证券欺诈民事诉讼之主导模式研究
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摘要
近年来,中国的证券市场得到了长足的发展,但是证券投资者保护不够却是制约着证券市场进一步发展的障碍。中国证券市场中的投资者正在遭受着来自上市公司、市场中介机构以及机构和庄家的重重侵害,而且受到的侵害还得不到有效的救济,因此对加强投资者的保护对于发展多层资本市场、建设和谐社会具有重要的现实意义。证券投资者的保护机制主要有公权执法、私人诉讼以及公司治理。近期西方理论界围绕着何种机制能有效地保护证券投资者产生了系列的理论争鸣,其中皮斯托和许成钢基于“不完备法律”提出应由监管机构行使剩余立法权和剩余执法权,而LLSV通过对49个国家和地区的实证研究认为私人诉讼比公权执法更能保护投资者。对于中国而言虽未发展到要在公权执法和私人诉讼进行政策优化选择,但是中国证券投资者的保护需要在公权执法、私人诉讼和上市公司自身改善三个方面同时取得进展。理论上,公权执法模式存在执法资源有限性、监管俘获、理性经济人的公共选择等缺陷,发展私人执法的理论认为发展诉讼保护机制能弥补这些缺陷。从现实上来讲,目前中国证券公权执法存在执法效率低下、腐败指数高企等问题,在公权执法体制上存在监管目标多元、执法衔接不畅、监管者与监管对象裙带相连等障碍。在当下的中国发展证券欺诈民事诉讼能填补受害者的损失、威慑不法者、提升公司治理、全面提升投资者保护水平的现实意义。
证券欺诈民事诉讼案件具有小额多数的特点,即虽然证券欺诈案件中造成的损失总额很大,但相对而言单个投资者所受的损失却是小额。证券欺诈案件具有高度的专业性和复杂性,投资者想要维权的诉讼成本很高,但是在全球范围内来说此类诉讼的收益却很低。依据奥尔森的理论进行博弈分析后发现,大部分受害投资者都会选择“搭便车”,因此在证券欺诈民事诉讼中产生了“集体行动的困境”。奥尔森认为“不对称”和“选择性激励”可以化解集体行动的困境,集体中的某部分人如果能获得比别人多的收益,或者他在为集体提供公共产品时可以搭售私人产品,这时这部分人会主动为集体提供公共产品。这种解决方案在比较法上的体现就是美国式律师主导的证券欺诈民事诉讼。证券投资者保护本质上是一种公共产品,公共产品的供给在出现市场失灵和政府失灵时可以通过非营利组织来供给。这种解决方案表现在比较法上就是东亚地区非营利组织主导的证券欺诈民事诉讼。两种解决方案利弊互见,律师主导模式虽然有高效率的优点,但是也存在律师激励过度而导致的滥诉、律师与被告勾结、投资者得不到实际赔偿而律师成为唯一受益者的系列问题。非营利组织主导模式虽然能避免滥诉并能有效地配合政府的执法行动,但也存在效率不彰、机构治理的困境、独立性的两难、经费的短缺等缺点。
对于中国而言,美国式律师主导模式目前要引入是不合适的,中美两国间存在着法律结构的差异,大陆法系和英美法系下法院和法官所发挥的作用是不同的,两国的民事法律中对于“惩罚性赔偿”认识也是不同的；中国的社会文化中对律师商业化的诉讼操作持高度警惕的态度；而且当权者对于证券集团诉讼也存在政治顾虑。而我国台湾地区由政府推动设立非营利组织主导诉讼模式对中国大陆而言是一种比较好的过渡方案。我国台湾地区与中国大陆有着相似的法律传统和证券市场结构,选择我国台湾地区模式能最小化法律变革的成本,而且由政府主导的非营利组织也具有政治上的可接受性。对于未来中国非营利组织主导证券欺诈民事诉讼模式的发展,首先在组织建设上,可以把现有的中国证券投资者保护基金公司发展为专门性的投资者保护组织。保护组织代理投资者诉讼性质应为法定的诉讼担当,同时保护组织提起的提起的诉讼还要有相应的配套诉讼制度的支持,如受理的案件与类型、受害投资者的授权与撤回、诉讼费用的优惠、判决书的书写、执行与上诉等。保护组织除代理诉讼外还具有其他职能：接受投资者的咨询申诉、投资者赔偿、调解证券纠纷、践行股东积极主义、开展投资者教育等。还应通过加强主管机关的监督、提高组织的透明度、完善组织的治理结构等方面来实现保护组织效率的提升。
In recent years, China's securities market got rapid progress, but the problem of securities investor protection have become an obstacle to further developments of securities market. China's investors of securities market are suffering from infringement of listed company, market intermediary organizations, institutions and bankers, and more than that, there is no effective relief. Therefore, strengthening protections for investors has important practical significance to developments of multilayer capital market and constructions harmonious society. The protection mechanisms of securities investor mainly have law enforcement by public power, private litigation and corporate governance. Recently, western theory around what kind of mechanism can effective protect securities investors have produced series of theory, including pierstor and XuChengGang's opinion of exercising the rest legislative power by regulator agencies, based on "incomplete law". However, LLSV through empirical studies of49countries and regions put forward that private litigation right have more effects on protecting investors than enforcement of public power. As for China, although has not been development to the process of making optimization choice between enforcement of public power and private suit, the protection for China's securities investor needs to be make advances all in law enforcement of public power, private litigation and listed companies improvement. In theory, the pattern of law enforcement by public power have some defects,such as limited resources, regulatory capture, rational public choice by economic man, and the theory that the development of law enforcement by private could make up for such defects. In reality, at present,China's securities law enforcement by public power have some obstacles in low efficiency of law enforcement, high corruption index, multielement regulatory targets,poor convergence, regulators and targets are connected in the system of law enforcement by public power. At the present situation, development of securities fraud civil litigation can have practical significances in compensating for victims'loss, intimidating illegal misfeasors,and improving overall protection levels for investors.
