企业内部控制与管理者代理问题研究
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摘要
委托代理关系是指“一个人或一些人(委托人)委托其他人(代理人)根据委托人的利益从事某些活动,并相应地授予代理人某些决策权的契约关系”(Jensen & Mecling,1976)。在企业所有权与控制权相分离的情况下,股东与管理者之间便形成了这种委托代理关系。由于信息的不对称和契约的不完备,因此在这种委托代理关系中就会产生管理者的代理问题(Hart,1995),如职务怠慢、管理舞弊、非效率投资、侵占股东利益等。要解决管理者的代理问题,不花成本是难以做到的。在这种情况下,就需要建立起有效的企业治理结构,包括内部控制。大量事实表明,内部控制有效可以抑制管理者的代理问题,而内部控制失败则会加剧管理者的代理问题。然而,现有文献对内部控制如何影响管理者的代理问题却缺乏系统研究。
本文在系统综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上,综合运用委托代理理论、产权理论、契约理论和内部控制理论等理论,并用规范分析、实证分析和契约分析等研究方法,以我国上市公司为研究样本,对内部控制如何影响管理者代理问题进行了全面而深入的研究。首先,对内部控制的边界、内部控制与相关概念的关系和内部控制的评价体系等基础性问题进行了论述,着重从企业治理与管理层面上建立了内部控制评价指标体系。其次,从不完全契约的角度,论述了管理者代理问题的产生机理,对内部控制如何影响管理者的代理问题进行了理论分析,并建立了相应的理论模型。再次,以我国2005-2010年深、沪两市上市公司的经验数据为研究样本,从代理成本和管理舞弊两个方面,实证分析了内部控制对管理者代理问题的影响。最后,理论联系实际,在理论研究和实证研究的基础上,着重从企业治理层内部控制方面,探讨了如何治理管理者代理问题的制度安排。
本文通过研究得出了以下主要结论和观点：(1)内部控制的边界是指内部控制的有效范围。它随着内部控制实践的发展而拓展。从目前内部控制的实践来看,内部控制的边界可以概括为企业内部活动,总体包括结构控制、过程控制和行为控制,具体包括资产控制、人员控制、信息控制、投融资控制、采购业务控制、销售业务控制、生产业务控制等。与企业的其他管理相比,内部控制侧重于如何明确企业内部活动中每个控制环节的责任与权力以及如何防范和控制风险。(2)由于影响管理者代理问题的内部控制主要是企业治理层的内部控制,因此从这一层面上建立了由股东权益、董事会制度、管理者报酬激励制度和财务报告控制等维度构成的内部控制评价指标体系。(3)从不完全契约的角度,对内部控制如何影响管理者的代理问题进行了理论分析,并建立了相应的理论模型,认为内部控制是解决管理者代理问题的一种控制权安排机制,也是一种再谈判机制。(4)通过实证考察内部控制对管理者代理问题的影响,结果表明,内部控制对管理者代理问题有一定的影响。(5)理论联系实际,从企业治理层内部控制的角度,为解决管理者代理问题提出了一套制度安排,包括完善企业控制权安排制度,内部控制评价与信息披露制度等。这些研究结论对进一步深化内部控制和管理者代理问题的理论研究,以及指导我国企业进一步完善内部控制、抑制管理者代理问题都具有一定的启示意义。
Principal-agency relationship is "a person or persons (the principal) entrusted to other people (agents) according to the client's interests to engage in certain activities, and the corresponding decision-making power granted to agents of some contractual relationship" (Jensen & Mecling,1976). In the condition that ownership separate from the control, this agency relationship will be formed between shareholders and gonvernor. Because of information asymmetry and incompleteness of contracts, this will cause a management agency problems in this principal-agency relationship (Hart,1995), such as job neglegence, management fraud, non-efficient investments, occupation of the interests of shareholders, etc. To solve the management agency problem, no cost will achieve no gains. In this case, we need to establish effective corporate governance structure, including internal controls. Large number of facts reflects that the effective internal control would inhibit management agency problems, and the internal control failure will exacerbate management agency problem. However, the existing literature lacks systematic research on the point that how the internal control affects the management agency problem.
