股权结构与公司治理研究
摘要
关于股权结构与公司治理的研究,最早可以追溯到Berle和Means(1932)。进入20世纪70——80年代,对公司治理问题的研究才真正兴起。较系统的关于公司价值与股权结构的研究始于Jensen和Meckling(1976)。
我国对公司治理问题的关注和研究始于20世纪90年代中期。目前,理论界对我国上市公司治理的一个基本判断是:股权结构不合理,公司治理机制运行效率低。
国内外学者研究股权结构与公司治理关系,大都以股权结构对公司绩效的影响为切入点,其理论依据是股权结构影响公司治理模式、方式以及日常管理,进而会对公司绩效产生影响。实证研究结果表明,股权结构与公司绩效确实存在相关关系,但由于各国国情不同以及研究样本选取的差异,不同学者对股权结构与公司绩效的相关关系又有不同解释。
本文第一章对国内外学者的研究进行了综述,继而确定了本文的研究思路、内容和方法。第二、三章对股权结构和公司治理的基本理论进行了研究。第四章研究了当前国际上比较有代表性的两种股权结构与公司治理模式:股权分散的外部型治理模式——英美公司治理以及股权集中的内部型公司治理模式——德日公司治理。第五章从内部治理机制与外部治理机制两个方面总结了当前我国上市公司治理存在的主要问题。
在理论及实践研究的基础上,第六章对我国高成长型中小上市公司股权结构与公司治理进行了实证研究。实证研究证实了当前我国上市公司股权集中度过高的现状,并且,实证结果表明,自然人股比例、无限售条件股比例与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)正向相关,国家股比例、法人股比例与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)负相关。第一大股东持股比例、反应前五大股东股权集中度指标的赫芬德尔指数H5与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)负相关,反应第一大股东受到制衡程度的Z指数与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)呈倒“S”形关系。并且,我们得到了第一大股东持股比例、赫芬德尔指数、Z指数与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)的曲线回归模型。
最后,在理论、实践以及实证研究的基础上,本文给出了优化股权结构、规范内部治理机制、完善外部治理机制的政策建议。
The research on the ownership structure and corporate governance can be traced back to the Berle and Means(1932) times. However, it was not until the beginning of the 20th century, between the year 1970 and the year 1980, that the research on corporate governance issues began to truly rise. The systematic study on the Corporate value and ownership structure had begun from Jensen and Meckling(1976) times.
The concern and research on corporate governance issues in China began in the mid-1990s. At present, a common conception on China's handling the businesses of public companies from the theoretical circle is: the ownership structure is unreasonable, corporate governance runs in low efficiency.
Most of the scholars both from home and abroad take the company performance influenced by ownership structure as an entry point when doing research on the relationships between ownership structure and corporate governance. The basic theory is that ownership structure of corporate has a great impact on the model of governance as well as daily management, in this way it will affect company performance. Empirical Study results show that the ownership structure and corporate performance are relevant indeed. However, the reason that different countries have different situations, so does the differences in sample selection exist, has caused varied scholars have various interpretations on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance.
Of this paper, the first chapter is a general overview on the research made by the scholars both home and abroad, setting this Paper's researching ideas, content and methods. In the second and third chapters, the ownership structure and corporate governance's basic theories were studied. The fifth chapter is a study on the two kinds of relatively representative ownership structure and corporate governance model: Ownership decentralized management of the external model - Britain and American corporate and ownership centralized management of the internal model - the German and Japanese corporate. Chapter V sums up the main issues existing in the governance of the public companies in China from both the internal and external governance mechanisms.
On the basis of theory and practice, Chapter VI this paper carries out an empirical study on the ownership structure and corporate governance of China's high-growth small and medium-sized public companies. Empirical research has shown the status quo that China's public companies' ownership is overly centralized, and that the proportion of natural shares, unlimited conditional shares and capital business return on assets (CROA) are positive associated, while state-owned shares and legal person shares and main business assets rates are negative correlation. The Herfindahl Index H5 which reflects the proportion of the largest shareholder and the top five shareholders and capital business return on assets (CROA) are negative correlation while the Z index which reflects the degree of checks and balances of the largest shareholder and capital business return on assets (CROA)are in the inverted "S" shape relations. In addition, we have got curve regression model of the proportion of largest shareholder, Herfindahl Index, Z index and capital business return on assets (CROA).
