产品市场竞争的权益资本成本效应研究
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摘要
权益资本成本是投资者权衡风险与收益后提出的要求报酬率，从微观角度看，关系到企业的融资能力、投资行为、利润分配和绩效考核，从宏观角度看，关系到资本市场资金流动、资源配置效率，因此权益资本成本是财务学中的核心概念。公司治理研究的逐步深入引起一轮从代理问题视角研究权益资本成本的热潮。现有文献大多从股权治理、董事会治理、管理层激励、信息披露等内部治理机制和投资者法律保护、政治关联等外部治理机制角度研究其对权益资本成本的影响，但忽略了一个重要的外部治理机制——产品市场竞争。在委托代理框架下，现有文献研究产品市场竞争对现金持有量、资本结构、投资决策、股利分配等财务政策的影响时已经证实了其具有公司治理功能，但产品市场竞争也会带来异质性风险，影响投资者要求报酬率的大小。
在产品市场竞争理论、委托代理理论和资产定价理论基础上，本文分析了产品市场竞争影响权益资本成本的公司治理效应和异质性风险效应，并利用2003-2011年上市公司数据为样本、从行业竞争程度和企业市场势力两个维度进行了实证检验。研究结论表明，行业竞争对权益资本成本的影响表现为公司治理效应，行业竞争程度越激烈，企业的权益资本成本越低，反之，行业竞争越缓和，企业的权益资本成本越高。也就是说，随着行业竞争程度的提高，委托代理问题逐渐削弱，表现为权益资本成本的逐渐降低。但本文并没有发现第一大股东持股、董事会独立性和高管激励在行业竞争与权益资本成本关系间的中介效应，这意味着行业竞争本身就具有公司治理效应，即可缓解委托代理问题、进而降低投资者的要求报酬率。企业市场势力对权益资本成本的影响表现为异质性风险效应，企业市场势力越大，权益资本成本越低，反之，企业市场势力越小，权益资本成本越高，异质性风险在企业市场势力与权益资本成本关系之间发挥了中介传导效应。也就是说，企业市场势力越大，异质性风险越小，进而降低了权益资本成本。在降低权益资本成本方面，行业竞争程度与综合治理水平之间呈替代关系，对处于竞争程度不高的行业的公司而言，提高公司治理水平更重要；企业市场势力与综合治理水平之间呈互补关系，市场势力的权益资本成本降低效应对综合治理水平高的公司而言更显著。
本文从体现资本市场定价功能的权益资本成本角度研究了产品市场与资本市场的关系，不仅从传统角度探讨了产品市场竞争的治理功能，而且从新的角度探讨了其异质性风险效应，加深了产品市场竞争对资本市场影响的全面认识和理解。行业竞争发挥了公司治理效应，促进了权益资本成本的降低，对于单个企业而言，提高其在产品市场的竞争力和垄断势力有利于增强抵制异质性风险的能力，降低权益资本成本。因此，产品市场改革应当考虑到行业竞争改革和行业内企业竞争改革不同的财务效应，顾及到资本市场融资功能的发挥。
The cost of equity capital is the required rate of return decided by investors, whichinvolves financing capacity, investment behavior, the distribution of profits andperformance appraisal from the microscopic point and relates to the efficiency of resourceallocation from macroscopic point.So the cost of equity capital is the core concept offinance.Many papers study the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms onthe cost of equity capital. Internal governance mechanisms consist of equity governance,board governance, management incentive and information disclosure. External governancemechanisms include the legal protection of investors, political association and so on.Howerver, as an important external governance mechanism, product market competitionalso can influence the cost of equity capital, which is ignored. Existing theses which studythe impact of product market competition on cash holdings, capital structure, investmentdecisions, dividend and other financial policies have confirmed its corporategovernance.Product market competition will bring the heterogeneity of risk, which affectsthe rate of return.
Based on product market competition theory, principal-agent theory and assetpricing theory, this paper uses the sample of A-share listed companies from2003to2011and analyzes the product market competition’s governace effect and idiosyncratic riskeffect from two dimensions of industry competition and company’s market power.Theempirical results indicate that the degree of industry competition shows a significantcorporate governance effect and company’s market power shows a significant idiosyncraticrisk effect.That means the stronger industry competition, the lower the cost of equitycapital,but the holding rate of largest shareholder, board independence andtop-management compensation aren’t intermediate variables between industry competitionand the cost of equity capital;the stronger market power,the lower the cost of equity capital,idiosyncratic risk is an intermediate variable between market power and the cost of equitycapital.The relationship between industry competition and integrative governancemechanism is substitutive. The relationship between market power and integrativegovernance mechanism is complementary.