This paper reviews the international research results systematically, applies to principal-agency theory, property rights theory, contract theory and the internal control theory synthetically, and with the research methods of normative analysis, contract analysis, empirical analysis, taking China's listed companies as research sample, and has a comprehensive and in-depth research on the internal control, which is how it affects management agency problem. Firstly, it discusses the boundaries of internal control, relationship between internal control and related concepts, internal control evaluation system and other infrastructure issues, focusing on the establishment of evaluation index system of internal control under the level of corporate governance. Secondly, it discusses how the management agency problem conducts, analyzes theoretically how the internal control affects the management agency problem, establishes corresponding theoretical model. Thirdly, taking our 2005-2010 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies empirical data as study sample, in aspects of agency costs and management fraud, empirically analyze how internal control affects management agency problems. Finally, linking theory with practice, based on the theoretical and empirical research, focusing on internal control of corporate governance, this article explores system arrangement on how to govern management agency problems.
This paper reaches the following main conclusions and perspectives under long-term study:(1) the marginal means internal control within the control range. It expands with the development of internal control practices. From the current practice of internal control, internal control boundary can be summarized as the enterprise's internal activities, which includes not only financial control, asset control, personnel control, information control, but also investment and financing control, procurement control, sales control, production operations control. Compared with other management, internal controls leans towards how to distinguish responsibility and authority of the each control part in internal activities, and how to prevent and control risks. (2) As the main impact to the internal control of management agency problem of mainly mainly comes from the internal control of corporate governance level, it establishes the internal control evaluation index system composed of the ownership structure of supervisors, board of directors system, management incentive compensation system control, maintenance and financial reporting control. (3) It analyzes theoretically how the internal control affects the management agency problem in perspective of incompleteness contract, and establishes corresponding theoretical model that internal control is a control mechanism which can solve the problem of management agency problem, which can be regarded as a re-negotiation mechanism. (4) With empirical study of the impacts to the management agency problem arises from the internal control, the results show that the internal control have a certain impact on management agency problems. (5) Linking theory with practice, in perspective of internal control of the corporate governance level, it brings forward a set of institutional arrangements to solve management agency problem, including improving enterprises control arrangement systems, internal control evaluation and disclosure system. These findings is revealing, which further deepens theory research on the internal control and management agency problem, and guides enterprises to further improve our internal controls, inhibits manager-agent problem.
本文在系统综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上,综合运用委托代理理论、产权理论、契约理论和内部控制理论等理论,并用规范分析、实证分析和契约分析等研究方法,以我国上市公司为研究样本,对内部控制如何影响管理者代理问题进行了全面而深入的研究。首先,对内部控制的边界、内部控制与相关概念的关系和内部控制的评价体系等基础性问题进行了论述,着重从企业治理与管理层面上建立了内部控制评价指标体系。其次,从不完全契约的角度,论述了管理者代理问题的产生机理,对内部控制如何影响管理者的代理问题进行了理论分析,并建立了相应的理论模型。再次,以我国2005-2010年深、沪两市上市公司的经验数据为研究样本,从代理成本和管理舞弊两个方面,实证分析了内部控制对管理者代理问题的影响。最后,理论联系实际,在理论研究和实证研究的基础上,着重从企业治理层内部控制方面,探讨了如何治理管理者代理问题的制度安排。
本文通过研究得出了以下主要结论和观点：(1)内部控制的边界是指内部控制的有效范围。它随着内部控制实践的发展而拓展。从目前内部控制的实践来看,内部控制的边界可以概括为企业内部活动,总体包括结构控制、过程控制和行为控制,具体包括资产控制、人员控制、信息控制、投融资控制、采购业务控制、销售业务控制、生产业务控制等。与企业的其他管理相比,内部控制侧重于如何明确企业内部活动中每个控制环节的责任与权力以及如何防范和控制风险。(2)由于影响管理者代理问题的内部控制主要是企业治理层的内部控制,因此从这一层面上建立了由股东权益、董事会制度、管理者报酬激励制度和财务报告控制等维度构成的内部控制评价指标体系。(3)从不完全契约的角度,对内部控制如何影响管理者的代理问题进行了理论分析,并建立了相应的理论模型,认为内部控制是解决管理者代理问题的一种控制权安排机制,也是一种再谈判机制。(4)通过实证考察内部控制对管理者代理问题的影响,结果表明,内部控制对管理者代理问题有一定的影响。(5)理论联系实际,从企业治理层内部控制的角度,为解决管理者代理问题提出了一套制度安排,包括完善企业控制权安排制度,内部控制评价与信息披露制度等。这些研究结论对进一步深化内部控制和管理者代理问题的理论研究,以及指导我国企业进一步完善内部控制、抑制管理者代理问题都具有一定的启示意义。
