中国式分权与农村公共品供给、农业经济增长绩效研究
|
摘要
中国的分权改革被普遍认为是引致经济增长奇迹的一个关键性制度安排，但是在理论研究与实证分析上，财政分权对中国农业经济增长的绩效并不明确。在财政分权的制度框架下，基于地方政府行为视域和中国的经验实证，系统考察农业经济增长绩效具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。鉴于中国政治上高度集权，经济上适度分权的发展中农业大国，本研究聚焦财政分权制度是否可以激励地方政府及其官员促进农业农村发展的积极性，进而改变城市偏向的政策设计，缩小城乡差距，有效推动农业可持续增长层面上。论文将财政分权、政府竞争、官员政治晋升等理论引入到农业经济增长研究视域中，尝试建立财政分权、政府竞争（官员晋升）与农村公共品、农业经济增长关系与效应的理论框架，立足财政职能视角，即在资源配置、收入分配和经济增长与稳定三个维度上，揭示财政分权对农村公共品供给、农业经济增长影响的作用机理，探寻中国农业与农村经济高质量增长和城乡发展一体化的运行机制，实施模式与调控政策。
研究的主要结论概述如下：
①中国式分权制度变量对农村公共品供给具有效率差异。国际通行的分权变量并未有效促进地方政府农村义务教育的公共支出。中国式分权变量对农村福利社保公共品都具有显著而稳健的供给效应。中央转移支付并未有效促进农村医疗公共品供给，地方政府财政自给率供给效应不显著，但地方政府对中央转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”明显。政府竞争对农村基础教育具有显著的负向激励。反腐败增强了农村基础教育的有效提供，但减少了福利保障供给，说明地方政府在农村公共品供给上具有腐败寻租的空间。城镇化对农村基础教育、卫生保健和福利社保公共品均具有显著的供给效应。经济增长水平与新农村建设政策变量也是影响农村公共品供给效应的重要因素并呈现差异性。
②尝试将中国式分权、农业经济增长与城乡收入差距架构在新制度经济学分析框架之下，进行多变量协整与向量误差修正模型（VECM）分析后发现：变量间具有显著的长期均衡关系与短期动态调节机制。城乡收入差距具有反向自身修正机制，但修正能力较弱。农业经济增长对城乡居民收入差距的影响呈现波动递减趋势。分权短期内会产生正向冲击，加剧城乡收入差距，但长期内会缓解差距，最后进行了VAR模型的静态与动态预测，这些发现对缩小城乡收入差距提供了有益启示与治理策略。
③运用DEA-Malmquist生产率指数法，对1978-2011年省级农业TFP进行了数量测算与系统分解，并细致考察了其时序演变差异、地理空间分布与分组增速效率等特征。测算发现：农业TFP增长源泉主要是由技术进步率与技术效率双轮驱动的，但技术效率的驱动作用有限。农业TFP与技术进步率指数呈顺周期变化，与技术效率指数有逆周期波动阶段。农业TFP效率变动具有比较严重的地理空间上的非均衡性。省际间各指数差异显著，农业技术效率指数全国各区域普遍不高，中西部地区的农业前沿技术进步率是比较糟糕的，但各主要效率指数直辖市增长效应显著。农业TFP及其分解指数“发散效应”明显，“收敛效应”与“外溢效应”趋势不显著。除了要素输入，经营模式创新更显重要，“双轮驱动”应成为未来中国农业经济增长方式转变与可持续发展的路径轨迹。
④对农业生产效率各指数变动的影响因素进行了计量分析，研究表明：地方政府行为因素影响非均衡，对提升农业TFP正向冲击效应显著，但对农业技术效率和纯技术效率影响为负，对农业前沿技术进步率与农业规模效率影响不显著。农业总产值占比增加对农业前沿技术进步负向作用明显，但对提升农业技术效率和纯技术效率正向作用机制显著，说明目前的农业经济增长依旧沿袭粗放式增长模式，并形成了路径依赖。农业人力资本存量具有正向提升效应。农业生产绩效受非粮食作物播种面积，自然灾害等因素制约显著。城镇化率与农业技术效率、农业纯技术效率、农业规模效率显著正相关。工业化对农业技术进步率正效应明显，却恶化了农业规模效率。政策启示在于完善顶层制度设计，激励地方政府支农行为，坚持城乡一体、工农互惠，向农业部门输入现代生产要素与经营模式。
⑤通过构建中国式分权的新制度经济学分析框架，理论分析地方政府财政支农、农村金融发展与生产要素投入对农业经济增长绩效变动的作用机制。实证研究结果显示：农业经济增长呈现明显的累积滞后效应，受政策驱动显著。分权的增长效应明显，具有跨时与区域差异特征。城乡金融发展非均衡与金融财政化引致农村金融功能拓展受到抑制，阻碍了农业经济增长，农村金融与实体经济部门之间良性互动机制不显著。地方政府财政农业投入和农村金融的协调与配合具有显著的增长效应，明显大于单纯财政支农的效力。宏观经济形势，农业能源消耗与农业经济增长的联系日益紧密。
研究的政策建议简述如下：
第一，推进治理体系和治理能力现代化，完善公共财政支农运行机制。首先，政府的财政行为应建立在宪政和法治的基石之上，逐渐改变通过中央的“决定”“通知”和“一号文件”等形式，而应借助正式的法律规范加以调整。其次，注重分权契约与财政体制的内在稳定性，避免分权与财政体制的频繁变动所引致的低效率。一方面，应改变目前财政支农“一级政府，一级财政”的约束，借鉴“省管县”和“乡财县管”的试点经验，积极稳妥推行财政支农“中央——省级——县级”支出层级，提高财政体制运行效率和财政资源配置的公平性。另一方面，地方政府应改革财政支农资金分配与管理体制，整合各类支农部门，明确部门职责，进行农业投资管理体制与运行机制的创新，并加强地方人大、政协与纪委等部门对农业投入资金的审计和监督。克服地方政府财政支农政策的执行偏差，提高投入产出绩效。最后是规模提升，结构优化，形成财政支农的优先序机制，确保财政资金输入到最需要的部门与领域。
第二，匹配事权与财权，建立财政支农预算硬约束机制。在保证中央宏观调控的基础上，减少共享税种和共享比例，适度降低中央财权，增强地方政府的财权财力，使他们有能力执行中央政府的“三农”事权安排。其次是按照财权与事权相对称的原则，清晰界定中央政府与地方政府财政农业支出的支出责任边界，同时完善地方税体系，赋予地方政府更大的发债权。地方政府应精简行政层级架构，减少政府运行成本，转变政府职能。促进预算的法治化与规范化，增强预算的法律约束力，刚性要求财政支农预算的绝对与相对增长幅度，预算编制、审批、执行和监督应有明确操作主体和职责边界。改变城市偏向的财政预算支出导向，增加直接促进农业生产要素投入的项目支出，提高农业生产性投资、人力资本和技术投资、农村公共服务投资的比重。建立更加严格的土地出让金硬约束机制，严格规制地方政府疯狂卖地，占用耕地的“掠夺之手”。建立参与式预算制度，将财政支农资金收支活动全部纳入预算审查和社会监督范畴之内。
第三，优化转移支付，实施城乡发展一体化模式。中央政府应对以往扶贫倾斜式的无条件转移支付进行绩效评估，克服低水平的财力均衡，创新中央转移支付绩效评价指标体系。其次，实行有配套条件或比例的转移支付，简化转移支付环节，提高转移资金利用效率。中央政府应建立转移支付的瞄准再分配机制，提高对落后省区农村公共品转移支付的精度和力度，对于外溢性较强的农村公共品，建立专项支付。再次，完善省级以下的转移支付制度，建立转移支付统一拨付渠道和透明的信息发布平台。消除制约城乡发展一体化的主要障碍，首先要促进城乡公共产品与服务供给均等化，提高城乡公共品供给的效率和质量，由地方政府主导城乡公共品配置权。坚持城乡公平统一的财政政策，构建城市对农村的制度与政策反哺，物质资本反哺，人力资本等反哺机制。最后是创新农地产权制度，切实保障农民的土地增值收益，探索农民增加财产性收入的渠道。
第四，向农业输入现代化的生产要素与经营模式。“双轮驱动”模式应成为未来中国农业经济增长方式转变与可持续发展的路径轨迹。通过财政，金融和保险等扶植政策，降低农业新技术的使用门槛，促进农业技术进步扩散与传播，构建工业化、信息化与农业生产效率的技术转移与良性协调互动机制。充分认识农业生产的周期规律性，加强农业基础设施建设，建立生态、低碳的现代农业。在确保粮食安全的前提下，加快推进农业产业内部结构调整与升级，完善农业保险机制，增强农业抵御丰产欠收，谷贱伤农等市场风险能力。完善激励与约束机制，推广适度规模经营，大力发展家庭农场，培育新型农业经营主体。建立城乡一体化的就业创业市场，构建高质量的农业科技培训与推广传播体系，尝试发放教育培训券等方式提高农村人力资本的投资与积累，建立城乡一体化的户籍与社会保障体系。
第五，促进农村金融深化，探索农业资本积累率与利润率稳定增长机制。消除城乡金融深化的二元鸿沟，创新制度安排，拓展农村金融服务农业功能。中央银行可以根据涉农金融机构的信用状况，逐步放松利率管制，实现更大幅度的浮动范围。合理定位商业性与政策性金融机构的市场边界，完善农村金融生态环境，着力拓展农村政策性金融功能，创新金融产品，发展微型金融，促进城乡金融的统筹融合。在风险得到有效监控的条件下，适度降低农村金融服务的门槛与成本，放松对农户贷款的容忍度并进行合理展期。中央政府对涉农企业税收减免与优惠，可在农业领域赋予省一级地方政府更大的财政与税收自主权与经济激励，可以考虑试点授权农业大省发行农业发展专项国债。地方政府尝试建立专业性的商业和政策性的涉农信用评估、担保机构，探索农村集体土地使用权的抵押担保融资方式。充分发挥财政资金的杠杆作用，诱导农户投资、金融、保险、社会资本等进行农业投资。
第六，注重中央政府对地方政府发展农业的制度激励与政策创新。优化政绩考核体系，创新地方政府支农的动力机制。中央政府应改变单纯以GDP论英雄的绩效考核机制，坚持科学发展观，注重城乡协调发展，将支农政绩指标纳入地方政府官员晋升的考核体系。革新公共治理方式，构建农民偏好表露与政府回应机制，进行农村社会管理体制和机制的创新。建立高度组织化和专业化的农民自治组织，降低维权交易成本，使农民有效介入公共选择的全过程，建立起真正意义上的“以足投票”“用手投票”机制。
China's decentralization reform is generally considered a key institutionalarrangement that causes economic growth miracle, but in the theoretical research andEmpirical Analysis on fiscal decentralization, the China agricultural economic growthperformance is not clear. In the institutional framework of fiscal decentralization, basedon local government behavior and empirical study, System analysis of agriculturaleconomic growth performance has significant theoretical and practical value. BecauseChina is a big developing agricultural country with political centralization, economicmoderate decentralization, the focus is on fiscal decentralization system that canencourage local governments and their officials to promote agricultural and ruraldevelopment, and the change of city biased policy design, narrowing the gap betweenurban and rural, promoting agricultural sustainable growth level.
The fiscal decentralization, competition, government officials and politicalpromotion theory are introduced to the agricultural economic growth perspective, andtrying to establish theoretical framework of the relationship and effect of fiscaldecentralization, government competition (promotion) and rural public goods,agricultural economic growth. Based on the perspective of fiscal function of resourceallocation, income distribution and economic growth and stability, the study reveals themechanism of fiscal decentralization on the impact of rural public goods supply,agricultural economic growth. Finally the study explores the operation mechanism,implementation mode and regulatory policy of Chinese agriculture and rural economicgrowth of high quality and the integration of urban and rural development.
