打开缺口：美国对波兰政策研究（1980-1989）
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摘要
20世纪80年代是美苏对抗的最后十年,也是决胜阶段。期间,以苏联为首的华约集团重要成员国——波兰正经历着政局的动荡不稳。这个国家既是苏联对抗美国的前沿阵地,又是苏东阵营内部最具有亲西方传统与反苏民族情绪的国家,是苏东社会主义链条上最不稳定的因素和最薄弱的环节。在此期间的美国三任总统卡特、里根和布什确定了以波兰为突破口,通过公开外交手段与隐蔽行动战略相结合,颠覆波兰共产党政权,进而瓦解整个苏东阵营的最终目标。美国对波兰的政策对东欧剧变和苏联解体发挥了“加速器”的作用。根据近些年陆续解密的美、苏、波等当事国家文献档案资料,以及相关国家政要的回忆录、言论集、总统公开文件和口述史等等,对美国在整个80年代对波兰的政策进行系统、深入的研究,既可以弥补目前我国学术界在这方面研究的不足,又有助于总结苏东剧变的历史经验教训,具有重要的学术意义和理论及现实意义。
本文的结构安排如下：
第一章：回顾了1945-1980年美国对波兰的政策。总的来说,美国对波兰的政策经历了从遏制到区别对待的演变。1956年是美国对东欧苏联卫星国政策的转折点。此前,这些国家被认为是苏联“顺从的卫星国”,在外交上与苏联等同对待；此后,东欧国家出现的自由化趋向改变了美国的看法,随之开始调整政策,和平演变取代了全面遏制。波兰作为苏东阵营里的特殊国家,开了美国政策调整之先声。1956年波兰事件后,美国视其为“半独立的卫星国”和敌对阵营里值得培育的“自由的种子”,遂对其采取“区别对待”,以经济援助、贸易优惠等措施拉拢波兰,以达到最终将波兰拉入资本主义阵营,瓦解苏东社会主义阵营的长远目标。期间,由于美苏关系的波动,波兰在外交上紧随苏联,美波关系有过恶化,但整体上来讲,美国对波兰的政策是有别于其它东欧国家的。
第二章：分析了1980-1981年波兰危机期间美国的外交政策。本章在简要梳理波兰危机经过的基础上,着重分析了美苏两个大国在此期间的反应与对策。苏联向波兰统一工人党政府施加了全方位的、多渠道的压力,敦促其坚决果断地镇压反革命势力,恢复国家的秩序。美国卡特和里根政府的首要考虑是防止苏联出兵干涉,保障波兰的民主化进程不出现倒退。为此它一方面争取与盟国协调立场,发动公开的外交攻势,向苏联施加政治压力。另一方面,以向波兰政府提供经济援助为诱饵,鼓励其行为保持克制,保证波兰国内的民主变革能够继续深入。总体上来说,受雅尔塔体系和波兰在苏东社会主义阵营的特殊地位所限,美国政府的行动能力大受影响。
第三章：梳理了里根政府对波兰的政策,这是政府对政府层面上的政策考察。这一时期,里根政府对外政策的重心是处理与苏联之间的关系,进行裁军谈判。因此,军管之后,对波兰的政策被放在了美国战略考虑的后台,附属于美国对苏联的政策。里根政府在宣布对波兰政府实施经济制裁的同时,又向其提出了解除制裁必须同时具备的三个条件：取消军管、释放所有被拘捕人员、与天主教会和反对派和解。在“渐进政策”的框架下,美国与波兰之间形成了“以取消个别经济制裁换取波兰逐步向满足上述三个条件迈进”的新关系模式,原来的制裁大棒变成了诱使波兰做出政治妥协的胡萝卜。1985年苏联戈尔巴乔夫上台后,美苏关系、波苏关系均发生变化,雅鲁泽尔斯基加快了国内政治改革,美国对波兰的政策开始超越“渐进”,以提供实质性的经济援助为诱饵推动波兰的政治多元化进程。总体上来看,这个阶段美波关系呈缓慢演进态势。
第四章：考察了布什政府对波兰的政策,此部分同样侧重政府对政府层面上的政策考察。1989年1月布什上台时,正是苏东阵营局势最动荡迷离的关头。波兰、匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克改革的迹象越来越清晰,与此同时,戈尔巴乔夫对其外交新思维的阐述也越来越频繁和直接。布什政府充分利用这一机会,把政策重心从与苏联之间进行军控谈判调整为关注东欧国家的政局演进,企图通过审慎地鼓励东欧国家的改革,把它们融合到以美国为首的西方世界中来。对白宫的外交政策设计师来讲,波兰是实现这一目标的突破口。在波兰国内政局动荡不稳的进程中,布什政府加强与波兰政府和反对派之间的联系,引导“革新”走渐变的道路。在波兰统一工人党丧失政权之后迅速扩散至整个东欧乃至苏联的社会主义制度崩溃的过程中,布什政府逐步推进所谓“变革”的谨慎的外交方式无疑发挥了重要的作用。
第五章：分析了美国隐蔽行动战略在波兰的实施,这是就美国政府对波兰反对派的政策所进行的考察。由于军管之后波兰反对派处于地下活动状态,美国政府对反对派的支持主要通过隐蔽行动的方式来实现。与同期美国在阿富汗、尼加拉瓜和安哥拉等国家主要是向叛乱分子提供武器、雇佣军、军事顾问和炸药等传统的方式不同,在波兰,美国的隐蔽行动采取了另外一种方式：以“推进民主运动”为旗号、以罗马教皇为合作伙伴,以波兰天主教会为政治渗透的渠道、以美国的非政府组织为媒介、以“自由欧洲电台”为宣传武器、以华沙大使馆为活动中心,向团结工会提供巨额的物资和资金以及信息援助。这些隐蔽行动“拯救”了团结工会,维持了它的生存和复兴,进一步加剧了波兰国内的政局动荡,加速了波兰共产主义体制向西方所谓的民主的和平转型,而美国政府自己却不留下任何可能被人抓住的把柄。
结论部分在前文分阶段论述美国对波兰外交政策的基础上,主要对美国此期的政策从整体上加以思考。80年代美国政府的公开外交于段与隐蔽行动战略密切配合,加剧了波兰的动荡形势,加速了该国的政局演变和制度的崩溃,进而引发了整个苏东阵营的连锁解体及制度崩溃的过程。这样,以波兰为缺口,美国的政策在东欧剧变、苏联解体与冷战结束中发挥了“加速器”的作用,这一作用不可低估。
1980s was the final decade and the decisive stage of the US-Soviet confrontation. Poland, which was the Warsaw Pact Group Ⅱ countries, was experiencing the instability of the political situation. During these ten years, Polish politics had gone through two stages:1980-1981Solidarity crisis and1981-1989years after martial law period.The policy of US to Poland was different in these two stages. Along with the recent years, multi-country reference materials declassified one after another which provided possibility to re-interpretation and re-analysis the US policy during the Polish crisis of1980-1981. Conducting "newly" research on the unsolved problems are meaningful. At present, the research of US policy to Poland during1981-1989is extremely weak. If we widely use the memoirs of the relevant national dignitaries, speech set, president public documents, Public offering of newspapers and periodicals, published journal articles, academic publications, oral histories and so on, coupled with the use of some online databases, we can also conduct meaningful research. That increasing comprehensive description and analysis of the policy of US to Poland of this period are both necessary and possible. In this sense, researching the foreign policy of the United States to Poland during1980-1989has the academic significance which cannot be ignored.