Principal-agency relationship is "a person or persons (the principal) entrusted to other people (agents) according to the client's interests to engage in certain activities, and the corresponding decision-making power granted to agents of some contractual relationship" (Jensen & Mecling,1976). In the condition that ownership separate from the control, this agency relationship will be formed between shareholders and gonvernor. Because of information asymmetry and incompleteness of contracts, this will cause a management agency problems in this principal-agency relationship (Hart,1995), such as job neglegence, management fraud, non-efficient investments, occupation of the interests of shareholders, etc. To solve the management agency problem, no cost will achieve no gains. In this case, we need to establish effective corporate governance structure, including internal controls. Large number of facts reflects that the effective internal control would inhibit management agency problems, and the internal control failure will exacerbate management agency problem. However, the existing literature lacks systematic research on the point that how the internal control affects the management agency problem.
This paper reviews the international research results systematically, applies to principal-agency theory, property rights theory, contract theory and the internal control theory synthetically, and with the research methods of normative analysis, contract analysis, empirical analysis, taking China's listed companies as research sample, and has a comprehensive and in-depth research on the internal control, which is how it affects management agency problem. Firstly, it discusses the boundaries of internal control, relationship between internal control and related concepts, internal control evaluation system and other infrastructure issues, focusing on the establishment of evaluation index system of internal control under the level of corporate governance. Secondly, it discusses how the management agency problem conducts, analyzes theoretically how the internal control affects the management agency problem, establishes corresponding theoretical model. Thirdly, taking our 2005-2010 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies empirical data as study sample, in aspects of agency costs and management fraud, empirically analyze how internal control affects management agency problems. Finally, linking theory with practice, based on the theoretical and empirical research, focusing on internal control of corporate governance, this article explores system arrangement on how to govern management agency problems.
This paper reaches the following main conclusions and perspectives under long-term study:(1) the marginal means internal control within the control range. It expands with the development of internal control practices. From the current practice of internal control, internal control boundary can be summarized as the enterprise's internal activities, which includes not only financial control, asset control, personnel control, information control, but also investment and financing control, procurement control, sales control, production operations control. Compared with other management, internal controls leans towards how to distinguish responsibility and authority of the each control part in internal activities, and how to prevent and control risks. (2) As the main impact to the internal control of management agency problem of mainly mainly comes from the internal control of corporate governance level, it establishes the internal control evaluation index system composed of the ownership structure of supervisors, board of directors system, management incentive compensation system control, maintenance and financial reporting control. (3) It analyzes theoretically how the internal control affects the management agency problem in perspective of incompleteness contract, and establishes corresponding theoretical model that internal control is a control mechanism which can solve the problem of management agency problem, which can be regarded as a re-negotiation mechanism. (4) With empirical study of the impacts to the management agency problem arises from the internal control, the results show that the internal control have a certain impact on management agency problems. (5) Linking theory with practice, in perspective of internal control of the corporate governance level, it brings forward a set of institutional arrangements to solve management agency problem, including improving enterprises control arrangement systems, internal control evaluation and disclosure system. These findings is revealing, which further deepens theory research on the internal control and management agency problem, and guides enterprises to further improve our internal controls, inhibits manager-agent problem.
引文
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