法律环境对投资者股市参与和上市公司治理的影响：理论和实证研究
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摘要
公司治理一直是学术界关注的热点问题之一。在不同时期,不同国家和地区经济发展的实践不同,人们对公司的性质、如何治理公司等问题的认识存在重大差异,因而在世界范围内出现了许多不同的治理模式。但20世纪80年代以来,随着经济全球化和金融市场一体化的进程,公司治理模式在世界范围内出现了一定程度的趋同,通过建立良好的法律环境和发达的金融市场来动员和吸引资金、利用外部机制促使公司建立规范的治理结构也逐步成为公司治理研究的重要内容。在这个背景下,对不同国家和地区的公司治理进行比较分析、寻找或发现更优的制度设计成为各国展开公司治理改革的一个重要议题。在理论研究方面,20世纪末期以来以LLSV为代表的部分学者注意到,公司治理的主要矛盾在于解决控股股东和中小股东之间的利益冲突,法律对中小投资者利益的保护程度对于吸引投资者参与和改善公司治理结构而言至关重要,它决定了资本市场的发达程度,并在长期内影响经济的可持续增长。我国自20世纪90年代初以来,证券市场发展取得了举世瞩目的成就,一大批国有和民营企业通过上市融资、改善治理结构而获得了长期发展能力,上市公司正逐步成为国家和地方经济发展的中坚力量。与此同时,股票投资的社会关注度也日渐提高,逐渐成为我国个人或家庭最重要、最常见的理财工具。但另一方面,我国证券市场发展一直不太正常,广大中小投资者的利益仍得不到有效的法律保护。这种局面一方面导致了相关法律对上市公司缺乏应有的约束作用,促使上市公司内部人或实际控制人敢于挑战法律的权威,选择侵害股东特别是中小股东利益的方式来追求私利,不利于上市公司治理的改善和公司质量的提高;另一方面也妨碍了我国中小投资者投资理念的形成,直接造成了市场投机之风盛行和股市的大起大落,不利于证券市场的健康发展。因此,研究法律环境对投资者股市参与和上市公司治理的影响具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文的研究包括八章,相应的内容安排为:第一章对写作的出发点、研究方法和创新点进行介绍。第二章是文献综述。理论界对公司治理的研究较多,结合交叉性研究的特点,本文选择从公司治理的法经济学理论和法与金融理论两个角度对相关文献进行梳理和简要评论。第三章试图建立一个分析框架,探讨公司治理模式的发展演变以及个人投资者与和上市公司治理之间的关系,并在此基础上,简要分析我国公司治理改革和证券市场发展的主要特点。第四和第五章分析法律环境对个人投资者股市参与的影响。其中,第四章利用跨国数据实证检验法律环境和股权结构对个人投资者参与程度的影响;第五章对我国个人投资者参与股市的程度进行了量化分析,并结合其特征利用我国分地区面板数据检验证券执法对股市参与的影响。第六和第七章考察法律环境对上市公司治理的作用。其中,第六章对LLSV模型进行了拓展,建立了以投资者诉讼为中心的不完全信息博弈模型,分析投资者诉讼以及与此相关联的立法和执法活动对上市公司的威慑作用。在此基础上,利用国际数据对主要结论进行实证检验;第七章利用我国分地区面板数据实证检验证券执法对公司治理的影响。第八章是结论和政策建议。
本文是法和金融的交叉研究,目的在于分析法律环境对个人投资者股市参与和上市公司治理的影响,创新之处在于:①借鉴LLSV模型的研究思路,运用博弈论方法建立模型从理论上研究了法律环境对上市公司治理的影响,并在此基础上利用国际和国内相关数据对理论结果进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,在其他条件不变的条件下,中小投资者利益保护书面立法和法律执行力度的加强对于上市公司治理改善具有显著正向作用;我国规范证券市场发展的立法导向存在一定偏差,投资者诉讼缺乏有力的执法保证,需要进一步加强法院执法的力度。②基于国际数据对世界主要国家和地区居民股市参与率进行了比较分析,并利用27个国家和地区的横截面数据实证研究了法律制度和股权结构对股票市场参与率的影响。研究发现,无论是发达还是在发展中国家和地区,均存在显著的有限参与现象,发达国家和地区居民的股市参与率在总体上高于发展中国家和地区;个人投资者股市参与程度受到法律制度和股权结构的显著影响,同时股权结构是影响法律制度作用发挥的重要因素。③基于我国证券市场个人投资者账户数据,量化分析了我国不同时期和不同地区个人投资者参与股市的程度,实证研究了我国以法院为中心和以监管机构为中心的两类执法活动对个人投资者股市参与率的影响。研究表明,我国公众参与股市的程度总体不高但发展迅速,而且存在显著的地区性差异、行情驱动性和市场反应滞后性特征;以法院为中心和以监管机构为中心的两类执法活动对个人投资者股市参与的影响存在显著差异。上述研究在理论上对LLSV模型进行了拓展和深化,在一定程度上丰富和充实了公司治理的法与金融理论,在实证上进一步提供了国内外法律环境对投资者参与和上市公司治理影响的经验证据,同时也为我国规范证券市场发展和保护中小股东利益法律法规的进一步完善提供了参考。
Corporate governance is a hot topic since the corporate came into existence. In different times, scholars have different opinions on those issues like the origins of firms and how to govern corporate. As a result, the governance models and governance mechanism differ around the world. However, due to the globalization of world economy and the intergrity of financial markets, there is tendency of convergence in corporate governance around the world since 1980th. Legal environment and securities market are viewed as important ways to moblize and absorb capital, improve the quality of corporate governance. Because of those changes, an important issue in corporate governance reform around