The principal conclusions of this study are as follows:
Institutional variable of China's decentralization has the efficiency difference onthe supply of rural public goods. International decentralization variable is not effectivein promoting rural compulsory education expenditure of local government, but China'sdecentralization variables have significant and robust effect on supplying rural welfaresocial public goods.Transfers from the central government do not effectively promotethe supply of public goods in rural medical. The supply effect of local governmentfinancial self-sufficiency rate is not significant. But the “flypaper effect” is obviousfrom local government to central transfers. Government competition has a negativeincentive effect on rural basic education. Anti-corruption enhances the effectiveness of rural basic education, but reduces the welfare supply, which implies that there are somerent-seeking and corruption opportunities. Urbanization has a significant supply effecton rural basic education, health care and welfare of social public goods.The economicgrowth and new rural construction policy variables are also important factors, whichaffect the supply of rural public goods effect and present the difference.
This article provides a system analysis framework of fiscal decentralization,agricultural economic growth and rural-urban income gap in China based on newinstitutional economics. Our study finds that all the variables have significant long-termequilibrium relationship and short-term dynamic adjustment mechanism by VAR&VECM model. Income gap has a reverse self correction mechanism, but the correctionability is poorer. The influence of agricultural economic growth on income gap residentsfluctuated degressive trend. Fiscal decentralization will have a positive impact andaggravate rural-urban income gap in a short-term, however, it will reduce the gap in along-term. This paper has also obtained VAR model forecast. These findings providebeneficial inspiration and public governance strategy.
This paper estimates and decomposes the provincial agricultural TFP from1978to2011by DEA-Malmquist productivity index method, and observes carefully thetemporal evolution of difference, regional distribution and group growth efficiency. Ourstudy finds that agricultural TFP growth is mainly determined by the rate oftechnological progress and technical efficiency, but the role of technical efficiency islimited. Agricultural TFP and technological progress index show cyclical changes, andtechnical efficiency index with inverse cycle stages. Agricultural TFP efficiency changeis unbalanced. The difference is significant among provinces. Agricultural technicalefficiency index is generally not high. Agricultural frontier technology progress issatisfied in the Central and Western regions. Growth effect of the main efficiency indexis obvious in municipalities. The main efficiency index is obvious in divergence effect,but the trend of convergence effect and spillover effect is not significant. Besides thefactor input, business model innovation is more important. So agricultural economicgrowth and sustainable development should be the path of the mode of two wheels drivein the future.
This paper analyses the influence factors on the efficiency of agriculturalproduction for each index change. The study find that Effects of local governmentbehavior factors is in non-equilibrium, and is significant positive effect on agriculturalTFP, but the impact is negative on the agricultural technical and pure technical efficiency, no significant influence on the agricultural frontier technology progress rateand scale efficiency. The effect is negative of total agricultural output value for theagricultural frontier technology progress, but the promotion is significantly positive ofagricultural technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency, indicating the currentagricultural economic growth is still followed the extensive growth pattern, and formspath dependence. Agricultural human capital has a positive promoting effect.Agricultural production performance is influenced by non-grain crops sown area andnatural disaster significantly. The relationship is significantly positive betweenurbanization and agricultural technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale ofagricultural efficiency. Industrialization for agricultural technology progress rate hassignificant positive effect, but is negative for agricultural scale efficiency. Policyimplication lies in perfecting the top system design and encourages local governmentsupport behavior. Finally the paper points out that Adhering to the integration of urbanand rural, mutual development of Industry and agriculture, and inputting factors ofmodern production and management pattern to the agricultural sector.
This paper first constructs China's decentralization system frame based on newinstitutional economics, and analyzes local government fiscal support for agriculture,rural financial development and production factors on agriculture economy growthperformance variation mechanism. The empirical results show: the growth ofagricultural economy has apparent cumulative hysteresis effect,policy drivensignificantly. The growth effect of fiscal decentralization is obvious and has the crossand regional difference characteristics. Urban and rural financial development is notbalanced and the rural financial function development is restrained, hindered the growthof agricultural economy. The interactive mechanism between rural finance and entityeconomy is not significant. The coordination between fiscal investment in agricultureand rural financial shows significantly growth effect, larger than the simple financialeffectiveness. The relationship has become more closer between macro economicsituation, agricultural energy consumption and agricultural economic growth.
The policy recommendations of the study are as follows:
First, promote the governance system and management modernization, improve theoperating mechanism of public financial support to agriculture. First of all, thegovernment fiscal behavior basis should be established on the constitutionalism andgovernment by law, gradually changed by the central “decision”,“notice”,“the firstdocument” and other forms, and should adjust by the law of formal specification. Secondly, it should be focus on the inherent stability of decentralization contract andfiscal system, and avoid the low efficiency caused by the frequent changes ofdecentralization and fiscal system. On the one hand, it should change the current fiscal“a level of government, a financial constraint” from “provinces control counties” and“counties control towns” experience, actively and steadily promote financial supportingagriculture into “central-province-county” spending levels, improve operating efficiencyof financial system and the fairness of financial resource allocation. On the other hand,the local government should reform the fiscal agriculture fund allocation andmanagement system, integrate various agriculture department, clear responsibility,innovate agricultural investment management system and operation mechanism, andstrengthen the local people's Congress, the CPPCC and the Commission for disciplineinspection departments of audit and supervision of agricultural investment funds. Toovercome the deviation of the implementation policy of supporting agriculture infinance of local government, improve the input-output performance. Finally, it shouldenhance scale, optimize structure, form into priority mechanism of the financial supportfor agriculture, and ensure financial input to the needs of departments and fields.
Secondly, match the governance and the financial rights, establish fiscal budgetconstraint mechanism. Based on guaranteeing the central macro-control, it shouldreduce the sharing of taxes and the share ratio, moderately reduce the central financialpower, and enhance financial power and resources of local governments, so that theyhave the ability to implement the central government's “three rural issues” governancearrangements. At the same time, according to the symmetrical principle of financialrights and the governance, it should clear definition of the central government and localgovernment fiscal agricultural expenditure responsibility boundary, also perfect thelocal tax system, giving local governments more rights of issuing bonds. The localgovernment should streamline the administrative structure, reduce the cost of runningthe government, and transform the functions of government. Promoting the rule of lawof budget and standardization, strengthening the legal binding budget, rigidly requiringof the absolute and relative growth rate. Moreover, there should be clear operating bodyand the boundary of responsibility for budget preparation, approval, implementation andsupervision. Change the budget expenditure oriented city deviation, and increase theproject investment in agricultural production elements. Promote the proportion ofagricultural production investment, human capital, technology and rural public serviceinvestment. The hard constraint mechanism of land grant fees should be establishment. The local government's “grabbing hand” of occupation farmland and crazily selling landshould be strictly regulated. Meanwhile, participatory budget system should beestablished, and the fiscal agriculture fund payments are included in the budget reviewand social supervision.
Thirdly, optimize the transfer payment and implement the integration mode ofurban and rural development. The performance of unconditional transfer payment, likeprevious poverty alleviation, should be evaluated by the central government. Overcomelow financial balance, and innovate performance evaluation index system of the centraltransfer. Meanwhile, the transfer of matching conditions or the proportion of paymentshould be implemented. Simplify the transfer payment links and improve the transferefficiency of capital utilization. The central government should establish a transferpayment mechanism of targeting and redistribution, improve the precision and intensityof transfer payment for the backward provinces of rural public goods. Especially for thespillover of rural public goods, the special payment must be established. Moreover,improve the transfer payment system at and below the provincial level, establish unifiedallocation of channels and transparent information release platform. To eliminate themain obstacle to the integration of urban and rural development, first of all to promotethe equalization of urban and rural public products and service supply, improve theefficiency and quality. The urban and rural public goods allocation should be dominatedby the local government. Adhere to the urban and rural fair unified fiscal policy,construction the feedback mechanism of city to rural institution and policy, materialcapital, human capital etc. The last is the innovation of rural land property rights system,Safeguarding farmer's land value-added income, and exploring channels of propertyincome.
Fourthly, factors of production and operation mode of modernization should beinput agriculture department.“Two wheel drive” mode should be the path change of thefuture China agricultural economic growth and sustainable development. Through fiscal,financial and insurance policies, it should reduce threshold of agricultural newtechnologies, promote the progress of agricultural technology diffusion and propagation,and construct technology transfer and interaction mechanism of industrialization,information and agricultural production efficiency. Fully understand the cycle ofagricultural production, strengthen the agricultural infrastructure construction, establishecological, low carbon modern agriculture. On the premise of ensuring food security,accelerate the adjustment of the internal structure and the upgrading of the agricultural industry, improve agricultural insurance mechanism, enhance the ability of agricultureresisting market risk. Improve the incentive and restraint mechanism, promoteappropriate scale operation, vigorously develop the family farm, and cultivate newagricultural management body. At the same time, establishing the integration of urbanand rural employment market, building high quality system of agricultural science andtechnology training and communication, improving the investment and accumulation ofrural human capital by education training ticket issuance and other methods, andestablishing the integration of urban and rural household registration and social securitysystem.
Fifthly, promote rural financial deepening and explore stable growth mechanism ofagricultural capital accumulation, profit rate. To eliminate the gap between urban andrural areas of financial deepening, innovate system arrangement of rural financialservices, and expand the service function. According to credit status of agriculturerelated financial institutions, the central bank can gradually relax the interest ratecontrol and realize the greater floating range. Moreover, reasonably position ofcommercial and policy financial institutions market boundary, improve the ruralfinancial ecological environment, expand the function of the rural policy finance,innovate financial products, develop micro finance, and promote urban and ruralfinancial co-ordination.In the effective risk monitoring conditions, it is appropriate toreduce the threshold and the cost of financial services in rural areas, relax the farmersloan tolerance and allow a reasonable extension. The central government can tax cutsand incentives for agricultural enterprises, give the provincial level local governmentsmore autonomy and economic incentive in the field of agriculture, and try to authorizeagricultural big province to issue special bonds of agricultural development. In addition,the local government can attempt to establish professional business and policy creditevaluation, guarantee institutions, and explore the way of mortgage, guarantee andfinancing of rural collective land. Let the leverage of financial capital be exertedadequately and induct household investment, financial, insurance, social capital toinvest in agriculture.
Finally, the central government should offer local government incentive systemand policy innovation for agricultural development. Optimize the system of politicalachievements and innovate dynamic mechanism of local government to supportagriculture. The central government should change the simple appraisal system in termsof GDP performance, adhere to the Scientific Outlook on Development, pay attention to the coordinated development of urban and rural areas, and put the performanceindicators of supporting Agriculture into the local government officials assessmentsystem. In addition, reform public governance mode, construct farmer preference andgovernment response mechanism, and innovate the system and mechanism of ruralsocial management. To reduce the transaction cost of rights, the highly organized andprofessional farmers autonomy organization should be established, so that it can allowfarmers access to take part in the whole process of public choice and establish the realsense of “vote with foot”,“vote” mechanism.
