中央企业控股上市公司投资微观效率和宏观作用研究
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摘要
进入21世纪以来,伴随着中国经济发展和改革的进一步深入,我国的国有企业取得了巨大的发展和进步,然而对其评价却“毁誉参半”,负面评价主要体现在指责其垄断、经营效率低下,占用大量资源,侵占民营企业的发展空间等等,那么国有企业是否如部分人所认为的存在效率低下问题,又该如何全面、客观地评价国有企业在中国经济发展中的作用是一个亟待澄清和解决的问题。
本文以国有企业投资支出为研究的切入点,在对企业投资理论、企业投资的微观效率、投资与宏观经济波动之间的关系等相关理论、以及中国国有企业投资体制历史沿革和治理特征等进行梳理和描述的基础上,以中央企业控股的上市公司为研究样本,运用计量经济学的方法,从投资支出的微观效率及其对宏观经济的作用两个方面进行对比研究,并从中央企业控股上市公司特殊公司治理结构特征角度对上述研究做进一步深化。
首先我们从中央企业控股上市公司的微观投资效率入手,运用2003-2011年包含166家中央企业控股上市的平衡面板数据,借鉴Richardson (2006)的模型对中央企业控股上市公司的预期资本支出进行量化,以实际资本支出和预期资本支出之间的差额对其非效率投资程度进行判断,实证结果发现中央企业控股上市公司在现实中存在非效率投资的现象,且过度投资和投资不足的情况同时存在,从频率和程度上看,过度投资多于投资不足,总体表现为过度投资。我们再以上述研究中发生过度投资的样本为研究对象,在公司治理层面上实证考察股权结构、董事会特征、管理层激励和债务治理等公司治理结构因素对企业过度投资的影响。发现中央企业对股东大会有绝对控制力,股东制衡无效；董事会治理起到了一定的作用,独立董事的监督作用尚未发挥出来；合理的管理层薪酬制度有利于抑制过度投资。具有硬约束特征的非银行负债对过度投资有抑制作用。
其次,我们转换研究的视角,从中央企业控股上市公司投资支出对宏观经济波动影响的角度,运用与前述研究相同的样本,侧重时间序列角度实证分析了中央企业投资支出增量与宏观经济波动(以经过HP滤波处理过的工业总产值产出缺口表示)之间的关系,发现与传统认识不同,投资支出增量与宏观经济波动之间呈现出逆周期特征,说明中央企业投资在客观上起到了平滑宏观经济波动,利于经济平稳运行的作用。接着我们分别从股权结构、债务来源结构和公司盈利能力三个方面实证分析了其对上市公司投资支出与宏观经济波动间周期性关系的影响。发现国有股和外资股比例的提高有利于抑制逆周期特征,银行负债规模显著抑制上市公司的逆周期特征。盈利能力越差的企业,逆周期特征越明显。
通过上述对比研究,使我们对国有企业在经济中发挥的作用有一个更为全面客观的认识：尽管国有企业投资有时在微观上无效率,但在宏观上有平滑经济波动,保障经济平稳运行的作用。微观上个体企业的效率牺牲有可能对整体的宏观经济有益(利于总体经济的平稳增长)；同时也说明部分政府通过国企投资进行宏观调控的措施是以牺牲企业个体效率为代价的。因此,发挥国有企业宏观调控作用也需要注意在微观效率和宏观作用之间求得平衡。
本文相比较于其它同类文献,可能存在的创新之处主要有三点：
(1)对于企业投资的效率和作用的研究,一般研究中都单独专注于企业投资的微观效率或者企业投资对宏观经济的影响作用。本文以上市公司的投资支出为切入点,以同一中央企业样本的面板数据为研究对象,从截面数据的角度讨论了上市公司投资的微观效率,同时,又从时间序列的角度,讨论了上市公司投资对宏观经济波动的影响,为全面评价中央企业在国民经济中发挥的作用提供了一定的理论支持和经验证据。
(2)对于投资对宏观经济波动的影响研究,大多文献是基于宏观投资的时间序列数据,鲜少有研究运用企业微观投资数据来解释投资对宏观经济波动周期性的影响。本文运用中央企业控股上市公司投资支出的微观数据,来对企业投资行为对宏观经济波动的影响进行实证检验,发现与传统认识不同,中央企业控股上市公司的投资支出增量与宏观经济波动存在明显的逆周期特征,即中央企业控股上市公司的投资有平滑宏观经济波动的效果。
(3)通过将包括股权结构和债务治理结构在内的中央企业控股上市公司特有的公司治理特征因素引入到关于上市公司微观投资效率和对宏观经济波动影响的研究中,本文为中央企业投资的微观效率和对宏观经济波动的影响及其之间的关联研究提供了基于国有控股上市公司治理特征要素的新的研究视角。
As the China races headlong into21st century amid reform paces, the country's state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") have achieved blazing progress, albeit with mixed comments. The negative remarks focus on the alleged monopoly, operating inefficiencies,"resource hogs", encroachment of private sectors etc.. It posed a question to be clarified and resolved on whether SOEs as alleged, are facing operating inefficiencies, and how to evaluate their effect on China's economy on a thorough and objective basis.
