 1990,p.151.
③ Shelley v. Kraemer,334 U.S 1(1948),151-53.
① Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971), pp. 1-35.
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.151-153.
① P. Bator, P.Mishkin, D.Meltzer&D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (3d ed.1988) quoting 1. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention (1911),154.
② Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No.78, (C.Rossiter ed.1961),465-66.
③ Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, pp.154-155.
④ Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,88 Colum. L.Rev (1988),727.
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law,Simon & Schuster, 1990,p.155.
② Helvering v. Hallock,309 U.S.106,119(1940).
①Antonin Scalia,Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.Cin.L.Rev.861(1989).
②Robert Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica:the Political Seduction of the law,Simon & Schuster,1990,pp.155-159.
③F.Frankfurter,The Commerce Clause 80-81(1937).
①[美]卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第79-80页。
② James M. Landis. A Note on "Statutory Interpretation".43 Harv. L. Rev.886 (1930).
③ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.21.
① Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.16.
② Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.17.
③ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997,17,25.
④ Conroy v. Aniskoff,507 U.S.511,519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
① Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p.23.
① Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, pp.' 23-25.
②施嵩：《美国宪法解释理论与实践中的原意主义——基于美国宪政发展的历程》,《法律方法》第九卷,陈金钊主持,山东人民出版社2009年版,第156页。
③参见范进学：《斯卡里亚宪法解释方法论及其评析》,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
① McCulloch v. Maryland,17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
② Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p38.
③ Antonin. Scalia, A Thoery of Constitution Interpretaiton, speech at Catholic University of America,10/18/96.
① Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4,1836), in Kermit L. Hall et al., American Legal Histoy,317,317-18 (1991).
① Trop v. Dulles,356 U.S.86,101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
② Fortunatus Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes, with American Notes and Additions by Platt Potter,122 (Albany, N.Y.1871).
③ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton University Press,1997, p41.
④徐振东：《宪法解释的哲学》,法律出版社2006年版,第254页。
⑤ "Scalia talks up' originalsim' in UVM speech", by David Associated Press, published: October 9,2004, website: http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041009/NEWS/410090381/1002
①焦宝乾：《文本论：一种法律文本解释方法的学说考察》,载《法律方法》第一卷,陈金钊主持,山东人民出版社2002年版,第100-103页。
②徐振东：《宪法解释的哲学》,法律出版社2006年版,第244-245页。
① see United States v. Bass,404 U.S.336,347-49(1971).
② See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,471 U.S.759,766.68(1985).
③ see Robert C. Reed & Co.v. Krawill Mach.Corp.,359 U.S.297,304-05(1959).
④ see Tcherepnin v. Knight,389 U.S.332,336(1967).
⑤ see United States v Nordic Village,Inc.,503 U.S.30,33,34(1992).
①McCulloch v. Maryland,17 U.S.(4 Wheat.)316,407(1819).
① Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court: How the Choice of Supreme Court Justices Shapes Our History, New York: Random House,1985, p.45.
② Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil",57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849 (1989).
① Myers v. United States,272 U.S.52,118 (1926).
① Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil",57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849 (1989).
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.152-153.
①[美]L.亨金：《权利的时代》,信春鹰、吴玉章、李林译,知识出版社1997年版,第108页。
②[法]托克维尔：《论美国的民主》,董果良译,商务印书馆1988年版,第64页。
③[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第7页。
④[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第113页。
⑤[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第195页。
⑥[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第240页。
⑦ Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.(1 Cranch)137,176-177(1803).
⑧[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如等译,商务印书馆1980年版,第393页。
① Robert H. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", Indiana Law Journal 47 (1997), at 2.3.
② Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution,27 S. Tex. L. J.455,465 (1986).
③ See Michael J.Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Rebecca L. Brown, Girardeau A.Spann: Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, p111.
①[美]亚历山大·M.比克尔：《最小危险部门——政治法庭上的最高法院》,姚中秋译,北京大学出版社2007年版,第17页。
② Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the law, Simon & Schuster,1990, p.201.
③[美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第115页。
①范进学：《美国宪法解释：“麦迪逊两难”之消解》,《法律科学》2006年第3期。
② Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, University of Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989), p.862.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.150-155.
② Greald Stourzh, Fundamental Laws and Individual Rights in 18th Century Constitution, from The American Foundings, Essays on the Formation of the Constitution, Edited by J.Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy, and Ken Masugi, (Greenwood Press, Inc.,1988), pp.181-182.转引自钱福臣：《美国宪政生成的深层背景》,法律出版社2005年版,第175页。
① Randy E. Bamett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, Loy. L.Rev 45 (1999), pp.629-643.
②黎作恒：《美国宪法成文形式的历史渊源》,《现代法学》2004年第2期。
① T.M.Cooley et al, Constiutitonal History of the United States as Seen in the Development of American Law,1889, pp.6-7/
② E.C.S. Wade and G.G.Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law, p.4.
③W.I.詹宁斯：《法与宪法》,恭祥瑞、侯健译,三联书店1997年版,第117页。
①[美]约瑟夫·斯托里：《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版,第158页。
②Thomas Cooley,A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations(Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1868, pp.54-55.
③参见[美]约瑟夫.斯托里:《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版,第128—132页.
① John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.3.
② Michael J.Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Rebecca L. Brown, Girardeau A. Spann:Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, p 113.
① Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S.137,176-77 (1803).
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review,
University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.57-58.
