风险资本、新企业先动优势与资本结构
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摘要
企业资本结构研究是理论界与实践界的一个重要话题。本文从新企业先动优势入手,分析风险资本对新企业资本结构的影响机制。对该问题的研究不仅可以揭示风险资本对新企业资本结构的作用机理,而且能够进一步佐证风险资本给新企业带来先动优势的作用,丰富风险资本对新企业作用的研究。
本文使用深圳创业板2009至2011年上市的公司为研究样本,运用Baron and Kenny (1986)中介作用的检验方法,使用Wind金融资讯数据库的数据和手工搜集整理的风险资本数据,得出的主要结论如下：
第一,风险资本参与投资新企业,能够对新企业的先动性与先动优势产生影响。风险资本支持的新企业比没风险资本支持的新企业会表现出较强的先动性。风险资本支持的新企业比没风险资本支持的新企业能够获得较明显地先动优势。第二,不同特征的风险资本,对新企业的先动优势产生不同的影响。能力强的风险资本支持的新企业比能力弱的风险资本支持的新企业会表现出较明显地先动优势。风险资本联合投资的新企业比独立投资的新企业能够产生明显地先动优势。第三,不同特征的风险资本,对新企业的资本结构产生不同的影响。能力强的风险资本支持的新企业比能力弱的风险资本支持的新企业的负债率显著提高。风险资本联合投资的新企业比独立投资的新企业的负债率显著偏高。第四,新企业的先动优势在风险资本和新企业资本结构之间起到部分中介作用；也就是说,风险资本部分通过影响新企业的先动优势,进而影响新企业的资本结构。
论文创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：第一,揭示了风险资本能力与联合投资对新企业先动优势与资本结构的影响机制,丰富了新企业先动优势理论和资本结构理论的研究；第二,揭示了产权性质不同的风险资本对新企业先动优势与资本结构的影响机制；第三,从新企业先动优势的视角,揭示了风险资本对新企业资本结构的作用机理,近一步丰富了风险资本理论、先动优势理论和资本结构的理论研究。
论文共分为七个部分,除了引言和结论两章外,其余章节分别包括文献综述、新企业融资的制度背景分析、风险资本特征与新企业资本结构、风险资本对新企业先动性与先动优势的影响以及先动优势的中介作用检验。
Capital structure theory is considered as an important topic in the field of theory and practice. Through the first-mover advantages of new ventures, this paper investigates the mechanism of venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures. This research can not only reveal the mechanism of venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures, but also further prove that VC-financed new ventures can gain obvious first-mover advantages. It will enrich the study of the role of venture capital for new ventures.
Using a sample of year2009to2011listed companies in Shenzhen GEM, also using the mediation method of Baron and Kenny (1986) and based on the Wind database of GEM board listed companies and hand-collected data of venture capital holdings, this paper investigates how venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures.
First, venture capital can affect proactiveness and first-mover advantages of new ventures. VC-financed new ventures exhibit strong proactiveness than non-VC-financed. VC-financed new ventures can gain obvious first-mover advantages than non-VC-financed. Second, different characteristics venture capital produce different first-mover advantages to new ventures. Strong ability VC-backed new ventures can gain obvious first-mover advantages than weak ability VC-backed. Syndicated venture capital can give obvious first-mover advantages to new ventures than non-syndicated venture capital. Third, different characteristics venture capital produce different to new ventures. Strong ability VC-backed new ventures use higher capital structure than weak ability VC-backed. new ventures Syndicated VC-backed new ventures use higher capital structure than non-syndicated VC-backed new ventures. Fourth, the empirical results show that the first-mover advantages act partial mediation between venture capital and the capital structure of new ventures; that is to say that venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures through the first-mover advantages.
The mainly value and innovation of this paper as follows:First, reveal the mechanism of ability and syndicated of venture capital affect the first-mover advantages and venture capital of new ventures. It will enrich the study of first-mover advantages theory and capital structure theory. Second, reveal the mechanism of different property nature of the venture capital affect the first-mover advantages and venture capital of new ventures. Third, reveal the mechanism of venture capital affect venture capital of new ventures baded on the first-mover advantages of new ventures. It will take a step forward to enrich the theory of venture capital, first-mover advantages and the theory of the capital structure of new ventures.
