我国政策性银行转型路径研究
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摘要
政策性金融是在一国政府支持下,以国家信用为基础,以实现社会效益最大化为目的,通过对特定的领域、行业、地区和项目提供融资支持来体现政府意图,贯彻国家政策的金融活动。它和国家财政、商业性金融体系一起共同承担一国的金融资源配置职能。同时,它自身的职能定位将随着一国经济的市场化程度、不同发展阶段以及金融体系的完善程度而变化。直接反映为其与商业性金融、财政的制度边界发生变化。并且,作为政府来说,政策性金融这一制度安排存在的收益与成本也在发生变化。在某一时点,当政策性金融存在的成本大于其收益时,政府就有动因推动制度变迁,通过合理的路径安排,降低制度变迁成本,实现新制度安排所带来的潜在利润。
随着我国市场化程度的不断深入,市场机制所覆盖业务范围不断拓宽,导致政策性银行原有政策性业务不断萎缩,政策性银行作为一种制度安排的成本收益比发生了变化。十多年来,我国三大政策性银行在各自的经营过程中,自身的运营机制、资产质量、市场竞争力等不断发生变化并产生了内生的累积影响,随着贸易、投资、金融等经济活动全球化的不断深入,政府本身作为一个有着自身激励的行为主体,在新的时代背景下目标函数也发生了变化。三大政策性银行原来所从事的绝大部分业务均已为商业机制所覆盖,政策性业务不断萎缩。国家开发银行已具备直接向商业性银行转型条件。“三农”建设、支持进出口贸易和“走出去”战略,要求中国农业发展银行和中国进出口银行在未来较长一段时间里仍有必要从事政策性业务,这需要它们对所从事的业务领域进行重定位,同时加快内部体制、机制的变革,为全面商业化转型创造条件。
从政府的角度来说,政策性银行转型为商业性银行,尽管政府金融控制权削弱,但其获得收益更大。一方面其作为唯一出资人和为政策性银行经营亏损买单的责任将逐步消失,另一方面,可以减少政策性银行与商业性银行因边界模糊引起的竞争而导致的政府资源配置效率低下,以及政策性银行可能利用其政策支持而获得的竞争优势而与商业性银行竞争带来的市场价格机制的扭曲。因此,推动政策性银行转型为商业性银行,是政府的制度供给收益大于成本的一种理性选择。
政策性银行转型为商业性银行,其制度结构将发生变化：国家信用将退出,代之以市场信用和机构信用；产权结构多元化,政府背景将淡出；业务范围扩大化；筹资渠道市场化；公司治理规范化；运行机制商业化。相应地,政策性银行转型将对自身及市场各利益主体带来深远的影响。以国开行为例,对于国开行来说,缺乏政府支持的单一的长期、大额、集中的信贷业务模式对国开行经营的稳健性带来挑战,信用结构发生变化将对国开行筹资模式带来挑战,建立在软贷款上的制度性竞争优势不复存在。对于国开行金融债券的投资者来说,如果新老不划断,国开行债信等级的变化将对所有存量国开债的投资者带来较大的损失,对银行的资本充足率带来不利影响；如果马上与商业银行的监管框架接轨,则由于保险公司和商业银行受持有集中度的限制,无法足额承接国开行发行的存量和增量金融债券,在对投资者资产配置带来困难的同时,也将导致国开行债券发行困难。
为了降低转型成本,基于有利于金融资源的优化配置、有利于政策性银行向商业银行的平稳过渡和可持续发展、有利于减少对利益相关者的负面影响的原则,针对政策性银行转型中面临的约束条件,以及国家作为“第一行动集团”对稳定性的偏好,在借鉴国外政策性银行转型经验的基础上,本文认为渐进的转型模式对政策性银行来说是一种可选的低成本的制度变迁,政策性银行可采用如下路径实现顺利转型：设置过渡期,通过试验为下一步转型路径选择提供更多信息；政府资金逐步退出,逐步培养商业信用和市场竞争力；新老划断,双轨运行,保持债权债务的连续性；进行增量改革,拓宽业务领域和融资渠道；改制上市,完善公司治理结构；监管框架逐步与商业银行趋同,同时注意差异化。
Policy-based finance refers to a financial activity which is based on national credit, aims to maximize social benefits, and demonstrates the intent of government by supplying financing to given domains, industries, regions and projects under the support of national government. It assumes the responsibility to allocate financial resources of a country together with national finance and commerce financial systems. Simultaneously, a country's policy-based finance tends to change with the degree and development of its marketization as well as the progress of its financial system. And it can be directly reflected from its changing relation with commercial finance and boundary of financial policy. Furthermore, benefits and costs to arrange policy-based finance are also changing from the angle of government. When costs to arrange policy-based finance are more than its benefits, government has motivation to promote system transition, and reduce costs of system transition as well as explore potential profits brought by new system through reasonable channels.