This paper uses listed companies controlled by central SOEs as samples and leverages econometric approaches, based on investment expenditures of SOEs, to conduct a comparative study with respect to the microscopic efficiency of investment expenditures and the impact of investment expenditures on macroeconomic volatility and further deepen the above study from the perspective of the special corporate governance factors and characteristics of listed companies controlled by central SOEs, while summarizing and describing the theory of enterprise investment, the microscopic efficiency of enterprise investment, the study on the theory related to the correlation between investment and macroeconomic volatility, as well as the history and corporate governance characteristics of China's SOE investment system.
First, it begins with the study on microscopic investment efficiency of listed companies controlled by central SOEs by plugging the balanced panel data of166listed companies controlled by central SOEs in2003-2011into the Richardson (2006) model for quantification of their expected capital expenditures, to help to judge whether there are investment inefficiencies based on the difference between actual and expected capital expenditures. According to the empirical result, investment inefficiencies are found in listed companies controlled by central SOEs in the reality. Besides, both over-investment and under-investment exist at the same time. Overall, those companies are featured with over-investment as over-investment is higher than under-investment in terms of frequency and extent. The over-investment samples are further used to carry out an empirical survey at the corporate governance level, with respect to the impact on over-investment from corporate governance factors such as shareholding structure, board characteristics, manager incentives and debt management. It was found that central SOEs have absolute control over the shareholders' meeting, resulting in ineffective balance-and-check relationships among shareholders; the board governance is somehow effective, but independent directors have not yet discharged the supervision function; a reasonable remuneration system of the management is conducive to curbing over-investment. Non-banking debts which are subject to hard constraints can also inhibit over-investment.
Besides, the perspective of the study is shifted to the impact on macroeconomic volatility from investment expenditures of listed companies controlled by central SOEs. The samples of the above study on microscopic investment efficiency are also used here to carry out a time-series empirical analysis of the correlation between investment expenditure accretion of central SOEs and macroeconomic volatility (represented by industrial production gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescot filter). It was found that the correlation between investment expenditure accretion and macroeconomic volatility presents a counter-cyclical characteristic, suggesting that the investment by central SOEs, on an objective basis, helps to smoothen the macroeconomic volatility and stabilize the economic development. Next, an empirical analysis is made with respect to the impact from three factors (i.e., shareholding structure, debt structure by source and corporate profitability) on the cyclical correlation between investment expenditures of the listed companies and macroeconomic volatility. It was found that the increase in the proportion of state-owned shares and foreign shares can help to undermine the cyclical effects, while the size of bank debts obviously restrain the counter-cyclical ability of listed companies. The lower the profitability of a company, the more obvious the counter-cyclical characteristics are in listed companies.
Through the above comparative studies, a more thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the role played by SOEs in the economy is provided:Although sometimes the investments by SOEs have no microscopic efficiency, it helps to smoothen the economic volatility on a macro basis and safeguard the stability of economic development. On a micro basis, the sacrifice of individual enterprise efficiency may be beneficial to the overall macro economy (or the stable economic growth as a whole); in other words, the sacrifice of individual enterprise efficiency is in favor of some measures for smoothening economic volatility through SOEs' investments. Therefore, it is also necessary to pay attention to the balance between microscopic efficiency and macro effect when SOEs are playing such a role.
Compared to similar documentation, the potential innovations in this paper mainly include three aspects:
(1) Generally, studies on the efficiency and role of corporate investments focus on either microscopic investment efficiency or the impact of corporate investments on macro economy. This paper draws upon investment expenditures of listed companies based on the panel data for a same group of central SOEs, discussing the microscopic investment efficiency of listed companies from a cross-sectional perspective. Meanwhile, time series are utilized to discuss the impact on macroeconomic volatility from investments of the listed companies, thus providing theoretical supports and empirical evidences for a thorough evaluation on the role of central SOEs in an economy.
(2) Most of researches on the impact of investments on macroeconomic volatility are based on time series data of macro investments, seldom using corporate microscopic investment data as an interpreter. In this paper, microscopic data of investment expenditures by listed companies controlled by central SOEs are used to carry out an empirical test for the impact of corporate investments on macroeconomic volatility, revealing their obvious counter-cyclicality unlike common enterprises; which implies the investments of listed companies controlled by central SOEs have a smoothing effect against macroeconomic volatility.