Finally, based on theory, practice and empirical research, this paper provides some policy recommendations on optimizing stock ownership structure, regulating the internal governance mechanisms, and improving external governance mechanisms.
我国对公司治理问题的关注和研究始于20世纪90年代中期。目前,理论界对我国上市公司治理的一个基本判断是:股权结构不合理,公司治理机制运行效率低。
国内外学者研究股权结构与公司治理关系,大都以股权结构对公司绩效的影响为切入点,其理论依据是股权结构影响公司治理模式、方式以及日常管理,进而会对公司绩效产生影响。实证研究结果表明,股权结构与公司绩效确实存在相关关系,但由于各国国情不同以及研究样本选取的差异,不同学者对股权结构与公司绩效的相关关系又有不同解释。
本文第一章对国内外学者的研究进行了综述,继而确定了本文的研究思路、内容和方法。第二、三章对股权结构和公司治理的基本理论进行了研究。第四章研究了当前国际上比较有代表性的两种股权结构与公司治理模式:股权分散的外部型治理模式——英美公司治理以及股权集中的内部型公司治理模式——德日公司治理。第五章从内部治理机制与外部治理机制两个方面总结了当前我国上市公司治理存在的主要问题。
在理论及实践研究的基础上,第六章对我国高成长型中小上市公司股权结构与公司治理进行了实证研究。实证研究证实了当前我国上市公司股权集中度过高的现状,并且,实证结果表明,自然人股比例、无限售条件股比例与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)正向相关,国家股比例、法人股比例与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)负相关。第一大股东持股比例、反应前五大股东股权集中度指标的赫芬德尔指数H5与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)负相关,反应第一大股东受到制衡程度的Z指数与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)呈倒“S”形关系。并且,我们得到了第一大股东持股比例、赫芬德尔指数、Z指数与主营业务资产收益率(CROA)的曲线回归模型。
最后,在理论、实践以及实证研究的基础上,本文给出了优化股权结构、规范内部治理机制、完善外部治理机制的政策建议。
The research on the ownership structure and corporate governance can be traced back to the Berle and Means(1932) times. However, it was not until the beginning of the 20th century, between the year 1970 and the year 1980, that the research on corporate governance issues began to truly rise. The systematic study on the Corporate value and ownership structure had begun from Jensen and Meckling(1976) times.
The concern and research on corporate governance issues in China began in the mid-1990s. At present, a common conception on China's handling the businesses of public companies from the theoretical circle is: the ownership structure is unreasonable, corporate governance runs in low efficiency.
Most of the scholars both from home and abroad take the company performance influenced by ownership structure as an entry point when doing research on the relationships between ownership structure and corporate governance. The basic theory is that ownership structure of corporate has a great impact on the model of governance as well as daily management, in this way it will affect company performance. Empirical Study results show that the ownership structure and corporate performance are relevant indeed. However, the reason that different countries have different situations, so does the differences in sample selection exist, has caused varied scholars have various interpretations on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance.
Of this paper, the first chapter is a general overview on the research made by the scholars both home and abroad, setting this Paper's researching ideas, content and methods. In the second and third chapters, the ownership structure and corporate governance's basic theories were studied. The fifth chapter is a study on the two kinds of relatively representative ownership structure and corporate governance model: Ownership decentralized management of the external model - Britain and American corporate and ownership centralized management of the internal model - the German and Japanese corporate. Chapter V sums up the main issues existing in the governance of the public companies in China from both the internal and external governance mechanisms.