The case of Securities fraud civil litigation has characteristics of small amount and much quantity. Although total loss is large amount, the loss is small to single investor relatively. Because this kind of case is expertise and complexity, litigation cost is high, while such litigation income is low in the global scope. Game analysis based on the theory of olsen, there is no hard to find that t most investors will choose "free-rider", therefore in securities fraud in civil procedure have been produced "collective action dilemma". Olson believed that "asymmetric" and "selective incentive" can resolve such predicament of collective action dilemma, namely the part of people if can get more benefits than others, or they can sell their private products when they provide public products, then this part of people will take initiative for providing public products. This solution in comparative law is American lawyer's leading in securities fraud civil action. The securities investor protection is essentially a kind of public products, in case of market failure and government failure,the supply of public products can be supplied by non-profit organizations. This solution in comparative law is the non-profit organization by East Asia's leading in securities fraud civil action. Two solutions both have their own advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, Although lawyer's leading model is high efficiency the advantages, there are also a series problems in disciplinary action, lawyers and the defendant are in cahoots, investors can not get the actual compensation and lawyer became the only beneficiaries, caused by incentive excessive to lawyers;On the other hand, the non-profit organization's leading model can avoid disciplinary action and effectively support government enforcement actions, but there are also shortcomings in inefficiency, organization management dilemma, independence problem, funds shortage.
For China, the American model of lawyer's leading is improper right now, since there are different in legal structure,roles of judges and courts in continental law system and common law system, and recognition of "punitive compensation" in two countries. More than that, China's social culture keeps an alter attitude to lawyers' commercialization operations of lawsuits,and authorities also have some political concerns for securities groups. The Taiwan'model, promoted by government to establish non-profit organizations is good transition plan for mainland. Taiwan and mainland have similar legal tradition and securities market structure. The choice of Taiwan'model can minimize legal reform cost,and government-led non-profit organization also has political acceptance. For the future development of China's non-profit organizations leading securities fraud civil action, the first in the organization construction, should develop existing China's securities investor protection fund companies to professional investor protection organizations. Litigations for protecting agency organization investors shall be the legal nature, and lawsuits for protecting organizations also have corresponding supporting litigation system, such as cases accepted and type, damaged investors authorization and withdraw, favorable litigation costs, standard of writing judgments, implementation and appeal, and so on. Besides litigation proceedings, protection organizations have some other functions:acceptance of consulting appeal and investors compensation, mediation securities disputes, practice of shareholder activism, conducting education, etc. Investors should also strengthen supervision of competent authority, improve organization transparency, perfect governance structure of organization to realize protection to promote the efficiency of organization.