研究的主要结论概述如下：
①中国式分权制度变量对农村公共品供给具有效率差异。国际通行的分权变量并未有效促进地方政府农村义务教育的公共支出。中国式分权变量对农村福利社保公共品都具有显著而稳健的供给效应。中央转移支付并未有效促进农村医疗公共品供给，地方政府财政自给率供给效应不显著，但地方政府对中央转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”明显。政府竞争对农村基础教育具有显著的负向激励。反腐败增强了农村基础教育的有效提供，但减少了福利保障供给，说明地方政府在农村公共品供给上具有腐败寻租的空间。城镇化对农村基础教育、卫生保健和福利社保公共品均具有显著的供给效应。经济增长水平与新农村建设政策变量也是影响农村公共品供给效应的重要因素并呈现差异性。
②尝试将中国式分权、农业经济增长与城乡收入差距架构在新制度经济学分析框架之下，进行多变量协整与向量误差修正模型（VECM）分析后发现：变量间具有显著的长期均衡关系与短期动态调节机制。城乡收入差距具有反向自身修正机制，但修正能力较弱。农业经济增长对城乡居民收入差距的影响呈现波动递减趋势。分权短期内会产生正向冲击，加剧城乡收入差距，但长期内会缓解差距，最后进行了VAR模型的静态与动态预测，这些发现对缩小城乡收入差距提供了有益启示与治理策略。
③运用DEA-Malmquist生产率指数法，对1978-2011年省级农业TFP进行了数量测算与系统分解，并细致考察了其时序演变差异、地理空间分布与分组增速效率等特征。测算发现：农业TFP增长源泉主要是由技术进步率与技术效率双轮驱动的，但技术效率的驱动作用有限。农业TFP与技术进步率指数呈顺周期变化，与技术效率指数有逆周期波动阶段。农业TFP效率变动具有比较严重的地理空间上的非均衡性。省际间各指数差异显著，农业技术效率指数全国各区域普遍不高，中西部地区的农业前沿技术进步率是比较糟糕的，但各主要效率指数直辖市增长效应显著。农业TFP及其分解指数“发散效应”明显，“收敛效应”与“外溢效应”趋势不显著。除了要素输入，经营模式创新更显重要，“双轮驱动”应成为未来中国农业经济增长方式转变与可持续发展的路径轨迹。
④对农业生产效率各指数变动的影响因素进行了计量分析，研究表明：地方政府行为因素影响非均衡，对提升农业TFP正向冲击效应显著，但对农业技术效率和纯技术效率影响为负，对农业前沿技术进步率与农业规模效率影响不显著。农业总产值占比增加对农业前沿技术进步负向作用明显，但对提升农业技术效率和纯技术效率正向作用机制显著，说明目前的农业经济增长依旧沿袭粗放式增长模式，并形成了路径依赖。农业人力资本存量具有正向提升效应。农业生产绩效受非粮食作物播种面积，自然灾害等因素制约显著。城镇化率与农业技术效率、农业纯技术效率、农业规模效率显著正相关。工业化对农业技术进步率正效应明显，却恶化了农业规模效率。政策启示在于完善顶层制度设计，激励地方政府支农行为，坚持城乡一体、工农互惠，向农业部门输入现代生产要素与经营模式。
⑤通过构建中国式分权的新制度经济学分析框架，理论分析地方政府财政支农、农村金融发展与生产要素投入对农业经济增长绩效变动的作用机制。实证研究结果显示：农业经济增长呈现明显的累积滞后效应，受政策驱动显著。分权的增长效应明显，具有跨时与区域差异特征。城乡金融发展非均衡与金融财政化引致农村金融功能拓展受到抑制，阻碍了农业经济增长，农村金融与实体经济部门之间良性互动机制不显著。地方政府财政农业投入和农村金融的协调与配合具有显著的增长效应，明显大于单纯财政支农的效力。宏观经济形势，农业能源消耗与农业经济增长的联系日益紧密。
研究的政策建议简述如下：
第一，推进治理体系和治理能力现代化，完善公共财政支农运行机制。首先，政府的财政行为应建立在宪政和法治的基石之上，逐渐改变通过中央的“决定”“通知”和“一号文件”等形式，而应借助正式的法律规范加以调整。其次，注重分权契约与财政体制的内在稳定性，避免分权与财政体制的频繁变动所引致的低效率。一方面，应改变目前财政支农“一级政府，一级财政”的约束，借鉴“省管县”和“乡财县管”的试点经验，积极稳妥推行财政支农“中央——省级——县级”支出层级，提高财政体制运行效率和财政资源配置的公平性。另一方面，地方政府应改革财政支农资金分配与管理体制，整合各类支农部门，明确部门职责，进行农业投资管理体制与运行机制的创新，并加强地方人大、政协与纪委等部门对农业投入资金的审计和监督。克服地方政府财政支农政策的执行偏差，提高投入产出绩效。最后是规模提升，结构优化，形成财政支农的优先序机制，确保财政资金输入到最需要的部门与领域。
第二，匹配事权与财权，建立财政支农预算硬约束机制。在保证中央宏观调控的基础上，减少共享税种和共享比例，适度降低中央财权，增强地方政府的财权财力，使他们有能力执行中央政府的“三农”事权安排。其次是按照财权与事权相对称的原则，清晰界定中央政府与地方政府财政农业支出的支出责任边界，同时完善地方税体系，赋予地方政府更大的发债权。地方政府应精简行政层级架构，减少政府运行成本，转变政府职能。促进预算的法治化与规范化，增强预算的法律约束力，刚性要求财政支农预算的绝对与相对增长幅度，预算编制、审批、执行和监督应有明确操作主体和职责边界。改变城市偏向的财政预算支出导向，增加直接促进农业生产要素投入的项目支出，提高农业生产性投资、人力资本和技术投资、农村公共服务投资的比重。建立更加严格的土地出让金硬约束机制，严格规制地方政府疯狂卖地，占用耕地的“掠夺之手”。建立参与式预算制度，将财政支农资金收支活动全部纳入预算审查和社会监督范畴之内。
第三，优化转移支付，实施城乡发展一体化模式。中央政府应对以往扶贫倾斜式的无条件转移支付进行绩效评估，克服低水平的财力均衡，创新中央转移支付绩效评价指标体系。其次，实行有配套条件或比例的转移支付，简化转移支付环节，提高转移资金利用效率。中央政府应建立转移支付的瞄准再分配机制，提高对落后省区农村公共品转移支付的精度和力度，对于外溢性较强的农村公共品，建立专项支付。再次，完善省级以下的转移支付制度，建立转移支付统一拨付渠道和透明的信息发布平台。消除制约城乡发展一体化的主要障碍，首先要促进城乡公共产品与服务供给均等化，提高城乡公共品供给的效率和质量，由地方政府主导城乡公共品配置权。坚持城乡公平统一的财政政策，构建城市对农村的制度与政策反哺，物质资本反哺，人力资本等反哺机制。最后是创新农地产权制度，切实保障农民的土地增值收益，探索农民增加财产性收入的渠道。
第四，向农业输入现代化的生产要素与经营模式。“双轮驱动”模式应成为未来中国农业经济增长方式转变与可持续发展的路径轨迹。通过财政，金融和保险等扶植政策，降低农业新技术的使用门槛，促进农业技术进步扩散与传播，构建工业化、信息化与农业生产效率的技术转移与良性协调互动机制。充分认识农业生产的周期规律性，加强农业基础设施建设，建立生态、低碳的现代农业。在确保粮食安全的前提下，加快推进农业产业内部结构调整与升级，完善农业保险机制，增强农业抵御丰产欠收，谷贱伤农等市场风险能力。完善激励与约束机制，推广适度规模经营，大力发展家庭农场，培育新型农业经营主体。建立城乡一体化的就业创业市场，构建高质量的农业科技培训与推广传播体系，尝试发放教育培训券等方式提高农村人力资本的投资与积累，建立城乡一体化的户籍与社会保障体系。
第五，促进农村金融深化，探索农业资本积累率与利润率稳定增长机制。消除城乡金融深化的二元鸿沟，创新制度安排，拓展农村金融服务农业功能。中央银行可以根据涉农金融机构的信用状况，逐步放松利率管制，实现更大幅度的浮动范围。合理定位商业性与政策性金融机构的市场边界，完善农村金融生态环境，着力拓展农村政策性金融功能，创新金融产品，发展微型金融，促进城乡金融的统筹融合。在风险得到有效监控的条件下，适度降低农村金融服务的门槛与成本，放松对农户贷款的容忍度并进行合理展期。中央政府对涉农企业税收减免与优惠，可在农业领域赋予省一级地方政府更大的财政与税收自主权与经济激励，可以考虑试点授权农业大省发行农业发展专项国债。地方政府尝试建立专业性的商业和政策性的涉农信用评估、担保机构，探索农村集体土地使用权的抵押担保融资方式。充分发挥财政资金的杠杆作用，诱导农户投资、金融、保险、社会资本等进行农业投资。
第六，注重中央政府对地方政府发展农业的制度激励与政策创新。优化政绩考核体系，创新地方政府支农的动力机制。中央政府应改变单纯以GDP论英雄的绩效考核机制，坚持科学发展观，注重城乡协调发展，将支农政绩指标纳入地方政府官员晋升的考核体系。革新公共治理方式，构建农民偏好表露与政府回应机制，进行农村社会管理体制和机制的创新。建立高度组织化和专业化的农民自治组织，降低维权交易成本，使农民有效介入公共选择的全过程，建立起真正意义上的“以足投票”“用手投票”机制。
China's decentralization reform is generally considered a key institutionalarrangement that causes economic growth miracle, but in the theoretical research andEmpirical Analysis on fiscal decentralization, the China agricultural economic growthperformance is not clear. In the institutional framework of fiscal decentralization, basedon local government behavior and empirical study, System analysis of agriculturaleconomic growth performance has significant theoretical and practical value. BecauseChina is a big developing agricultural country with political centralization, economicmoderate decentralization, the focus is on fiscal decentralization system that canencourage local governments and their officials to promote agricultural and ruraldevelopment, and the change of city biased policy design, narrowing the gap betweenurban and rural, promoting agricultural sustainable growth level.
The fiscal decentralization, competition, government officials and politicalpromotion theory are introduced to the agricultural economic growth perspective, andtrying to establish theoretical framework of the relationship and effect of fiscaldecentralization, government competition (promotion) and rural public goods,agricultural economic growth. Based on the perspective of fiscal function of resourceallocation, income distribution and economic growth and stability, the study reveals themechanism of fiscal decentralization on the impact of rural public goods supply,agricultural economic growth. Finally the study explores the operation mechanism,implementation mode and regulatory policy of Chinese agriculture and rural economicgrowth of high quality and the integration of urban and rural development.
The principal conclusions of this study are as follows:
Institutional variable of China's decentralization has the efficiency difference onthe supply of rural public goods. International decentralization variable is not effectivein promoting rural compulsory education expenditure of local government, but China'sdecentralization variables have significant and robust effect on supplying rural welfaresocial public goods.Transfers from the central government do not effectively promotethe supply of public goods in rural medical. The supply effect of local governmentfinancial self-sufficiency rate is not significant. But the “flypaper effect” is obviousfrom local government to central transfers. Government competition has a negativeincentive effect on rural basic education. Anti-corruption enhances the effectiveness of rural basic education, but reduces the welfare supply, which implies that there are somerent-seeking and corruption opportunities. Urbanization has a significant supply effecton rural basic education, health care and welfare of social public goods.The economicgrowth and new rural construction policy variables are also important factors, whichaffect the supply of rural public goods effect and present the difference.
This article provides a system analysis framework of fiscal decentralization,agricultural economic growth and rural-urban income gap in China based on newinstitutional economics. Our study finds that all the variables have significant long-termequilibrium relationship and short-term dynamic adjustment mechanism by VAR&VECM model. Income gap has a reverse self correction mechanism, but the correctionability is poorer. The influence of agricultural economic growth on income gap residentsfluctuated degressive trend. Fiscal decentralization will have a positive impact andaggravate rural-urban income gap in a short-term, however, it will reduce the gap in along-term. This paper has also obtained VAR model forecast. These findings providebeneficial inspiration and public governance strategy.
