风险投资对公司治理的作用机制研究
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摘要
根据“道琼斯风险资源”(Dow Jones Venture Source)的统计数据,2011年,中国企业共获得约60亿美元的风险资本股权融资,同比增长了8%,而同时期欧洲的风险资本股权融资大约为61亿美元。风险投资在中国的快速发展在很大程度上活跃了中国经济的发展,同时也催生了一大批优质的上市公司,如盛大网络、百度等(张学勇和廖理,2011)。这些由于风险投资的介入而飞速发展的上市公司的出现,也为相关研究提供了实证检验所使用的数据。
经典的金融理论已经比较详细的分析了以“金融中介”为主的间接融资相对于以股票市场为主的“直接投资”的各自优劣,但是,如果风险投资作为一种有别于以往的金融中介的形式发展,一个亟需解决的理论问题就是：风险投资的优势到底在哪里?或者说,为什么投资者愿意把资金投资给风险投资而不是其他的金融机构或者直接投资给企业家呢?针对于这一问题的思考,进而衍生出了很多的研究成果。目前的国内外相关的实证研究主要集中于探讨风险投资是否影响创业企业成功上市(Bottazzi等,2008)、企业上市股票的表现(Barry等,1990;Lemer,1994; Brav and Gompers,1997; Bottazzi等,2008；陈工孟等,2011；张学勇和廖理,2011)等方面。此外,以往文献综述来看,关于风险投资如何改善公司治理领域的研究,侧重于讨论风险投资在提升公司业绩(Nahata,2008)、帮助公司建立更有效率的治理结构(Hellmann等,2002Hochberg,2008)等方面。而对于风险投资对企业或者公司治理的影响机制问题,至今很少文献对此进行涉及。鉴于此,本文基于委托代理理论,采用实证模型,利用2001年—2011年间我国上市公司的大样本微观数据,对风险投资对我国公司治理的机制进行深入的研究和探讨,以期能够得到有利于风险投资资本对中国公司治理机制更加有益的政策建议。
从委托代理理论出发,我们不难发现,在风险投资的委托代理关系中,委托代理主体主要包括风险投资家、企业家和投资者。其中,投资者位于该层系结构的最顶端,投资者委托风险投资家进行项目投资；风险投资家则位于层系结构的中端,风险投资家是资本的传递者和风险的分担和控制者；层系结构的最下端联系着企业家,企业家是风险资本的实际运作者,企业家不仅创造出风险投资家的高收益,也催生了风险投资的高风险。三者一起构成了两级的网络化分工结构,而在风险投资过程中,依此体现了投资者与风险投资家、风险投资家与风险企业家之间的双重委托代理关系。
本文的研究主要集中在第二重的委托代理关系,重点探讨风险投资在中国的发展对引入风险投资的公司治理起到什么样的作用,具体从以下几个方面展开：
(1)风险投资对被投资企业管理层的激励机制有什么影响?或者说,风险投资的介入是否改变了以及如何改变了企业的激励机制?具体的关注点在于：风险投资的进入对公司高管持股比例的影响；对公司高管薪酬的业绩敏感性的影响；对公司高管薪酬的粘性的影响等。
(2)风险投资的进入是否具有信号传递作用,并进而改变企业的股利政策?具体的关注点在于：VC是否“挤出”了现金股利?
(3)风险投资如何在不完全合同条件下分配权力?即当风险投资机构无法与创业企业签订完全的激励合同时,双方如何通过借助外部的工具来分配控制权以达成事前的最优效率?
全文共分六章,结构安排和主要内容如下：
第一章是引言,主要介绍了本文研究的背景、意义,研究思路和内容的结构安排,以及指出文章的创新点和不足之处。
第二章采用委托代理的相关理论,阐述了在风险投资资本介入被投资企业的前续与后续环节当中,存在的双重委托代理关系,并详细总结了以往相关研究的研究成果和制度设计问题。
第三章通过我国上市公司和有风险投资支持的上市公司的数据对比实证分析,进一步考察风险投资如何影响企业治理。结论表明,有风险投资背景的企业对高管的激励越强,具体表现在：有风险投资背景的企业高管的持股比例更高；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出对公司业绩有更敏感的反应；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出更低的粘性,即对于业绩下滑有更敏感的反应。文中的高管薪酬数据、公司治理数据和财务数据主要来自中国股票市场交易数据库(CSMAR)。由于2001年之前我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露不够规范,故选取之后沪深股市2001-2011年所有A股上市公司作为研究样本,然后进一步基于研究的需要对样本做如下的处理：首先,剔除了金融和保险行业的上市公司样本；其次,剔除ST、PT的公司样本；然后,还剔除了一些关键变量缺失的公司样本,剔除了极端值的影响。对于上市公司是否具有风险投资支持,参照吴超鹏等(2012)的方法进行界定,在2001—2011年这11年间,有风险投资机构背景上市公司样本中共有312家,有风险投资支持的上市公司观测数占总样本观测数的比例为14.35%。
第四章通过与第三章同样的数据库进行实证分析,研究风险投资的信号作用和风险投资是否对现金股利有挤出作用。实证研究结果表明：风险投资确实发挥了帮助企业向市场传递“信号”的功能,因此一定程度上“挤出”了现金股利支付。并且论文的结果也证实了,现金股利在解决委托代理关系方面发挥较弱的作用。由于现金股利支付可能是一种相对成本更高的“信号”,所以风险投资的信号作用可以有效地缓解企业因为支付现金股利对企业资金产生的压力。
第五章从风险企业委托代理关系治理的角度入手,探讨不同的融资工具在减少风险企业信息不对称性和代理风险、控制权分配等方面的作用,并说明一国的金融市场发展程度如何影响其风险投资的发展。基于不完全契约框架下风险投资过程的考察发现,金融工具实际上为风险投资机构提供了一种分配控制权与现金流权力的工具,有利于解决风险投资与企业之间的事后争端。由于“敲竹杠问题”会导致事前投资不足,因此,金融工具的存在有利于风险投资与风险企业的双赢。这一理论框架有利于我们认识一国的资本市场成熟度如何影响该国风险投资的发展。基于上市公司的经验研究发现,风险投资背景的企业对类似可转换债券的金融工具有更高的需求,从而证明了金融工具对风险投资发展的关键作用。
第六章为全文总结及研究展望。
根据我们对现今相关风险投资在中国发展系列问题的学术研究成果总结,本文的研究主要有以下几点创新：
第一,更加系统的阐述了风险投资中双重委托代理问题,并从理论上重点探讨了风险投资家对企业家及被投资企业的影响关系,也就是“风险投资家—>企业家”这一环节。