This paper researches the relationship between product market and capital marketfrom capital market’s pricing function.Not only product market competition’s governancefunction is studied from the traditional point of view,but also product market competition’sidiosyncratic risk effect is discussed from the new perspective,which deepenscomprehensive understanding of product market competition’s impact on capital market.It’s necessary that reform of product market should take the different effect ofindustry competition and enterprise competition into account.Capital markets’ financingfunction should be considered during the reform of product market.
在产品市场竞争理论、委托代理理论和资产定价理论基础上，本文分析了产品市场竞争影响权益资本成本的公司治理效应和异质性风险效应，并利用2003-2011年上市公司数据为样本、从行业竞争程度和企业市场势力两个维度进行了实证检验。研究结论表明，行业竞争对权益资本成本的影响表现为公司治理效应，行业竞争程度越激烈，企业的权益资本成本越低，反之，行业竞争越缓和，企业的权益资本成本越高。也就是说，随着行业竞争程度的提高，委托代理问题逐渐削弱，表现为权益资本成本的逐渐降低。但本文并没有发现第一大股东持股、董事会独立性和高管激励在行业竞争与权益资本成本关系间的中介效应，这意味着行业竞争本身就具有公司治理效应，即可缓解委托代理问题、进而降低投资者的要求报酬率。企业市场势力对权益资本成本的影响表现为异质性风险效应，企业市场势力越大，权益资本成本越低，反之，企业市场势力越小，权益资本成本越高，异质性风险在企业市场势力与权益资本成本关系之间发挥了中介传导效应。也就是说，企业市场势力越大，异质性风险越小，进而降低了权益资本成本。在降低权益资本成本方面，行业竞争程度与综合治理水平之间呈替代关系，对处于竞争程度不高的行业的公司而言，提高公司治理水平更重要；企业市场势力与综合治理水平之间呈互补关系，市场势力的权益资本成本降低效应对综合治理水平高的公司而言更显著。
本文从体现资本市场定价功能的权益资本成本角度研究了产品市场与资本市场的关系，不仅从传统角度探讨了产品市场竞争的治理功能，而且从新的角度探讨了其异质性风险效应，加深了产品市场竞争对资本市场影响的全面认识和理解。行业竞争发挥了公司治理效应，促进了权益资本成本的降低，对于单个企业而言，提高其在产品市场的竞争力和垄断势力有利于增强抵制异质性风险的能力，降低权益资本成本。因此，产品市场改革应当考虑到行业竞争改革和行业内企业竞争改革不同的财务效应，顾及到资本市场融资功能的发挥。
The cost of equity capital is the required rate of return decided by investors, whichinvolves financing capacity, investment behavior, the distribution of profits andperformance appraisal from the microscopic point and relates to the efficiency of resourceallocation from macroscopic point.So the cost of equity capital is the core concept offinance.Many papers study the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms onthe cost of equity capital. Internal governance mechanisms consist of equity governance,board governance, management incentive and information disclosure. External governancemechanisms include the legal protection of investors, political association and so on.Howerver, as an important external governance mechanism, product market competitionalso can influence the cost of equity capital, which is ignored. Existing theses which studythe impact of product market competition on cash holdings, capital structure, investmentdecisions, dividend and other financial policies have confirmed its corporategovernance.Product market competition will bring the heterogeneity of risk, which affectsthe rate of return.
Based on product market competition theory, principal-agent theory and assetpricing theory, this paper uses the sample of A-share listed companies from2003to2011and analyzes the product market competition’s governace effect and idiosyncratic riskeffect from two dimensions of industry competition and company’s market power.Theempirical results indicate that the degree of industry competition shows a significantcorporate governance effect and company’s market power shows a significant idiosyncraticrisk effect.That means the stronger industry competition, the lower the cost of equitycapital,but the holding rate of largest shareholder, board independence andtop-management compensation aren’t intermediate variables between industry competitionand the cost of equity capital;the stronger market power,the lower the cost of equity capital,idiosyncratic risk is an intermediate variable between market power and the cost of equitycapital.The relationship between industry competition and integrative governancemechanism is substitutive. The relationship between market power and integrativegovernance mechanism is complementary.
This paper researches the relationship between product market and capital marketfrom capital market’s pricing function.Not only product market competition’s governancefunction is studied from the traditional point of view,but also product market competition’sidiosyncratic risk effect is discussed from the new perspective,which deepenscomprehensive understanding of product market competition’s impact on capital market.It’s necessary that reform of product market should take the different effect ofindustry competition and enterprise competition into account.Capital markets’ financingfunction should be considered during the reform of product market.
引文
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