the world is how to borrow more ideas and find better institutions to improve corporate governance from the other countries. In theoretical research, LLSV and some other scholars argue that a important problem in corporate governance is to solve the interest conflict between the control shareholder and the minor shareholders. To achieve that objective, legal environment is critical to the development of capital market, the improvement of investors’confidence, which is of great important to the allocation of capital. Through that channel, legal institutions matter for the improvement of corporate governance and the development of economy, which is important for the economy growth in the long term. In China, the capital market is developing quickly since the establishment of securities markets in early 1990s. A great number of companies have achieved the growth ability in the long run through raising money from the securities market and improving the corporate governance qualily. Due to that change, the listed companies have been gradually becoming the most important part to the economy development of our country and different regions. Meanwhile, stock investment is becoming a regular and important invest channel for the public and is gaining more and more attention. However, the protection of the interests of minor investor by the legal system is still weak, which has negative effects on the improvement of corporate governance and stock market participation. Under this situation, the stuey on the effects of legal environment on stock market participation and corporate governance has important theoretical and pratical significance.
This dissertation is divided into eight sections. The first section is on the basic ideas, the research methods and the possible innovative points. The second section is the literature review on those researches from the prospectives of“law and economics”and “law and finance”. In the third section, this article attempts to establish an analythetical framework to discuss the diffecences and the changes of insider and outsider governance models, the relationship between the individual and corporate and the development of the securities markets and corporage governance reform in China. The fourth and fifth sections study the effects of legal environment on stock market participation. In these two parts, this article calculated the participation rate and analysed the effect of legal environment empirically. The sixth and seventh sections are about the effects of legal environment on listed companies by employing an imperfect game model between outside investor and the listed companies. According to the results drawing from the model, this article analysed the effects of book law and law enforcement on corporate governance empirically. The final part is about the results and policy implications.