(3) By incorporating the unique corporate governance characteristics of listed companies controlled by central SOEs (including shareholding structure and debt management) into the study, this paper provides a new "corporate governance" perspective for the study on the impact of microscopic investment efficiency of central SOEs on macroeconomic volatility and their correlation.
本文以国有企业投资支出为研究的切入点,在对企业投资理论、企业投资的微观效率、投资与宏观经济波动之间的关系等相关理论、以及中国国有企业投资体制历史沿革和治理特征等进行梳理和描述的基础上,以中央企业控股的上市公司为研究样本,运用计量经济学的方法,从投资支出的微观效率及其对宏观经济的作用两个方面进行对比研究,并从中央企业控股上市公司特殊公司治理结构特征角度对上述研究做进一步深化。
首先我们从中央企业控股上市公司的微观投资效率入手,运用2003-2011年包含166家中央企业控股上市的平衡面板数据,借鉴Richardson (2006)的模型对中央企业控股上市公司的预期资本支出进行量化,以实际资本支出和预期资本支出之间的差额对其非效率投资程度进行判断,实证结果发现中央企业控股上市公司在现实中存在非效率投资的现象,且过度投资和投资不足的情况同时存在,从频率和程度上看,过度投资多于投资不足,总体表现为过度投资。我们再以上述研究中发生过度投资的样本为研究对象,在公司治理层面上实证考察股权结构、董事会特征、管理层激励和债务治理等公司治理结构因素对企业过度投资的影响。发现中央企业对股东大会有绝对控制力,股东制衡无效；董事会治理起到了一定的作用,独立董事的监督作用尚未发挥出来；合理的管理层薪酬制度有利于抑制过度投资。具有硬约束特征的非银行负债对过度投资有抑制作用。
其次,我们转换研究的视角,从中央企业控股上市公司投资支出对宏观经济波动影响的角度,运用与前述研究相同的样本,侧重时间序列角度实证分析了中央企业投资支出增量与宏观经济波动(以经过HP滤波处理过的工业总产值产出缺口表示)之间的关系,发现与传统认识不同,投资支出增量与宏观经济波动之间呈现出逆周期特征,说明中央企业投资在客观上起到了平滑宏观经济波动,利于经济平稳运行的作用。接着我们分别从股权结构、债务来源结构和公司盈利能力三个方面实证分析了其对上市公司投资支出与宏观经济波动间周期性关系的影响。发现国有股和外资股比例的提高有利于抑制逆周期特征,银行负债规模显著抑制上市公司的逆周期特征。盈利能力越差的企业,逆周期特征越明显。
通过上述对比研究,使我们对国有企业在经济中发挥的作用有一个更为全面客观的认识：尽管国有企业投资有时在微观上无效率,但在宏观上有平滑经济波动,保障经济平稳运行的作用。微观上个体企业的效率牺牲有可能对整体的宏观经济有益(利于总体经济的平稳增长)；同时也说明部分政府通过国企投资进行宏观调控的措施是以牺牲企业个体效率为代价的。因此,发挥国有企业宏观调控作用也需要注意在微观效率和宏观作用之间求得平衡。
本文相比较于其它同类文献,可能存在的创新之处主要有三点：
(1)对于企业投资的效率和作用的研究,一般研究中都单独专注于企业投资的微观效率或者企业投资对宏观经济的影响作用。本文以上市公司的投资支出为切入点,以同一中央企业样本的面板数据为研究对象,从截面数据的角度讨论了上市公司投资的微观效率,同时,又从时间序列的角度,讨论了上市公司投资对宏观经济波动的影响,为全面评价中央企业在国民经济中发挥的作用提供了一定的理论支持和经验证据。
(2)对于投资对宏观经济波动的影响研究,大多文献是基于宏观投资的时间序列数据,鲜少有研究运用企业微观投资数据来解释投资对宏观经济波动周期性的影响。本文运用中央企业控股上市公司投资支出的微观数据,来对企业投资行为对宏观经济波动的影响进行实证检验,发现与传统认识不同,中央企业控股上市公司的投资支出增量与宏观经济波动存在明显的逆周期特征,即中央企业控股上市公司的投资有平滑宏观经济波动的效果。
(3)通过将包括股权结构和债务治理结构在内的中央企业控股上市公司特有的公司治理特征因素引入到关于上市公司微观投资效率和对宏观经济波动影响的研究中,本文为中央企业投资的微观效率和对宏观经济波动的影响及其之间的关联研究提供了基于国有控股上市公司治理特征要素的新的研究视角。
As the China races headlong into21st century amid reform paces, the country's state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") have achieved blazing progress, albeit with mixed comments. The negative remarks focus on the alleged monopoly, operating inefficiencies,"resource hogs", encroachment of private sectors etc.. It posed a question to be clarified and resolved on whether SOEs as alleged, are facing operating inefficiencies, and how to evaluate their effect on China's economy on a thorough and objective basis.