The structure of this paper is as follows:
Chapter one:Recalling the1945-1980U.S. policy of Poland. Generally speaking, the policy of US to Poland experienced the evolution from containment to differentiation.1956was the turning point of the U.S. policy of the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe. Previously, these countries were considered to be the "pliant Soviet satellites" and diplomatically equated to treat with Soviet Union; Since then, That the liberalization of the Eastern European countries tended to change the views of the United States, so it started to adjust the policy of peaceful evolution to replace the comprehensive containment. As a special country in the Soviet Union and Eastern camp, Poland opened the harbinger of U.S. policy adjustments. After1956Polish event, the US regarded it as "semi-independent satellite State" and "seeds of freedom" in the hostile camp which was worth cultivating, then adopted favorable treatment to it. The American government took some measures such as economic aid, trade concessions to win over Poland in order to pull Poland into the capitalist camp, and took the collapse of the Soviet Union and eastern socialist camp as the long-term goal. In the whole, the policy of US to Poland was different from other Eastern European countries.
Chapter two:Analysis of the United States foreign policy during the Polish crisis of1980-1981. This chapter emphatically analyzes responses and the countermeasure of the American and Soviet, combing the Polish crisis briefly in the foundation. Soviet Union had exerted all-around, the multi-channel pressures to Polish Unification Worker's Party Government, Urged its decisive suppression of counter-revolutionary forces to restore order in the country. The most important consideration of Washington was to prevent Soviet Union to dispatch troops to interfere, safeguard the Polish existing democratic reform achievement. To this end, on the one hand, it launched the public policy and diplomatic offensive, strived to coordinate their positions with allies to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it took providing economic aid to the Polish government for the bait, in order to encourage its behavior to maintain the restraint, and ensure the Polish domestic democratic reform to continue thoroughly.
Chapter three:Combing the Reagan administration policy of Poland, Which belongs to the policy inspection of government to government dimension. During this period,the core of Reagan administration foreign policy is relation with Soviet Union. After martial law, the policy of Poland was on the background of the U.S. strategic considerations, attached to the policy of the United States against the Soviet Union. While the Reagan administration announced the imposition of economic sanctions to the Polish government, it proposed the lifting of sanctions must have three conditions: Removal of martial law, Release of all arrested personnel, and Reconciliation with the Catholic Church and the opposition. In the "step-by-step" policy framework, the United States and Poland formed a new model that" Cancellation of the individual economic sanctions in exchange for Poland gradually move to satisfy the above three conditions".so, the original sanctions big stick became into a carrot to lure Poland for political compromise. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in1985, Jaruzelski sped up the domestic politics reform.U.S. policy for Poland began to go beyond "the step-by-step"to provide substantial economic aid as a bait to promote Poland's process of political pluralism.