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary research of law and finance, which aims at analysising the effects of legal environment on the stock market participation and listed companies’governance. The innovations can be listed as follows:①Following LLSV’s model, this dissertation analysed the effects of legal environment on listed companies’governance by establishing a game theory model and tested the main conclusions empirically by employing the cross-section international datas and panal datas of 30 regions in China. The results show that the improvement of written law and law enforcement has positive effects on the corporate governance, and the written law and law enforcement regulating the development of securities markets and corporate governance should be improved in China.②This dissertation draw a comparative study on the stock market participation difference across the world and studied the effects of legal environment and shareholder structure on the stock market participation empirically by employing 27samples. The results showed that the stock market participation rates in developed countries and regions are higher than those in developing ones overally, and, both legal environment and shareholder structure have significant effects on stock market participation.③This dissertation measured the stock market participation rate in different time and different regions in China by employing the datas of the individual investors and tested the effects of two kinds of law enforcement,which are called as the enforcement taking the courts as centre and the law enforcement taking regulatory instutition as centre, on stock market participation. The results showed that the stock market participation is relatively low but is developing very quickly. And, there are great regional differences in stock market participation, the participation decisions of individual investors are driven by the market expectation and their reactions are lagged behind the market most of the time. Then, this dissertation tested the effects of law enforcement on the stock market participation rate by employing the panal regional datas, which showed that the effects of the two different kinds of law encorcement mentioned above are greatly different. As a conclusion, the research of this dissertation enriched and deepened related researches theoretically and empirically, and the main results have important policy implications to the further reform of securities markets and corporate governance in China.
本文的研究包括八章,相应的内容安排为:第一章对写作的出发点、研究方法和创新点进行介绍。第二章是文献综述。理论界对公司治理的研究较多,结合交叉性研究的特点,本文选择从公司治理的法经济学理论和法与金融理论两个角度对相关文献进行梳理和简要评论。第三章试图建立一个分析框架,探讨公司治理模式的发展演变以及个人投资者与和上市公司治理之间的关系,并在此基础上,简要分析我国公司治理改革和证券市场发展的主要特点。第四和第五章分析法律环境对个人投资者股市参与的影响。其中,第四章利用跨国数据实证检验法律环境和股权结构对个人投资者参与程度的影响;第五章对我国个人投资者参与股市的程度进行了量化分析,并结合其特征利用我国分地区面板数据检验证券执法对股市参与的影响。第六和第七章考察法律环境对上市公司治理的作用。其中,第六章对LLSV模型进行了拓展,建立了以投资者诉讼为中心的不完全信息博弈模型,分析投资者诉讼以及与此相关联的立法和执法活动对上市公司的威慑作用。在此基础上,利用国际数据对主要结论进行实证检验;第七章利用我国分地区面板数据实证检验证券执法对公司治理的影响。第八章是结论和政策建议。
本文是法和金融的交叉研究,目的在于分析法律环境对个人投资者股市参与和上市公司治理的影响,创新之处在于:①借鉴LLSV模型的研究思路,运用博弈论方法建立模型从理论上研究了法律环境对上市公司治理的影响,并在此基础上利用国际和国内相关数据对理论结果进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,在其他条件不变的条件下,中小投资者利益保护书面立法和法律执行力度的加强对于上市公司治理改善具有显著正向作用;我国规范证券市场发展的立法导向存在一定偏差,投资者诉讼缺乏有力的执法保证,需要进一步加强法院执法的力度。②基于国际数据对世界主要国家和地区居民股市参与率进行了比较分析,并利用27个国家和地区的横截面数据实证研究了法律制度和股权结构对股票市场参与率的影响。研究发现,无论是发达还是在发展中国家和地区,均存在显著的有限参与现象,发达国家和地区居民的股市参与率在总体上高于发展中国家和地区;个人投资者股市参与程度受到法律制度和股权结构的显著影响,同时股权结构是影响法律制度作用发挥的重要因素。③基于我国证券市场个人投资者账户数据,量化分析了我国不同时期和不同地区个人投资者参与股市的程度,实证研究了我国以法院为中心和以监管机构为中心的两类执法活动对个人投资者股市参与率的影响。研究表明,我国公众参与股市的程度总体不高但发展迅速,而且存在显著的地区性差异、行情驱动性和市场反应滞后性特征;以法院为中心和以监管机构为中心的两类执法活动对个人投资者股市参与的影响存在显著差异。上述研究在理论上对LLSV模型进行了拓展和深化,在一定程度上丰富和充实了公司治理的法与金融理论,在实证上进一步提供了国内外法律环境对投资者参与和上市公司治理影响的经验证据,同时也为我国规范证券市场发展和保护中小股东利益法律法规的进一步完善提供了参考。
Corporate governance is a hot topic since the corporate came into existence. In different times, scholars have different opinions on those issues like the origins of firms and how to govern corporate. As a result, the governance models and governance mechanism differ around the world. However, due to the globalization of world economy and the intergrity of financial markets, there is tendency of convergence in corporate governance around the world since 1980th. Legal environment and securities market are viewed as important ways to moblize and absorb capital, improve the quality of corporate governance. Because of those changes, an important issue in corporate governance reform around the world is how to borrow more ideas and find better institutions to improve corporate governance from the other countries. In theoretical research, LLSV and some other scholars argue that a important problem in corporate governance is to solve the interest conflict between the control shareholder and the minor shareholders. To achieve that objective, legal environment is critical to the development of capital market, the improvement of investors’confidence, which is of