This paper estimates and decomposes the provincial agricultural TFP from1978to2011by DEA-Malmquist productivity index method, and observes carefully thetemporal evolution of difference, regional distribution and group growth efficiency. Ourstudy finds that agricultural TFP growth is mainly determined by the rate oftechnological progress and technical efficiency, but the role of technical efficiency islimited. Agricultural TFP and technological progress index show cyclical changes, andtechnical efficiency index with inverse cycle stages. Agricultural TFP efficiency changeis unbalanced. The difference is significant among provinces. Agricultural technicalefficiency index is generally not high. Agricultural frontier technology progress issatisfied in the Central and Western regions. Growth effect of the main efficiency indexis obvious in municipalities. The main efficiency index is obvious in divergence effect,but the trend of convergence effect and spillover effect is not significant. Besides thefactor input, business model innovation is more important. So agricultural economicgrowth and sustainable development should be the path of the mode of two wheels drivein the future.
This paper analyses the influence factors on the efficiency of agriculturalproduction for each index change. The study find that Effects of local governmentbehavior factors is in non-equilibrium, and is significant positive effect on agriculturalTFP, but the impact is negative on the agricultural technical and pure technical efficiency, no significant influence on the agricultural frontier technology progress rateand scale efficiency. The effect is negative of total agricultural output value for theagricultural frontier technology progress, but the promotion is significantly positive ofagricultural technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency, indicating the currentagricultural economic growth is still followed the extensive growth pattern, and formspath dependence. Agricultural human capital has a positive promoting effect.Agricultural production performance is influenced by non-grain crops sown area andnatural disaster significantly. The relationship is significantly positive betweenurbanization and agricultural technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale ofagricultural efficiency. Industrialization for agricultural technology progress rate hassignificant positive effect, but is negative for agricultural scale efficiency. Policyimplication lies in perfecting the top system design and encourages local governmentsupport behavior. Finally the paper points out that Adhering to the integration of urbanand rural, mutual development of Industry and agriculture, and inputting factors ofmodern production and management pattern to the agricultural sector.
This paper first constructs China's decentralization system frame based on newinstitutional economics, and analyzes local government fiscal support for agriculture,rural financial development and production factors on agriculture economy growthperformance variation mechanism. The empirical results show: the growth ofagricultural economy has apparent cumulative hysteresis effect,policy drivensignificantly. The growth effect of fiscal decentralization is obvious and has the crossand regional difference characteristics. Urban and rural financial development is notbalanced and the rural financial function development is restrained, hindered the growthof agricultural economy. The interactive mechanism between rural finance and entityeconomy is not significant. The coordination between fiscal investment in agricultureand rural financial shows significantly growth effect, larger than the simple financialeffectiveness. The relationship has become more closer between macro economicsituation, agricultural energy consumption and agricultural economic growth.
The policy recommendations of the study are as follows:
First, promote the governance system and management modernization, improve theoperating mechanism of public financial support to agriculture. First of all, thegovernment fiscal behavior basis should be established on the constitutionalism andgovernment by law, gradually changed by the central “decision”,“notice”,“the firstdocument” and other forms, and should adjust by the law of formal specification. Secondly, it should be focus on the inherent stability of decentralization contract andfiscal system, and avoid the low efficiency caused by the frequent changes ofdecentralization and fiscal system. On the one hand, it should change the current fiscal“a level of government, a financial constraint” from “provinces control counties” and“counties control towns” experience, actively and steadily promote financial supportingagriculture into “central-province-county” spending levels, improve operating efficiencyof financial system and the fairness of financial resource allocation. On the other hand,the local government should reform the fiscal agriculture fund allocation andmanagement system, integrate various agriculture department, clear responsibility,innovate agricultural investment management system and operation mechanism, andstrengthen the local people's Congress, the CPPCC and the Commission for disciplineinspection departments of audit and supervision of agricultural investment funds. Toovercome the deviation of the implementation policy of supporting agriculture infinance of local government, improve the input-output performance. Finally, it shouldenhance scale, optimize structure, form into priority mechanism of the financial supportfor agriculture, and ensure financial input to the needs of departments and fields.
Secondly, match the governance and the financial rights, establish fiscal budgetconstraint mechanism. Based on guaranteeing the central macro-control, it shouldreduce the sharing of taxes and the share ratio, moderately reduce the central financialpower, and enhance financial power and resources of local governments, so that theyhave the ability to implement the central government's “three rural issues” governancearrangements. At the same time, according to the symmetrical principle of financialrights and the governance, it should clear definition of the central government and localgovernment fiscal agricultural expenditure responsibility boundary, also perfect thelocal tax system, giving local governments more rights of issuing bonds. The localgovernment should streamline the administrative structure, reduce the cost of runningthe government, and transform the functions of government. Promoting the rule of lawof budget and standardization, strengthening the legal binding budget, rigidly requiringof the absolute and relative growth rate. Moreover, there should be clear operating bodyand the boundary of responsibility for budget preparation, approval, implementation andsupervision. Change the budget expenditure oriented city deviation, and increase theproject investment in agricultural production elements. Promote the proportion ofagricultural production investment, human capital, technology and rural public serviceinvestment. The hard constraint mechanism of land grant fees should be establishment. The local government's “grabbing hand” of occupation farmland and crazily selling landshould be strictly regulated. Meanwhile, participatory budget system should beestablished, and the fiscal agriculture fund payments are included in the budget reviewand social supervision.
Thirdly, optimize the transfer payment and implement the integration mode ofurban and rural development. The performance of unconditional transfer payment, likeprevious poverty alleviation, should be evaluated by the central government. Overcomelow financial balance, and innovate performance evaluation index system of the centraltransfer. Meanwhile, the transfer of matching conditions or the proportion of paymentshould be implemented. Simplify the transfer payment links and improve the transferefficiency of capital utilization. The central government should establish a transferpayment mechanism of targeting and redistribution, improve the precision and intensityof transfer payment for the backward provinces of rural public goods. Especially for thespillover of rural public goods, the special payment must be established. Moreover,improve the transfer payment system at and below the provincial level, establish unifiedallocation of channels and transparent information release platform. To eliminate themain obstacle to the integration of urban and rural development, first of all to promotethe equalization of urban and rural public products and service supply, improve theefficiency and quality. The urban and rural public goods allocation should be dominatedby the local government. Adhere to the urban and rural fair unified fiscal policy,construction the feedback mechanism of city to rural institution and policy, materialcapital, human capital etc. The last is the innovation of rural land property rights system,Safeguarding farmer's land value-added income, and exploring channels of propertyincome.
Fourthly, factors of production and operation mode of modernization should beinput agriculture department.“Two wheel drive” mode should be the path change of thefuture China agricultural economic growth and sustainable development. Through fiscal,financial and insurance policies, it should reduce threshold of agricultural newtechnologies, promote the progress of agricultural technology diffusion and propagation,and construct technology transfer and interaction mechanism of industrialization,information and agricultural production efficiency. Fully understand the cycle ofagricultural production, strengthen the agricultural infrastructure construction, establishecological, low carbon modern agriculture. On the premise of ensuring food security,accelerate the adjustment of the internal structure and the upgrading of the agricultural industry, improve agricultural insurance mechanism, enhance the ability of agricultureresisting market risk. Improve the incentive and restraint mechanism, promoteappropriate scale operation, vigorously develop the family farm, and cultivate newagricultural management body. At the same time, establishing the integration of urbanand rural employment market, building high quality system of agricultural science andtechnology training and communication, improving the investment and accumulation ofrural human capital by education training ticket issuance and other methods, andestablishing the integration of urban and rural household registration and social securitysystem.
Fifthly, promote rural financial deepening and explore stable growth mechanism ofagricultural capital accumulation, profit rate. To eliminate the gap between urban andrural areas of financial deepening, innovate system arrangement of rural financialservices, and expand the service function. According to credit status of agriculturerelated financial institutions, the central bank can gradually relax the interest ratecontrol and realize the greater floating range. Moreover, reasonably position ofcommercial and policy financial institutions market boundary, improve the ruralfinancial ecological environment, expand the function of the rural policy finance,innovate financial products, develop micro finance, and promote urban and ruralfinancial co-ordination.In the effective risk monitoring conditions, it is appropriate toreduce the threshold and the cost of financial services in rural areas, relax the farmersloan tolerance and allow a reasonable extension. The central government can tax cutsand incentives for agricultural enterprises, give the provincial level local governmentsmore autonomy and economic incentive in the field of agriculture, and try to authorizeagricultural big province to issue special bonds of agricultural development. In addition,the local government can attempt to establish professional business and policy creditevaluation, guarantee institutions, and explore the way of mortgage, guarantee andfinancing of rural collective land. Let the leverage of financial capital be exertedadequately and induct household investment, financial, insurance, social capital toinvest in agriculture.
Finally, the central government should offer local government incentive systemand policy innovation for agricultural development. Optimize the system of politicalachievements and innovate dynamic mechanism of local government to supportagriculture. The central government should change the simple appraisal system in termsof GDP performance, adhere to the Scientific Outlook on Development, pay attention to the coordinated development of urban and rural areas, and put the performanceindicators of supporting Agriculture into the local government officials assessmentsystem. In addition, reform public governance mode, construct farmer preference andgovernment response mechanism, and innovate the system and mechanism of ruralsocial management. To reduce the transaction cost of rights, the highly organized andprofessional farmers autonomy organization should be established, so that it can allowfarmers access to take part in the whole process of public choice and establish the realsense of “vote with foot”,“vote” mechanism.
引文
①Fei,C.H and G.Ranis,“A Theory of Economic Development”,American Economic Review.1961.
①李晓澜,宋继清.二元经济理论模型评述[J].山西财经大学学报.2004,(1):14-19.
②瓦格纳法则:当国民收入增长时，财政支出会以更大比例增长。随着人均收入水平的提高，政府支出占GNP的比重将会提高，这就是财政支出的相对增长。
①《中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》。
①樊勇明,杜莉.公共经济学（第二版）[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007:311.
①罗森,盖亚著;郭庆旺,赵志耘译.财政学（第八版）[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2009:54-55.
①具体参见:杨志勇,张馨.公共经济学（第二版）[M].北京:清华大学出版社.2008:44-51.
②布坎南.自由、市场与国家[M].上海:三联书店.1989:31.
③具体参见:高培勇,杨志勇,杨立刚,夏杰长[M].公共经济学.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2007:94-96.
①具体办法参见:贾康.中国财税改革30年简要回顾与评述[J].财政研究,2008,(10):2-20.
①具体参见《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》国发[1993]85号。
①“囚犯的快乐”制度博弈分析思路来自袁庆明.新制度经济学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2012:322-324.
