境外背景独立董事的有效性研究
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摘要
改革开放30年，在明确了将建立“产权清晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学”的现代企业制度作为国有企业改革的方向以后，随着改革的逐步推进，完善公司治理成为建立现代企业制度的核心。鉴于董事会在建立现代企业制度中的核心作用，微观上完善公司治理的改革的重点也因此聚焦在董事会上。而独立董事制度作为现代公司制度的衍生物，目前已经成为了董事会治理的一种重要安排，在公司治理体系中占据着十分重要的地位。
2004年，为了贯彻党的十六大、十六届三中全会精神，推进股份制改革，完善公司法人治理结构，加快建立现代企业制度，适应新的国有资产管理体制的要求，依法规范地行使出资人权利，国务院国有资产监督管理委员会决定选择部分中央企业进行建立和完善国有独资公司董事会试点工作。在试点工作开展的过程中，一类特殊的独立董事——具有境外背景的独立董事开始进入人们的视野，成为了改革中的亮点，并取得了一定的成绩。为了更好地对境外背景独立董事的有效性进行探究，本文以境外背景独立董事参与董事会重大决策事项的投票行为作为中介变量，以董事会的团队异质性作为调节变量，综合考察独立董事的境外背景、投票行为以及董事会的团队异质性，构建了境外背景独立董事有效性发挥的理论模型。在对主要研究变量的可靠性进行检验的基础上，根据理论模型，依次检验了境外背景独立董事积极参与董事会重大决策的投票行为在境外背景独立董事有效性发挥过程中的中介效应，以及董事会的团队异质性在这一过程中的调节效应。根据实证分析结果，本研究的主要结论如下：
（一）境外背景独立董事在参与我国上市公司运作的过程中，确实具有一定的价值效应。首先，通过对同一家上市公司聘请具有境外背景独立董事前后的公司财务绩效和公司价值绩效进行对比分析，结果显示通过聘请具有境外背景的独立董事确实能够带来一定的公司绩效增值。其次，通过对聘请具有境外背景独立董事的数量与公司绩效之间的回归分析，发现上市公司中具有境外背景的独立董事的数量与上市公司总资产收益率呈显著的正相关关系，这说明上市公司聘请具有境外背景的独立董事是有利于公司财务绩效的提升的。第三，在对境外背景独立董事的境外背景进行细分的基础上，本文发现上市公司聘请的具有境外学习背景的独立董事与公司财务绩效呈显著的负相关关系，说明具有境外学习背景的独立董事不利于公司绩效的提升，即不会对公司绩效产生正面影响；而上市公司聘请的具有境外工作背景的独立董事与公司财务绩效呈显著的正相关关系，说明境外的工作背景能够为独立董事更好地发挥其有效性提供重要的支持。
（二）积极参与董事会运作在境外背景独立董事发挥其有效性的过程中作用并不十分明显。理论模型的构建以及分析都提示我们，积极参与董事会的决策行为，确实可能成为境外背景独立董事发挥其有效性的重要途径。然而，本研究在控制了具有境外研究机构工作背景的独立董事以后，虽然独立董事积极参与董事会决策的投票行为对于公司财务绩效具有正向的影响作用，而且也削减了一部分具有境外研究机构工作背景的独立董事对公司财务绩效的影响，但结果不显著。这意味着目前在我国的上市公司中，虽然具有境外背景的独立董事能够在一定程度上通过积极参与董事会的决策过程来改善公司绩效，但从总体上来看，其路径还是不完全确定的。
（三）董事会团队异质性在董事会决策过程中具有一定的调节作用，但相对较小。董事会作为一个决策群体，如理论模型的分析，其中个体在进行决策判断的过程中也必然会受到其他个体以及整个群体的影响。然而实证结果显示，只有董事会知识结构中的专业背景异质性和职业背景异质性对于具有境外研究机构工作背景的独立董事产生了作用，对于具有财务、法律等中介机构工作背景的独立董事则没有产生影响。
本研究是基于中国上市公司聘请具有境外背景独立董事的现实而开展的探索性研究，其创新点就在于从更为完整的视角对境外背景独立董事的有效性进行了理论分析和实证研究。首先，将境外背景独立董事的特征、参与董事会重大决策的投票行为以及董事会的团队异质性紧密联系在一起，更为科学地就境外背景独立董事的有效性进行了分析，为上市公司优化自身治理结构、提升治理效率提供了新的思路。第二，在将现有理论进行整合的基础上，通过引入独立董事参与董事会投票的行为，从更完整的角度探究了境外背景独立董事有效性的作用路径。第三，基于董事会的团队异质性，对影响境外背景独立董事行为的因素进行了研究，丰富了现有的研究框架。
In the last30years, as the modern enterprise system, which is "clear propertyrights, well-defined right and responsibility, separate government functions fromenterprise management, scientific management", has become the reform direction forthe state-owned enterprise, the perfect corporate governance has become the core ofestablishing a modern enterprise system. As the core role in establishing a modernenterprise system, the board of directors became the focus in perfecting corporategovernance reform on the micro level. And as the derivatives of the modern companysystem, the system of independent director has become an important arrangement inthe governance of board of directors.