As China's marketing economy constantly develops and business scope covered by marketing system continuously expands, original policy-related business in policy banks continually shrinks, and cost-benefit ratio as a system arrangement of policy banks has changed. Within more than ten years, operation system, assets quality, competitiveness and other aspects of three big policy banks in China have constantly changed and generated inside cumulative effects in their respective operation. With trade, investment, finance and other economic activities keep deepening their globalized trend, government as a self-stimulated action entity, its objective functions have also changed under the background of new ear. Most of the three policy banks'original business has been replaced by commercial system, and policy-related business constantly shrinks. Therefore, conditions are already mature for China Development Bank to be transformed to commercial bank directly. Policies like Construction of "Agriculture, Farmer, and Countryside", support for export and import trade, and strategy of "going global" cause Agriculture Bank of China and The Export-Import Bank of China necessarily to deal with policy-related business for a long time in the future. But a renewed position of business range is required for those banks, and meanwhile reforms of interior system and mechanism should be accelerated to create conditions for all-around commercialization.
From the angle of government, although policy bank's transition to commercial bank may weaken government's financial control, the benefits would be bigger. First, government would not be the only investor and its exclusive responsibility for the loss of the bank would gradually fade away. Besides, it would lessen the low efficiency of government in allocating resources for blurring boundary between policy banks and commercial banks as well as avoid marketing price system distortion caused by policy banks'competition with commercial banks since they enjoy policy backup. Therefore, to promote policy banks'transition to commercial banks is a rational choice for the government, and that would make it reap more benefits than pay costs.
Institution structure of policy banks would change after they transform to commercial bank:first, national credit would be withdrawn and replaced by market credit and institution credit; second, there would be a diversification of property right structure and government background would gradually fade out; third, business scope would be expanded; fourth, channel of raising fund would be marketlized; fifth, corporate governance would be standard; and finally, its operation would be commercialized. Accordingly, the transition of policy banks would produce profound influence on themselves as well as each market interest party. Take China Development Bank for an example, lack of long-term, large amount and collective credit operation pattern supported by government have brought a challenge to the steadiness of the bank's operation currently, and change of credit structure has challenged the fund raising pattern of the bank. Then, its institution competition advantage built upon soft loan would not exist any more. In terms of financial bond investors to the bank, if there is no differentiation between new and old systems, change of the bank's credit rate would cause serious loss to investors of the stock financial bonds issued by the bank, and affect capital adequacy ratio negatively. If the bank connects with commercial bank's supervision frame instantly, investors cannot fully carry on stocks and increment financial bonds issued by China Development bank for both insurance company and commercial bank are restricted by ownership centralization. That would make it hard for investors to allocate capital and also put up difficulties to the bank to issue bond.
In order to reduce transition costs, with the principle to favorably optimize allocation of financial resources, fulfill the peaceful transition and sustainable development of policy bank, and lessen negative affect on relevant interest parties, taking constraints that the banks would face in transition into account as well as country's emphasis on stability as "The First Act Group", on the base of learning from foreign countries'successful experience in policy banks transition, the writer believes gradual transition mode is a suitable choice for policy banks to change their system with low costs. And the banks could achieve their transition with following paths:first, to set transition period, and provide more information for channel of the next transition through experiments; second, to withdraw government fund step by step, and gradually foster commercial credit and market competitiveness; third, to differentiate new and old systems and remain the continuity of credit and liability through dual-path operation; fourth, to implement increment reform, and expand business scope and financing channels; fifth, to reconstruct IPO (initial public offering), and improve corporate governance structure; finally, to reform supervision framework similar to commercial banks gradually, and notice differentiation at the same time.