证券欺诈民事诉讼案件具有小额多数的特点,即虽然证券欺诈案件中造成的损失总额很大,但相对而言单个投资者所受的损失却是小额。证券欺诈案件具有高度的专业性和复杂性,投资者想要维权的诉讼成本很高,但是在全球范围内来说此类诉讼的收益却很低。依据奥尔森的理论进行博弈分析后发现,大部分受害投资者都会选择“搭便车”,因此在证券欺诈民事诉讼中产生了“集体行动的困境”。奥尔森认为“不对称”和“选择性激励”可以化解集体行动的困境,集体中的某部分人如果能获得比别人多的收益,或者他在为集体提供公共产品时可以搭售私人产品,这时这部分人会主动为集体提供公共产品。这种解决方案在比较法上的体现就是美国式律师主导的证券欺诈民事诉讼。证券投资者保护本质上是一种公共产品,公共产品的供给在出现市场失灵和政府失灵时可以通过非营利组织来供给。这种解决方案表现在比较法上就是东亚地区非营利组织主导的证券欺诈民事诉讼。两种解决方案利弊互见,律师主导模式虽然有高效率的优点,但是也存在律师激励过度而导致的滥诉、律师与被告勾结、投资者得不到实际赔偿而律师成为唯一受益者的系列问题。非营利组织主导模式虽然能避免滥诉并能有效地配合政府的执法行动,但也存在效率不彰、机构治理的困境、独立性的两难、经费的短缺等缺点。
对于中国而言,美国式律师主导模式目前要引入是不合适的,中美两国间存在着法律结构的差异,大陆法系和英美法系下法院和法官所发挥的作用是不同的,两国的民事法律中对于“惩罚性赔偿”认识也是不同的；中国的社会文化中对律师商业化的诉讼操作持高度警惕的态度；而且当权者对于证券集团诉讼也存在政治顾虑。而我国台湾地区由政府推动设立非营利组织主导诉讼模式对中国大陆而言是一种比较好的过渡方案。我国台湾地区与中国大陆有着相似的法律传统和证券市场结构,选择我国台湾地区模式能最小化法律变革的成本,而且由政府主导的非营利组织也具有政治上的可接受性。对于未来中国非营利组织主导证券欺诈民事诉讼模式的发展,首先在组织建设上,可以把现有的中国证券投资者保护基金公司发展为专门性的投资者保护组织。保护组织代理投资者诉讼性质应为法定的诉讼担当,同时保护组织提起的提起的诉讼还要有相应的配套诉讼制度的支持,如受理的案件与类型、受害投资者的授权与撤回、诉讼费用的优惠、判决书的书写、执行与上诉等。保护组织除代理诉讼外还具有其他职能：接受投资者的咨询申诉、投资者赔偿、调解证券纠纷、践行股东积极主义、开展投资者教育等。还应通过加强主管机关的监督、提高组织的透明度、完善组织的治理结构等方面来实现保护组织效率的提升。
In recent years, China's securities market got rapid progress, but the problem of securities investor protection have become an obstacle to further developments of securities market. China's investors of securities market are suffering from infringement of listed company, market intermediary organizations, institutions and bankers, and more than that, there is no effective relief. Therefore, strengthening protections for investors has important practical significance to developments of multilayer capital market and constructions harmonious society. The protection mechanisms of securities investor mainly have law enforcement by public power, private litigation and corporate governance. Recently, western theory around what kind of mechanism can effective protect securities investors have produced series of theory, including pierstor and XuChengGang's opinion of exercising the rest legislative power by regulator agencies, based on "incomplete law". However, LLSV through empirical studies of49countries and regions put forward that private litigation right have more effects on protecting investors than enforcement of public power. As for China, although has not been development to the process of making optimization choice between enforcement of public power and private suit, the protection for China's securities investor needs to be make advances all in law enforcement of public power, private litigation and listed companies improvement. In theory, the pattern of law enforcement by public power have some defects,such as limited resources, regulatory capture, rational public choice by economic man, and the theory that the development of law enforcement by private could make up for such defects. In reality, at present,China's securities law enforcement by public power have some obstacles in low efficiency of law enforcement, high corruption index, multielement regulatory targets,poor convergence, regulators and targets are connected in the system of law enforcement by public power. At the present situation, development of securities fraud civil litigation can have practical significances in compensating for victims'loss, intimidating illegal misfeasors,and improving overall protection levels for investors.