第二,关于风险投资对被投资企业的影响,目前国内外相关的实证研究主要侧重于从IPO、IPO折价、投资行为以及企业价值等角度分析风险投资的进入会对企业产生的影响。可以看出,这些研究主要侧重于具体的表现,而缺乏对影响路径的研究,也就是说,对于风险投资到底如何增加企业的价值,或者说风险投资改变了企业的什么方面,相关的实证研究,尤其是国内相关的研究还十分匮乏。本文通过大样本的上市公司微观数据,通过实证研究,结论表明,有风险投资背景的企业对高管的激励越强,具体表现在：有风险投资背景的企业高管的持股比例更高；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出对公司业绩有更敏感的反应；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出更低的粘性,即对于业绩下滑有更敏感的反应。
第三,在企业面临较为严重的信息不对称问题时,企业现金股利的发放通常被认为具有“发送信号”的作用,以帮助投资者了解企业的未来盈利能力。但是由于风险投资的进入同样具有“信号传递”的作用,那么这两种不同的信号机制之间是否会相互影响?针对于这一问题现有的研究相对较为缺乏,因此,本文在我们前期研究的基础上,进行实证研究,结果表明,风险投资确实发挥了帮助企业向市场传递“信号”的功能,因此一定程度上“挤出”了现金股利支付,同时,也发现现金股利在解决委托代理关系方面发挥较弱的作用。
文章的不足之处可能有：
首先,本论文尽管通过多个章节来阐述风险投资如何影响创业企业的各个方面,包括相应的契约设计与制度安排,但是由于风险投资这一特殊的投资方式使得风险投资双方之间的关系非常复杂,尽管在理论基础章节中对风险投资双方的委托代理关系的表现形式进行了归纳和总结,但是并没有从共性方面将这些契约关系用一个框架或统一模式提炼清晰,从根本上也没有构造出考察风险投资核心作用的统一体系。进一步从风险投资的治理效果形成的根本机理,用一个框架性的体系去研究这一问题,是值得深入思考的问题。
其次,本论文虽然基于不完全契约的分析框架研究了金融工具(市场)与风险投资发展之间的关系,从理论上初步阐明了金融工具如何影响风险投资的过程,或者从宏观上来说一国的资本市场成熟度如何影响该国风险投资的发展；但是由于经验数据有限,并没有给出强有力的实证证据来支持这一推论。所以,如果能从实际出发,从实证方面和操作层角度来分析一国的资本市场如何影响风险投资的发展也是很有意义的。尽管这些研究有很高的难度,但不可否认这是一个很值得作者继续完成的研究课题。
最后,本文对风险投资治理机制影响的研究局限于有关高管薪酬激励、现金股利政策方面,后续的研究还可以进一步拓展到探讨风险投资机构对兼并收购、盈余管理、人力资源管理以及短期财务决策等各个方面的影响；同时,对不同性质风险投资(比如区分为外资、国有、私有背景的风险投资)的影响差异也将有利于我们更进一步认识风险投资的核心功能,以及如何进一步发展我国风险投资的积极作用。
本文的研究仅仅是针对我国风险投资相关课题中的部分内容进行了有益的尝试,因此无论是研究方法,还是所得出的结论,仍不乏粗浅甚至谬误之处,有待于笔者在今后的研究中不断改进和完善。
Chinese enterprises received a total of about6billion U.S. dollars of venture capital equity financing in2011, increasing by8%, while at the same period, the European venture capital equity financing was about6.1billion U.S. dollars (Dow Jones Venture Source statistics). The rapid growth of venture capitals didn't only benefit the size of economy, but also spawned a large number of high-quality listed companies such as Snda, Baidu (Zhang and Liao,2011). The emergence and development of these venture capitals also provided empirical evidence for the study of how venture capital works.
Classic financial theory has a more detailed analysis on the pros and cons of the stock market-based "direct investment" relative to financial intermediary "indirect financing". However, compared to other financial intermediaries, we want to know where is the advantage of venture capital? Or, why investors are willing to invest venture capital rather than other financial institutions or direct investment to entrepreneurs? To answer these questions, a lot of researches have been done, but still not well understood. Current studies mainly focused on how the venture capitals affect the probability of successfully listed (Bottazzi, et al.,2008), the stock's performance after the IPO (Barry1990; Lerner,1994; Brav and Gompers,1997; Bottazzi, et al.,2008:Chen et al.,2011; Zhang and Liao,2011). However, a little work have been done to study how venture capitals can enhance the performance of the companies, such as how venture capitals can help the company to establish a more efficient governance structure of the Board of Directors (Hellmann,2002; Hochberg,2008), removal of incompetent CEOs, and so on.