In2004, in order to promote the reform of joint-stock system, perfect thecorporate governance structure, speed up the establishment of a modern enterprisesystem, the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the statecouncil decided to select part of the central enterprises as the pilot works to establishand perfect the board of directors of the wholly state-owned company. In this process,a special kind of independent directors–the independent directors with overseasbackground begin to enter people's field of vision, become the highlight of the reform, and has obtained some achievements. In order to better understand the effectivenessof independent directors with overseas background, based on them to participate inmaking important decisions matters voting behavior as a intervening variable, withthe board of directors’ team heterogeneity as the moderator variable, thecomprehensive investigation of the independent directors with overseas background,voting behavior and the board of directors’ team heterogeneity, constructs the theorymodel of the effectiveness of independent directors with overseas background. In themain research variables based on the reliability test, according to the theoreticalmodel, the dissertation in turn tests the intermediary effect of the voting bahaviore ofindependent directors with overseas background in making important decisions of theboard of directors and the regulating effect of board of directors’ team heterogeneity.According to the empirical analysis results, the the main conclusions of this study areas follows:
1. The independent directors with overseas background in China's listedcompanies do have a certain value effect. First of all, for the same listed companiesemploy independent directors with overseas background, the results of contrastanalysis indicate that the employment of independent directors with overseasbackground are able to bring certain company performance appreciation. Secondly, through the regression analysis between the number of independent directors withoverseas background and the corporate performance, we found that more independentdirectors with overseas background will bring a high total return on assets in thesample companies; it shows that the listed company employ overseas background ofindependent directors is conducive to the company's financial performance ofascension. Third, for the segmentation of overseas background, the study shows thatthe independent directors with overseas study background and the company'sfinancial performance is significantly negative correlated, explaining that independentdirectors with overseas study background are unfavorable to the companyperformance improvement, that is not a positive effect on the company performance,while the listed companies have hired independent directors with overseas workingbackground are significantly positive correlated with the company's financialperformance, indicating that independent directors with overseas working backgroundcan provide important support for the effectiveness of themselves.
2. The effectiveness that independent director with overseas background playthrough the process of participating in the voting of the boardof directors is not veryobvious. The theoretical model and the analysis suggest that, actively participate inthe voting of the board of directors may become the important way for independent director to exert their effectiveness. However, after controlling for the independentdirectors with overseas working background of researching in institutions, althoughthe independent director actively participate in the voting of the board of directorsplays a positive impact on the company's financial performance, and also cut parts ofthe influence of independent directors’ overseas working background on thecompany's financial performance, the result was not significant. This means that, tosome extent, the special background of the independent directors can improve thecompany performance through actively participate in the voting of the board ofdirectors, but looked from the overall, its path maybe uncertain.
3. The regulated function of board of directors’ team heterogeneity in the votingbehavior is relatively smaller. The board of directors as a decision-making group,such as theory analysis in the model, individual in decision making process will beaffected by the influence of other individuals. However the empirical result showsthat only the team heterogeneity of knowledge structure and professional backgroundhas the regulation effect in participating in voting behavior for independent directorswith overseas working background of researching in institutions only, for theoverseas working background of intermediaries, such as financial and legal officehave no effect.
This exploratory research is based on the Chinese listed companies whichemploy independent directors with overseas background, its innovation lies in themore complete perspective of theoretical analysis and empirical research of theeffectiveness of independent director with overseas background. First of all,combined with the characteristics of independent director with overseas background,participating in voting in making important decisions in the board of directors and theboard of directors’ team heterogeneity closely together, to analyze the effectivenessof independent directors with overseas background more scientific, and in order toprovide a new thought in optimizing the governance structure and improving theefficiency of governance. Second, based on the integration of existing theories, byintroducing the voting behavior of independent director in the board of directors,explores the effectiveness of independent director with overseas background morecomplete. Third, based on the board of directors’ team heterogeneity, this studydiscusses the influence factors upon the voting bahavior of independent directors withoverseas background, and enriches the existing research framework.