随着我国市场化程度的不断深入,市场机制所覆盖业务范围不断拓宽,导致政策性银行原有政策性业务不断萎缩,政策性银行作为一种制度安排的成本收益比发生了变化。十多年来,我国三大政策性银行在各自的经营过程中,自身的运营机制、资产质量、市场竞争力等不断发生变化并产生了内生的累积影响,随着贸易、投资、金融等经济活动全球化的不断深入,政府本身作为一个有着自身激励的行为主体,在新的时代背景下目标函数也发生了变化。三大政策性银行原来所从事的绝大部分业务均已为商业机制所覆盖,政策性业务不断萎缩。国家开发银行已具备直接向商业性银行转型条件。“三农”建设、支持进出口贸易和“走出去”战略,要求中国农业发展银行和中国进出口银行在未来较长一段时间里仍有必要从事政策性业务,这需要它们对所从事的业务领域进行重定位,同时加快内部体制、机制的变革,为全面商业化转型创造条件。
从政府的角度来说,政策性银行转型为商业性银行,尽管政府金融控制权削弱,但其获得收益更大。一方面其作为唯一出资人和为政策性银行经营亏损买单的责任将逐步消失,另一方面,可以减少政策性银行与商业性银行因边界模糊引起的竞争而导致的政府资源配置效率低下,以及政策性银行可能利用其政策支持而获得的竞争优势而与商业性银行竞争带来的市场价格机制的扭曲。因此,推动政策性银行转型为商业性银行,是政府的制度供给收益大于成本的一种理性选择。
政策性银行转型为商业性银行,其制度结构将发生变化：国家信用将退出,代之以市场信用和机构信用；产权结构多元化,政府背景将淡出；业务范围扩大化；筹资渠道市场化；公司治理规范化；运行机制商业化。相应地,政策性银行转型将对自身及市场各利益主体带来深远的影响。以国开行为例,对于国开行来说,缺乏政府支持的单一的长期、大额、集中的信贷业务模式对国开行经营的稳健性带来挑战,信用结构发生变化将对国开行筹资模式带来挑战,建立在软贷款上的制度性竞争优势不复存在。对于国开行金融债券的投资者来说,如果新老不划断,国开行债信等级的变化将对所有存量国开债的投资者带来较大的损失,对银行的资本充足率带来不利影响；如果马上与商业银行的监管框架接轨,则由于保险公司和商业银行受持有集中度的限制,无法足额承接国开行发行的存量和增量金融债券,在对投资者资产配置带来困难的同时,也将导致国开行债券发行困难。
为了降低转型成本,基于有利于金融资源的优化配置、有利于政策性银行向商业银行的平稳过渡和可持续发展、有利于减少对利益相关者的负面影响的原则,针对政策性银行转型中面临的约束条件,以及国家作为“第一行动集团”对稳定性的偏好,在借鉴国外政策性银行转型经验的基础上,本文认为渐进的转型模式对政策性银行来说是一种可选的低成本的制度变迁,政策性银行可采用如下路径实现顺利转型：设置过渡期,通过试验为下一步转型路径选择提供更多信息；政府资金逐步退出,逐步培养商业信用和市场竞争力；新老划断,双轨运行,保持债权债务的连续性；进行增量改革,拓宽业务领域和融资渠道；改制上市,完善公司治理结构；监管框架逐步与商业银行趋同,同时注意差异化。
Policy-based finance refers to a financial activity which is based on national credit, aims to maximize social benefits, and demonstrates the intent of government by supplying financing to given domains, industries, regions and projects under the support of national government. It assumes the responsibility to allocate financial resources of a country together with national finance and commerce financial systems. Simultaneously, a country's policy-based finance tends to change with the degree and development of its marketization as well as the progress of its financial system. And it can be directly reflected from its changing relation with commercial finance and boundary of financial policy. Furthermore, benefits and costs to arrange policy-based finance are also changing from the angle of government. When costs to arrange policy-based finance are more than its benefits, government has motivation to promote system transition, and reduce costs of system transition as well as explore potential profits brought by new system through reasonable channels.