Using a full sample of listed companies' information from2001to2011, this paper thus contributes to the literature by investigating whether and how involvement of venture capital in Chinese listed companies affected their mechanism of corporate governance.
We focused on in the second tier of the agency relationship, paying attention to venture capital governance' roles in the development of China's introduction of venture capital companies, specifically from the following aspects:
(1) What are the influences of venture capital on the invested enterprise management incentives? Whether the involvement of venture capital changed and how to change the incentives of enterprises? We are most interested in that the impact of the entry of the venture capital to the company executives' stake; influences of performance sensitivity of executive pay; influences of the company's executive compensation viscous.
(2) Whether the entry of the venture capital has the signaling role or not, thus changes the company's dividend policies? What the most important is:whether VC extrudes the company's cash dividends?
(3) How does the venture capital divide the regulation power under the incomplete contracts? Which mean when VC can not sign the complete incentive contracts; and how can they use the external method to divide the control power?
We found that Corporations with venture capital background had the stronger executive incentive, which were showed concretely as follows:higher stake of the venture capital background enterprise executives; higher performance sensitivity of executive payment and lower compensation viscous. Our empirical results showed that VC has the positive effect to help enterprise to show their signal to the market, so cash dividends would be "crowded out". And our results also told us that the cash dividends played a weak role in the resolve of the agency relationship. Since the cash dividend payment may be a relatively higher cost of "signal", the role of venture capital could effectively alleviate the pressures due to the payment of cash dividends on the enterprise funds.
Based on the incomplete contract theory we got that financial instruments actually provided an allocation of control rights and cash flow of power tools for risk investment institutions, which benefited to resolve the dispute between venture capital enterprise and invested firms. Holdup problem would lead to be lack of prior investment; therefore, the existence of financial instruments will be conducive to a win-win between venture capital and invested firms. This theoretical framework is conducive to understand that one country's capital market maturity affected the development of venture capital. Based on the empirical researches we also got that venture capital background enterprise financial instruments like convertible bonds had a higher demand, which proved that the financial instruments was vital to the development of venture capital.
The paper has six chapters, structural arrangements and the main contents are as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, in this chapter we introduced the background, significance, research ideas and general content arrangements, and pointed out the innovation and inadequacies of this paper.
In the second chapter, we summarized the double principal-agent relationships, past researches and system design issues.
Using the data of China's listed companies in the third chapter, we estimated how the venture capital affected the double principal-agent conflict.
In the fourth chapter, we selected all A-share listed companies to test the three main assumptions.
In Chapter Five, we explored the roles of different finance instruments to reduce the risk of information asymmetry and agency risk, and explained how development level of one country's financial market impacted the development of venture capital.
Chapter Ⅵ is the Summary and Prospect.
Overall, our study has the following innovations:
Firstly, we have a more systematic elaboration in the double principal-agent problem, and explored the influences for the venture capital to their partners based on the theory.
Secondly, in our study, we used large micro-data sample of listed companies to explore:the impact of the intervention of the venture capital to the executives stake; salaries of corporate executives is more sensitive with the venture capital background; the salaries of corporate executives showed sticky problem.
Thirdly, when enterprises faced the serious problem of information asymmetry, cash dividend payment would be generally considered the role of "sending signals" to help investors understand the future profitability of the enterprises. Today's academic researches mainly focused on the ability to transmit information in dividends to become a way of signaling conditions (Aharony and Swary,1980);whether dividend can transmit the information?(Bajaj, and Vijh, 1990; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan,2002) and how did the dividend transmit the information?(Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan,2002), but VC also have the "signal role", whether these two different signaling mechanisms will affect each other? To resolve this question, there is lack of researches; therefore, based on our preliminary studies, we used all A-share listed companies' data between2001and2011to do empirical analysis.
The inadequacies of the article may exist in the followings:
First of all, due to the limitations of the topics, the papers did not specifically consider the main functions of venture capital's "filter" ability. This was mainly due to the actual situation of China Venture Capital and related material collected are difficult to be obtained, especially before the listing, the corporations'data were more difficult to be gathered.
Secondly, in our study we used multiple chapters to elaborate how the VC affected all aspects of the start-ups, including contract design and institutional arrangements, because of the venture capital investment makes the relationship between the two parties is very complex, although both manifestations of the agency relationship are summarized in the theoretical foundation chapter of the venture capital, yet we did not refine the common aspects of these contractual relationship with a clear framework, and not fundamentally constructed an unified system to examine the VC's central functions.
Thirdly, the paper studied the relationship between the financial instruments (or financial market) and the development of venture capital based on the incomplete contract framework, and clarified the influences process of the financial instruments to VC theoretically. However, due to the limited empirical data, we could not give stronger empirical evidence to support this inference.
Fourthly, this paper is limited to study the executive payment incentives, cash dividend policies and so on, subsequent research can be further expanded to explore risk investment institutions how to affect mergers, acquisitions earnings management and human resources management, and short-term financial risk investment governance mechanisms decision-making. At the same time, to clarify the different nature of different kind of venture capital will help us to know more about the core function of the venture capital.