2004年，为了贯彻党的十六大、十六届三中全会精神，推进股份制改革，完善公司法人治理结构，加快建立现代企业制度，适应新的国有资产管理体制的要求，依法规范地行使出资人权利，国务院国有资产监督管理委员会决定选择部分中央企业进行建立和完善国有独资公司董事会试点工作。在试点工作开展的过程中，一类特殊的独立董事——具有境外背景的独立董事开始进入人们的视野，成为了改革中的亮点，并取得了一定的成绩。为了更好地对境外背景独立董事的有效性进行探究，本文以境外背景独立董事参与董事会重大决策事项的投票行为作为中介变量，以董事会的团队异质性作为调节变量，综合考察独立董事的境外背景、投票行为以及董事会的团队异质性，构建了境外背景独立董事有效性发挥的理论模型。在对主要研究变量的可靠性进行检验的基础上，根据理论模型，依次检验了境外背景独立董事积极参与董事会重大决策的投票行为在境外背景独立董事有效性发挥过程中的中介效应，以及董事会的团队异质性在这一过程中的调节效应。根据实证分析结果，本研究的主要结论如下：
（一）境外背景独立董事在参与我国上市公司运作的过程中，确实具有一定的价值效应。首先，通过对同一家上市公司聘请具有境外背景独立董事前后的公司财务绩效和公司价值绩效进行对比分析，结果显示通过聘请具有境外背景的独立董事确实能够带来一定的公司绩效增值。其次，通过对聘请具有境外背景独立董事的数量与公司绩效之间的回归分析，发现上市公司中具有境外背景的独立董事的数量与上市公司总资产收益率呈显著的正相关关系，这说明上市公司聘请具有境外背景的独立董事是有利于公司财务绩效的提升的。第三，在对境外背景独立董事的境外背景进行细分的基础上，本文发现上市公司聘请的具有境外学习背景的独立董事与公司财务绩效呈显著的负相关关系，说明具有境外学习背景的独立董事不利于公司绩效的提升，即不会对公司绩效产生正面影响；而上市公司聘请的具有境外工作背景的独立董事与公司财务绩效呈显著的正相关关系，说明境外的工作背景能够为独立董事更好地发挥其有效性提供重要的支持。
（二）积极参与董事会运作在境外背景独立董事发挥其有效性的过程中作用并不十分明显。理论模型的构建以及分析都提示我们，积极参与董事会的决策行为，确实可能成为境外背景独立董事发挥其有效性的重要途径。然而，本研究在控制了具有境外研究机构工作背景的独立董事以后，虽然独立董事积极参与董事会决策的投票行为对于公司财务绩效具有正向的影响作用，而且也削减了一部分具有境外研究机构工作背景的独立董事对公司财务绩效的影响，但结果不显著。这意味着目前在我国的上市公司中，虽然具有境外背景的独立董事能够在一定程度上通过积极参与董事会的决策过程来改善公司绩效，但从总体上来看，其路径还是不完全确定的。
（三）董事会团队异质性在董事会决策过程中具有一定的调节作用，但相对较小。董事会作为一个决策群体，如理论模型的分析，其中个体在进行决策判断的过程中也必然会受到其他个体以及整个群体的影响。然而实证结果显示，只有董事会知识结构中的专业背景异质性和职业背景异质性对于具有境外研究机构工作背景的独立董事产生了作用，对于具有财务、法律等中介机构工作背景的独立董事则没有产生影响。
本研究是基于中国上市公司聘请具有境外背景独立董事的现实而开展的探索性研究，其创新点就在于从更为完整的视角对境外背景独立董事的有效性进行了理论分析和实证研究。首先，将境外背景独立董事的特征、参与董事会重大决策的投票行为以及董事会的团队异质性紧密联系在一起，更为科学地就境外背景独立董事的有效性进行了分析，为上市公司优化自身治理结构、提升治理效率提供了新的思路。第二，在将现有理论进行整合的基础上，通过引入独立董事参与董事会投票的行为，从更完整的角度探究了境外背景独立董事有效性的作用路径。第三，基于董事会的团队异质性，对影响境外背景独立董事行为的因素进行了研究，丰富了现有的研究框架。
In the last30years, as the modern enterprise system, which is "clear propertyrights, well-defined right and responsibility, separate government functions fromenterprise management, scientific management", has become the reform direction forthe state-owned enterprise, the perfect corporate governance has become the core ofestablishing a modern enterprise system. As the core role in establishing a modernenterprise system, the board of directors became the focus in perfecting corporategovernance reform on the micro level. And as the derivatives of the modern companysystem, the system of independent director has become an important arrangement inthe governance of board of directors.