On the basis of theory and practice, Chapter VI this paper carries out an empirical study on the ownership structure and corporate governance of China's high-growth small and medium-sized public companies. Empirical research has shown the status quo that China's public companies' ownership is overly centralized, and that the proportion of natural shares, unlimited conditional shares and capital business return on assets (CROA) are positive associated, while state-owned shares and legal person shares and main business assets rates are negative correlation. The Herfindahl Index H5 which reflects the proportion of the largest shareholder and the top five shareholders and capital business return on assets (CROA) are negative correlation while the Z index which reflects the degree of checks and balances of the largest shareholder and capital business return on assets (CROA)are in the inverted "S" shape relations. In addition, we have got curve regression model of the proportion of largest shareholder, Herfindahl Index, Z index and capital business return on assets (CROA).
Finally, based on theory, practice and empirical research, this paper provides some policy recommendations on optimizing stock ownership structure, regulating the internal governance mechanisms, and improving external governance mechanisms.
引文
[1]严武.公司股权结构与治理机制.经济管理出版社,2004,1:1-48
[2]苏武康在其2003年的研究中将我国上市公司股权构成按股东属性划分为国家股东、法人股东和社会公众股东。苏武康.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效.经济科学出版社,2003,1:38-165
[3]马连福.股权结构的适度性与公司治理效率.南开管理评论,2000,4
[4]李维安,武力东.公司治理教程.上海人民出版社.2002,1
[6]朗咸平.从大历史动荡看中国今天需要怎么样的公司治理.新财富,2002,11
[7]John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Future as History:The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications,Columbia University of Law,The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection,http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=142833
[8]Shleifer,Vishny.ASurvey of Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance,1997
[9]冯根福.西方主要国家公司股权结构与股东监控机制比较研究.当代经济学,1997,6:34
[10]阮兴华.对于日本法人相互持股的质疑.外国经济管理,1994,11:21
11 1996年股票市值对GDP比重大幅上升是由该年德国电信大规模初次发行引起的,不足以说明整个股市有重大发展。
12 Boehmer,E..Corporate Governance in Germany:Institutional Background and Empirical Results.Humboldt University Berlin,mimeo.1999
13坦尼夫,张春霖,白瑞福特.中国的公司治理与企业改革.中国财政经济出版社,2002,1:76
14何旭.上市公司股权结构与经营绩效研究.东北林业大学出版社,2004,1:29-37
15 宁向东.公司治理理论.中国发展出版社,2005,1
[1]Tricker, Robert. Corporate Government and the Challenges Ahead. Corporate Governance International(Hong Kong, China), 1999, 2: 64—81
[2]Harris, Raviv. Corporate control contests and capital. Journal of Finance, 1988, 46: 297-350
[3]Hart, Oliver. Corporate governance: Some theory and implications. The Economic Journal, 1995, 105(May): 678-689
[4]Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen. Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the Largest European Companies. Strategic Management Journal,2001, Vol.21,No.6: 689-705
[5]Qian Sun, Wilson H.S.Tong. China share issue privatization: the extent of its success. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003,70: 183—222
[6]Harold Demesetz, Belen Villalonga. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2001,7: 209—233
[7]Shleifer, Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 1997
[8]Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen. Ownership structure and economic Performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 2000, 21: 689—705
[9]Claessens.S. Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic. Working Paper of the World Bank, 1997
[10]La Porta, Rafael. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58: 3—27
[11]Boehmer, E.. Corporate Governance in Germany: Institutional Background and Empirical Results. Humboldt University Berlin, mimeo.1999
[12]Myeong-Hyeon Cho. Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: an Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998, 47: 103—121
[13]Morck, Nakamura, Shivdasani. Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan. Journal of Business, 2000, 10: 155 — 182
[14]Makhija, Spiro. Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czeh Firms. The Financial Review, 2000, 2: 131 — 159
[15]Grossman, Hart. Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, 11: 42 — 64
[16]Demsetz H., Lehn K.. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177
