公用企业的治理与运营
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摘要
基于对公用事业自然垄断性的考虑,西方国家曾对公用事业普遍实行公有公营。随着自然垄断产业边界变化和政府规制理论的发展,20世纪70年代以来,以英、美为主的西方国家掀起了公用事业的民营化改造,通过企业化、公司化的形式,放松政府规制、引入竞争机制,逐步实现政企分开。这些改革措施在降低公用企业经营成本和提高企业效率起到了一定的作用。公用企业民营化改革趋势影响到了中国。
中国公用企业改革是伴随着国资国企改革深化而推进的,呈现出明显的非均衡性。这种非均衡性既表现为公用企业严重滞后于一般竞争性企业市场化改革,也表现为公用事业内部各行业改革不平衡。中国公用事业企业化改革后,在上世纪90年代以来,以“社会主义市场经济体制”确立为标志,掀起了新一轮制度变革。进入21世纪以来,尤其是加入WTO,市场开放度逐步提高,非公经济快速发展,加快公用企业市场化改革,解决目前面临的体制困挠和制度危机的矛盾和问题,提升公用企业内部经营效率势在必行。
本文从公用企业治理和运营视角,立足公用企业的“企业”经济特质,借助自然垄断、政府规制和企业共同治理模式等理论(第一章),在全面总结中国经济转型前后公用企业的发展轨迹(第二章),着重研究解决公用企业市场化改革中的四个问题:一是产权结构单一。要建立与公用企业有效竞争相适应的多元产权结构,剥离竞争性垄断业务,建立国有单一产权结构调节机制,实现政府控制与市场化改造的相结合(第三章)。二是治理机制固化。基于公用企业的社会性之特质,引入公用企业的核心利益相关者,实现共同治理下的多元利益主体的均衡(第四章)。三是内部动力不足。公用企业传统的成本加成定价方式,缺少降低成本的激励,与公用企业市场化改革不协调,因此,选择高强度的激励性定价机制应用到公用事业不同领域,增强企业内部经营效率的驱动力(第五章)。四是融资模式老化问题。推行ABS资产证券化,将公用事业资产中一部分具有稳定的现金流的资产进行组合,使之资产证券化,然后筹得资金,这是解决资金问题的有效方式之一。并分析了公用企业实施ABS模式的优势和环境(第六章)。在本文最后一章(第七章),对上海公交企业运营模式改革的案例进行了分析。
Because of natural monopoly, public utilities used to be run by the public sector in the western countries. However, with the evolution of natural monopoly industries and further development of government regulation theories, there has been a privatization drive in such western countries as the U.S. and Britain since 1970s. With government regulations eased and competitive mechanism introduced, Public utilities are industrialized and incorporated, separated from the public sector. All these measures have been playing a considerable part in cutting operation costs and improving efficiency in public utilities. And now, China is beginning to gear up with the rest of the world through embracing the privatization orientation.
Progressing along with the deepened reform of state-owned assets and enterprises, the reform of Chinese utility enterprises has apparently been lopsided, which is manifested on one hand in the fact that the utilities reform is lagging far behind that of other competitive enterprises, and on the other hand in the lopsided reform development of various departments comprising public utilities. Ever since the foundation of the“socialist market economy mechanism”in 1990s, there has been a new round of institutional reform concerning the privatization of public utilities. The advent of 21st century and entry into WTO have brought on further market open-up and the acceleration of the private sector. As a result, what top the agenda of the government institutional reform are the facilitation of market-oriented reform of public utility enterprises, the resolution of the institutional confusion and crisis, and the promotion of the operation efficiency of public utility enterprises.
From the perspective of utility enterprise governance and operation, this thesis begins with the introduction of such theories as natural monopoly, incentive regulation and co-operational governance models of enterprises in chapter 1. A comprehensive elaboration on the utility enterprise development before and after the transformation of Chinese economy follows in chapter 2, before the emphasis of this thesis is raised, i.e. the resolution of the four problems involved in the market-oriented reform of public utility enterprises. First, chapter 3 deals with the property problem. A multi-property structure is to be set up to accord with the competitive system. A regulation mechanism should be created to coordinate government regulation and market reform. Chapter 4 concerns the inflexible management mechanism. Based on the social nature of public utilities, relevant core interests should be allowed to partake so that a co-operated multi-interest balance can be realized. Chapter 5 discusses the insufficiency of internal impetus. The traditional cost-plus pricing does not encourage cost efficiency, and can not meet the requirements of market-oriented reform of public utilities. Therefore, incentive pricing should be introduced into various departments of public utilities, giving an impetus to internal operational efficiency. Chapter 6 elaborates on the outdated financing model. One of the effective approaches to cope with this problem is to promote ABS asset backed securitization, under which model the part of public utility assets which provides steady cash flow can be securitized to raise funds. The ABS enjoys merits superior to the BOT, and is highly feasible in China. Chapter 7, i.e. the last chapter of this thesis, winds up the discussion with a case analysis of the operational reform of public transport service in Shanghai.