The case of Securities fraud civil litigation has characteristics of small amount and much quantity. Although total loss is large amount, the loss is small to single investor relatively. Because this kind of case is expertise and complexity, litigation cost is high, while such litigation income is low in the global scope. Game analysis based on the theory of olsen, there is no hard to find that t most investors will choose "free-rider", therefore in securities fraud in civil procedure have been produced "collective action dilemma". Olson believed that "asymmetric" and "selective incentive" can resolve such predicament of collective action dilemma, namely the part of people if can get more benefits than others, or they can sell their private products when they provide public products, then this part of people will take initiative for providing public products. This solution in comparative law is American lawyer's leading in securities fraud civil action. The securities investor protection is essentially a kind of public products, in case of market failure and government failure,the supply of public products can be supplied by non-profit organizations. This solution in comparative law is the non-profit organization by East Asia's leading in securities fraud civil action. Two solutions both have their own advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, Although lawyer's leading model is high efficiency the advantages, there are also a series problems in disciplinary action, lawyers and the defendant are in cahoots, investors can not get the actual compensation and lawyer became the only beneficiaries, caused by incentive excessive to lawyers;On the other hand, the non-profit organization's leading model can avoid disciplinary action and effectively support government enforcement actions, but there are also shortcomings in inefficiency, organization management dilemma, independence problem, funds shortage.
For China, the American model of lawyer's leading is improper right now, since there are different in legal structure,roles of judges and courts in continental law system and common law system, and recognition of "punitive compensation" in two countries. More than that, China's social culture keeps an alter attitude to lawyers' commercialization operations of lawsuits,and authorities also have some political concerns for securities groups. The Taiwan'model, promoted by government to establish non-profit organizations is good transition plan for mainland. Taiwan and mainland have similar legal tradition and securities market structure. The choice of Taiwan'model can minimize legal reform cost,and government-led non-profit organization also has political acceptance. For the future development of China's non-profit organizations leading securities fraud civil action, the first in the organization construction, should develop existing China's securities investor protection fund companies to professional investor protection organizations. Litigations for protecting agency organization investors shall be the legal nature, and lawsuits for protecting organizations also have corresponding supporting litigation system, such as cases accepted and type, damaged investors authorization and withdraw, favorable litigation costs, standard of writing judgments, implementation and appeal, and so on. Besides litigation proceedings, protection organizations have some other functions:acceptance of consulting appeal and investors compensation, mediation securities disputes, practice of shareholder activism, conducting education, etc. Investors should also strengthen supervision of competent authority, improve organization transparency, perfect governance structure of organization to realize protection to promote the efficiency of organization.
引文
①Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, "What Works in Securities Laws?" The Journal of Finance(2006), no.1,at 1-32.中译本参见《证券法中什么在起作用?》.吴飞,郭雳译.载吴敬琏主编：《比较》(第23辑).中信出版社,2006
①参见曹征.论中国上市公司治理中的违法违规行为一一基于法律环境的视角：[南开大学博士论文].天津：南开大学,2009
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p256
② Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts,p43
Misko on Class Actions, p14
Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts,p44
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p236
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p237
① Rawlings v. prudential-bache props, inc.,9 F.3d 513,516(6th cir.1993)("the interest of class counsel in obtaining fees is adverse to the interest of the interest of the class in obtaining recovery because the fees come out of the common fund set up for the benefit of the class.")