①中国式分权是指在保持中央政府高度政治集权的前提下，赋予地方政府的经济分权，参见傅勇，张晏（2007）；近年来，分权领域研究出现了关注分权负面效应的学术动向，参见Keen et al.，1996；Triesman，2000；Bardhan，2002；Bucovetsky，2005；Cai et al.，2005；关于中国分权式改革的得失讨论经典文献参见王永钦等，2007；正如乔宝云（2005），傅勇（2010）所述：本文并未否定委任制与分权制本身，不排除在联邦制下，同样存在因地方政府竞争而出现分权的不合意结果。
②因《中国农村统计年鉴》对北京和上海2010和2011年农村床位数并未统计，遂上述两市数据来源于《中国统计年鉴》。
①1995-2008年FDI数据来自《新中国60年统计资料汇编》，2009-2010年数据来自各省统计年鉴，统计口径为“实际使用金额”。
③因《中国检察年鉴》历年各省对贪污贿赂案件称谓略有不同，本文使用的检察机关立案侦查数包括反贪污贿赂案件，即贪污案，贿赂案，挪用公款案，集体私分案，巨额财产来源不明案和其他案件；渎职侵权案件，即滥用职权案，玩忽职守案，徇私舞弊案和其他案件；职务犯罪案件。1995-2008年数据来自《中国检察年鉴》和西南政法大学密集书库；在2009-2011年数据采集过程中，北京，天津，吉林，上海，江苏，安徽，河南，湖北，四川，贵州，甘肃来自各省统计年鉴，其他省份因数据缺失，使用剔除趋势的二次移动平均法（N=3）进行预测取值。
①根据《中国财政年鉴》中央补助收入（包括税收返还）从1995年开始在财经统计资料中显示，所以样本起始点选择在1995年；另外，本章将数据更新到2011年，前期研究成果发表于《预测》2014年第一期，时间窗是1995-2010年。
②具体参见:[美]古扎拉蒂著,林少宫译.计量经济学(第三版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2000:744;高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模:EViews应用及实例(第二版)[M].北京:清华大学出版社.2009:281.
①本章主要介绍基于产出的曼奎斯特生产率指数法，参考了Fare et al（1994），郑京海等（2002，2005），魏权龄（2012）等相关前期研究。
①党的十八大报告中提出：“坚持走中国特色新型工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化道路，推动信息化和工业化深度融合、工业化和城镇化良性互动、城镇化和农业现代化相互协调，促进工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化同步发展”；2013年中央一号文件也指出：“把城乡发展一体化作为解决“三农”问题的根本途径；必须统筹协调，促进工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化同步发展，着力强化现代农业基础支撑，深入推进社会主义新农村建设”；具体参见《关于加快发展现代农业进一步增强农村发展活力的若干意见》。
①关于“中国式分权”参见论文第四章的有关说明。
②具体参见十七届三中全会《中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定》。
①相关前期研究工作参见宁满秀（2008），续竞秦（2009），李晓嘉（2011）。
①参见乔宝云（2002），殷德生（2004），周业安和张泉（2008）。总财政支出为人均各省份本级财政支出与人均中央本级财政支出之和。
①公共财政覆盖农村在学术研究上已经达成共识，但在政策设计与实践操作环节却来得很迟，直到2003年，财政部才第一次提出“要让公共财政的阳光照耀农村”（丁学东和张岩松，2007）。
②《农业法》第三十八条规定：“国家逐步提高农业投入的总体水平。中央和县级以上地方财政每年对农业总投入的增长幅度应当高于其财政经常性收入的增长幅度。”近年来有众多学者提出修改该法或制定《农业投资法》等。
①党的十八届三中全会《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》指出：“在坚持和完善最严格的耕地保护制度前提下，赋予农民对承包地占有、使用、收益、流转及承包经营权抵押、担保权能……保障农户宅基地用益物权……慎重稳妥推进农民住房财产权抵押、担保、转让，探索农民增加财产性收入渠道。”
①张宁，胡鞍钢，郑京海（2006）曾使用省级面板数据，应用数据包络分析方法（DEA）对中国各地区的健康生产效率进行测度，具体参见《经济研究》2006年第7期，应用DEA测度中国各地区农村居民健康生产率的文献暂未发现。
陈卫平.2006.中国农业生产率增长、技术进步与效率变化:1990-2003年[J].中国农村观察,(1):18-23.
陈锡文.2010.当前农业和农村经济形势与“三农”面临的挑战[J].中国农村经济,(1):4-9.
陈斌开,张鹏飞,杨汝岱.2010.政府教育投入、人力资本投资与中国城乡收入差距[J].管理世界,(1):36-43.
陈刚,李树.2010.中国的腐败、收入分配和收入差距[J].经济科学,(2):55-68.
陈硕.2010.分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给[J].经济学(季刊),9(4):1427-1446.
陈小君,蒋省三.2010.宅基地使用权制度:规范解析、实践挑战及其立法回应[J].管理世界,(10):1-12.
陈安平,杜金沛.2010.中国的财政支出与城乡收入差距[J].统计研究,(11):35-39.
蔡继明.1998.中国城乡比较生产力与相对收入差别[J].经济研究,(1):11-19.
蔡昉,杨涛.2000.城乡收入差距的政治经济学[J].中国社会科学,(4):11-22.
陈宗胜,周云波.2001.非法非正常收入对居民收入差别的影响及其经济学解释[J].经济研究,(4):14-23.
程开明,李金昌.2007.城市偏向、城市化与城乡收入差距的作用机制及动态分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(7):116-125.
Daniel C.Monchuk.2009.中国农业生产非效率的影响因素分析[J].世界经济文汇,(2):47-56.
邓可斌,丁菊红.2009.转型中的分权与公共品供给:基于中国经验的实证研究[J].财经研究,(3):139-150.
邓子基.2009.新中国60年税制改革的成就与展望[J].税务研究,(10):3-7.
丁志国,赵晶,赵宣凯等.2011.我国城乡收人差距的库兹涅茨效应识别与农村金融政策应对路径选择[J].金融研究,(7):142-151.
樊胜根.1998.中国农业生产与生产率的增长:新的测算方法及结论[J].农业技术经济,(4):27-35
樊勇.2006.财政分权度的衡量方法研究——兼议中国财政分权水平[J].当代财经,(10):33-36.
傅勇,张晏.2007.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,(3):4-11.
傅勇.2010.财政分权、政府治理与非经济性公共物品供给[J].经济研究,(8):4-15.
方鸿.2010.中国农业生产技术效率研究:基于省级层面的测度、发现与解释[J].农业技术经济,(1):34-41.
方福前,张艳丽.2010.中国农业全要素生产率的变化及其影响因素分析——基于1991-2008年Malmquist指数方法[J].经济理论与经济管理,(9):5-12.
付文林.2012.人口流动、增量预算与地方公共品的拥挤效应[J].中国经济问题,(1):41-53.
顾海,孟令杰.2002.中国农业TFP的增长及其构成[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(10):15-18.
高梦滔,张颖.2006.小农户更有效率?——八省农村的经验证据.统计研究,(8):21-26.
高彦彦.2010.城市偏向、城乡收入差距与中国农业增长[J].中国农村观察,(5):2-13.
胡书东.2001.经济发展中的中央与地力关系--中国财政制度变迁研究[M].上海:上海人民出版社.
侯风云.2004.中国农村人力资本收益率研究[J].经济研究,(12):75-84.
侯风云,张凤兵.2007.农村人力资本投资及外溢与城乡收入差距实证研究[J].财经研究,(8):118-131.
黄少安,孙圣民,宫明波.2005.中国土地产权制度对农业经济增长的——对1949-1978年中国大陆农业生产效率的实证分析[J].中国社会科学,(3):38-47.
胡联合,胡鞍钢,徐绍刚.2005.贫富差距对违法犯罪活动影响的实证分析[J].管理世界,(6):34-44.
黄季焜等.2008.制度变迁和可持续发展:30年中国农业与农村[M].上海:格致出版社,上海人民出版社.
黄肖广,李睿鑫.2009.财政分权与经济增长的地区差异效应研究——基于东、中、西部省际面板数据(1988-2005)的分析[J].学术交流,(1):90-94.
洪正.2011.新型农村金融机构改革可行吗?——基于监督效率视角的分析[J].经济研究,(2):44-58.
蒋省三,刘守英,李青.2007.土地制度改革与国民经济成长[J].管理世界,(9):1-9.
林毅夫,刘志强.2000.中国的财政分权与经济增长[J].北京人学学报(哲学社会科学版),(4):5-17.
林毅夫.2008.制度、技术与中国农业发展[M].上海:格致出版社:上海人民出版社.
李实.2003.中国个人收入分配研究回顾与展望[J].经济学(季刊),2(2):379-404.
陆铭,陈钊.2004.城市化、城市倾向的经济政策与城乡收入差距[J].经济研究,(6):50-58.
李静,孟令杰.2006.中国农业生产率的变动与分解分析:1978-2004年——基于非参数的HMB生产率指数的实证研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(5):11-19.
李谷成,冯中朝,范丽霞.2006.教育、健康与农民收入增长——来自转型期湖北省农村的证据[J].中国农村经济,(1):66-74.
李谷成,冯中朝,占绍文.2008.家庭禀赋对农户家庭经营技术效率的影响冲击——基于湖北省农户的随机前沿生产函数实证[J].统计研究,(1):35-42.
李谷成,冯中朝,范丽霞.2009.小农户真的更加具有效率吗?来自湖北省的经验证据[J].经济学（季刊),9(1):95-124.
李谷成.2009.技术效率、技术进步与中国农业生产率增长[J].经济评论,(1):60-68.
李谷成.2009.中国农村经济制度变迁、农业生产绩效与动态演进——基于1978-2005年省际面板数据的DEA实证[J].制度经济学研究,(3):20-54.
李谷成,冯中朝.2010.中国农业全要素生产率增长技术推进抑或效率驱动——一项基于随机前沿生产函数的行业比较研究[J].农业技术经济,(5):4-14.
李周,于法稳.2005.西部地区农业生产效率的DEA分析[J].中国农村观察,(6):2-10.
刘卓珺,于长革.2010.中国财政分权演进轨迹及其创新路径[J].改革,(6):31-37.
刘灿.2011.构建农民与农村经济长期发展的财产权基础——基于成都市改革经验的理论分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,(11):5-14.
罗伟卿.2010.财政分权是否影响了公共教育供给——基于理论模型与地级面板数据的研究[J].财经研究,36(11):39-49.
罗必良.2011.农地产权模糊化:一个概念性框架及其解释[J].学术研究,(12):48-56.
罗必良.2013.农地保障和退出条件下的制度变革:福利功能让渡财产功能[J].改革,(1):66-75.
林江.2011.财政分权、晋升激励和地方政府义务教育供给[J].财贸经济,(1):34-40.
赖小琼,黄智淋.2011.财政分权、通货膨胀与城乡收入差距关系研究[J].厦门大学学报（哲学社会科版),(1):22-29.
雷根强,蔡翔.2012.初次分配扭曲、财政支出城市偏向与城乡收入差距——来自中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(3):76-89.
Michael Carter,姚洋.2004.工业化、土地市场和农业投资[J].经济学(季刊),3(4):983-1002.
莫亚琳,张志超.2011.城市化进程、公共财政支出与社会收入分配[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(3):79-89.
孟令杰.2000.中国农业产出技术效率动态研究[J].农业技术经济,(5):1-4.
平新乔,白洁.2006.中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给[J].财贸经济,(2):49-55.
乔宝云,范剑勇,冯兴元.2005.中国的财政分权与小学义务教育[J].中国社会科学,(6):37-46.
全炯振.2009.中国农业全要素生产率增长的实证研究:1978-2007年——基于随机前沿分析(SFA)方法[J].中国农村经济,(9):36-47.
马光荣,杨恩艳.2010.中国式分权、城市倾向的经济政策与城乡收入差距[J].制度经济学研究,(1):10-21.
马光荣,杨恩艳.2010.打到底线的竞争--财政分权、政府目标与公共品的提供[J].经济评论,(6):59-69.
冉光和,温涛,李敬.2008.中国农村经济发展的金融约束效应研究[J].中国软科学,(7):27-37.
舒尔茨著,梁小民译.1999.改造传统农业[M].北京:商务印书馆.
Scott Rozelle,黄季焜.2005.中国的农村经济与通向现代工业国之路[J].经济学(季刊),4(4):1019-1042.
沈坤荣,张璟.2007.中国农村公共支出及其绩效分析——基于农民收入增长和城乡收入差距的经验研究[J].管理世界,(1):30-40.