As China's marketing economy constantly develops and business scope covered by marketing system continuously expands, original policy-related business in policy banks continually shrinks, and cost-benefit ratio as a system arrangement of policy banks has changed. Within more than ten years, operation system, assets quality, competitiveness and other aspects of three big policy banks in China have constantly changed and generated inside cumulative effects in their respective operation. With trade, investment, finance and other economic activities keep deepening their globalized trend, government as a self-stimulated action entity, its objective functions have also changed under the background of new ear. Most of the three policy banks'original business has been replaced by commercial system, and policy-related business constantly shrinks. Therefore, conditions are already mature for China Development Bank to be transformed to commercial bank directly. Policies like Construction of "Agriculture, Farmer, and Countryside", support for export and import trade, and strategy of "going global" cause Agriculture Bank of China and The Export-Import Bank of China necessarily to deal with policy-related business for a long time in the future. But a renewed position of business range is required for those banks, and meanwhile reforms of interior system and mechanism should be accelerated to create conditions for all-around commercialization.
From the angle of government, although policy bank's transition to commercial bank may weaken government's financial control, the benefits would be bigger. First, government would not be the only investor and its exclusive responsibility for the loss of the bank would gradually fade away. Besides, it would lessen the low efficiency of government in allocating resources for blurring boundary between policy banks and commercial banks as well as avoid marketing price system distortion caused by policy banks'competition with commercial banks since they enjoy policy backup. Therefore, to promote policy banks'transition to commercial banks is a rational choice for the government, and that would make it reap more benefits than pay costs.
Institution structure of policy banks would change after they transform to commercial bank:first, national credit would be withdrawn and replaced by market credit and institution credit; second, there would be a diversification of property right structure and government background would gradually fade out; third, business scope would be expanded; fourth, channel of raising fund would be marketlized; fifth, corporate governance would be standard; and finally, its operation would be commercialized. Accordingly, the transition of policy banks would produce profound influence on themselves as well as each market interest party. Take China Development Bank for an example, lack of long-term, large amount and collective credit operation pattern supported by government have brought a challenge to the steadiness of the bank's operation currently, and change of credit structure has challenged the fund raising pattern of the bank. Then, its institution competition advantage built upon soft loan would not exist any more. In terms of financial bond investors to the bank, if there is no differentiation between new and old systems, change of the bank's credit rate would cause serious loss to investors of the stock financial bonds issued by the bank, and affect capital adequacy ratio negatively. If the bank connects with commercial bank's supervision frame instantly, investors cannot fully carry on stocks and increment financial bonds issued by China Development bank for both insurance company and commercial bank are restricted by ownership centralization. That would make it hard for investors to allocate capital and also put up difficulties to the bank to issue bond.
In order to reduce transition costs, with the principle to favorably optimize allocation of financial resources, fulfill the peaceful transition and sustainable development of policy bank, and lessen negative affect on relevant interest parties, taking constraints that the banks would face in transition into account as well as country's emphasis on stability as "The First Act Group", on the base of learning from foreign countries'successful experience in policy banks transition, the writer believes gradual transition mode is a suitable choice for policy banks to change their system with low costs. And the banks could achieve their transition with following paths:first, to set transition period, and provide more information for channel of the next transition through experiments; second, to withdraw government fund step by step, and gradually foster commercial credit and market competitiveness; third, to differentiate new and old systems and remain the continuity of credit and liability through dual-path operation; fourth, to implement increment reform, and expand business scope and financing channels; fifth, to reconstruct IPO (initial public offering), and improve corporate governance structure; finally, to reform supervision framework similar to commercial banks gradually, and notice differentiation at the same time.
引文
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②王学人：《我国政策性金融研究综述》,求索,2006(7)
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② Andrew Walder:China's Transitional Economy, Oxford University Press,1996.
①庄辉：《充分发掘和运用我国政策性金融的作用》,宏观经济管理,2001(9).
①吴晓灵：《政策性银行应独立立法》,国际金融报,2003-4-23.
②国务院发展研究中心《开发性金融研究》课题组：《开发性金融在市场经济体系建设中的作用及其与财政的关系研究》,经济研究参考,2006,(12).
①袁庆明：《新制度经济学》,北京：中国发展出版社,2005年版.
①[比]热若尔.罗兰：《转型与经济学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2002年版
①樊纲：《两种改革成本与两种改革方式》,经济研究,1993,(1)
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