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p213
③ Manual for complex litigation,4th.p185
④ Manual for complex litigation,4th.p186
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p186
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p186
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p188
②Goldberger v. Integrated Res.,Inc.,209 F.3d 43,50 (2d Cir.2000)(要求提供记录律师工作时数之文件作为合理比计算法交叉比对确认之用)；United States v.8.0 Acres of Land,197 F.3d 24,33(1st Cir.1999)(判决使用指标计算报酬法达到共同基之合理比率)；Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.,102F.3d 777,780 (6th Cir.1996)(支持地方法院在报酬判决难于共同基金之比例计算,但仍交叉检视集团师指数计算之工作时数)In re Gen. Motors Corp.,55 F.3d at 820(认为法院应该在认可报酬请求时以第二方法来检是使用第一计算方法之结论)
③487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973)
④Manual for complex litigation,4th.p190
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p193
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p189
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p196
②Manual for complex litigation,4th.p1y6
③Manual for complex litigation,4th.p196
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p197
①In Re Warner Communnications Sec.Litig.,618 F.Supp.735,740(S.D.N.Y.1985)
①The Definition Of "American Rule" Is "The General Policy That All Litigants, Even The Prevailing One, Must Bear Their Own Attorney's Fees. The Rule Is Subject To Bad-Faith And Other Statutory And Contractual Exceptions." See Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004).
②参见Janet Cooper Alexander, Do The Merits Matter:A Study Of Settlements In Securities Class Action,43 Stan. L. Rev.497 (1991).但有论者以其样本数仅1983年之8家科技公司因初次公开发行所涉之和解案为分析,显然在案件代表性及样本数上皆有讨论空间,See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter,108 Harv. L. Rev.438 (1994)即便有些和解案件的确欠缺法律依据,但也不能否认有些案件确实具有法律上之正当性,参见Steven P. Marino & RenEE D. Marino, An Empirical Study Of Recent Class Action Settlement Involving Ccountants, Attorneys, Or Underwriters,22 Sec. Reg. L.Rev.115 (1994).
①15 USC §78u-5(Ⅰ)(1)
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p543
③ Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 21E,15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(C)(1)(A) Provides That (1) In General Except As Provided In Subsection (B) Of This Section, In Any Private Action Arising Under This Chapter That Is Based On An Untrue Statement Of A Material Fact Or Omission Of A Material Fact Necessary To Make The Statement Not Misleading, A Person Referred To In Subsection (A) Of This Section Shall Not Be Liable With Respect To Any Forward-Looking Statement, Whether Written Or Oral, If And To The Extent That—(A) The Forward-Looking Statement Is—(Ⅰ) Identified As A Forward-Looking Statement, And Is Accompanied By Meaningful Cautionary Statements Identifying Important Factors That Could Cause Actual Results To Differ Materially From Those In The Forward-Looking Statement; Or (Ii) Immaterial
④ Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 §21E,15 U.S.C. §78u-5(C)(1)(B) Provides That (B) The Plaintiff Fails To Prove That The Forward-Looking Statement—(I) If Made By A Natural Person, Was Made With Actual Knowledge By That Person That The Statement Was False Or Misleading
⑤ 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(B)(2)(C)-(E),78u-5(B)(2)(C)-(E)
⑥ 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(B)(2)(A),78u-5(B)(2)(A)
①Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 §21D(B)(2),15 U.S.C. §78u-4(B)(2) (2005) Provides That "In Any Private Action Arisingunder This Title In Which The Plaintiff May Recover Money Damages Only On Proof That The Defendant Acted With A Particular State Of Mind, The Complaint Shall, With Respect To Each Act Or Omission Alleged To Violate This Title, State With Particularity Facts Giving Rise To A Strong Inference That The Defendant Acted With The Required State Of Mind
②Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 §21D(B)(3)(B),15 U.S.C. §78u-4(B)(3)(B)
③Manual for complex litigation,4th.p544
④15 U.S.C.§78u-4(C)
15 U.S.C.§77(V)(A),77aa
15 U.S.C.§77p(F)(2)(A) ①具体来讲,SLUSA不适用于私人当事人依据州公司法提起的在州法院或联邦法院的诉讼,不适用十派生诉讼(Derivative Actions),不适用于州的官员(State Officials)提起的诉讼,不适用于依据发行人与信托人订立的合同提起的诉讼,不适用于“特拉华州例外”(Delaware Carve-Out)
② H.R.1689§2(A)(1)(Proposing To Add Securities Act§16(B));S.1260§101 (A)(1)(Same)
③ Manual for complex litigation,4th.p531
④ 15 U.S.C.§78bb(F)(1)-(2)
⑤ See Larry E. Craig,Chairman,S.1260-The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998,Legislative Notice,U.S Senate Republican Policy Committee,May 11,1998,2
①See Robert S. Greenberger, Questioning The Books:Panel, In Enron'sWake, To Review Lawsuit Curbs, W All S T. J., Feb.6,2002, At A8; Stephen Labaton, Nowwho, Exactly, Gotus Into This?, N. Y. Tim Es, Feb.3, 2002, §3, At 1; Tamara Loomis, Enron And Reform:Congress Is Looking At Securities Litigation Law, N. Y. L. J., Mar.28,2002, P.5
② See Rinat Fried,In Brief,The Record,Feb.28,1997
③ See Jeffery Toobin,The Man Chasing Enron,The New Yorker,Sept.9,2002
①韩国效仿美国集团诉讼制度,于2004年1月20日通过了《证券相关的集团诉讼法》,该法已于2005年1月1日实施
①台湾地区“司法院”院解字第3104号解释
②台湾地区“司法院”院字第1431号解释
③地方地区“桃园地院”96年易字1217号判决
①News: Asia-Pacific:Shareholders Sue Korea Bank Over Bad Loans, Financial Times Mandate, June 6,1997
②Samsung Sued For Manipulating Documents At Failed E-Business A Non-Governmental Organization Has Filed A Lawsuit Against The Samsung Group In The Seoul District Court For Allegedly Having Manipulated Documents Before It Faces Probes On Suspicion Of Illega, KOREA TIMES,November 23,2001
①台湾地区“财政部”证券暨期货管理委员会(92)台财证(三)字第09201094594号函,核备订定发布全文15条
②财团法人证券投资人暨期货交易人保护中心办理团体诉讼或仲裁事件处理办法第6条、第8条
③财团法人证券投资人及期货交易人保护中心办理团体诉讼或仲裁事件处理办法第2条第2项
①台湾地区民事诉讼法第526条第1项、2项规定
①台湾地区强制执行法第28-2条规定
①参见2009年保护投资人权益系列座谈会,刘连煜教授、吴复兴(财团法人证券投资人及期货交易人保护机购中心总经理)发言部分,工商时报2009/7/29 A14版
②参见2009年保护投资人权益系列座淡会,周行一教授、台湾地区“金管会证期局”副局长王咏心发言部分,工商时报2009/7/29 A14版
③财团法人证券投资人及期货交易人保护中心办理证券投资人及期货交易人保护法第十条之一诉讼事件处理办法第3条
④参见2009年保护投资人权益系列座谈会,林国全教授发言部分,工商时报2009/7/29 A14版
①对于这方面的研究主要有：Generally Rafael La Porta Et Al.,Legal Determinants Of External Finance,52 J. FIN.1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta Et Al., Law And Finance,106 J. POL. ECON.1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta Et Al.,Investor Protection And Corporate Governance,58 J. FIN. ECON.3,4 (2000);Rafael La Porta Et Al., Investor Protection And Corporate Valuation,57 J. FIN.1147(2002); Rafael La Porta Et Al., What Works In Securities Laws?,61 J. FIN.1(2006)
①中国证券投资者保护基金公司2010年年报
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① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p256
② Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts,p43
Misko on Class Actions, p14
Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts,p44
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p236
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p237
① Rawlings v. prudential-bache props, inc.,9 F.3d 513,516(6th cir.1993)("the interest of class counsel in obtaining fees is adverse to the interest of the interest of the class in obtaining recovery because the fees come out of the common fund set up for the benefit of the class.")