[17]Morck,R.,Andrei Shleifer,Robert vishny.Management ownership and market valuation:an empirical analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:293-316
[18]Mehran H..Executive Compensation Structure,Ownership,and Firm Performance.Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38:625-662
[19]严武.公司股权结构与治理机制.经济管理出版社,2004,1:1-48
[20]苏武康.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效.经济科学出版社,2003,1:38-165
[21]马连福.股权结构的适度性与公司治理效率.南开管理评论,2000,4
[22]李维安,武力东.公司治理教程.上海人民出版社,2002,1
[23]朗咸平.从大历史动荡看中国今天需要怎么样的公司治理.新财富,2002,11
[24]冯根福.西方主要国家公司股权结构与股东监控机制比较研究.当代经济学,1997,6:34
[25]阮兴华.对于日本法人相互持股的质疑.外国经济管理,1994,11:21
[26]坦尼夫,张春霖,白瑞福特.中国的公司治理与企业改革.中国财政经济出版社,2002,1:76
[27]何旭.上市公司股权结构与经营绩效研究.东北林业大学出版社,2004,1:29-37
[28]宁向东.公司治理理论.中国发展出版社,2005,1
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[50]白重恩.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究.经济研究,2005,2
[2]苏武康在其2003年的研究中将我国上市公司股权构成按股东属性划分为国家股东、法人股东和社会公众股东。苏武康.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效.经济科学出版社,2003,1:38-165
[3]马连福.股权结构的适度性与公司治理效率.南开管理评论,2000,4
[4]李维安,武力东.公司治理教程.上海人民出版社.2002,1
[6]朗咸平.从大历史动荡看中国今天需要怎么样的公司治理.新财富,2002,11
[7]John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Future as History:The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications,Columbia University of Law,The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection,http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=142833
[8]Shleifer,Vishny.ASurvey of Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance,1997
[9]冯根福.西方主要国家公司股权结构与股东监控机制比较研究.当代经济学,1997,6:34
[10]阮兴华.对于日本法人相互持股的质疑.外国经济管理,1994,11:21
11 1996年股票市值对GDP比重大幅上升是由该年德国电信大规模初次发行引起的,不足以说明整个股市有重大发展。
12 Boehmer,E..Corporate Governance in Germany:Institutional Background and Empirical Results.Humboldt University Berlin,mimeo.1999
13坦尼夫,张春霖,白瑞福特.中国的公司治理与企业改革.中国财政经济出版社,2002,1:76
14何旭.上市公司股权结构与经营绩效研究.东北林业大学出版社,2004,1:29-37
15 宁向东.公司治理理论.中国发展出版社,2005,1
[1]Tricker, Robert. Corporate Government and the Challenges Ahead. Corporate Governance International(Hong Kong, China), 1999, 2: 64—81
[2]Harris, Raviv. Corporate control contests and capital. Journal of Finance, 1988, 46: 297-350
[3]Hart, Oliver. Corporate governance: Some theory and implications. The Economic Journal, 1995, 105(May): 678-689
[4]Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen. Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the Largest European Companies. Strategic Management Journal,2001, Vol.21,No.6: 689-705
[5]Qian Sun, Wilson H.S.Tong. China share issue privatization: the extent of its success. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003,70: 183—222
[6]Harold Demesetz, Belen Villalonga. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2001,7: 209—233
[7]Shleifer, Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 1997
[8]Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen. Ownership structure and economic Performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 2000, 21: 689—705
[9]Claessens.S. Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic. Working Paper of the World Bank, 1997
[10]La Porta, Rafael. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58: 3—27
[11]Boehmer, E.. Corporate Governance in Germany: Institutional Background and Empirical Results. Humboldt University Berlin, mimeo.1999
[12]Myeong-Hyeon Cho. Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: an Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998, 47: 103—121
[13]Morck, Nakamura, Shivdasani. Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan. Journal of Business, 2000, 10: 155 — 182
[14]Makhija, Spiro. Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czeh Firms. The Financial Review, 2000, 2: 131 — 159
[15]Grossman, Hart. Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, 11: 42 — 64
[16]Demsetz H., Lehn K.. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177
[17]Morck,R.,Andrei Shleifer,Robert vishny.Management ownership and market valuation:an empirical analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:293-316
[18]Mehran H..Executive Compensation Structure,Ownership,and Firm Performance.Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38:625-662
[19]严武.公司股权结构与治理机制.经济管理出版社,2004,1:1-48
[20]苏武康.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效.经济科学出版社,2003,1:38-165
[21]马连福.股权结构的适度性与公司治理效率.南开管理评论,2000,4
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