孙琳,潘春阳.2009.“利维坦假说”、财政分权和地方政府规模膨胀——来自1998-2006年的省级证据[J].财经论丛,(2):15-22.
孙蚌珠,刘翰飞.2010.中国财政分权的数量化度量及其地区间差距——基于1979-2008年省级面板数据[J].经济理论与经济管理,(5):5-13.
陶然,刘明兴.2007.中国城乡收入差距,地方政府开支及财政自主[J].世界经济文汇,(2):2-21.
温涛,冉光和,熊德平.2005.我国金融发展与农民收入增长[J].经济研究,(9):30-43.
温涛,董文杰.2011.财政金融支农政策的总体效应与时空差异——基于中国省际面板数据的研究[J].农业技术经济,(1):24-33.
王永钦,张晏,章元等.2007.中国的大国发展道路--论分权式改革的得失[J].经济研究,(1):4-14.
王小鲁.2007.我国的灰色收入与居民收入差距[[J].中国税务,(10):48-49.
王文剑,覃成林.2008.地方政府行为与财政分权增长效应的地区差异性——基于经验分析的判断、假说及检验[J].管理世界,(1):9-21.
王志刚,龚六堂.2009.财政分权和地方政府非税收入:基于省级财政数据[J].世界经济文汇,(5):17-38.
王珏,宋文飞,韩先锋.2010.中国地区农业全要素生产率及其影响因素的空间计量分析——基于1992-2007年省域空间面板数据[J].中国农村经济,(8):24-35.
王小鲁.2010.灰色收入与国民收入分配[J].人力资源,(8):50-52.
王奇,王会,陈海丹.2012.中国农业绿色全要素生产率变化研究:1992-2010年[J].经济评论,(5):24-33.
万广华.2008.不平等的度量与分解[J].经济学（季刊）,8(1):347-368.
吴磊,周洁.2010.Malmquist指数法与中国全要素生产率研究:误解与争论[J].商业时代,(29):4-5.
万广华,吴一平.2012.司法制度、工资激励与反腐败:中国案例[J].经济学(季刊),11(3):997-1010.
卫龙宝,张菲.2012.农村基层治理满意程度及其影响因素分析——基于公共物品供给的微观视角[J].中国农村经济,(6):85-96.
魏权龄.2012.评价相对有效性的数据包络分析模型:DEA和网络DEA[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.
熊柴,黄薇.2010.行政分权、财政分权与劳资收入不平等[J].制度经济学研究,(2):76-100.
刑祖礼,邓朝春.2012.财政分权与农村义务教育研究——基于财政自给度视角[J].中国经济问题,(4):62-68.
姚洋.2000.中国农地制度:一个分析框架[J].中国社会科学,(2):54-65.
姚洋,杨雷.2003.制度供给失衡和中国财政分权的后果[J].战略与管理,(3):27-33.
姚洋.2000.集体决策下的诱导性制度变迁——中国农村地权稳定性演化的实证分析[J].中国农村观察,(2):11-19.
姚洋,张牧扬.2013.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛——来自城市数据的证据[J].经济研究,(1):137-149.
于长革.2008.中国式财政分权与公共服务供给的机理分析[J].财经问题研究,(11):84-89.
余新平,熊皛白,熊德平.2010.中国农村金融发展与农民收入增长[J].中国农村经济,(6):77-96.
余长林.2011.财政分权、公共品供给与中国城乡收入差距[J].中国经济问题,(5):36-45.
郑京海,刘小玄,Arne Bigsten.2002.1980-1994期间中国国有企业的效率、技术进步和最佳实践[J].经济学(季刊),1(3):521-540.
郑京海,胡鞍钢.2005.中国改革时期省际生产率增长变化的实证分析(1979-2001年)[J].经济学(季刊),4(2):263-296.
张晓波,樊胜根,张林秀等.2003.中国农村基层治理与公共物品提供[J].经济学(季刊),2(4):947-960.
周黎安.2004.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,(6):33-40.
周黎安.2007.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,(7):36-50.
周其仁.2004.农地产权与征地制度——中国城市化面临的重大选择[J].经济学（季刊）,4(1):193-210.
周业安,章泉.2008.财政分权、经济增长和波动[J].管理世界,(3):6-14.
张晏,龚六堂.2005.分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),5(1):75-108.
邹薇,张芬.2006.农村地区收入差异与人力资本积累[J].中国社会科学,(2):67-79.
曾国安.2007.论工业化过程中导致城乡居民收入差距扩大的自然因素与制度因素[J].经济评论,(3):41-47.
张军,高远,傅勇等.2007.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施[J].经济研究,(3):4-17.
郑磊.2008.财政分权、政府竞争与公共支出结构--政府教育支出比重的影响因素分析[J].经济科学,(1):28-39.
章祥荪,贵斌威.2008.中国全要素生产率分析:Malmquist指数法评述与应用[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(6):111-122.
章元,刘时菁,刘亮.2011.城乡收入差距、民工失业与中国犯罪率的上升[J].经济研究,(2):59-71.
左翔,殷醒民,潘孝挺.2011.财政收入集权增加了基层政府公共服务支出吗?以河南省减免农业税为例[J].经济学(季刊),10(4):1349-1374.
朱喜,史清华,盖庆恩.2011.要素配置扭曲与农业全要素生产率[J].经济研究,(5):86-98.
张义博,刘文忻.2012.人口流动、财政支出结构与城乡收入差距[J].中国农村经济,(1):16-29.
Barro R J.,1991.Economic Growth in A Cross Section of Countries[J].Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,2:407-443.
Bates Robert.,1981.Markets and States in Tropical Africa[M].Berkeley: University of California.
Bardhan P.,2002.Decentralization of Governance and Development[J].The Journal of EconomicPerspectives,16(4):186.
Bardhan, P. K.,1973.Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: An Analysis of Farm-level Data inIndian Agriculture[J].Journal of Political Economy,81:1370-1386.
Battese G.E., T.J.Coelli.,1995.A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic FrontierProduction Function for Panel Data[J].Empirical Economics,20(2):325-332.
C.A.Sims.,1980.Wacroeconomics and Reality[J].Econometrica,48:1-48.
Cecilia.,Turnovsky.,2007.Crowth, Income Inequality and Fiscal Policy:What Are the RelevantTrade-offs?[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,39(2):1-30.
C.M.Tiebout.,1956.Pure Theory of Clubs[J].American Economics Reviews,64:416-424.
Cai H B,Treisman D.,2005.Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization,Globalization, and Public Policy[J].American Economic Review,95(4):817-830.
Chen,Aimin.,2002.Urbanization and Disparities in China: Challenges of Growth andDevelopment[J].China Economic Review,13:407-411.
Crilliches., Zvi.,1957.An Exploration of the Economics of Technological Change[J].Econometrica,25:501-522.
Chavas,Jean-paul,Petrie Ragan et al.,2005.Farm Household Production Efficiency Evidence from theCambia[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87(1):160-179.
Enikolopov R, Zhuravskaya E.,2007.Decentralization and Political Institutions[J].Journal of PublicEconomics,91(2):2261-2290.
Fare.,Rolf.,Shawna.,Crosskopf.etal.,1994.Productivity Growth,Technical Progress and EfficiencyChange in Industrialized Countries[J].American Economic Review,84(1):66-83.
Faguet J P.,2004.Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs？Evidence from Bolivia[J].Journal of Public Economics,88:867-893.
Fan,S.and Pardy,P.G.,1997.Research,Productivity and Output Growth in Chinese Agriculture[J].Journal of Development Economics,53(1):115-137.
Griliches,Zvi.,1963.The Source of Measured Productivity Growth: United StatesAgriculture,1940-1960[J].Journal of Political Economy,71(7):122-134.
Lin,J.Y.,1997.Institutional Reforms and Dynamics of Agricultural Growth in China[J].FoodPolicy,22(3):201-212.
Lin J Y, Liu Z.,2000.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China[J].EconomicDevelopment and Cultural Change,49(1):1-21.
Lipton Michael.,1977.Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development[M].Boston:Harvard University.
Lin,Justin Y.,1992.Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China[J].American EconomicReview,82(1):34-51.
Hayami.,Yujiro.,Vernon Ruttan.,1970.Factor Prices and Technical Change in AgriculturalDevelopment:The United States and Japan,1880to1960[J].Journal of PoliticalEconomy,78:1115-1141.
Hao R.,Wei Z.,2008.Fundamental Causes of Inland-coastal Income Inequality in Post-reformChina[Z].The Chinese Economist Society Annual Conference.
Jin H, Qian Y, Weignast B.,2004.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of Public Economics,12:1719-1742.
Johnson D.G., Richard T.,1997.Ely Lecture: Agriculture and the Wealth of Nations[J].AmericanEconomic Review,87(2):1-12.
Krueger Anne., Maurice Schiff., Alberto Valdes.,1991.The Political Economy of Agricultural PricingPolicy[M].Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University.
Kanbur Ravi., Zhang Xiaobo.,2005.Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: A Journey ThroughCentral Planning, Reform and Openness[J].Review of Development Economics,9(1):87-106.
Kuznets, S.,1976.Economic Growth and Income Inequality[J].American Economic Review,45:1-28.
Kumbhakar S.C.,2000.Estimation and Decomposition of Productivity Change When Production isNot Efficient: A Panel Data Approach[J].Econometric Reviews,19(4):425-460.
Karagiannis C., P.Midmore.,V. Tzouvelekas.,2002.Separating Technical Change from Time-VaryingTechnical Inefficiency in the Absence of Distributional Assumptions[J].Journal of ProductivityAnalysis,18(1):23-38.
Mauro P.,1998.Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure[J].Journal of PublicEconomics,69:263-279.
Qian Y,Barry R,Weingast B.,1997.Federalism as A Commitment to Preserving MarketIncentives[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,11(4):83-92.
Qian Y,Roland G.,1998.Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J].American EconomicReview,77:265-284.
Robert M.Solow.,1957.Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function[J].The Review ofEconomics and Statistics,39(3):312-320.
Rosegrant M.W., Evenson R. E.,1992.Agricultural Productivity and Sources of Growth in SouthAsia[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,8:757-761.
Shankar R., Shah A.,2001.Bridging the Economic Divide within Nations: A Scorecard on thePerformance of Regional Development Policies in Reducing Regional IncomeDisparities[M].Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
West L,C Wong.,1995.Fiscal Decentralization and Crowing Regional Disparities in Rural China:Some Evidence in the Provision of Social Services[J].Oxford Review of EconomicPolicy,11(4):70-84.
Yang,Demis Tao.,1999.Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China[J].AmericanEconomic Review Papers And Proceedings,5:306-310.
Zhuravskaya E.,2000.Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, RussianStyle[J].Journal of Public Economics,76:337-368.
①李晓澜,宋继清.二元经济理论模型评述[J].山西财经大学学报.2004,(1):14-19.
②瓦格纳法则:当国民收入增长时，财政支出会以更大比例增长。随着人均收入水平的提高，政府支出占GNP的比重将会提高，这就是财政支出的相对增长。
①《中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》。
①樊勇明,杜莉.公共经济学（第二版）[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007:311.
①罗森,盖亚著;郭庆旺,赵志耘译.财政学（第八版）[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2009:54-55.
①具体参见:杨志勇,张馨.公共经济学（第二版）[M].北京:清华大学出版社.2008:44-51.
②布坎南.自由、市场与国家[M].上海:三联书店.1989:31.
③具体参见:高培勇,杨志勇,杨立刚,夏杰长[M].公共经济学.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2007:94-96.
①具体办法参见:贾康.中国财税改革30年简要回顾与评述[J].财政研究,2008,(10):2-20.
①具体参见《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》国发[1993]85号。
①“囚犯的快乐”制度博弈分析思路来自袁庆明.新制度经济学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2012:322-324.