① Nathamel Chipman, Principles of Government (Burlington, VT:Edward Smith,1833), at 254.
②参见范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第140-141页。
③参见洪汉鼎：《诠释学——它的历史和当代发展》,人民出版社2001年版,第74页。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆2007年版,第391页。
①参见[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆2007年版,第392页。
①参见William Burnham:《英美法导论》,林利芝译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第169-171页。
②参见张千帆：《西方宪政体系(上册·美国宪法)》,中国政法大学出版社2004年版,第74-76页。
③[美]阿奇博尔德·考克斯：《法院与宪法》,田雷译,北京大学出版社2006年版,第160-161页。
① James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 7 (1893), p.144.
Baldwin v. Missouri,281 U.S., at 595.
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.297,303 (1976).
① West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,319 U.S.624,632(1943).
① Edwin Meese Ⅲ, "Interpreting the Constitution", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.16.
② William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, pp.23-34.
③ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Original Meaning Jurisprudence:A Sourcebook, WashingtonD.C.,1987,p.26.参见赵晓力：《美国宪法的原旨主义》,载赵晓力执行主编：《宪法与公民》,上海人民出版社2004年版,第390页。
① Robert H.Bork, "Address at the University of San Diege Law School", in the Great Debate (Washington, D.C.: Federalist Society,1986), at 45.
② Gralia, "'Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on Bork", Stanford Law Review 44 (1992),1020.
① H.L.A.Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,1961, p124.
② H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", in H.L.A. Hart. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press,1983, p.71.
③[美]德沃金：《认真对待权利》,信春鹰、吴玉章译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版,第41页。
④范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第136页。
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Menaing, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.41-43.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Menaing, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.5-6.
① Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principle of Constitutional Law,73 Harvard Law Review (1959).
①赫伯特·威克斯勒：《走向宪法的中立原则》,张千帆译,载张千帆组织编译的《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》,法律出版社2005年版,第34页。
②赫伯特·威克斯勒：《走向宪法的中立原则》,张千帆译,载张千帆组织编译的《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》,法律出版社2005年版,第51页。
①参见赫伯特·威克斯勒：《走向宪法的中立原则》,张千帆译,载张千帆组织编译的《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》,法律出版社2005年版,第52-54页。
② Smith v. Allwright,321 U.S.649(1944).
③ Shelly v. Kraemer,334 U.S.1(1948)；Barrows v.Jackson,346 U.S.249(1953).
④ Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S.483(1954).
⑤张千帆教授在《哈佛法律评论(宪法学精粹)》一书第63页的脚注86中认为,“关于白人初选和歧视性租约的两类案件都涉及到政府行为(state action)问题,因为作为社会团体的政党和私人地产的拥有者都不是国家机构,因而在原则上不是宪法诉讼的适格被告。”笔者认为这一注解犯了两个错误。一是state action应是州行为而非政府行为。第十四修正案针对各州提出了“不得制定或实施限制合众国公民的特权或豁免权的任何法律”,限制的是州行为而非政府行为。二是司法审查的适格条件(stnading)要求联邦法院所审查的所有案件的原告必须证明被告造成原告明确的实际损害和法律损害,且原告与争议的结果有非常密切的个人关联。被告只是造成原告损害结果的个人或机构,并不限制于国家机构。
① Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, Simon & Schuster,1990, at 4,5,9.
① Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.176.
② Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:the Political Seduction of the law, by Simon & Schuster,1990, p.300.
③ Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, in Interpreting the Constitution:the Debate over Originallintent, edited by Jack N.Rakove, Northeastern University Press 1990, at 199.
① Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press,1985, p.36.
①[美]德沃金：《法律帝国》,李常青译,中国大百科全书出版社1996年版,第299页。
② Michael S.Moore, "The Semantics of Judging", Sourthern California Law Review 54 (1981), p.265-266.
③ Mark Tushnet, "The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers", Buffalo Law Review 36 (1987), p.221; Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constituion, New York:Praeger,1987, p.51. Cf. Sunstein, "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State", pp.427,433.
④ Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes, Boston:Little Brown,1985, p.37.
① Richard S. Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions: Three Objections and Responses", Northwestern University Law Review 82 (1988), p.249.
② Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, p.84.
③[美]德沃金：《法律帝国》,李常青译,中国大百科全书出版社1996年版,第286页。
④ Federal Energy Administration v. Alaonquin SNG, Inc.,426 U.S.548,564 (1976); National Association of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Service,462 U.S.810,832n.28 (1983).
① See, generally, Berger, Government by Judiciary, pp.134-156; Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? "pp.5-139.
② Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review (1980), p.214.
③[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《原则问题》,张国清译,江苏人民出版社2005年版,第43页。
① Huston, The Creation of the Constitution:The Integrity of the Documentary Record, Texas Law Review 65 (1986), p.34.
②[美]卡尔·范·杜伦：《伟大的预演：美国宪法草拟和批准的故事》,赵盾译,美国驻华大使馆新闻文化处1985年版,第17页。
③ Huston, The Creation of the Constitution:The Integrity of the Documentary Record, Texas Law Review 65 (1986), p.36.
④ See Leonard Levy, Original Intent and the Framers'Constitution, New York:Macmillian,1988, pp.292-94. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.17; Chester J. Antieau, "Constitutional Construction:A Guide to the Principles and Their Application," Notre Dame Lawyer 51 (1976), p.363.
① Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,72 VA. L. Rev.1237,1250-51 (1986).
