中央银行沟通： 理论与实践
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摘要
所谓的中央银行沟通，指的是中央银行向相关主体披露货币政策信息并寻求该信息为沟通对象理解认同的信息沟通过程。随着货币政策“预期管理”的本质特征日益得到认同，各国中央银行相继摒弃以往的隐秘性文化，逐渐变得愿意并且乐于通过中央银行沟通的方式来追求实现其货币政策目标，中央银行沟通成了传统工具外中央银行可资利用的“新的货币政策工具”。虽然实践方面取得巨大进展，但由于其浓厚的“艺术”特性，中央银行沟通相关研究仍处于极其初步的状态。本文正是试图在借鉴前人相关研究的基础上，对中央银行沟通进行系统的理论研究与实践经验总结，以填补现有理论研究空白，并为具体实践提供指导。
在对既有文献进行全面梳理的基础上，本文沿着中央银行沟通是什么、为什么应该进行、具体怎么做的逻辑链条展开研究。在清晰界定中央银行沟通的定义、指明其与货币政策有效性关系后，文章的研究重心放在探讨中央银行沟通怎么做上面：深入研究了中央银行沟通的三大可行性限制边界，并相应探讨了延展扩宽之道；通过构建一个包含沟通误差的Morris-Shin扩展模型，具体回答了“中央银行应何时畅所欲言、何时缄默不语、何时刻意含糊”，得出了“中央银行应积极对外披露准确度高的信息，而对于披露准确度低的信息，则应采取十分谨慎的态度”的有效沟通基本原则；通过构建经济主体处于两个不同行业的Morris-Shin扩展模型，具体回答了“决定对外披露信息时中央银行又应选择何种沟通方式”，得出了“中央银行应采取透明化而非黑箱式的披露方式，以方便经济主体结合自身信息做出正确决策”的另一有效沟通基本原则。在上述理论分析的基础上，文章进而考察中央银行沟通的具体实践经验，多个国家日常及非常时期的沟通实践印证了上述基本结论，并提供了一系列可资借鉴的沟通技巧。文章最后具体考察了中国人民银行的沟通实践，并针对性地提出了改进中国人民银行沟通实践的政策建议。
本文的学术价值主要体现在以下几个方面：1、首次对中央银行沟通进行了系统、全面的考察，为后继研究搭建起一个基本分析框架。2、通过分析中央银行沟通的可行性边界，以及构建两个Morris-Shin扩展模型，提炼出中央银行沟通应遵循的基本前提与基本原则，为中央银行沟通实践提供科学指导。3、详细考察了各国中央银行沟通实践，并从中提炼出一系列可资借鉴的经验教训与沟通技巧。
Central bank communication can be defined as the process in which the central bank discloses the monetary policy information to the target groups and seeks the information digested by the target groups. Central banks were shrouded in mystery previously, but now the essence of monetary policy is the art of managing expectations has already became received wisdom, and central banks around the world are willing to pursue of their monetary policy objective through central bank communication. Central bank communication is no longer the taboo of the central bank circles, but has become the new monetary policy instrument available to the central bank beyond the traditional tools. Although the practice had made tremendous progress, because of its art essence, the research of central bank communication is still in very preliminary status. This paper can be seen as a valuable attempt in this field. Based on the previous research, this paper carries out systematic theoretical research into central bank communication and summarizes the related international experiences aiming to fill the gaps in theoretical research and provide valuable guidance for the practice.
Based on the fully literature review, this paper unfolds the research into central bank communication under the logic of "what is central bank communication, why is it desirable to carry out central bank communication, and how to implement it". After defining central bank communication clearly and pointing out the relationship between central bank communication and the effectiveness of monetary policy, this paper focuses on the study of how to implement it. Firstly, this paper analyzes the three feasible boundaries of central bank communication and points out how to expand the feasible areas. Secondly, by building a Morris-Shin style model with communication errors, this paper successfully answers the question that when should the central bank talk freely, keep silent, and mumble with great incoherence, then we get the first fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication which says that the central bank should actively disclose accurate information, but for the disclosure of information with low accuracy, it should adopt a very cautious attitude. Thirdly, by building a Morris-Shin style model with two different industries, this paper successfully answers the question that which communication methods should the central bank take if it has decided to disclose information, the we get the second fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication which says that central bank should take the transparent communication method instead of the black-box-style disclosure means aiming to facilitate the use of the private information of agents. Fourthly, this paper makes a detailed investigation into the practices of central bank communication around the world, and draws some valuable experiences and skills. It is easy to find that the practices confirm the main conclusions of this paper. Finally, this paper analyzes the central bank communication practices of the People's Bank of China thoroughly, and puts forward some operable recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the central bank communication of PBC.