①中国式分权是指在保持中央政府高度政治集权的前提下，赋予地方政府的经济分权，参见傅勇，张晏（2007）；近年来，分权领域研究出现了关注分权负面效应的学术动向，参见Keen et al.，1996；Triesman，2000；Bardhan，2002；Bucovetsky，2005；Cai et al.，2005；关于中国分权式改革的得失讨论经典文献参见王永钦等，2007；正如乔宝云（2005），傅勇（2010）所述：本文并未否定委任制与分权制本身，不排除在联邦制下，同样存在因地方政府竞争而出现分权的不合意结果。
②因《中国农村统计年鉴》对北京和上海2010和2011年农村床位数并未统计，遂上述两市数据来源于《中国统计年鉴》。
①1995-2008年FDI数据来自《新中国60年统计资料汇编》，2009-2010年数据来自各省统计年鉴，统计口径为“实际使用金额”。
③因《中国检察年鉴》历年各省对贪污贿赂案件称谓略有不同，本文使用的检察机关立案侦查数包括反贪污贿赂案件，即贪污案，贿赂案，挪用公款案，集体私分案，巨额财产来源不明案和其他案件；渎职侵权案件，即滥用职权案，玩忽职守案，徇私舞弊案和其他案件；职务犯罪案件。1995-2008年数据来自《中国检察年鉴》和西南政法大学密集书库；在2009-2011年数据采集过程中，北京，天津，吉林，上海，江苏，安徽，河南，湖北，四川，贵州，甘肃来自各省统计年鉴，其他省份因数据缺失，使用剔除趋势的二次移动平均法（N=3）进行预测取值。
①根据《中国财政年鉴》中央补助收入（包括税收返还）从1995年开始在财经统计资料中显示，所以样本起始点选择在1995年；另外，本章将数据更新到2011年，前期研究成果发表于《预测》2014年第一期，时间窗是1995-2010年。
②具体参见:[美]古扎拉蒂著,林少宫译.计量经济学(第三版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2000:744;高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模:EViews应用及实例(第二版)[M].北京:清华大学出版社.2009:281.
①本章主要介绍基于产出的曼奎斯特生产率指数法，参考了Fare et al（1994），郑京海等（2002，2005），魏权龄（2012）等相关前期研究。
①党的十八大报告中提出：“坚持走中国特色新型工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化道路，推动信息化和工业化深度融合、工业化和城镇化良性互动、城镇化和农业现代化相互协调，促进工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化同步发展”；2013年中央一号文件也指出：“把城乡发展一体化作为解决“三农”问题的根本途径；必须统筹协调，促进工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化同步发展，着力强化现代农业基础支撑，深入推进社会主义新农村建设”；具体参见《关于加快发展现代农业进一步增强农村发展活力的若干意见》。
①关于“中国式分权”参见论文第四章的有关说明。
②具体参见十七届三中全会《中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定》。
①相关前期研究工作参见宁满秀（2008），续竞秦（2009），李晓嘉（2011）。
①参见乔宝云（2002），殷德生（2004），周业安和张泉（2008）。总财政支出为人均各省份本级财政支出与人均中央本级财政支出之和。
①公共财政覆盖农村在学术研究上已经达成共识，但在政策设计与实践操作环节却来得很迟，直到2003年，财政部才第一次提出“要让公共财政的阳光照耀农村”（丁学东和张岩松，2007）。
②《农业法》第三十八条规定：“国家逐步提高农业投入的总体水平。中央和县级以上地方财政每年对农业总投入的增长幅度应当高于其财政经常性收入的增长幅度。”近年来有众多学者提出修改该法或制定《农业投资法》等。
①党的十八届三中全会《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》指出：“在坚持和完善最严格的耕地保护制度前提下，赋予农民对承包地占有、使用、收益、流转及承包经营权抵押、担保权能……保障农户宅基地用益物权……慎重稳妥推进农民住房财产权抵押、担保、转让，探索农民增加财产性收入渠道。”
①张宁，胡鞍钢，郑京海（2006）曾使用省级面板数据，应用数据包络分析方法（DEA）对中国各地区的健康生产效率进行测度，具体参见《经济研究》2006年第7期，应用DEA测度中国各地区农村居民健康生产率的文献暂未发现。
陈卫平.2006.中国农业生产率增长、技术进步与效率变化:1990-2003年[J].中国农村观察,(1):18-23.
陈锡文.2010.当前农业和农村经济形势与“三农”面临的挑战[J].中国农村经济,(1):4-9.
陈斌开,张鹏飞,杨汝岱.2010.政府教育投入、人力资本投资与中国城乡收入差距[J].管理世界,(1):36-43.
陈刚,李树.2010.中国的腐败、收入分配和收入差距[J].经济科学,(2):55-68.
陈硕.2010.分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给[J].经济学(季刊),9(4):1427-1446.
陈小君,蒋省三.2010.宅基地使用权制度:规范解析、实践挑战及其立法回应[J].管理世界,(10):1-12.
陈安平,杜金沛.2010.中国的财政支出与城乡收入差距[J].统计研究,(11):35-39.
蔡继明.1998.中国城乡比较生产力与相对收入差别[J].经济研究,(1):11-19.
蔡昉,杨涛.2000.城乡收入差距的政治经济学[J].中国社会科学,(4):11-22.
陈宗胜,周云波.2001.非法非正常收入对居民收入差别的影响及其经济学解释[J].经济研究,(4):14-23.
程开明,李金昌.2007.城市偏向、城市化与城乡收入差距的作用机制及动态分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(7):116-125.
Daniel C.Monchuk.2009.中国农业生产非效率的影响因素分析[J].世界经济文汇,(2):47-56.
邓可斌,丁菊红.2009.转型中的分权与公共品供给:基于中国经验的实证研究[J].财经研究,(3):139-150.
邓子基.2009.新中国60年税制改革的成就与展望[J].税务研究,(10):3-7.
丁志国,赵晶,赵宣凯等.2011.我国城乡收人差距的库兹涅茨效应识别与农村金融政策应对路径选择[J].金融研究,(7):142-151.
樊胜根.1998.中国农业生产与生产率的增长:新的测算方法及结论[J].农业技术经济,(4):27-35
樊勇.2006.财政分权度的衡量方法研究——兼议中国财政分权水平[J].当代财经,(10):33-36.
傅勇,张晏.2007.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,(3):4-11.
傅勇.2010.财政分权、政府治理与非经济性公共物品供给[J].经济研究,(8):4-15.
方鸿.2010.中国农业生产技术效率研究:基于省级层面的测度、发现与解释[J].农业技术经济,(1):34-41.
方福前,张艳丽.2010.中国农业全要素生产率的变化及其影响因素分析——基于1991-2008年Malmquist指数方法[J].经济理论与经济管理,(9):5-12.
付文林.2012.人口流动、增量预算与地方公共品的拥挤效应[J].中国经济问题,(1):41-53.
顾海,孟令杰.2002.中国农业TFP的增长及其构成[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(10):15-18.
高梦滔,张颖.2006.小农户更有效率?——八省农村的经验证据.统计研究,(8):21-26.
高彦彦.2010.城市偏向、城乡收入差距与中国农业增长[J].中国农村观察,(5):2-13.
胡书东.2001.经济发展中的中央与地力关系--中国财政制度变迁研究[M].上海:上海人民出版社.
侯风云.2004.中国农村人力资本收益率研究[J].经济研究,(12):75-84.
侯风云,张凤兵.2007.农村人力资本投资及外溢与城乡收入差距实证研究[J].财经研究,(8):118-131.
黄少安,孙圣民,宫明波.2005.中国土地产权制度对农业经济增长的——对1949-1978年中国大陆农业生产效率的实证分析[J].中国社会科学,(3):38-47.
胡联合,胡鞍钢,徐绍刚.2005.贫富差距对违法犯罪活动影响的实证分析[J].管理世界,(6):34-44.
黄季焜等.2008.制度变迁和可持续发展:30年中国农业与农村[M].上海:格致出版社,上海人民出版社.
黄肖广,李睿鑫.2009.财政分权与经济增长的地区差异效应研究——基于东、中、西部省际面板数据(1988-2005)的分析[J].学术交流,(1):90-94.
洪正.2011.新型农村金融机构改革可行吗?——基于监督效率视角的分析[J].经济研究,(2):44-58.
蒋省三,刘守英,李青.2007.土地制度改革与国民经济成长[J].管理世界,(9):1-9.
林毅夫,刘志强.2000.中国的财政分权与经济增长[J].北京人学学报(哲学社会科学版),(4):5-17.
林毅夫.2008.制度、技术与中国农业发展[M].上海:格致出版社:上海人民出版社.
李实.2003.中国个人收入分配研究回顾与展望[J].经济学(季刊),2(2):379-404.
陆铭,陈钊.2004.城市化、城市倾向的经济政策与城乡收入差距[J].经济研究,(6):50-58.
李静,孟令杰.2006.中国农业生产率的变动与分解分析:1978-2004年——基于非参数的HMB生产率指数的实证研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(5):11-19.
李谷成,冯中朝,范丽霞.2006.教育、健康与农民收入增长——来自转型期湖北省农村的证据[J].中国农村经济,(1):66-74.
李谷成,冯中朝,占绍文.2008.家庭禀赋对农户家庭经营技术效率的影响冲击——基于湖北省农户的随机前沿生产函数实证[J].统计研究,(1):35-42.
李谷成,冯中朝,范丽霞.2009.小农户真的更加具有效率吗?来自湖北省的经验证据[J].经济学（季刊),9(1):95-124.
李谷成.2009.技术效率、技术进步与中国农业生产率增长[J].经济评论,(1):60-68.
李谷成.2009.中国农村经济制度变迁、农业生产绩效与动态演进——基于1978-2005年省际面板数据的DEA实证[J].制度经济学研究,(3):20-54.
李谷成,冯中朝.2010.中国农业全要素生产率增长技术推进抑或效率驱动——一项基于随机前沿生产函数的行业比较研究[J].农业技术经济,(5):4-14.
李周,于法稳.2005.西部地区农业生产效率的DEA分析[J].中国农村观察,(6):2-10.
刘卓珺,于长革.2010.中国财政分权演进轨迹及其创新路径[J].改革,(6):31-37.
刘灿.2011.构建农民与农村经济长期发展的财产权基础——基于成都市改革经验的理论分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,(11):5-14.
罗伟卿.2010.财政分权是否影响了公共教育供给——基于理论模型与地级面板数据的研究[J].财经研究,36(11):39-49.
罗必良.2011.农地产权模糊化:一个概念性框架及其解释[J].学术研究,(12):48-56.
罗必良.2013.农地保障和退出条件下的制度变革:福利功能让渡财产功能[J].改革,(1):66-75.
林江.2011.财政分权、晋升激励和地方政府义务教育供给[J].财贸经济,(1):34-40.
赖小琼,黄智淋.2011.财政分权、通货膨胀与城乡收入差距关系研究[J].厦门大学学报（哲学社会科版),(1):22-29.
雷根强,蔡翔.2012.初次分配扭曲、财政支出城市偏向与城乡收入差距——来自中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(3):76-89.
Michael Carter,姚洋.2004.工业化、土地市场和农业投资[J].经济学(季刊),3(4):983-1002.
莫亚琳,张志超.2011.城市化进程、公共财政支出与社会收入分配[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(3):79-89.
孟令杰.2000.中国农业产出技术效率动态研究[J].农业技术经济,(5):1-4.
平新乔,白洁.2006.中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给[J].财贸经济,(2):49-55.
乔宝云,范剑勇,冯兴元.2005.中国的财政分权与小学义务教育[J].中国社会科学,(6):37-46.