② Velasquez v. Frapwell,160 F.3d 389,393 (7th Cir,1998).
③参见范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第143页。
① Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of Constitution, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp.12-13
① Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:Politics and Ideas in the Making of Constitution, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp.14-16.
②参见[美]肯尼思·W·汤普森编：《宪法的政治理论》,张志铭译,三联书店1997年版,第4-5页。
① Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:Politics and Ideas in the Making of Constitution, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1996, pp.19-21
① Paul Brest, "Berger v. Brown, et al", New York Times Book Review, December 11,1977. Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,1992, pp.100-107. Larry Simon, "The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be justified?" California Law Review 73.(1984):1487.
①参见[美]罗伯特·A.达尔：《美国宪法的民主批判》,佟德志译,东方出版社2007年版,第15-18页。
① Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L.Rev.204,229 (1980).
② Michael J. Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe. Jr., Rebecca L.Brown, Girardeau A. Spann, Constiuttional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, pp.120-120.
① Stephen Carter, "Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text:A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle," Yale Law Journal 94 (1985), p.842.
②参见[美]罗伯特·A.达尔：《美国宪法的民主批判》,佟德志译,东方出版社2007年版,第128-129页。
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.195-196.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.129-130.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.132.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.136.
① Thomas Jefferson, "Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions" (1789) and letter of September 7,1803, Writings, edited by Merrill Peterson (New York, Library of America,1984), pp.959,962,1402.
① James Madison, Letter of February 4,1790, in The Papers of James Madison, vol.13, edited by Charles Hobson and Robert Rutland (Charottesville, University Press of Virginia,1981), p.22.
②[美]史蒂芬·霍姆斯：《先定约束与民主的悖论》,载[美]埃尔斯特、[挪]斯莱格斯塔德编：《宪政与民主——理性与社会变迁研究》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,三联书店出版社1998年版,第265页。
①张首映：《西方二十世纪文论史》,北京大学出版社1999年版,第112页。
②王先霈：《文学批评原理》,华中师范大学出版社1999年版,第75页。
③王岳川：《作者之死与文本欢欣》,《文学自由谈》1998年第4期,第77页。
①[法]罗兰·巴特：《作者之死》,载《罗兰·巴特随笔选》,怀宇译,百花文艺出版社2007年版,第103页。
②[法]罗兰·巴特：《作者之死》,载《罗兰·巴特随笔选》,怀宇译,百花文艺出版社2007年版,第300、307页。
③米歇尔·福柯：《作者是什么?》,逢真译,载《后现代主义的突破：外国后现代主义理论》,敦煌文艺出版社1996年版,第270-272页。
①罗兰·巴尔特：《S/Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版,第70页。
②罗兰·巴尔特：《S/Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版,第51页。
③罗兰·巴尔特：《S/Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版,第51页。
④[美]费什：《文学在阅读中：感受文体学》,王逢振编：《最新西方文论选》,漓江出版社1991年版,第74页。
⑤[美]费什：《文学在阅读中：感受文体学》,王逢振编：《最新西方文论选》,漓江出版社1991年版,第57页。
①[美]简·汤普金斯：《读者反应批评》,文化艺术出版社1989年版,第100页。
②[美]费什：《文学在阅读中：感受文体学》,王逢振编：《最新西方文论选》,漓江出版社1991年版,第69页。
①[德]伽达默尔：《真理与方法(上卷)》,洪汉鼎译,上海译文出版社2004年版,第4-8页。
②[德]伽达默尔：《真理与方法(下卷)》,洪汉鼎译,上海译文出版社2004年版,第498页。
③ Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.89-91.
①W·K·维姆塞特·比尔兹利：《感受谬误》,赵毅衡编：《新批评文集》,中国社会科学出版社1988年版,第228页。
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.161.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.162.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, p.94.
③ Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.98-99.
① Keith E. Whittington, Constitution Interpretation:Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.103-104.
②谢晖：《法律的意义追问——诠释学视野中的法哲学》,商务印书馆2003年版,第176页。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版,第391页。
① Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism:Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Secutity?, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.13-14.
②[美]阿奇博尔德·考克斯：《法院与宪法》,田雷译,北京大学出版社2006年版,第142页。
③ Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism:Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security?, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.18-19.
①任东来：《改变美国宪政历史的一个脚注》,《读书》2005年第9期。
② Anthony Lewis: The Legacy of the Warren Court, in Bernard Schwartz, ed., The Warren Court: A Retrospective, Oxford University Press,1996, p.406.
③任东来、胡晓进等：《在宪政舞台上》,中国法制出版社2007年版,第458-459页。
①[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国最高法院史》,毕洪海等译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版,第301页。
② William J.Brennan, Jr., "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, pp.23-34.
① Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.483,494-495(1954).
①参见[美]莫顿·J·霍维茨：《沃伦法院对正义的追求》,信春鹰、张志铭译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第148-151页。
② John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, pp.45-47.
① Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and.New, Virginia Law Review, Vol.55, No.3, pp.422-423.
② West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,319 U.S.624,638 (1943).