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p213
③ Manual for complex litigation,4th.p185
④ Manual for complex litigation,4th.p186
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p186
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p186
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p188
②Goldberger v. Integrated Res.,Inc.,209 F.3d 43,50 (2d Cir.2000)(要求提供记录律师工作时数之文件作为合理比计算法交叉比对确认之用)；United States v.8.0 Acres of Land,197 F.3d 24,33(1st Cir.1999)(判决使用指标计算报酬法达到共同基之合理比率)；Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.,102F.3d 777,780 (6th Cir.1996)(支持地方法院在报酬判决难于共同基金之比例计算,但仍交叉检视集团师指数计算之工作时数)In re Gen. Motors Corp.,55 F.3d at 820(认为法院应该在认可报酬请求时以第二方法来检是使用第一计算方法之结论)
③487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973)
④Manual for complex litigation,4th.p190
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p193
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p189
①Manual for complex litigation,4th.p196
②Manual for complex litigation,4th.p1y6
③Manual for complex litigation,4th.p196
① Manual for complex litigation,4th.p197
①In Re Warner Communnications Sec.Litig.,618 F.Supp.735,740(S.D.N.Y.1985)
①The Definition Of "American Rule" Is "The General Policy That All Litigants, Even The Prevailing One, Must Bear Their Own Attorney's Fees. The Rule Is Subject To Bad-Faith And Other Statutory And Contractual Exceptions." See Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004).
②参见Janet Cooper Alexander, Do The Merits Matter:A Study Of Settlements In Securities Class Action,43 Stan. L. Rev.497 (1991).但有论者以其样本数仅1983年之8家科技公司因初次公开发行所涉之和解案为分析,显然在案件代表性及样本数上皆有讨论空间,See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter,108 Harv. L. Rev.438 (1994)即便有些和解案件的确欠缺法律依据,但也不能否认有些案件确实具有法律上之正当性,参见Steven P. Marino & RenEE D. Marino, An Empirical Study Of Recent Class Action Settlement Involving Ccountants, Attorneys, Or Underwriters,22 Sec. Reg. L.Rev.115 (1994).
①15 USC §78u-5(Ⅰ)(1)
② Manual for complex litigation,4th.p543
③ Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 21E,15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(C)(1)(A) Provides That (1) In General Except As Provided In Subsection (B) Of This Section, In Any Private Action Arising Under This Chapter That Is Based On An Untrue Statement Of A Material Fact Or Omission Of A Material Fact Necessary To Make The Statement Not Misleading, A Person Referred To In Subsection (A) Of This Section Shall Not Be Liable With Respect To Any Forward-Looking Statement, Whether Written Or Oral, If And To The Extent That—(A) The Forward-Looking Statement Is—(Ⅰ) Identified As A Forward-Looking Statement, And Is Accompanied By Meaningful Cautionary Statements Identifying Important Factors That Could Cause Actual Results To Differ Materially From Those In The Forward-Looking Statement; Or (Ii) Immaterial
④ Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 §21E,15 U.S.C. §78u-5(C)(1)(B) Provides That (B) The Plaintiff Fails To Prove That The Forward-Looking Statement—(I) If Made By A Natural Person, Was Made With Actual Knowledge By That Person That The Statement Was False Or Misleading
⑤ 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(B)(2)(C)-(E),78u-5(B)(2)(C)-(E)