This paper just attempt to study only part of the venture capital of China, both research methods and conclusions still have some shortage, which will be remained for our future studies.
经典的金融理论已经比较详细的分析了以“金融中介”为主的间接融资相对于以股票市场为主的“直接投资”的各自优劣,但是,如果风险投资作为一种有别于以往的金融中介的形式发展,一个亟需解决的理论问题就是：风险投资的优势到底在哪里?或者说,为什么投资者愿意把资金投资给风险投资而不是其他的金融机构或者直接投资给企业家呢?针对于这一问题的思考,进而衍生出了很多的研究成果。目前的国内外相关的实证研究主要集中于探讨风险投资是否影响创业企业成功上市(Bottazzi等,2008)、企业上市股票的表现(Barry等,1990;Lemer,1994; Brav and Gompers,1997; Bottazzi等,2008；陈工孟等,2011；张学勇和廖理,2011)等方面。此外,以往文献综述来看,关于风险投资如何改善公司治理领域的研究,侧重于讨论风险投资在提升公司业绩(Nahata,2008)、帮助公司建立更有效率的治理结构(Hellmann等,2002Hochberg,2008)等方面。而对于风险投资对企业或者公司治理的影响机制问题,至今很少文献对此进行涉及。鉴于此,本文基于委托代理理论,采用实证模型,利用2001年—2011年间我国上市公司的大样本微观数据,对风险投资对我国公司治理的机制进行深入的研究和探讨,以期能够得到有利于风险投资资本对中国公司治理机制更加有益的政策建议。
从委托代理理论出发,我们不难发现,在风险投资的委托代理关系中,委托代理主体主要包括风险投资家、企业家和投资者。其中,投资者位于该层系结构的最顶端,投资者委托风险投资家进行项目投资；风险投资家则位于层系结构的中端,风险投资家是资本的传递者和风险的分担和控制者；层系结构的最下端联系着企业家,企业家是风险资本的实际运作者,企业家不仅创造出风险投资家的高收益,也催生了风险投资的高风险。三者一起构成了两级的网络化分工结构,而在风险投资过程中,依此体现了投资者与风险投资家、风险投资家与风险企业家之间的双重委托代理关系。
本文的研究主要集中在第二重的委托代理关系,重点探讨风险投资在中国的发展对引入风险投资的公司治理起到什么样的作用,具体从以下几个方面展开：
(1)风险投资对被投资企业管理层的激励机制有什么影响?或者说,风险投资的介入是否改变了以及如何改变了企业的激励机制?具体的关注点在于：风险投资的进入对公司高管持股比例的影响；对公司高管薪酬的业绩敏感性的影响；对公司高管薪酬的粘性的影响等。
(2)风险投资的进入是否具有信号传递作用,并进而改变企业的股利政策?具体的关注点在于：VC是否“挤出”了现金股利?
(3)风险投资如何在不完全合同条件下分配权力?即当风险投资机构无法与创业企业签订完全的激励合同时,双方如何通过借助外部的工具来分配控制权以达成事前的最优效率?
全文共分六章,结构安排和主要内容如下：
第一章是引言,主要介绍了本文研究的背景、意义,研究思路和内容的结构安排,以及指出文章的创新点和不足之处。
第二章采用委托代理的相关理论,阐述了在风险投资资本介入被投资企业的前续与后续环节当中,存在的双重委托代理关系,并详细总结了以往相关研究的研究成果和制度设计问题。
第三章通过我国上市公司和有风险投资支持的上市公司的数据对比实证分析,进一步考察风险投资如何影响企业治理。结论表明,有风险投资背景的企业对高管的激励越强,具体表现在：有风险投资背景的企业高管的持股比例更高；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出对公司业绩有更敏感的反应；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出更低的粘性,即对于业绩下滑有更敏感的反应。文中的高管薪酬数据、公司治理数据和财务数据主要来自中国股票市场交易数据库(CSMAR)。由于2001年之前我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露不够规范,故选取之后沪深股市2001-2011年所有A股上市公司作为研究样本,然后进一步基于研究的需要对样本做如下的处理：首先,剔除了金融和保险行业的上市公司样本；其次,剔除ST、PT的公司样本；然后,还剔除了一些关键变量缺失的公司样本,剔除了极端值的影响。对于上市公司是否具有风险投资支持,参照吴超鹏等(2012)的方法进行界定,在2001—2011年这11年间,有风险投资机构背景上市公司样本中共有312家,有风险投资支持的上市公司观测数占总样本观测数的比例为14.35%。
第四章通过与第三章同样的数据库进行实证分析,研究风险投资的信号作用和风险投资是否对现金股利有挤出作用。实证研究结果表明：风险投资确实发挥了帮助企业向市场传递“信号”的功能,因此一定程度上“挤出”了现金股利支付。并且论文的结果也证实了,现金股利在解决委托代理关系方面发挥较弱的作用。由于现金股利支付可能是一种相对成本更高的“信号”,所以风险投资的信号作用可以有效地缓解企业因为支付现金股利对企业资金产生的压力。
第五章从风险企业委托代理关系治理的角度入手,探讨不同的融资工具在减少风险企业信息不对称性和代理风险、控制权分配等方面的作用,并说明一国的金融市场发展程度如何影响其风险投资的发展。基于不完全契约框架下风险投资过程的考察发现,金融工具实际上为风险投资机构提供了一种分配控制权与现金流权力的工具,有利于解决风险投资与企业之间的事后争端。由于“敲竹杠问题”会导致事前投资不足,因此,金融工具的存在有利于风险投资与风险企业的双赢。这一理论框架有利于我们认识一国的资本市场成熟度如何影响该国风险投资的发展。基于上市公司的经验研究发现,风险投资背景的企业对类似可转换债券的金融工具有更高的需求,从而证明了金融工具对风险投资发展的关键作用。
第六章为全文总结及研究展望。
根据我们对现今相关风险投资在中国发展系列问题的学术研究成果总结,本文的研究主要有以下几点创新：
第一,更加系统的阐述了风险投资中双重委托代理问题,并从理论上重点探讨了风险投资家对企业家及被投资企业的影响关系,也就是“风险投资家—>企业家”这一环节。