In2004, in order to promote the reform of joint-stock system, perfect thecorporate governance structure, speed up the establishment of a modern enterprisesystem, the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the statecouncil decided to select part of the central enterprises as the pilot works to establishand perfect the board of directors of the wholly state-owned company. In this process,a special kind of independent directors–the independent directors with overseasbackground begin to enter people's field of vision, become the highlight of the reform, and has obtained some achievements. In order to better understand the effectivenessof independent directors with overseas background, based on them to participate inmaking important decisions matters voting behavior as a intervening variable, withthe board of directors’ team heterogeneity as the moderator variable, thecomprehensive investigation of the independent directors with overseas background,voting behavior and the board of directors’ team heterogeneity, constructs the theorymodel of the effectiveness of independent directors with overseas background. In themain research variables based on the reliability test, according to the theoreticalmodel, the dissertation in turn tests the intermediary effect of the voting bahaviore ofindependent directors with overseas background in making important decisions of theboard of directors and the regulating effect of board of directors’ team heterogeneity.According to the empirical analysis results, the the main conclusions of this study areas follows:
1. The independent directors with overseas background in China's listedcompanies do have a certain value effect. First of all, for the same listed companiesemploy independent directors with overseas background, the results of contrastanalysis indicate that the employment of independent directors with overseasbackground are able to bring certain company performance appreciation. Secondly, through the regression analysis between the number of independent directors withoverseas background and the corporate performance, we found that more independentdirectors with overseas background will bring a high total return on assets in thesample companies; it shows that the listed company employ overseas background ofindependent directors is conducive to the company's financial performance ofascension. Third, for the segmentation of overseas background, the study shows thatthe independent directors with overseas study background and the company'sfinancial performance is significantly negative correlated, explaining that independentdirectors with overseas study background are unfavorable to the companyperformance improvement, that is not a positive effect on the company performance,while the listed companies have hired independent directors with overseas workingbackground are significantly positive correlated with the company's financialperformance, indicating that independent directors with overseas working backgroundcan provide important support for the effectiveness of themselves.
2. The effectiveness that independent director with overseas background playthrough the process of participating in the voting of the boardof directors is not veryobvious. The theoretical model and the analysis suggest that, actively participate inthe voting of the board of directors may become the important way for independent director to exert their effectiveness. However, after controlling for the independentdirectors with overseas working background of researching in institutions, althoughthe independent director actively participate in the voting of the board of directorsplays a positive impact on the company's financial performance, and also cut parts ofthe influence of independent directors’ overseas working background on thecompany's financial performance, the result was not significant. This means that, tosome extent, the special background of the independent directors can improve thecompany performance through actively participate in the voting of the board ofdirectors, but looked from the overall, its path maybe uncertain.
3. The regulated function of board of directors’ team heterogeneity in the votingbehavior is relatively smaller. The board of directors as a decision-making group,such as theory analysis in the model, individual in decision making process will beaffected by the influence of other individuals. However the empirical result showsthat only the team heterogeneity of knowledge structure and professional backgroundhas the regulation effect in participating in voting behavior for independent directorswith overseas working background of researching in institutions only, for theoverseas working background of intermediaries, such as financial and legal officehave no effect.
This exploratory research is based on the Chinese listed companies whichemploy independent directors with overseas background, its innovation lies in themore complete perspective of theoretical analysis and empirical research of theeffectiveness of independent director with overseas background. First of all,combined with the characteristics of independent director with overseas background,participating in voting in making important decisions in the board of directors and theboard of directors’ team heterogeneity closely together, to analyze the effectivenessof independent directors with overseas background more scientific, and in order toprovide a new thought in optimizing the governance structure and improving theefficiency of governance. Second, based on the integration of existing theories, byintroducing the voting behavior of independent director in the board of directors,explores the effectiveness of independent director with overseas background morecomplete. Third, based on the board of directors’ team heterogeneity, this studydiscusses the influence factors upon the voting bahavior of independent directors withoverseas background, and enriches the existing research framework.
引文
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[2]William A. Reese Jr.A&Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings inthe United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics,2002, Vol.66, No.1,65-104
[1]William A. Reese Jr&Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in theUnited States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics,2002, Vol.66, No.1,65-104
[1]L.A.A. Van den Berghe&Tom Baelden, The Complex Relation Between Director Independence and BoardEffectiveness, Corporate Governance,2005, Vol.5, No.5,58-83
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