③ Roe v. Wade,410 U.S.113 (1973).基本案情如下：1970年,一位化名为杰恩·罗伊的妇女把其所在县的检察长亨利·韦德告上法庭,指控德克萨斯州的堕胎禁令侵犯了她的“隐私权”,要求联邦法院宣布该法违宪,并下令禁止韦德继续执行该法。德州刑法规定,除了依照医嘱而为拯救母亲生命进行堕胎之外,其他一切堕胎均为刑事犯罪。1973年,最高法院以6：3的多数意见裁定德州刑法禁止堕胎的规定过于宽泛地限制妇女的选择权,侵犯了第十四修正案的正当程序条款所保护的个人自由。
① Baker v. Carr,369 U.S.(1962),186.
①参见李道揆：《美国政府和美国政治》,商务印书馆1999年版,第505-506页。William Burnham:《英美法导论》,林利芝译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第154-155页。
② Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism:Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security?, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.73-75.
① Arthur S.Miller, "In Defense of Judicial Activism", in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, ed. Stephen C. Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, Lexington Books,1982, pp.173-177.
② Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Activism: Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Secutity? Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,1997, pp.27-30.
①参见[美]桑斯坦：《就事论事——美国最高法院的司法最低限度主义》,泮伟江、周武译,北京大学出版社2007年版,第294-295页,第316-319页。
①方流芳：《罗伊判例：关于司法和政治分界的争辩——堕胎和美国宪法第14修正案的司法解释》,载《比较法研究》1998年第1期。
②[美]路易斯·享金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,三联书店1996年版,第115页。
③[美]博登海默：《法理学：法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年版,第587页。
①随着司法审查呈现出很强“公法”倾向,在这一发展过程中决定案件双方争议的意义或者说重点就退至幕后,人们的注意力越来越集中到案件的立法层面。司法能动主义的一个显著特征是司法权力的领域可以大大超越个案的范围。通过扩大集团诉讼、扩大宣告性判决以及为反对政府行为的诉讼提供慷慨的资助等方式,现代最高法院(经常在国会的支持下)已经减少了传统上对接近司法权的条件限制,从而使寻求司法保护变得越来越容易。
② Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent," Harvard Law Review 98 (1985), pp.885-948.
③ Ronald Dworkin, "The Bork Nomination," New York Review of Books (August 13,1987), p.3, n.1.
④ Mark Tushnet, "The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers,"Buffalo Law Review 36 (1987), p.219.
① H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,98 Harvard Law Review (1985),895-896.
② H.Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,98 Harvard Law Review (1985),898.
① Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritche (Sep.15,1821), reprinted in The Original Understanding of Original Intent, supra note, at 936.
② H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,98 Harvard Law Review (1985),899.
③ Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philisophical Study, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc,1992,pp.67-71.
①詹姆斯·安修：《美国宪法判例与解释》,黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版,第145页。
② Sherry, The Founders'Unwritten Constitution,54 U. CHI.L.Rev.1127,1145-46 (1987).
① Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S.479 (1965).
② Slaughterhouse Cases,83 U.S.36 (1873).
③ John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.23.
① Thomas C.Grey, "Do we Have an Unwritten Constitution?" 27 Stan. L. Rev.703 (1975).
② Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 117 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork), p.249. Reprinted in Randy E. Barnett, ed., The Rights Retained by The People, vol.2, George Mason University Press,1993, p.441.
③ Griswold v, Connecticut,381 U.S.479 (1965).
①[美]约瑟夫·斯托里：《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版,第574页。
①贾敬华：《视域融合的法哲学的现实分析》,《法制与社会发展》2006年第3期。
②[美]伯尔曼：《法律与革命——西方法律传统的形成》,贺卫方、高鸿钧、张志铭、夏勇译,中国大百科全书出版社1993年版,第45-46页。
①王彬：《美国宪法解释中的原旨主义》,《河南广播电视大学学报》2009年第1期。
①陆自荣：《“价值无涉”与“价值关联”：韦伯思想中的一对张力》,《西安交通大学学报》2005年第2期。
①[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《法律的成长：法律科学的悖论》,董炯、彭冰译,中国法制出版社商务印书馆2000年版,第13、90-91页。
② Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution, Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987, pp.343-345.
①[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆2000年版,第5-6页。
②[美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京大学出版社2005年版,第121页。
③ Richard A. Posner, "Bork and Beethoven", Stanford Law Review, Vol.42, No.6(1990), p.1371.
④ Richard A. Posner, "Bork and Beethoven", Stanford Law Review, Vol.42, No.6(1990), pp.1372,1380..
⑤[美]理查德·波斯纳：《法官如何思考》,苏力译,北京大学出版社2009年版,第247页。
①韩大元、张翔：《试论宪法解释的界限》,载韩大元主编《现代宪法解释基本理论》,中国民主法制出版社2006年版,第169页。
②朱瑞祥：《美国联邦最高法院判例史程》,台北黎明文化事业股份公司1984年版,第354页。
③ Southern Pacific Co.v. Jensen,244 U.S.205,at 221(1916).转引自美]E·博登海默：《法理学-法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年版,第584-585页。
④[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆2000年版,第4-7页。
①范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版,第25页。
② Michael J.Gerhardt, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr, Rebecca L. Brown, Girardeau A.Spann:Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives, LEXIS Publishing,2000, p 100.
③本文认为,从宪法解释方法论角度来看,“活的宪法”解释方法与原意主义解释方法相互对立,而从法院在司法审查中的立场进行区分,则为司法能动主义与原意主义所主张的司法克制主义相互对立。
④ William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.23.
① William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.24-25.
② William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.26.
③ William J.Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States:Contemporary Ratification", in Interpreting the Constitution:The Debate over Original Intent, edited by Jack N. Rakove, Northeastern University Press,1990, p.29.