⑥ 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(B)(2)(A),78u-5(B)(2)(A)
①Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 §21D(B)(2),15 U.S.C. §78u-4(B)(2) (2005) Provides That "In Any Private Action Arisingunder This Title In Which The Plaintiff May Recover Money Damages Only On Proof That The Defendant Acted With A Particular State Of Mind, The Complaint Shall, With Respect To Each Act Or Omission Alleged To Violate This Title, State With Particularity Facts Giving Rise To A Strong Inference That The Defendant Acted With The Required State Of Mind
②Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 §21D(B)(3)(B),15 U.S.C. §78u-4(B)(3)(B)
③Manual for complex litigation,4th.p544
④15 U.S.C.§78u-4(C)
15 U.S.C.§77(V)(A),77aa
15 U.S.C.§77p(F)(2)(A) ①具体来讲,SLUSA不适用于私人当事人依据州公司法提起的在州法院或联邦法院的诉讼,不适用十派生诉讼(Derivative Actions),不适用于州的官员(State Officials)提起的诉讼,不适用于依据发行人与信托人订立的合同提起的诉讼,不适用于“特拉华州例外”(Delaware Carve-Out)
② H.R.1689§2(A)(1)(Proposing To Add Securities Act§16(B));S.1260§101 (A)(1)(Same)
③ Manual for complex litigation,4th.p531
④ 15 U.S.C.§78bb(F)(1)-(2)
⑤ See Larry E. Craig,Chairman,S.1260-The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998,Legislative Notice,U.S Senate Republican Policy Committee,May 11,1998,2
①See Robert S. Greenberger, Questioning The Books:Panel, In Enron'sWake, To Review Lawsuit Curbs, W All S T. J., Feb.6,2002, At A8; Stephen Labaton, Nowwho, Exactly, Gotus Into This?, N. Y. Tim Es, Feb.3, 2002, §3, At 1; Tamara Loomis, Enron And Reform:Congress Is Looking At Securities Litigation Law, N. Y. L. J., Mar.28,2002, P.5
② See Rinat Fried,In Brief,The Record,Feb.28,1997
③ See Jeffery Toobin,The Man Chasing Enron,The New Yorker,Sept.9,2002
①韩国效仿美国集团诉讼制度,于2004年1月20日通过了《证券相关的集团诉讼法》,该法已于2005年1月1日实施
①台湾地区“司法院”院解字第3104号解释
②台湾地区“司法院”院字第1431号解释
③地方地区“桃园地院”96年易字1217号判决
①News: Asia-Pacific:Shareholders Sue Korea Bank Over Bad Loans, Financial Times Mandate, June 6,1997
②Samsung Sued For Manipulating Documents At Failed E-Business A Non-Governmental Organization Has Filed A Lawsuit Against The Samsung Group In The Seoul District Court For Allegedly Having Manipulated Documents Before It Faces Probes On Suspicion Of Illega, KOREA TIMES,November 23,2001
①台湾地区“财政部”证券暨期货管理委员会(92)台财证(三)字第09201094594号函,核备订定发布全文15条
②财团法人证券投资人暨期货交易人保护中心办理团体诉讼或仲裁事件处理办法第6条、第8条
③财团法人证券投资人及期货交易人保护中心办理团体诉讼或仲裁事件处理办法第2条第2项
①台湾地区民事诉讼法第526条第1项、2项规定
①台湾地区强制执行法第28-2条规定
①参见2009年保护投资人权益系列座谈会,刘连煜教授、吴复兴(财团法人证券投资人及期货交易人保护机购中心总经理)发言部分,工商时报2009/7/29 A14版
②参见2009年保护投资人权益系列座淡会,周行一教授、台湾地区“金管会证期局”副局长王咏心发言部分,工商时报2009/7/29 A14版
③财团法人证券投资人及期货交易人保护中心办理证券投资人及期货交易人保护法第十条之一诉讼事件处理办法第3条
④参见2009年保护投资人权益系列座谈会,林国全教授发言部分,工商时报2009/7/29 A14版
①对于这方面的研究主要有：Generally Rafael La Porta Et Al.,Legal Determinants Of External Finance,52 J. FIN.1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta Et Al., Law And Finance,106 J. POL. ECON.1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta Et Al.,Investor Protection And Corporate Governance,58 J. FIN. ECON.3,4 (2000);Rafael La Porta Et Al., Investor Protection And Corporate Valuation,57 J. FIN.1147(2002); Rafael La Porta Et Al., What Works In Securities Laws?,61 J. FIN.1(2006)
①中国证券投资者保护基金公司2010年年报
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