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垂直协作与农户质量控制行为研究
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摘要
我国畜产品供给已从短缺状态转变为相对过剩状态,消费者对畜产品的需求已由数量开始转向对品质的需求,动物性食品安全正越来越受到社会的广泛关注。但是,畜产品质量安全问题的解决,仅靠加工和销售企业的努力显然是无法做到的,因此突出生产阶段的质量控制显得尤为重要。
     大量学术研究成果为解决畜产品质量安全现实问题发挥了重要作用。纵观这些学术成果可以看出:一方面,目前学术研究多集中在畜产品生产者质量控制意愿方面,而对生产者的具体质量控制行为研究较少;另一方面,有些学术研究还多集中在政府管理体制和质量标准化建设方面,而对建立以农户为主的畜产品质量可追溯体系的研究涉及较少;最后,有些研究多汇集于以畜产品供应链管理理论为基础的畜产品全程质量控制研究,而揭示垂直协作和农户质量控制行为的内在逻辑关系和相互影响方面研究较少。通过上述“三多三少”的分析,本文基于生猪行业作为研究对象。认为从一般理论上讲,垂直协作与养猪户质量控制行为之间究竟是一个什么样的关系?能否构建一个理论分析框架对垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为间的逻辑关系进行分析和梳理?揭示出垂直协作对养猪户质量控制行为差异的影响及可能的原因,这种影响通过什么机制来实现的?在不失一般性的原则下,考察并验证交易成本对垂直协作选择和养猪户质量控制行为的影响及其程度。
     本文以垂直协作的作用机理特性作为逻辑起点,采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法。通过理论分析,证明垂直协作和农户质量控制行为之间的内在逻辑关系,为实证分析提供理论支撑。接着以江苏省6个县(市、区)、14个镇、28个村542户以养猪业为主的农户进行实地调查的数据为依据,运用计量分析方法,对不同特征和禀赋的养猪户垂直协作和质量控制行为的相互关系以及影响因素进行描述性分析和模型检验。最后提出相关政策建议。全文分为8个部分,主要研究结论如下:
     研究内容一:垂直协作和农户质量控制行为之间的关系分析
     通过契约选择和交易成本两个视角对垂直协作和农户质量控制行为之间的内在逻辑关系进行阐释。探讨垂直协作对农户质量控制行为的影响及其成因。然后对加工屠宰(收购)企业与养猪户之间契约选择机理的分析建立非对称信息下多代理人的委托-代理模型。研究发现:第一,养猪户的特征和一些社会经济因素对于农户垂直协作选择和质量控制行为产生影响;第二,养猪户的养殖规模和所采用的不同契约激励模式也是影响其质量控制行为的因素;第三,交易成本对垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为也有较强的影响。
     研究内容二:江苏省生猪行业农户垂直协作形式和质量控制情况
     通过对江苏省生猪行业农户参加垂直协作情况和质量控制情况的描述,进一步明确了江苏省生猪行业垂直协作所处阶段和质量控制情况。从对江苏省养猪户的调查数据看,目前养猪户仍主要采用市场交易的垂直协作方式(69%),采用合作社和生产合同的比例较低,分别占25.1%和5.9%,农户参与合作社和生产合同的时间普遍不长。农户的质量控制行为虽有所改善,但仍不容乐观。
     研究内容三:垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为实证分析
     据实地调查,运用Probit和Tobit模型对垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为进行实证分析。研究发现,垂直协作的紧密程度对养猪户质量控制行为的确存在显著影响。除此外,其他诸多影响因素中,还包括农户养殖经验、有无生猪治疗和防疫记录、是否干部、参与合作组织与否、养殖培训和质量安全政策法规认知程度等均随着农户养殖规模的变化而发生变化,且影响较为明显。
     研究内容四:垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为的比较分析
     据实地调查,分别采用结构方程模型和“双栏”选择模型较为系统地分析并比较了垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为的差异及其形成原因。结果表明,垂直协作的紧密程度对养猪户的药物添加剂使用行为存在明显差异,而且影响因素亦不尽相同。总体来说,养猪户的质量控制行为主要受到养猪户所处区位、年龄、受教育程度、健康程度、是否村干部、非农就业人数、养猪收入占总收入比重、养殖规模(折算)、有无防疫治疗记录、养猪户的风险偏好以及对农产品的质量安全认知等因素的影响。对于参与紧密合同关系方式下的养殖户而言,其药物添加剂的使用行为影响因素明显多于松散的市场交易方式,且对于药物添加剂的需求倾向也明显弱于后者。
     研究内容五:交易成本对垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为影响研究
     据实地调查,采用二元Probit模型系统地分析了生猪流通中交易成本对不同规模养猪户垂直协作和质量控制行为的影响及其差异。研究发现:信息成本对三类经营规模农户都有较强的约束;谈判成本对不同经营规模养猪户的垂直协作形式选择的影响差异比较明显;监督(执行)成本对经营规模较大农户垂直协作形式选择的负面影响明显大于对中小经营规模农户的负面影响;当养猪户认为自己养殖的生猪质量不确定性较强时,就越倾向于选择质量检查相对不严的市场交易方式,而养殖规模对于质量检查问题的反应很强烈。
     总之,本研究围绕上述五部分内容,借助垂直协作和农户质量控制行为的一般经济学理论,对我国畜产品质量控制和追溯体系的构建过程中,垂直协作和养猪户质量控制行为的发展关系,以及养猪户自身的发展,展开全面、系统和深入的研究。通过研究和探索,期望能在理论上有所创新,在政策选择上有新的突破。
During the stage of our country's livestock product from scarcity to surplus comparatively,consumer's demand for is changing from quantity to quality.So livestock product is becoming more and more overwhelmingly concerned.However counting on processing and marketing firm to deal with livestock product quality problem is impossible thing,thus it is so importantly to stand out the stage of breeding is urgent affaires.