① John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.103.
① Laurence H Tribe, "The Puzzling Persistence of process-Based Constitutional Theories," 59 Yale Law Journal (1980),1063,1065,1067.
② Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.23-24.
③[美]德沃金：《原则问题》,张国清译,江苏人民出版社2005年版,第70页。
①参见陈弘毅：《当代西方法律解释学初探》,载梁治平主编的《法律解释问题》,法律出版社1998年版,通信处15页。
②参见[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《自由的法：对美国宪法的道德解读》,刘丽君译,上海人民出版社2001年版,第12-13页。
③ Keith E.Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism": The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, The Review of Politics, Vol.62, No.2, (2000).
①[美]理查德·波斯纳：《法理学问题》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版,第29页。
②[美]理查德·波斯纳：《超越法律》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版,第4页。
③[美]理查德·波斯纳：《道德与法律理论的疑问》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版,第263-264页。
① Richard A. Posner, "Bork and Beethoven", Stanford Law Review, Vol.42, No.6(1990),1368,1374,1375.
②徐爱国、李桂林、郭义贵：《西方法律思想史》,北京大学出版社2002年版,第286页。
③ Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Menaing, Original Intent and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas,1999, pp.33-34.
④ Laurence Tribe, Michal, On Reading the Constitutional Law, Harvard University Press,1991, pp.24-30.
① Walter F Murphy et al, American Constitutional Interpretation (Westbury, NY:Foundation Press,2nd ed 1995) at 384.
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1.[美]基思·E·惠廷顿：《宪法解释：文本含义、原初意图与司法审查》,杜强强、刘国、柳建龙译,中国人民大学出版社2006年版。
2.[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦：《就事论事——美国最高法院的司法最低限度主义》,泮伟江、周武译,北京大学出版社2007年版。
3.[美]亚历山大·M.比克尔：《最小危险部门——政治法庭上的最高法院》,姚中秋译,北京大学出版社2007年版。
4.[美]凯斯·R.桑斯坦：《偏颇的宪法》,宋华琳、毕竞悦译,北京大学出版社2007年版。
5.[美]保罗·布莱斯特、桑福·列文森、杰克·巴尔金、阿基尔·阿玛：《宪法决策的过程：案例与材料》(第四版·上册),张千帆、范亚峰、孙雯译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
6.[美]保罗·布莱斯特、桑福·列文森、杰克·巴尔金、阿基尔·阿玛：《宪法决策的过程：案例与材料》(第四版·下册),陆符嘉、周青风、张千帆、沈根明译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
7.[美]布鲁斯·阿克曼：《我们人民：宪法的根基》,孙力、张朝霞译,法律出版社2004年版。
8.[美]科恩：《论民主》,聂崇信、朱秀贤译,商务印书馆1988年版。
9.[美]约翰·哈特·伊利：《民主与不信任——关于司法审查的理论》,朱中一、顾运译,法律出版社2003年版。
10.[美]克里斯托弗·沃尔夫：《司法能动主义——自由的保障还是安全的威胁?》,黄金荣译,中国政法大学出版社2004年版。
11.[英]亨利·萨姆奈·梅因：《古代法》,高敏、瞿慧虹译,九州出版社2007年版。
12.[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊：《联邦党人文集》,程逢如、在汉、舒逊译,商务印书馆1980年版。
13.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《认真对待权利》,信春鹰、吴玉章译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版。
14.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《原则问题》,张国清译,江苏人民出版社2005年版。
15.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《法律帝国》,李常青译,中国大百科全书出版社1996年版。
16.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《自由的法：对美国宪法的道德解读》,刘丽君译,上海人民出版社2001年版。
17.[美]罗纳德·德沃金：《至上的美德：平等的理论与实践》,冯克利译,江苏人民出版社2003年版。
18.[美]小卢卡斯·A·鲍威：《沃伦法院与美国政治》,欧树军译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
19.[美]莫顿·J·霍维茨：《沃伦法院对正义的追求》,信春鹰、张志铭译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
20.[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国最高法院史》,毕洪海、柯翀、石明磊译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