The academic contribution of this paper can be expressed as follow. Firstly, this paper is the first attempt to carry out systematic research into central bank communication, the conclusion of this paper can be seen as the basic analytical framework for the follow-up research. Secondly, by analyzing the feasible boundaries of central bank communication and building two Morris-Shin style models, this paper successfully summarizes the basic premise and fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication, and these can provide scientific guidance for the practice. Thirdly, this paper makes a detailed investigation into the practices of central bank communication around the world, and draws some valuable experiences and skills.
在对既有文献进行全面梳理的基础上，本文沿着中央银行沟通是什么、为什么应该进行、具体怎么做的逻辑链条展开研究。在清晰界定中央银行沟通的定义、指明其与货币政策有效性关系后，文章的研究重心放在探讨中央银行沟通怎么做上面：深入研究了中央银行沟通的三大可行性限制边界，并相应探讨了延展扩宽之道；通过构建一个包含沟通误差的Morris-Shin扩展模型，具体回答了“中央银行应何时畅所欲言、何时缄默不语、何时刻意含糊”，得出了“中央银行应积极对外披露准确度高的信息，而对于披露准确度低的信息，则应采取十分谨慎的态度”的有效沟通基本原则；通过构建经济主体处于两个不同行业的Morris-Shin扩展模型，具体回答了“决定对外披露信息时中央银行又应选择何种沟通方式”，得出了“中央银行应采取透明化而非黑箱式的披露方式，以方便经济主体结合自身信息做出正确决策”的另一有效沟通基本原则。在上述理论分析的基础上，文章进而考察中央银行沟通的具体实践经验，多个国家日常及非常时期的沟通实践印证了上述基本结论，并提供了一系列可资借鉴的沟通技巧。文章最后具体考察了中国人民银行的沟通实践，并针对性地提出了改进中国人民银行沟通实践的政策建议。
本文的学术价值主要体现在以下几个方面：1、首次对中央银行沟通进行了系统、全面的考察，为后继研究搭建起一个基本分析框架。2、通过分析中央银行沟通的可行性边界，以及构建两个Morris-Shin扩展模型，提炼出中央银行沟通应遵循的基本前提与基本原则，为中央银行沟通实践提供科学指导。3、详细考察了各国中央银行沟通实践，并从中提炼出一系列可资借鉴的经验教训与沟通技巧。
Central bank communication can be defined as the process in which the central bank discloses the monetary policy information to the target groups and seeks the information digested by the target groups. Central banks were shrouded in mystery previously, but now the essence of monetary policy is the art of managing expectations has already became received wisdom, and central banks around the world are willing to pursue of their monetary policy objective through central bank communication. Central bank communication is no longer the taboo of the central bank circles, but has become the new monetary policy instrument available to the central bank beyond the traditional tools. Although the practice had made tremendous progress, because of its art essence, the research of central bank communication is still in very preliminary status. This paper can be seen as a valuable attempt in this field. Based on the previous research, this paper carries out systematic theoretical research into central bank communication and summarizes the related international experiences aiming to fill the gaps in theoretical research and provide valuable guidance for the practice.
Based on the fully literature review, this paper unfolds the research into central bank communication under the logic of "what is central bank communication, why is it desirable to carry out central bank communication, and how to implement it". After defining central bank communication clearly and pointing out the relationship between central bank communication and the effectiveness of monetary policy, this paper focuses on the study of how to implement it. Firstly, this paper analyzes the three feasible boundaries of central bank communication and points out how to expand the feasible areas. Secondly, by building a Morris-Shin style model with communication errors, this paper successfully answers the question that when should the central bank talk freely, keep silent, and mumble with great incoherence, then we get the first fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication which says that the central bank should actively disclose accurate information, but for the disclosure of information with low accuracy, it should adopt a very cautious attitude. Thirdly, by building a Morris-Shin style model with two different industries, this paper successfully answers the question that which communication methods should the central bank take if it has decided to disclose information, the we get the second fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication which says that central bank should take the transparent communication method instead of the black-box-style disclosure means aiming to facilitate the use of the private information of agents. Fourthly, this paper makes a detailed investigation into the practices of central bank communication around the world, and draws some valuable experiences and skills. It is easy to find that the practices confirm the main conclusions of this paper. Finally, this paper analyzes the central bank communication practices of the People's Bank of China thoroughly, and puts forward some operable recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the central bank communication of PBC.
The academic contribution of this paper can be expressed as follow. Firstly, this paper is the first attempt to carry out systematic research into central bank communication, the conclusion of this paper can be seen as the basic analytical framework for the follow-up research. Secondly, by analyzing the feasible boundaries of central bank communication and building two Morris-Shin style models, this paper successfully summarizes the basic premise and fundamental principles for the effective central bank communication, and these can provide scientific guidance for the practice. Thirdly, this paper makes a detailed investigation into the practices of central bank communication around the world, and draws some valuable experiences and skills.
引文
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