     Thers are such many research fruits to some great extent about how to deal with livestock quality problems.By view of these researches,it's no hard to find that three "excessive"and three "fewness",first one is more researches about breeder quanlity control desire and less breeder quanlity practical control behaviors;second one is more researches focus on government policy and standardiztion making;third one is more researches focus on supply chain theory to deal with livestock quanlity through full acess control.
     By now,author thinks that from the general theory,what relationships between vertical coordination and breeder's quality control behavior on earth? Can we constructing a theory model to explain and tire the inner logical relation between them? And to find out any possible reasons and influence factors? last but not least,to find out if transaction costs play very important role in this?
     The close vertical coordination not only can resolve the fund problems that use the smaller capital to engaged in the more large-scale production,but also can resolve the anti-risk problem in the swine industry,and resolving the safe problem of food.
     For this aim,the research from farmer angle,the total target is to make the analysis around the present condition,quanlity control behavior and the influence factors of swine industry in Jiangsu province.
     The study from the swine industry vertical coordination development of world scope to the Chinese swine industry vertical coordination development condition,make use of the economerics model and statistics seeing about the present condition,put forward the policy suggestion of development our country the swine industry vertical coordination.The full text is divided into 8 parts,the main studying contents and conclusions be illustrated as follows:
     Part 1:The economic analysis for vertical coordination and farmer quality behavior relationship
     Through transaction costs and farmer risk preference point of view,we can find of it's inner and inter logical relations.and by use of constructing principal-agent model between breeders and processors.we can find out that transaction costs、breeding scale、bredders' characteristics and some social factors are all bring infections in vertical coordination and breeders' quality behaviors
     Part 2:To examine the vertical coordination present condition of swine industry in Jiangsu province
     The research by investigate 6 county(town) of the north、middle part and south in Jiangsu province,the vertical coordination form of swine in Jiangsu province currently is Spot market,Market contract,Cooperatives,Production contract,Vertical integration. Market contract and Vertical integration is not the main vertical coordination form which be adopted by the farmer,but Spot market,Cooperatives and Production contract is the main vertical coordination form currently.