中国公用企业改革是伴随着国资国企改革深化而推进的,呈现出明显的非均衡性。这种非均衡性既表现为公用企业严重滞后于一般竞争性企业市场化改革,也表现为公用事业内部各行业改革不平衡。中国公用事业企业化改革后,在上世纪90年代以来,以“社会主义市场经济体制”确立为标志,掀起了新一轮制度变革。进入21世纪以来,尤其是加入WTO,市场开放度逐步提高,非公经济快速发展,加快公用企业市场化改革,解决目前面临的体制困挠和制度危机的矛盾和问题,提升公用企业内部经营效率势在必行。
本文从公用企业治理和运营视角,立足公用企业的“企业”经济特质,借助自然垄断、政府规制和企业共同治理模式等理论(第一章),在全面总结中国经济转型前后公用企业的发展轨迹(第二章),着重研究解决公用企业市场化改革中的四个问题:一是产权结构单一。要建立与公用企业有效竞争相适应的多元产权结构,剥离竞争性垄断业务,建立国有单一产权结构调节机制,实现政府控制与市场化改造的相结合(第三章)。二是治理机制固化。基于公用企业的社会性之特质,引入公用企业的核心利益相关者,实现共同治理下的多元利益主体的均衡(第四章)。三是内部动力不足。公用企业传统的成本加成定价方式,缺少降低成本的激励,与公用企业市场化改革不协调,因此,选择高强度的激励性定价机制应用到公用事业不同领域,增强企业内部经营效率的驱动力(第五章)。四是融资模式老化问题。推行ABS资产证券化,将公用事业资产中一部分具有稳定的现金流的资产进行组合,使之资产证券化,然后筹得资金,这是解决资金问题的有效方式之一。并分析了公用企业实施ABS模式的优势和环境(第六章)。在本文最后一章(第七章),对上海公交企业运营模式改革的案例进行了分析。
Because of natural monopoly, public utilities used to be run by the public sector in the western countries. However, with the evolution of natural monopoly industries and further development of government regulation theories, there has been a privatization drive in such western countries as the U.S. and Britain since 1970s. With government regulations eased and competitive mechanism introduced, Public utilities are industrialized and incorporated, separated from the public sector. All these measures have been playing a considerable part in cutting operation costs and improving efficiency in public utilities. And now, China is beginning to gear up with the rest of the world through embracing the privatization orientation.
Progressing along with the deepened reform of state-owned assets and enterprises, the reform of Chinese utility enterprises has apparently been lopsided, which is manifested on one hand in the fact that the utilities reform is lagging far behind that of other competitive enterprises, and on the other hand in the lopsided reform development of various departments comprising public utilities. Ever since the foundation of the“socialist market economy mechanism”in 1990s, there has been a new round of institutional reform concerning the privatization of public utilities. The advent of 21st century and entry into WTO have brought on further market open-up and the acceleration of the private sector. As a result, what top the agenda of the government institutional reform are the facilitation of market-oriented reform of public utility enterprises, the resolution of the institutional confusion and crisis, and the promotion of the operation efficiency of public utility enterprises.
From the perspective of utility enterprise governance and operation, this thesis begins with the introduction of such theories as natural monopoly, incentive regulation and co-operational governance models of enterprises in chapter 1. A comprehensive elaboration on the utility enterprise development before and after the transformation of Chinese economy follows in chapter 2, before the emphasis of this thesis is raised, i.e. the resolution of the four problems involved in the market-oriented reform of public utility enterprises. First, chapter 3 deals with the property problem. A multi-property structure is to be set up to accord with the competitive system. A regulation mechanism should be created to coordinate government regulation and market reform. Chapter 4 concerns the inflexible management mechanism. Based on the social nature of public utilities, relevant core interests should be allowed to partake so that a co-operated multi-interest balance can be realized. Chapter 5 discusses the insufficiency of internal impetus. The traditional cost-plus pricing does not encourage cost efficiency, and can not meet the requirements of market-oriented reform of public utilities. Therefore, incentive pricing should be introduced into various departments of public utilities, giving an impetus to internal operational efficiency. Chapter 6 elaborates on the outdated financing model. One of the effective approaches to cope with this problem is to promote ABS asset backed securitization, under which model the part of public utility assets which provides steady cash flow can be securitized to raise funds. The ABS enjoys merits superior to the BOT, and is highly feasible in China. Chapter 7, i.e. the last chapter of this thesis, winds up the discussion with a case analysis of the operational reform of public transport service in Shanghai.
引文
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