21.[美]罗伯特·麦克洛斯基著、桑福德·列文森增订：《美国最高法院》(第三版),任东来、孙雯、胡晓进译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
22.[美]布赖恩·H.比克斯：《牛津法律理论词典》,邱昭继、马得华、刘叶深、冉杰、鲁强译,法律出版社2007年版。
23.[法]托克维尔：《论美国的民主》,董果良译,商务印书馆1988年版。
24.[美]安东尼·G·阿姆斯特丹姆：《关注美国法律》,于兆波、李莹、李艳荣译,吉林人民出版社2004年版。
25.[德]伯恩·魏德士：《法理学》,丁小春、吴越译,法律出版社2003年版。
26.[德]卡尔·拉伦茨：《法学方法论》,陈爱娥译,商务印书馆2005年版。
27.[德]伽达默尔：《真理与方法》,洪汉鼎译,上海译文出版社2004年版。
28.[美]波斯纳：《法理学问题》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
29.[美]本杰明·卡多佐：《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆2000年版。
30.[美]詹姆士·安修：《美国宪法解释与判例》，黎建飞译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版。
31.[古希腊]亚里士多德：《政治学》,吴寿彭译,商务印书馆1996年版。
32.[古希腊]亚里士多德：《修辞学》,罗念生译,三联书店1996年版。
33.[美]波斯纳：《法理学问题》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
34.[美]博登海默：《法理学：法律哲学与法律方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社1999年版。
35.[美]罗斯科·庞德：《普通法的精神》,唐前宏等译,法律出版社2001年版。
36.[美]罗尔斯：《正义论》,何怀宏等译,中国社会科学出版社年2005版。
37.[美]伯尔曼：《法律与宗教》,梁治平译,三联书店1991年版。
38.[美]埃尔曼：《比较法律文化》,贺卫方、高鸿钧译,三联书店1990年版。
39.[德]哈贝马斯：《在事实与规范之间：关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论》,童世骏译,三联书店2003年版。
40.[英]拉兹：《法律的权威》,朱峰译,法律出版社2005年版。
41.[美]波斯纳：《联邦法院挑战与改革》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
42.[美]波斯纳：《超越法律》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版。
43.[美]波斯纳：《法律理论的前沿》,武欣、凌斌译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
44.[法]德里达：《论文字学》,汪堂家译,上海译文出版社1999年版。
45.[法]福柯：《规训与惩罚》,刘北成等译,三联书店出版社1999年版。
46.[法]福柯：《权力的眼睛》,严峰译,上海人民出版社1997年版。
47.[德]阿图尔·考夫曼：《后现代法哲学——告别演讲》,米健译,法律出版社2003年版。
48.[德]伽达默尔：《哲学解释学》,夏镇平、宋建平译,上海译文出版社1994年 版。
49.[德]海德格尔：《存在与时间》,陈嘉映、王庆节译,三联书店1999年版。
50.[德]海德格尔：《海德格尔选集》,孙周兴选编,上海三联书店1996年版。
51.[美]埃尔斯特、[挪]斯莱格斯塔德主编：《民主与宪政》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,三联书店1997年版。
52.[美]沃浓·路易·帕灵顿：《美国思想史》,陈永国、李增、郭乙瑶译,吉林人民出版社2002年版。
53.[美]C·H·麦基文：《宪政古今》,翟小波译,贵族人民出版社2004年版。
54.[美]爱德华·S·考文：《美国宪法的“高级法”背景》,强世功译,三联书店1997年版。
55.[英]维尔：《宪政与分权》,苏力译,三联书店1997年版。
56.[美]卡尔·J·弗里德里希：《超验正义：宪政的宗教之维》,周勇、王丽芝译,梁治平校,三联书店1997年版。
57.[美]约翰·邓恩主编：《民主的历程》,林猛等译,吉林人民出版社1999年版。
58.[美]斯科特·戈登：《控制国家：西方宪政的历史》,应奇等译,江苏人民出版社2001年版。
59.[美]A·L·考夫曼：《卡多佐》,张守东译,法律出版社2001年版。
60.[美]潘恩：《潘恩选集》,马清槐等译,商务印书馆1981年版。
61.[美]杰罗姆·巴伦、托马斯·迪恩斯：《美国宪法概论》,刘瑞祥等译,中国社会科学出版社1995年版。
62.[英]F·F·哈耶克：《法律、立法和自由》,邓正来等译,中国大百科全书出版社2003年版。
63.[英]F·F·哈耶克：《自由秩序原理》,邓正来译,三联书店1997年版。
64.[美]路易斯·亨金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,三联书店1996年版。
65.[美]阿兰·S·罗森鲍姆编：《宪政的哲学之维》,郑戈、刘茂林译,三联书店2001年版。
66.[美]希尔斯曼：《美国是如何治理的》,北京商务印书馆1986年版。
67.[美]罗斯科·庞德：《通过法律的社会控制,法律的任务》,沈宗灵、董世忠译, 商务印书馆1984年版。
68.[美]罗斯科·庞德：《法律史解释》,邓正来译,中国法制出版社2002年版。
69.[美]卡尔威因、帕尔德森：《美国宪法释义》,徐卫东等译,华夏出版社1989年版。
70.[美]史蒂文·J·伯顿：《法律和法律推理导论》,张志铭、解兴权译,中国政法大学出版社1998年版。
71.[美]约翰·M·康利、威廉·M·欧巴尔：《法律、语言与权力》,程朝阳译,’法律出版社2007年版。
72.[美]卡尔·范·杜伦：《伟大的预演：美国宪法草拟和批准的故事》,美国驻华大使馆新闻文化处出版社,1985年10月香港第1版。
73.[美]拉里·亚历山大： 《宪政的哲学基础》,付子堂、文正邦、赵明等译校,中国政法大学出版社2007年版。
74.[美]约瑟夫·斯托里： 《美国宪法评注》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2006年版。
75.[英]H·L·A·哈特： 《法律、自由与道德》,支振锋译,法律出版社2006年版。
76.[美]安德雷·马默主编： 《法律与解释》,张卓明、徐宗立等译,法律出版社2006年版。