This paper uses listed companies controlled by central SOEs as samples and leverages econometric approaches, based on investment expenditures of SOEs, to conduct a comparative study with respect to the microscopic efficiency of investment expenditures and the impact of investment expenditures on macroeconomic volatility and further deepen the above study from the perspective of the special corporate governance factors and characteristics of listed companies controlled by central SOEs, while summarizing and describing the theory of enterprise investment, the microscopic efficiency of enterprise investment, the study on the theory related to the correlation between investment and macroeconomic volatility, as well as the history and corporate governance characteristics of China's SOE investment system.
First, it begins with the study on microscopic investment efficiency of listed companies controlled by central SOEs by plugging the balanced panel data of166listed companies controlled by central SOEs in2003-2011into the Richardson (2006) model for quantification of their expected capital expenditures, to help to judge whether there are investment inefficiencies based on the difference between actual and expected capital expenditures. According to the empirical result, investment inefficiencies are found in listed companies controlled by central SOEs in the reality. Besides, both over-investment and under-investment exist at the same time. Overall, those companies are featured with over-investment as over-investment is higher than under-investment in terms of frequency and extent. The over-investment samples are further used to carry out an empirical survey at the corporate governance level, with respect to the impact on over-investment from corporate governance factors such as shareholding structure, board characteristics, manager incentives and debt management. It was found that central SOEs have absolute control over the shareholders' meeting, resulting in ineffective balance-and-check relationships among shareholders; the board governance is somehow effective, but independent directors have not yet discharged the supervision function; a reasonable remuneration system of the management is conducive to curbing over-investment. Non-banking debts which are subject to hard constraints can also inhibit over-investment.
Besides, the perspective of the study is shifted to the impact on macroeconomic volatility from investment expenditures of listed companies controlled by central SOEs. The samples of the above study on microscopic investment efficiency are also used here to carry out a time-series empirical analysis of the correlation between investment expenditure accretion of central SOEs and macroeconomic volatility (represented by industrial production gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescot filter). It was found that the correlation between investment expenditure accretion and macroeconomic volatility presents a counter-cyclical characteristic, suggesting that the investment by central SOEs, on an objective basis, helps to smoothen the macroeconomic volatility and stabilize the economic development. Next, an empirical analysis is made with respect to the impact from three factors (i.e., shareholding structure, debt structure by source and corporate profitability) on the cyclical correlation between investment expenditures of the listed companies and macroeconomic volatility. It was found that the increase in the proportion of state-owned shares and foreign shares can help to undermine the cyclical effects, while the size of bank debts obviously restrain the counter-cyclical ability of listed companies. The lower the profitability of a company, the more obvious the counter-cyclical characteristics are in listed companies.
Through the above comparative studies, a more thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the role played by SOEs in the economy is provided:Although sometimes the investments by SOEs have no microscopic efficiency, it helps to smoothen the economic volatility on a macro basis and safeguard the stability of economic development. On a micro basis, the sacrifice of individual enterprise efficiency may be beneficial to the overall macro economy (or the stable economic growth as a whole); in other words, the sacrifice of individual enterprise efficiency is in favor of some measures for smoothening economic volatility through SOEs' investments. Therefore, it is also necessary to pay attention to the balance between microscopic efficiency and macro effect when SOEs are playing such a role.
Compared to similar documentation, the potential innovations in this paper mainly include three aspects:
(1) Generally, studies on the efficiency and role of corporate investments focus on either microscopic investment efficiency or the impact of corporate investments on macro economy. This paper draws upon investment expenditures of listed companies based on the panel data for a same group of central SOEs, discussing the microscopic investment efficiency of listed companies from a cross-sectional perspective. Meanwhile, time series are utilized to discuss the impact on macroeconomic volatility from investments of the listed companies, thus providing theoretical supports and empirical evidences for a thorough evaluation on the role of central SOEs in an economy.
(2) Most of researches on the impact of investments on macroeconomic volatility are based on time series data of macro investments, seldom using corporate microscopic investment data as an interpreter. In this paper, microscopic data of investment expenditures by listed companies controlled by central SOEs are used to carry out an empirical test for the impact of corporate investments on macroeconomic volatility, revealing their obvious counter-cyclicality unlike common enterprises; which implies the investments of listed companies controlled by central SOEs have a smoothing effect against macroeconomic volatility.