第二,关于风险投资对被投资企业的影响,目前国内外相关的实证研究主要侧重于从IPO、IPO折价、投资行为以及企业价值等角度分析风险投资的进入会对企业产生的影响。可以看出,这些研究主要侧重于具体的表现,而缺乏对影响路径的研究,也就是说,对于风险投资到底如何增加企业的价值,或者说风险投资改变了企业的什么方面,相关的实证研究,尤其是国内相关的研究还十分匮乏。本文通过大样本的上市公司微观数据,通过实证研究,结论表明,有风险投资背景的企业对高管的激励越强,具体表现在：有风险投资背景的企业高管的持股比例更高；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出对公司业绩有更敏感的反应；有风险投资背景的企业高管的薪酬表现出更低的粘性,即对于业绩下滑有更敏感的反应。
第三,在企业面临较为严重的信息不对称问题时,企业现金股利的发放通常被认为具有“发送信号”的作用,以帮助投资者了解企业的未来盈利能力。但是由于风险投资的进入同样具有“信号传递”的作用,那么这两种不同的信号机制之间是否会相互影响?针对于这一问题现有的研究相对较为缺乏,因此,本文在我们前期研究的基础上,进行实证研究,结果表明,风险投资确实发挥了帮助企业向市场传递“信号”的功能,因此一定程度上“挤出”了现金股利支付,同时,也发现现金股利在解决委托代理关系方面发挥较弱的作用。
文章的不足之处可能有：
首先,本论文尽管通过多个章节来阐述风险投资如何影响创业企业的各个方面,包括相应的契约设计与制度安排,但是由于风险投资这一特殊的投资方式使得风险投资双方之间的关系非常复杂,尽管在理论基础章节中对风险投资双方的委托代理关系的表现形式进行了归纳和总结,但是并没有从共性方面将这些契约关系用一个框架或统一模式提炼清晰,从根本上也没有构造出考察风险投资核心作用的统一体系。进一步从风险投资的治理效果形成的根本机理,用一个框架性的体系去研究这一问题,是值得深入思考的问题。
其次,本论文虽然基于不完全契约的分析框架研究了金融工具(市场)与风险投资发展之间的关系,从理论上初步阐明了金融工具如何影响风险投资的过程,或者从宏观上来说一国的资本市场成熟度如何影响该国风险投资的发展；但是由于经验数据有限,并没有给出强有力的实证证据来支持这一推论。所以,如果能从实际出发,从实证方面和操作层角度来分析一国的资本市场如何影响风险投资的发展也是很有意义的。尽管这些研究有很高的难度,但不可否认这是一个很值得作者继续完成的研究课题。
最后,本文对风险投资治理机制影响的研究局限于有关高管薪酬激励、现金股利政策方面,后续的研究还可以进一步拓展到探讨风险投资机构对兼并收购、盈余管理、人力资源管理以及短期财务决策等各个方面的影响；同时,对不同性质风险投资(比如区分为外资、国有、私有背景的风险投资)的影响差异也将有利于我们更进一步认识风险投资的核心功能,以及如何进一步发展我国风险投资的积极作用。
本文的研究仅仅是针对我国风险投资相关课题中的部分内容进行了有益的尝试,因此无论是研究方法,还是所得出的结论,仍不乏粗浅甚至谬误之处,有待于笔者在今后的研究中不断改进和完善。
Chinese enterprises received a total of about6billion U.S. dollars of venture capital equity financing in2011, increasing by8%, while at the same period, the European venture capital equity financing was about6.1billion U.S. dollars (Dow Jones Venture Source statistics). The rapid growth of venture capitals didn't only benefit the size of economy, but also spawned a large number of high-quality listed companies such as Snda, Baidu (Zhang and Liao,2011). The emergence and development of these venture capitals also provided empirical evidence for the study of how venture capital works.
Classic financial theory has a more detailed analysis on the pros and cons of the stock market-based "direct investment" relative to financial intermediary "indirect financing". However, compared to other financial intermediaries, we want to know where is the advantage of venture capital? Or, why investors are willing to invest venture capital rather than other financial institutions or direct investment to entrepreneurs? To answer these questions, a lot of researches have been done, but still not well understood. Current studies mainly focused on how the venture capitals affect the probability of successfully listed (Bottazzi, et al.,2008), the stock's performance after the IPO (Barry1990; Lerner,1994; Brav and Gompers,1997; Bottazzi, et al.,2008:Chen et al.,2011; Zhang and Liao,2011). However, a little work have been done to study how venture capitals can enhance the performance of the companies, such as how venture capitals can help the company to establish a more efficient governance structure of the Board of Directors (Hellmann,2002; Hochberg,2008), removal of incompetent CEOs, and so on.