     Part 3:The effect factor analysis reasarch on Swine breeder
     By using of structural equation modeling and combining with theory of plained behavior to analysis breeders' quality behavior,and find out that only if increase swine breeders' quality decision behavior through moral liability、income expection,and characteristics、relative behavior ect can get to the end,and it's very necessary to increase swine breeders' quality cognive control capacity simultaneity.By starting with the use behavior of feed additive,find out that,different breed scales' breeders are obviously different in quality control behavior and effet factors.such as breed experiences、if have cure and epidemic prevention record、if leader、if farm cooperation member、vertial coordination degree、breeding train and some cognitions about quality policies or laws.
     Part 4:Compare research on different vertical coordination condition with swine quality control behavior
     By use of "Double hurdle" model to deep research on differences between special coordinational conditions.and find out that,there so many factors that to some extent effects on breeders' feed additive useage,such as location、age、eduction、health、breed income specific gravity ect.For closer coordination breeders have much more effect factors than relax coordination,and closer coordination breeders' demanding tendency for feed additive are much less than the latter one.
     Part 5:The research on transaction cost effect between vertical coordination and swine breeders' quality control behavior
     It was based on first hand research on swine breeders,and by use of binary choice probit model to be based on information cost,negotiation cost and enforcement cost separately to review which factors and how affet farmers'methods choice of vertical coordination.The conclusions tell us that public poice producers should encourage greatly farmers scale-business and through closer coordination can reduce tranaction costs and improve product quality efficiently.
     At the basis of the above analysis,the research surrounding above six parts,and from theory and experience research,it is hope that it can give some help about how to comprehend the importance of vertical coordination on farm priduct quanlity control. Relative policy recommendations were also put forward to strengthen vertical coordination construction and quality control behehavior
引文
[1]约翰.克老奈维根编,朱舟、黄瑞虹译,《交易成本经济学及其超越——机会主义、学习与组织演进》[M].上海财经大学出版社,2004
    [1]转引自:[冰岛]恩拉思.埃格特森著,吴经邦,李耀等译,《经济行为与制度》,商务印书馆,2004
    [1]Valentinov,V.(2005):The organizational nature of agricultural cooperatives:a perspective from the farm problem theory,in:Journal of Rural Cooperation,Vol.33(2),pp.139-151.
    [1]此结论同Pilar A Jano(2007)
    [2]参见Aimee Hampel-Milagrosa(2007)
    [1]引自胡浩,应瑞瑶,刘佳,中国生猪产地移动的经济分析——从自然性布局向经济性布局的转变,《中国农村经济》,2005.12。
    [2]数据来源:历年《江苏统计年鉴》整理所得。
    [1]资料来源:历年《江苏省畜牧业统计年鉴》以及江苏省农林厅畜牧局内部统计资料整理。
    [2]参考戴迎春,《猪肉供应链垂直协作关系研究》,南京农业大学2003年硕士毕业论文.第22页。
    [1]引自:陈焕生,欧美国家动物福利法及其对畜牧业生产和贸易的影响。《世界农业》,2004第六期。
    [2]参见:H.J.恩布勒希,安全饲料——安全食品。《中国家禽》.2002(15)1-5。
    [1]只有当这个社会中的大多数人放弃原来的制度安排并接受新制度安排时,制度变迁才会发生,例如一种新的组织制度安排对农户质量安全观念、道德意识和责任感的改变(卫,2004,2005:周,2006,2007;胡定寰等,2006)。
    [1]在二值响应模型中,由于在现实应用中,研究者更倾向于对方程(1)和(3)中的e的正态性假定.所以Probit模型较Logit模型更为广泛。
    [2]参见 Robert S.Pindyck,Daniel L.Rubinfeld,Econometric Models and Economic Forecast,McGraw-Hill,4~(th) Edition,p329-p330
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