(3) By incorporating the unique corporate governance characteristics of listed companies controlled by central SOEs (including shareholding structure and debt management) into the study, this paper provides a new "corporate governance" perspective for the study on the impact of microscopic investment efficiency of central SOEs on macroeconomic volatility and their correlation.
引文
1 资料来源：《国务院关于国有企业改革与发展工作情况的报告》,2012
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29.唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静.上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究.[J].会计研究,2007(7)：44-54
30.童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为—来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：75-86
31.童盼,陆正飞.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究：述评与展望[J].会计研究,2005(12)：71-77
32.王建梅.改革开放30年我国国有企业产权制度改革评述[J].经济研究参考,2008(49)：34-40.
33.王寿君.中央企业投资基本情况及特点[J].经济研究参考,2013(14)：33-37.
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42. Jensen, M.C:The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Finance,1993,48:831-880
43. Jensen, Michael C.:Agency costs of free-cash-flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, American Economic Review.1986,76:323-329.
44. Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling,:Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency
67. Samuelson, P. A. The pure theory of public expenditure. The review of economics and statistics,1954,36(4),387-389.
68. Scott,F. Evidence on the Importance of Financial Structure, Financial Management, 1972,3:45-50.
69. Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, the Journal of Finance, 1997,52:737-783.
70. Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny:Management Entrenchment:The Case of Managerial Specific Investments, Journal of Financial Economics.1989,25:123-139.
71. Smith C., Watts. R. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1992, (32):263-292.
72. Stiglitz, J. E. (1972). Some aspects of the pure theory of corporate finance:bankruptcies and take-overs. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,458-482.
73. Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss:Credit Rationing and Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review,1981,71:393-410.
74. Stiglitz, J.E:Some Aspect of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance:Bankruptcies and Takeovers, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 1972,23:60-67.
75. Stulz, R.M:Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies [J], Journal of Financial Economies,1990,26:131-160.
76. Tobin, James. A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1969,1:15-29.
77. Townsend, R. M. Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. Journal of Economic theory,1979,21 (2),265-293.
78. Vickers, J., & Yarrow, G. Economic perspectives on privatization.The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1991,5(2),111-132.
79. Vogt Stephen C.The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship:Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firms [J]. Financial Management,1994,3-20.
80. Williamson,O:Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1988,43: 567-591.
81. Williamson, S. D. Financial intermediation, business failures, and real business cycles. The Journal of Political Economy,1987,95(6),1196-1216.
82. Yarrow, G., King, M., Mairesse, J., & Melitz, J. Privatization in theory and practice. Economic policy,1986,324-377.
19.李金,李仕明,熊小舟.我国上市公司投资-现金流敏感度实证研究[J].管理科学,2007(11)：824-829
20.李世辉,雷新途.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究—来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008(5)：30-37
21.刘怀珍,欧阳令南.经理私人利益与过度投资[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004(10)：45-49
22.刘星,杨亦民.融资结构与企业投资：理论分析及经验证据[J].管理工程学报,2008(1)：148-152
23.罗琦,肖文翀,夏新平.融资约束抑或过度投资—中国上市企业投资现金流敏感度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007(9)
24.梅丹.我国上市公司固定资产投资规模财务影响因素研究[J].管理科学,2005(10)：80-86
25.欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.股权制度安排、信息不对称与企业非效率投资行为[J].当代经济科学,2005(7)：72-80
26.潘敏,金岩.信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资[J].金融研究,2003(1)：36-45
27.庞明川.中国的投资效率与过度投资问题研究[J].财经问题研究,2007(7)：46-53
28.饶育蕾,汪玉英.中国上市公司大股东对投资影响的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2006第9卷(5)：67-73
29.唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静.上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究.[J].会计研究,2007(7)：44-54
30.童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为—来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：75-86
31.童盼,陆正飞.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究：述评与展望[J].会计研究,2005(12)：71-77
32.王建梅.改革开放30年我国国有企业产权制度改革评述[J].经济研究参考,2008(49)：34-40.
33.王寿君.中央企业投资基本情况及特点[J].经济研究参考,2013(14)：33-37.
34.魏锋,刘星.融资约束、不确定性对公司投资行为的影响[J].经济科学,2004(2)：35-43
35.文宏.融资偏好与融资效率[J].当代经济科学,1999(6)
36.吴亭.国企公司治理结构问题与企业风险相关性研究[J].洛阳师范学院学报,2013第32卷(4)
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