77.[法]卢梭： 《社会契约论》,何光武译,商务印书馆2003年版。
78.[美]劳伦斯·H.却伯、麦克尔·C.多尔夫： 《解读宪法》,陈林林、储智勇译,上海三联书店出版社2007年版。
79.[美]凯斯·R·桑斯坦： 《法律推理与政治冲突》,金朝武等译,法律出版社2004年版。
80.[美]本杰明·N·卡多佐：《法律的成长：法律科学的悖论》,彭冰译,中国法制出版社2002年版。
81.[美]斯蒂芬·L·埃尔金、[美]卡罗尔·爱德华·索乌坦编：《新宪政论——为美好的社会设计政治制度》,周叶谦译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
82.[美]肯尼思·W·汤普森编：《宪法的政治理论》,张志铭译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
83.[美]路易斯·亨金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
84.[美]朱迪丝·N·施克莱：《守法主义——法、道德和政治审判》,彭亚楠译,中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
85.[美]斯提芬·K·贝尼：《美国政治与政府》,宾龙译,河北大学法律系翻印。
86.[美]William Burnham:《英美法导论》,林利芝译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
87.[美]唐纳德J·布莱克：《法律的运作行为》,唐越、苏力译,中国政法大学出版社1994年版。
88.[美]詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯：《民治政府——美国政府与政治》,中国人民大学出版社2007年版。
89.[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《联邦法院：挑战与改革》,邓海平译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
90.[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《法官如何思考》,苏力译,北京大学出版社2009年版。
91.[美]埃尔斯特、[挪]斯莱格斯塔德主编：《宪政与民主——理性与社会变迁研究》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
91.[美]罗伯特·A.达尔：《美国宪法的民主批判》,佟德志译,东方出版社2007年版。
92.[美]彼得·G·伦斯特洛姆编：《美国法律辞典》,贺卫方等译,中国政法大学出版社1998年版。
93.[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国法律史》,王军等译,法律出版社2007年版。
94.[美]纪念美国宪法颁布200周年委员会编：《美国公民与宪法》,劳娃、许旭译,清华大学出版社2006年版。
95.[英]H. L. A.哈特：《法律的概念》,许家馨、李冠宜译,法律出版社2006年版。
96.[英]H. L. A.哈特：《法律、自由与道德》,支振锋译,法律出版社2006年版。
97.[美]简·汤普金斯：《读者反应批评》,文化艺术出版社1989年版。
98.[美]安德雷·马默主编：《法律与解释》,张卓明、徐宗立等译,法律出版社2006年版。
99.[美]肯尼思·w·汤普森编：《宪法的政治理论》,张志铭译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
100.[美]路易斯·亨金：《宪政·民主·对外事务》,邓正来译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1996年版。
101.[美]斯蒂芬·L·埃尔金卡罗尔·爱德华·索乌坦：《新宪政论》,周叶谦译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
102.[美]埃尔斯特[挪]斯莱格斯塔德：《宪政与民主—理性与社会变迁研究》,潘勤、谢鹏程译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1997年版。
103.[美]詹姆斯·麦格雷戈·伯恩斯：《民治政府—美国政府与政治》,吴爱明、李亚梅译,中国人民大学出版社2007年版。
104.[美]本杰明·N·卡多佐：《法律的成长：法律科学的悖论》,董炯、彭冰译,中国法制出版社2002年版。
105.[法]罗兰·巴特：《罗兰·巴特随笔选》,怀宇译,百花文艺出版社2007年版。
106.[法]罗兰·巴尔特：《S／Z》,屠友祥译,上海人民出版社2000年版。
107.[美]伯尔曼：《法律与革命——西方法律传统的形成》,贺卫方、高鸿钧、张志铭、夏勇译,中国大百科全书出版社1993年版。
1.范进学：《宪法解释的理论建构》,山东人民出版社2004年版。
2.范进学：《认真对待宪法解释》,山东人民出版社2007年版。
3.谢晖：《法律的意义追问——诠释学视野中的法哲学》,商务印书馆2003年版。
4.陈金钊主编：《法治与法律方法》,山东人民出版社2003年版。
5.韩大元等：《现代宪法解释基本理论》,中国民主法制出版社2006年版。
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1.赵晓力：《美国宪法的原旨解释》,《宪法与公民》,上海人民出版社2004年版。
2.张翔：《美国宪法解释理论中的原旨主义》,《山东社会科学》2005年第7期。
3.侯学宾：《宪法解释中原旨主义的内在困境》,吉林大学2006年硕士学位论文。
4.范进学：《美国宪法解释方法论之辨思》,《现代法学》2006年第5期。
5.范进学：《美国宪法解释：“麦迪逊两难“之消解》,《法律科学》2006年第6期。
6.徐秀勇、马建平：《原意解释及其批判》,《天府新论》2006年6月。
7.范进学：《斯卡里亚宪法解释方法论及其评析》,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
8.饶志静：《原旨主义与美国宪法解释理论的论争》,《广西政法管理干部学院学报》2008年第1期。
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10.张翔：《分权制衡原则与宪法解释》,《法商研究》2002年第6期。
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12.任东来：《美国司法审查权的确立：马伯里诉麦迪逊案》,“公法网”,http://www.gongfa.com/rendlmabolisumaidixun.htm,2005年4月4日.