全炯振.2009.中国农业全要素生产率增长的实证研究:1978-2007年——基于随机前沿分析(SFA)方法[J].中国农村经济,(9):36-47.
马光荣,杨恩艳.2010.中国式分权、城市倾向的经济政策与城乡收入差距[J].制度经济学研究,(1):10-21.
马光荣,杨恩艳.2010.打到底线的竞争--财政分权、政府目标与公共品的提供[J].经济评论,(6):59-69.
冉光和,温涛,李敬.2008.中国农村经济发展的金融约束效应研究[J].中国软科学,(7):27-37.
舒尔茨著,梁小民译.1999.改造传统农业[M].北京:商务印书馆.
Scott Rozelle,黄季焜.2005.中国的农村经济与通向现代工业国之路[J].经济学(季刊),4(4):1019-1042.
沈坤荣,张璟.2007.中国农村公共支出及其绩效分析——基于农民收入增长和城乡收入差距的经验研究[J].管理世界,(1):30-40.
孙琳,潘春阳.2009.“利维坦假说”、财政分权和地方政府规模膨胀——来自1998-2006年的省级证据[J].财经论丛,(2):15-22.
孙蚌珠,刘翰飞.2010.中国财政分权的数量化度量及其地区间差距——基于1979-2008年省级面板数据[J].经济理论与经济管理,(5):5-13.
陶然,刘明兴.2007.中国城乡收入差距,地方政府开支及财政自主[J].世界经济文汇,(2):2-21.
温涛,冉光和,熊德平.2005.我国金融发展与农民收入增长[J].经济研究,(9):30-43.
温涛,董文杰.2011.财政金融支农政策的总体效应与时空差异——基于中国省际面板数据的研究[J].农业技术经济,(1):24-33.
王永钦,张晏,章元等.2007.中国的大国发展道路--论分权式改革的得失[J].经济研究,(1):4-14.
王小鲁.2007.我国的灰色收入与居民收入差距[[J].中国税务,(10):48-49.
王文剑,覃成林.2008.地方政府行为与财政分权增长效应的地区差异性——基于经验分析的判断、假说及检验[J].管理世界,(1):9-21.
王志刚,龚六堂.2009.财政分权和地方政府非税收入:基于省级财政数据[J].世界经济文汇,(5):17-38.
王珏,宋文飞,韩先锋.2010.中国地区农业全要素生产率及其影响因素的空间计量分析——基于1992-2007年省域空间面板数据[J].中国农村经济,(8):24-35.
王小鲁.2010.灰色收入与国民收入分配[J].人力资源,(8):50-52.
王奇,王会,陈海丹.2012.中国农业绿色全要素生产率变化研究:1992-2010年[J].经济评论,(5):24-33.
万广华.2008.不平等的度量与分解[J].经济学（季刊）,8(1):347-368.
吴磊,周洁.2010.Malmquist指数法与中国全要素生产率研究:误解与争论[J].商业时代,(29):4-5.
万广华,吴一平.2012.司法制度、工资激励与反腐败:中国案例[J].经济学(季刊),11(3):997-1010.
卫龙宝,张菲.2012.农村基层治理满意程度及其影响因素分析——基于公共物品供给的微观视角[J].中国农村经济,(6):85-96.
魏权龄.2012.评价相对有效性的数据包络分析模型:DEA和网络DEA[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.
熊柴,黄薇.2010.行政分权、财政分权与劳资收入不平等[J].制度经济学研究,(2):76-100.
刑祖礼,邓朝春.2012.财政分权与农村义务教育研究——基于财政自给度视角[J].中国经济问题,(4):62-68.
姚洋.2000.中国农地制度:一个分析框架[J].中国社会科学,(2):54-65.
姚洋,杨雷.2003.制度供给失衡和中国财政分权的后果[J].战略与管理,(3):27-33.
姚洋.2000.集体决策下的诱导性制度变迁——中国农村地权稳定性演化的实证分析[J].中国农村观察,(2):11-19.
姚洋,张牧扬.2013.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛——来自城市数据的证据[J].经济研究,(1):137-149.
于长革.2008.中国式财政分权与公共服务供给的机理分析[J].财经问题研究,(11):84-89.
余新平,熊皛白,熊德平.2010.中国农村金融发展与农民收入增长[J].中国农村经济,(6):77-96.
余长林.2011.财政分权、公共品供给与中国城乡收入差距[J].中国经济问题,(5):36-45.
郑京海,刘小玄,Arne Bigsten.2002.1980-1994期间中国国有企业的效率、技术进步和最佳实践[J].经济学(季刊),1(3):521-540.
郑京海,胡鞍钢.2005.中国改革时期省际生产率增长变化的实证分析(1979-2001年)[J].经济学(季刊),4(2):263-296.
张晓波,樊胜根,张林秀等.2003.中国农村基层治理与公共物品提供[J].经济学(季刊),2(4):947-960.
周黎安.2004.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,(6):33-40.
周黎安.2007.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,(7):36-50.
周其仁.2004.农地产权与征地制度——中国城市化面临的重大选择[J].经济学（季刊）,4(1):193-210.
周业安,章泉.2008.财政分权、经济增长和波动[J].管理世界,(3):6-14.
张晏,龚六堂.2005.分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),5(1):75-108.
邹薇,张芬.2006.农村地区收入差异与人力资本积累[J].中国社会科学,(2):67-79.
曾国安.2007.论工业化过程中导致城乡居民收入差距扩大的自然因素与制度因素[J].经济评论,(3):41-47.
张军,高远,傅勇等.2007.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施[J].经济研究,(3):4-17.
郑磊.2008.财政分权、政府竞争与公共支出结构--政府教育支出比重的影响因素分析[J].经济科学,(1):28-39.
章祥荪,贵斌威.2008.中国全要素生产率分析:Malmquist指数法评述与应用[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(6):111-122.
章元,刘时菁,刘亮.2011.城乡收入差距、民工失业与中国犯罪率的上升[J].经济研究,(2):59-71.
左翔,殷醒民,潘孝挺.2011.财政收入集权增加了基层政府公共服务支出吗?以河南省减免农业税为例[J].经济学(季刊),10(4):1349-1374.
朱喜,史清华,盖庆恩.2011.要素配置扭曲与农业全要素生产率[J].经济研究,(5):86-98.
张义博,刘文忻.2012.人口流动、财政支出结构与城乡收入差距[J].中国农村经济,(1):16-29.
Barro R J.,1991.Economic Growth in A Cross Section of Countries[J].Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,2:407-443.
Bates Robert.,1981.Markets and States in Tropical Africa[M].Berkeley: University of California.
Bardhan P.,2002.Decentralization of Governance and Development[J].The Journal of EconomicPerspectives,16(4):186.
Bardhan, P. K.,1973.Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: An Analysis of Farm-level Data inIndian Agriculture[J].Journal of Political Economy,81:1370-1386.
Battese G.E., T.J.Coelli.,1995.A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic FrontierProduction Function for Panel Data[J].Empirical Economics,20(2):325-332.
C.A.Sims.,1980.Wacroeconomics and Reality[J].Econometrica,48:1-48.
Cecilia.,Turnovsky.,2007.Crowth, Income Inequality and Fiscal Policy:What Are the RelevantTrade-offs?[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,39(2):1-30.
C.M.Tiebout.,1956.Pure Theory of Clubs[J].American Economics Reviews,64:416-424.
Cai H B,Treisman D.,2005.Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization,Globalization, and Public Policy[J].American Economic Review,95(4):817-830.
Chen,Aimin.,2002.Urbanization and Disparities in China: Challenges of Growth andDevelopment[J].China Economic Review,13:407-411.
Crilliches., Zvi.,1957.An Exploration of the Economics of Technological Change[J].Econometrica,25:501-522.
Chavas,Jean-paul,Petrie Ragan et al.,2005.Farm Household Production Efficiency Evidence from theCambia[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87(1):160-179.
Enikolopov R, Zhuravskaya E.,2007.Decentralization and Political Institutions[J].Journal of PublicEconomics,91(2):2261-2290.
Fare.,Rolf.,Shawna.,Crosskopf.etal.,1994.Productivity Growth,Technical Progress and EfficiencyChange in Industrialized Countries[J].American Economic Review,84(1):66-83.
Faguet J P.,2004.Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs？Evidence from Bolivia[J].Journal of Public Economics,88:867-893.
Fan,S.and Pardy,P.G.,1997.Research,Productivity and Output Growth in Chinese Agriculture[J].Journal of Development Economics,53(1):115-137.
Griliches,Zvi.,1963.The Source of Measured Productivity Growth: United StatesAgriculture,1940-1960[J].Journal of Political Economy,71(7):122-134.
Lin,J.Y.,1997.Institutional Reforms and Dynamics of Agricultural Growth in China[J].FoodPolicy,22(3):201-212.
Lin J Y, Liu Z.,2000.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China[J].EconomicDevelopment and Cultural Change,49(1):1-21.
Lipton Michael.,1977.Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development[M].Boston:Harvard University.
Lin,Justin Y.,1992.Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China[J].American EconomicReview,82(1):34-51.
Hayami.,Yujiro.,Vernon Ruttan.,1970.Factor Prices and Technical Change in AgriculturalDevelopment:The United States and Japan,1880to1960[J].Journal of PoliticalEconomy,78:1115-1141.
Hao R.,Wei Z.,2008.Fundamental Causes of Inland-coastal Income Inequality in Post-reformChina[Z].The Chinese Economist Society Annual Conference.
Jin H, Qian Y, Weignast B.,2004.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of Public Economics,12:1719-1742.
Johnson D.G., Richard T.,1997.Ely Lecture: Agriculture and the Wealth of Nations[J].AmericanEconomic Review,87(2):1-12.
Krueger Anne., Maurice Schiff., Alberto Valdes.,1991.The Political Economy of Agricultural PricingPolicy[M].Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University.
Kanbur Ravi., Zhang Xiaobo.,2005.Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: A Journey ThroughCentral Planning, Reform and Openness[J].Review of Development Economics,9(1):87-106.
Kuznets, S.,1976.Economic Growth and Income Inequality[J].American Economic Review,45:1-28.
Kumbhakar S.C.,2000.Estimation and Decomposition of Productivity Change When Production isNot Efficient: A Panel Data Approach[J].Econometric Reviews,19(4):425-460.
Karagiannis C., P.Midmore.,V. Tzouvelekas.,2002.Separating Technical Change from Time-VaryingTechnical Inefficiency in the Absence of Distributional Assumptions[J].Journal of ProductivityAnalysis,18(1):23-38.
Mauro P.,1998.Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure[J].Journal of PublicEconomics,69:263-279.
Qian Y,Barry R,Weingast B.,1997.Federalism as A Commitment to Preserving MarketIncentives[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,11(4):83-92.
Qian Y,Roland G.,1998.Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J].American EconomicReview,77:265-284.
Robert M.Solow.,1957.Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function[J].The Review ofEconomics and Statistics,39(3):312-320.
Rosegrant M.W., Evenson R. E.,1992.Agricultural Productivity and Sources of Growth in SouthAsia[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,8:757-761.
Shankar R., Shah A.,2001.Bridging the Economic Divide within Nations: A Scorecard on thePerformance of Regional Development Policies in Reducing Regional IncomeDisparities[M].Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
West L,C Wong.,1995.Fiscal Decentralization and Crowing Regional Disparities in Rural China:Some Evidence in the Provision of Social Services[J].Oxford Review of EconomicPolicy,11(4):70-84.
Yang,Demis Tao.,1999.Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China[J].AmericanEconomic Review Papers And Proceedings,5:306-310.
Zhuravskaya E.,2000.Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, RussianStyle[J].Journal of Public Economics,76:337-368.