Using a full sample of listed companies' information from2001to2011, this paper thus contributes to the literature by investigating whether and how involvement of venture capital in Chinese listed companies affected their mechanism of corporate governance.
We focused on in the second tier of the agency relationship, paying attention to venture capital governance' roles in the development of China's introduction of venture capital companies, specifically from the following aspects:
(1) What are the influences of venture capital on the invested enterprise management incentives? Whether the involvement of venture capital changed and how to change the incentives of enterprises? We are most interested in that the impact of the entry of the venture capital to the company executives' stake; influences of performance sensitivity of executive pay; influences of the company's executive compensation viscous.
(2) Whether the entry of the venture capital has the signaling role or not, thus changes the company's dividend policies? What the most important is:whether VC extrudes the company's cash dividends?
(3) How does the venture capital divide the regulation power under the incomplete contracts? Which mean when VC can not sign the complete incentive contracts; and how can they use the external method to divide the control power?
We found that Corporations with venture capital background had the stronger executive incentive, which were showed concretely as follows:higher stake of the venture capital background enterprise executives; higher performance sensitivity of executive payment and lower compensation viscous. Our empirical results showed that VC has the positive effect to help enterprise to show their signal to the market, so cash dividends would be "crowded out". And our results also told us that the cash dividends played a weak role in the resolve of the agency relationship. Since the cash dividend payment may be a relatively higher cost of "signal", the role of venture capital could effectively alleviate the pressures due to the payment of cash dividends on the enterprise funds.
Based on the incomplete contract theory we got that financial instruments actually provided an allocation of control rights and cash flow of power tools for risk investment institutions, which benefited to resolve the dispute between venture capital enterprise and invested firms. Holdup problem would lead to be lack of prior investment; therefore, the existence of financial instruments will be conducive to a win-win between venture capital and invested firms. This theoretical framework is conducive to understand that one country's capital market maturity affected the development of venture capital. Based on the empirical researches we also got that venture capital background enterprise financial instruments like convertible bonds had a higher demand, which proved that the financial instruments was vital to the development of venture capital.
The paper has six chapters, structural arrangements and the main contents are as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, in this chapter we introduced the background, significance, research ideas and general content arrangements, and pointed out the innovation and inadequacies of this paper.
In the second chapter, we summarized the double principal-agent relationships, past researches and system design issues.
Using the data of China's listed companies in the third chapter, we estimated how the venture capital affected the double principal-agent conflict.
In the fourth chapter, we selected all A-share listed companies to test the three main assumptions.
In Chapter Five, we explored the roles of different finance instruments to reduce the risk of information asymmetry and agency risk, and explained how development level of one country's financial market impacted the development of venture capital.
Chapter Ⅵ is the Summary and Prospect.
Overall, our study has the following innovations:
Firstly, we have a more systematic elaboration in the double principal-agent problem, and explored the influences for the venture capital to their partners based on the theory.
Secondly, in our study, we used large micro-data sample of listed companies to explore:the impact of the intervention of the venture capital to the executives stake; salaries of corporate executives is more sensitive with the venture capital background; the salaries of corporate executives showed sticky problem.
Thirdly, when enterprises faced the serious problem of information asymmetry, cash dividend payment would be generally considered the role of "sending signals" to help investors understand the future profitability of the enterprises. Today's academic researches mainly focused on the ability to transmit information in dividends to become a way of signaling conditions (Aharony and Swary,1980);whether dividend can transmit the information?(Bajaj, and Vijh, 1990; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan,2002) and how did the dividend transmit the information?(Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan,2002), but VC also have the "signal role", whether these two different signaling mechanisms will affect each other? To resolve this question, there is lack of researches; therefore, based on our preliminary studies, we used all A-share listed companies' data between2001and2011to do empirical analysis.
The inadequacies of the article may exist in the followings:
First of all, due to the limitations of the topics, the papers did not specifically consider the main functions of venture capital's "filter" ability. This was mainly due to the actual situation of China Venture Capital and related material collected are difficult to be obtained, especially before the listing, the corporations'data were more difficult to be gathered.
Secondly, in our study we used multiple chapters to elaborate how the VC affected all aspects of the start-ups, including contract design and institutional arrangements, because of the venture capital investment makes the relationship between the two parties is very complex, although both manifestations of the agency relationship are summarized in the theoretical foundation chapter of the venture capital, yet we did not refine the common aspects of these contractual relationship with a clear framework, and not fundamentally constructed an unified system to examine the VC's central functions.
Thirdly, the paper studied the relationship between the financial instruments (or financial market) and the development of venture capital based on the incomplete contract framework, and clarified the influences process of the financial instruments to VC theoretically. However, due to the limited empirical data, we could not give stronger empirical evidence to support this inference.
Fourthly, this paper is limited to study the executive payment incentives, cash dividend policies and so on, subsequent research can be further expanded to explore risk investment institutions how to affect mergers, acquisitions earnings management and human resources management, and short-term financial risk investment governance mechanisms decision-making. At the same time, to clarify the different nature of different kind of venture capital will help us to know more about the core function of the venture capital.
This paper just attempt to study only part of the venture capital of China, both research methods and conclusions still have some shortage, which will be remained for our future studies.