great important to the allocation of capital. Through that channel, legal institutions matter for the improvement of corporate governance and the development of economy, which is important for the economy growth in the long term. In China, the capital market is developing quickly since the establishment of securities markets in early 1990s. A great number of companies have achieved the growth ability in the long run through raising money from the securities market and improving the corporate governance qualily. Due to that change, the listed companies have been gradually becoming the most important part to the economy development of our country and different regions. Meanwhile, stock investment is becoming a regular and important invest channel for the public and is gaining more and more attention. However, the protection of the interests of minor investor by the legal system is still weak, which has negative effects on the improvement of corporate governance and stock market participation. Under this situation, the stuey on the effects of legal environment on stock market participation and corporate governance has important theoretical and pratical significance.
This dissertation is divided into eight sections. The first section is on the basic ideas, the research methods and the possible innovative points. The second section is the literature review on those researches from the prospectives of“law and economics”and “law and finance”. In the third section, this article attempts to establish an analythetical framework to discuss the diffecences and the changes of insider and outsider governance models, the relationship between the individual and corporate and the development of the securities markets and corporage governance reform in China. The fourth and fifth sections study the effects of legal environment on stock market participation. In these two parts, this article calculated the participation rate and analysed the effect of legal environment empirically. The sixth and seventh sections are about the effects of legal environment on listed companies by employing an imperfect game model between outside investor and the listed companies. According to the results drawing from the model, this article analysed the effects of book law and law enforcement on corporate governance empirically. The final part is about the results and policy implications.
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary research of law and finance, which aims at analysising the effects of legal environment on the stock market participation and listed companies’governance. The innovations can be listed as follows:①Following LLSV’s model, this dissertation analysed the effects of legal environment on listed companies’governance by establishing a game theory model and tested the main conclusions empirically by employing the cross-section international datas and panal datas of 30 regions in China. The results show that the improvement of written law and law enforcement has positive effects on the corporate governance, and the written law and law enforcement regulating the development of securities markets and corporate governance should be improved in China.②This dissertation draw a comparative study on the stock market participation difference across the world and studied the effects of legal environment and shareholder structure on the stock market participation empirically by employing 27samples. The results showed that the stock market participation rates in developed countries and regions are higher than those in developing ones overally, and, both legal environment and shareholder structure have significant effects on stock market participation.③This dissertation measured the stock market participation rate in different time and different regions in China by employing the datas of the individual investors and tested the effects of two kinds of law enforcement,which are called as the enforcement taking the courts as centre and the law enforcement taking regulatory instutition as centre, on stock market participation. The results showed that the stock market participation is relatively low but is developing very quickly. And, there are great regional differences in stock market participation, the participation decisions of individual investors are driven by the market expectation and their reactions are lagged behind the market most of the time. Then, this dissertation tested the effects of law enforcement on the stock market participation rate by employing the panal regional datas, which showed that the effects of the two different kinds of law encorcement mentioned above are greatly different. As a conclusion, the research of this dissertation enriched and deepened related researches theoretically and empirically, and the main results have important policy implications to the further reform of securities markets and corporate governance in China.
引文
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