This paper is divided into seven parts. In addition to two chapters of the introduction and conclusion, the remaining chapters include literature review, financing and background analysis of new ventures, characteristics of venture capital and first-mover advantages of new ventures, venture capital affect proactiveness and first-mover advantages of new ventures, and first-mover advantages act partial mediation between venture capital and the capital structure of new ventures.
本文使用深圳创业板2009至2011年上市的公司为研究样本,运用Baron and Kenny (1986)中介作用的检验方法,使用Wind金融资讯数据库的数据和手工搜集整理的风险资本数据,得出的主要结论如下：
第一,风险资本参与投资新企业,能够对新企业的先动性与先动优势产生影响。风险资本支持的新企业比没风险资本支持的新企业会表现出较强的先动性。风险资本支持的新企业比没风险资本支持的新企业能够获得较明显地先动优势。第二,不同特征的风险资本,对新企业的先动优势产生不同的影响。能力强的风险资本支持的新企业比能力弱的风险资本支持的新企业会表现出较明显地先动优势。风险资本联合投资的新企业比独立投资的新企业能够产生明显地先动优势。第三,不同特征的风险资本,对新企业的资本结构产生不同的影响。能力强的风险资本支持的新企业比能力弱的风险资本支持的新企业的负债率显著提高。风险资本联合投资的新企业比独立投资的新企业的负债率显著偏高。第四,新企业的先动优势在风险资本和新企业资本结构之间起到部分中介作用；也就是说,风险资本部分通过影响新企业的先动优势,进而影响新企业的资本结构。
论文创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：第一,揭示了风险资本能力与联合投资对新企业先动优势与资本结构的影响机制,丰富了新企业先动优势理论和资本结构理论的研究；第二,揭示了产权性质不同的风险资本对新企业先动优势与资本结构的影响机制；第三,从新企业先动优势的视角,揭示了风险资本对新企业资本结构的作用机理,近一步丰富了风险资本理论、先动优势理论和资本结构的理论研究。
论文共分为七个部分,除了引言和结论两章外,其余章节分别包括文献综述、新企业融资的制度背景分析、风险资本特征与新企业资本结构、风险资本对新企业先动性与先动优势的影响以及先动优势的中介作用检验。
Capital structure theory is considered as an important topic in the field of theory and practice. Through the first-mover advantages of new ventures, this paper investigates the mechanism of venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures. This research can not only reveal the mechanism of venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures, but also further prove that VC-financed new ventures can gain obvious first-mover advantages. It will enrich the study of the role of venture capital for new ventures.
Using a sample of year2009to2011listed companies in Shenzhen GEM, also using the mediation method of Baron and Kenny (1986) and based on the Wind database of GEM board listed companies and hand-collected data of venture capital holdings, this paper investigates how venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures.
First, venture capital can affect proactiveness and first-mover advantages of new ventures. VC-financed new ventures exhibit strong proactiveness than non-VC-financed. VC-financed new ventures can gain obvious first-mover advantages than non-VC-financed. Second, different characteristics venture capital produce different first-mover advantages to new ventures. Strong ability VC-backed new ventures can gain obvious first-mover advantages than weak ability VC-backed. Syndicated venture capital can give obvious first-mover advantages to new ventures than non-syndicated venture capital. Third, different characteristics venture capital produce different to new ventures. Strong ability VC-backed new ventures use higher capital structure than weak ability VC-backed. new ventures Syndicated VC-backed new ventures use higher capital structure than non-syndicated VC-backed new ventures. Fourth, the empirical results show that the first-mover advantages act partial mediation between venture capital and the capital structure of new ventures; that is to say that venture capital affects the capital structure of new ventures through the first-mover advantages.
The mainly value and innovation of this paper as follows:First, reveal the mechanism of ability and syndicated of venture capital affect the first-mover advantages and venture capital of new ventures. It will enrich the study of first-mover advantages theory and capital structure theory. Second, reveal the mechanism of different property nature of the venture capital affect the first-mover advantages and venture capital of new ventures. Third, reveal the mechanism of venture capital affect venture capital of new ventures baded on the first-mover advantages of new ventures. It will take a step forward to enrich the theory of venture capital, first-mover advantages and the theory of the capital structure of new ventures.
This paper is divided into seven parts. In addition to two chapters of the introduction and conclusion, the remaining chapters include literature review, financing and background analysis of new ventures, characteristics of venture capital and first-mover advantages of new ventures, venture capital affect proactiveness and first-mover advantages of new ventures, and first-mover advantages act partial mediation between venture capital and the capital structure of new ventures.
引文
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