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[20]鲁海帆,2007：《高管团队内部货币薪酬差距与公司业绩关系研究——来自中国A股市场的经验证据》,《南方经济》第4期。
[21]罗宏、黄文华,2008：《国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩》,《管理世界》第9期。
[22]彭海城,2012：《中国私募股权基金退出机制研究》,华中科技大学博士论文。
[23]钱苹、张帏,2007：《我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素》,《经济研究》第5期。
[24]孙铮、刘浩,2004：《中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究》,《经济研究》第12期。
[25]王宏,2008：《高管的薪酬要置于阳光下》,《江淮法治》第12期。
[26]王克敏、王志超,2007：《高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究》,《管理世界》第7期。
[27]王小鲁、樊纲,2004：《中国地区差距的变动趋势和影响因素》,《经济研究》第1期。
[28]王晓义,2004：《融资工具创新与民营创新企业治理机制的研究》,天津大学博士论文。
[29]王松奇,王元,2003—-2009：《中国创业投资发展报告》,北京：经济管理出版社。
[30]汪继华,2004：《信息不对称条件下风险投资决策机制研究》,浙江工业大学硕士论文。
[31]魏刚,2000：《高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效》,《经济研究》第3期。
[32]文炳洲、虞青松,2006：《薪酬管制、在职消费与控制权收益综述及其引申》,《改革》第6期。
[33]吴超鹏、吴世农、程静雅、王璐,2012：《风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究》,《经济研究》第1期
[34]夏纪军、张晏,2008：《控制权与激励的冲突——兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析》,《经济研究》第3期。
[35]夏立军、方轶强,2005,《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值》,《经济研究》第5期。
[36]肖继辉,2005：《我国上市公司经理报酬水平的制度特征研究》,《财贸研究》第5期。
[37]肖珉,2010：《现金股利、内部现金流与投资效率》,《金融研究》第10期。
[38]辛清泉、林斌、王彦超,2007：《政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资》,《经济研究》第8期。
[39]薛云奎、白云霞,2008：《国有所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩》,《管理世界》第10期。
[40]杨丹辉、渠慎宁,2009：《私募基金参与跨国并购：核心动机、特定优势及其影响》,《中国工业经济》第3期。
[41]杨华军、胡奕明,2007：《制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资》,《管理世界》第9期。
[42]姚佐文、陈晓剑,2003：《企业融资的激励与控制理论评介》,《经济学动态》第8期。
[43]俞红海、徐龙炳、陈百助,2010：《终极控股股东控制权与自由现金流过度投资》,《经济研究》第8期。
[44]张敏、吴联生、王亚平,2010：《国有股权、公司业绩与投资行为》,《金融研究》第12期。
[45]张学勇、廖理,2011：《风险投资支持与公司IPO：市场表现与内在机理》,《经济研究》第6期。
[46]张翼、李辰,2005：《股权结构、现金流与资本投资》,《经济学季刊》第1期。
[47]张学勇、廖理,2011：《风险投资支持与公司IPO：市场表现与内在机理》,《经济研究》第6期。
[48]郑辉,2007：《风险投资双重委托代理研究》,复旦大学博士论文。
[49]周建波、孙菊生,2003：《经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的证据》,《经济研究》第5期。
[50]朱红军,2004：《高级管理人员更换与经营业绩》,《经济科学》第4期。
[51]朱南苗,2011：《我国上市公司股利政策研究》,西南财经大学博士论文。
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[2]陈冬华、陈信元、万华林,2005：《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》第2期。
[3]陈震,2006：《高管层级差报酬的成因和后果》,《南方经济》第3期。
[4]陈工孟、俞欣、寇祥河,2011：《风险投资参与对中资企业首次公开发行折价的影响——不同证券市场的比较》,《经济研究》第5期。
[5]陈蕾,2006：《风险资本投资中国传媒产业决策研究》,同济大学博士论文。
[6]杜胜利、翟艳玲,2005：《总经理年度报酬决定因素的实证分析》,《管理世界》第8期。
[7]杜兴强、王丽华,2007：《高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究》,《会计研究》第1期。
[8]方军雄,2008：《政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购》,《管理世界》第9期。
[9]方军雄,2009：《我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?》,《经济研究》第3期。
[10]付玉慧,2012：《风险投资对公司治理影响的研究综述》,《时代金融》第6期。
[11]龚玉池,2001：《公司绩效与高层更换》,《经济研究》第10期。
[]2]胡一帆、宋敏、郑红亮,2006：《所有制结构对中国企业绩效的影响》,《中国社会科学》第4期。
[13]姜付秀、张敏、陆正飞、陈才东,2009：《企业家过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境》,《经济研究》第1期。
[14]李建伟,2008：《高管薪酬规范与法律的有限干预》,《政法论坛》第5期。
[15]李琴、郑辉,2007：《风险投资家的逆向选择、道德风险及契约设计》,《广西经济管理干部学院学报》第7期。
[16]李维安、张国萍,2005：《经理层治理评价指数与相关绩效的实证研究——基于中国上市公司治理评价的研究》,《经济研究》第11期。
[17]李增泉,2000：《激励机制与企业绩效——项基于上市公司的实证研究》,《会计研究》第1期。
[18]林毅夫、刘明兴、章奇,2004：《政策性负担与企业的预算软约束：来自中国的实证研究》,《管理世界》第8期。
[19]卢锐,2007：《管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效》,《南方经济》第7期。
[20]鲁海帆,2007：《高管团队内部货币薪酬差距与公司业绩关系研究——来自中国A股市场的经验证据》,《南方经济》第4期。
[21]罗宏、黄文华,2008：《国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩》,《管理世界》第9期。
[22]彭海城,2012：《中国私募股权基金退出机制研究》,华中科技大学博士论文。
[23]钱苹、张帏,2007：《我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素》,《经济研究》第5期。
[24]孙铮、刘浩,2004：《中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究》,《经济研究》第12期。
[25]王宏,2008：《高管的薪酬要置于阳光下》,《江淮法治》第12期。
[26]王克敏、王志超,2007：《高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究》,《管理世界》第7期。
[27]王小鲁、樊纲,2004：《中国地区差距的变动趋势和影响因素》,《经济研究》第1期。
[28]王晓义,2004：《融资工具创新与民营创新企业治理机制的研究》,天津大学博士论文。
[29]王松奇,王元,2003—-2009：《中国创业投资发展报告》,北京：经济管理出版社。
[30]汪继华,2004：《信息不对称条件下风险投资决策机制研究》,浙江工业大学硕士论文。