13.任东来：《改变美国宪政历史的一个脚注》,《读书》2005年第9期。
14.陈弘毅：《普通法权限中的宪法解释》,施嵩译,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
15.韩大元：《试论宪法解释的效力》,《山东社会科学》2005年第6期。
16.郑永流：《出释入造——法律诠释学及其与法律解释学的关系》,《法学研究》2002年第3期。
17.谢晖：《法律的作者》,《求是》2003年第5期。
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21.疏义红：《法律解释方法的发现与归类》,《法商研究》2004年第2期。
22.陈金钊：《法律解释中的矛盾与选择》,《法商研究》2004年第2期。
23.张翔：《功能适当原则与宪法解释模式的选择》,《学习与探索》2007年第1期。
24.夏泽祥、施嵩：《何谓宪法解释》,《山东社会科学》2005年第
25.徐振东：《客观主义和现实主义——美国判例制度下的宪法解释方法论》,《浙江社会科学》2006年第3期。
26.周健勇：《理解的困惑——论作者与读者的关系》,《宁夏党校学报》2004年第3期。
27.侯学华：《历史解释与美国宪法史学流派》,《西安交通大学学报》2005年12月。
28.陈金钊：《拯救客观性——关于法治方法的理论探索》,《法律科学》2001年第6期。
29.田成有：《重构还是超越法律解释的客观性探询——以德沃金和波斯纳的法律解释论为主》,《法制与社会发展》2003年第1期。
30.陈金钊：《法律解释学的转向与实用法学的第三条道路》,载陈金钊主编《法治与法律方法》,山东人民出版社2003年版。
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32.杨建军：《法律语言的特点》,《西北大学学报》2005年第5期。
33.陈金钊、孙光宁：《“历史”的危机与“意义”的重生——法律解释中的历史方法(因素)》,《河南省政法管理干部学院学报》2006年第2期。
34.苗连营：《宪法解释的功能、原则及其中国图景》,《法律科学》2004年第6期。
35.谢晖：《法律的读者》,《政治与法律》2002年第6期。
36.左建辉、杨军：《在规范和现实之间——规范宪法学与宪法解释学之比较分析》,《保定师范专科学校学报》2007年第3期。
37.谢晖：《达致真理：诠释法律的憧憬》,《江苏行政学院学报》2002年第3期。
38.吴开明：《现代性哲学基础的反思——哈贝马斯对意识哲学范式的拒斥》,《厦门大学学报》2001年第3期。
39.陈金钊：《文义解释法律方法的优位选择》,《文史哲》2005年第6期。
40.廖美珍：《论法学的语言转向》,《社会科学战线》2006年第2期。
41.于兴中：《人工智能、话语理论与可辩驳推理》,载葛洪义主编《法律方法与法律思维(第3辑)》,中国政法大学2005年版。
42.丁伟：《美国宪法上的正当法律程序——一个历史的视角》,中国政法大学2005年博士论文。
43.刘慧英、任东来：《能动还是克制——一场尚无结果的美国司法辩论》,《美国研究》2005年第4期。
44.张翔：《祛魅与自足：政治理论对宪法解释的影响及其限度》,《政法论坛》2007年第7期.
45.郑贤君：《确立“法”上之力：宪法解释学的中国使命》,《山东社会科学》2005年第6期。
46.王金福：《什么是文本的“意义”?》,《江苏行政学院学报》2006年第5期。
47.谭融：《试析美国的司法能动主义》,《天津师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2003年第6期。
48.强世功：《文本、结构与立法原意——“人大释法”的法律技艺》,《中国社会科学》2007年第5期。
49.夏泽祥：《宪法解释：一种拯救中国宪法权威性的方法》,《法学论坛》2006年1月。
50.周伟：《宪法解释的方法体系》,《社会科学研究》2004年第5期。
51.郑贤君：《宪法解释是政治法律化的基本途径》,《法学杂志》2006年第1期。
52.王广辉：《宪法解释与宪法理解》,《中国法学》2001年第4期。
53.王书成：《宪法解释之前命题与方法》,《浙江学刊》2007年第3期。
54.周伟：《宪法解释中学说解释、历史解释和先例解释方法研究》,《南京师大学报(社会科学版)》2005年第3期。
55.郑贤君：《宪法文本分析：一种解释方法》,《法律科学》2008年第2期。
56.汪庆华：《宪法与人民——从布鲁斯·阿克曼〈我们人民：奠基〉谈起》,《政法论坛》2005年第6期。
57.范进学：《宪政与方法：走向宪法文本自身的解释》,《浙江学刊》2005年第2期。
58.庞凌：《法院如何寻求司法能动主义和克制主义的平衡》,《法律适用》2004年第1期。
59.胡锦光：《论审判权的界限》,《河南省政法管理干部学报》2003年第4期。
60.王岳川：《作者之死与文本欢欣》,《文学自由谈》1998年第4期。
61.范进学：《从规范分析宪法学到宪法解释学》,《河南省政法管理干部学报学报》2005年第2期。
62.范进学、杨阿妮：《宪法解释学：作为宪法方法论的学问》,《浙江学刊》2009年第5期。
63.韩大元：《中国宪法学方法论的学术倾向与问题意识》,《中国法学》2008年第1期。
64.王彬：《美国宪法解释中的原旨主义》,《河南广播电视大学学报》2009年第1期。
65.施嵩：《美国宪法解释理论与实践中的原意主义——基于美国宪政发展历程的考察》,《法律方法》第九卷,陈金钊主持,山东人民出版社2009年版。
66.韩大元、张翔：《试论宪法解释的界限》,载韩大元主编《现代宪法解释基本理论》,中国民主法制出版社2006年版。
67.贾敬华：《视域融合的法哲学的现实分析》,《法制与社会发展》2006年第3期。
68.陆自荣：《“价值无涉”与“价值关联”：韦伯思想中的一对张力》,《西安交通大学学报》2005年第2期。