[31]魏刚,2000：《高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效》,《经济研究》第3期。
[32]文炳洲、虞青松,2006：《薪酬管制、在职消费与控制权收益综述及其引申》,《改革》第6期。
[33]吴超鹏、吴世农、程静雅、王璐,2012：《风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究》,《经济研究》第1期
[34]夏纪军、张晏,2008：《控制权与激励的冲突——兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析》,《经济研究》第3期。
[35]夏立军、方轶强,2005,《政府控制、治理环境与公司价值》,《经济研究》第5期。
[36]肖继辉,2005：《我国上市公司经理报酬水平的制度特征研究》,《财贸研究》第5期。
[37]肖珉,2010：《现金股利、内部现金流与投资效率》,《金融研究》第10期。
[38]辛清泉、林斌、王彦超,2007：《政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资》,《经济研究》第8期。
[39]薛云奎、白云霞,2008：《国有所有权、冗余雇员与公司业绩》,《管理世界》第10期。
[40]杨丹辉、渠慎宁,2009：《私募基金参与跨国并购：核心动机、特定优势及其影响》,《中国工业经济》第3期。
[41]杨华军、胡奕明,2007：《制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资》,《管理世界》第9期。
[42]姚佐文、陈晓剑,2003：《企业融资的激励与控制理论评介》,《经济学动态》第8期。
[43]俞红海、徐龙炳、陈百助,2010：《终极控股股东控制权与自由现金流过度投资》,《经济研究》第8期。
[44]张敏、吴联生、王亚平,2010：《国有股权、公司业绩与投资行为》,《金融研究》第12期。
[45]张学勇、廖理,2011：《风险投资支持与公司IPO：市场表现与内在机理》,《经济研究》第6期。
[46]张翼、李辰,2005：《股权结构、现金流与资本投资》,《经济学季刊》第1期。
[47]张学勇、廖理,2011：《风险投资支持与公司IPO：市场表现与内在机理》,《经济研究》第6期。
[48]郑辉,2007：《风险投资双重委托代理研究》,复旦大学博士论文。
[49]周建波、孙菊生,2003：《经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——来自中国上市公司的证据》,《经济研究》第5期。
[50]朱红军,2004：《高级管理人员更换与经营业绩》,《经济科学》第4期。
[51]朱南苗,2011：《我国上市公司股利政策研究》,西南财经大学博士论文。
[52]Aghin-Bolton,1992, " An Incomplete Contract Approach to Financial Contracting", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.59, No.2,473-494.
[53]Baker, Malcolm, Jeremy Stein and Jeffrey Wurgler,2003, "When Does the Market Matter? Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.118, No.3,969-1005.
[54]Barry, Christopher B., Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy Ⅲ and Michael R. Vetsuypens,1990, "The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies:Evidence from the Going-public Process", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.27, Issue 2,447-471.
[55]Bottazzi, Laura, Marco Da Rin and Thomas Hellmann,2008, "Who are the Active Investors? Evidence from Venture Capital", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.89, Issue 3,488-512.
[56]Brander, James A., Raphael Amit and Werner Antweiler,2002, "Venture-capital Syndication:Improved Venture Selection vs. the Venture-added Hypothesis", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol.11, Issue 3,423-452.
[57]Brav, Alon and Paul A. Gompers,1997, "Myth or Reality? The Long-run Underperformance of Initial Public Offering:Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-backed Companies", Journal of Finance, Vol.52, No.5, 1791-1821.
[58]Cumming, Douglas and Na Dai,2010, "Local Bias in Venture Capital Investments", Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol.17, Issue 3,326-380.
[59]Ellison, G. and D. Fudenberg,1995, "Word-of-mouth Communication and Social Learning", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.110, Issue 1, 93-125.
[60]Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg,2005, "Market Value and Patent Citations", RAND Journal of Economic, Vol.36, No.1,16-38.
[61]Hellmann, Thomas and Manju Puri,2002, "Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms:Empirical Evidence", Journal of Finance, Vol.57, Issue 1,169-197.
[62]Hochberg, Yael V.,2008, "Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm", Unpublished Working Paper, Northwestern University.
[63]Hochberg, Yeal V., Alexander Ljungqvist and Yang Lu,2007, "Whom You Know Matters:Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance", Journal of Finance, Vol.62, Issue 1,251-301.
[64]Jensen, Michael C.,1986, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers", American Economic Review, Vol.76, No.2, 323-329.
[65]Kaplan, Steven N. and Per Strmberg,2003, "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World:An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.70, No.2,281-315.
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