Chapter four:Exploring the Bush administration's policy in Poland, which Similarly belongs to the policy inspection of government to government dimension. level. When Bush took office in January1989, the situation of the Soviet-Eastern Europe were changing.The Bush administration took full advantage of this opportunity, adjusted the focus of policy, attempted to encourage the reform of the Eastern European countries prudently for their integration into the US-led Western world. Poland is a breakthrough in achieving this goal. Bush strengthened the links between the Government and the opposition, Led innovation along the path of the gradient, in order to avoid social chaos and ensure a peaceful transition of the system.
Chapter five:Analysis of United States covert operations strategy in Poland, which is the policy of the U.S. government to the Polish opposition. Because the Polish opposition was in the underground, U.S. government's support for the opposition mainly through covert action. In Poland, the covert operations of the United States had taken a different approach:under the banner of "Promoting democracy movement", Pope John Paul II for partners, Polish Catholic Church for political penetration channels, Non-governmental organizations in the United States as a medium,"Radio Free Europe" as a propaganda weapon, Embassy in Warsaw as an activity center. Providing huge amount of material and financial resources and information assistance to solidarity. These covert actions saved the Solidarity, and accelerated the evolution of the political situation in Poland, while the United States Government did not leave any handles that may be caught.
In conclusion part, on the basis of primarily discussing the United States foreign policy to Poland, it was mainly thought and understood the United States policy as a whole for this period in this part. In the1980s, the policy of the United States to Poland accelerated the evolution of the political situation of the country and the collapse of the system. With the collapse of the socialist system in Poland, the entire process chain disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern camp and system was crashed. Thus, taking Poland as the gap, the policy of the United States played the role of the "accelerator" in the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Union that can't be underestimated.
本文的结构安排如下：
第一章：回顾了1945-1980年美国对波兰的政策。总的来说,美国对波兰的政策经历了从遏制到区别对待的演变。1956年是美国对东欧苏联卫星国政策的转折点。此前,这些国家被认为是苏联“顺从的卫星国”,在外交上与苏联等同对待；此后,东欧国家出现的自由化趋向改变了美国的看法,随之开始调整政策,和平演变取代了全面遏制。波兰作为苏东阵营里的特殊国家,开了美国政策调整之先声。1956年波兰事件后,美国视其为“半独立的卫星国”和敌对阵营里值得培育的“自由的种子”,遂对其采取“区别对待”,以经济援助、贸易优惠等措施拉拢波兰,以达到最终将波兰拉入资本主义阵营,瓦解苏东社会主义阵营的长远目标。期间,由于美苏关系的波动,波兰在外交上紧随苏联,美波关系有过恶化,但整体上来讲,美国对波兰的政策是有别于其它东欧国家的。
第二章：分析了1980-1981年波兰危机期间美国的外交政策。本章在简要梳理波兰危机经过的基础上,着重分析了美苏两个大国在此期间的反应与对策。苏联向波兰统一工人党政府施加了全方位的、多渠道的压力,敦促其坚决果断地镇压反革命势力,恢复国家的秩序。美国卡特和里根政府的首要考虑是防止苏联出兵干涉,保障波兰的民主化进程不出现倒退。为此它一方面争取与盟国协调立场,发动公开的外交攻势,向苏联施加政治压力。另一方面,以向波兰政府提供经济援助为诱饵,鼓励其行为保持克制,保证波兰国内的民主变革能够继续深入。总体上来说,受雅尔塔体系和波兰在苏东社会主义阵营的特殊地位所限,美国政府的行动能力大受影响。
第三章：梳理了里根政府对波兰的政策,这是政府对政府层面上的政策考察。这一时期,里根政府对外政策的重心是处理与苏联之间的关系,进行裁军谈判。因此,军管之后,对波兰的政策被放在了美国战略考虑的后台,附属于美国对苏联的政策。里根政府在宣布对波兰政府实施经济制裁的同时,又向其提出了解除制裁必须同时具备的三个条件：取消军管、释放所有被拘捕人员、与天主教会和反对派和解。在“渐进政策”的框架下,美国与波兰之间形成了“以取消个别经济制裁换取波兰逐步向满足上述三个条件迈进”的新关系模式,原来的制裁大棒变成了诱使波兰做出政治妥协的胡萝卜。1985年苏联戈尔巴乔夫上台后,美苏关系、波苏关系均发生变化,雅鲁泽尔斯基加快了国内政治改革,美国对波兰的政策开始超越“渐进”,以提供实质性的经济援助为诱饵推动波兰的政治多元化进程。总体上来看,这个阶段美波关系呈缓慢演进态势。
第四章：考察了布什政府对波兰的政策,此部分同样侧重政府对政府层面上的政策考察。1989年1月布什上台时,正是苏东阵营局势最动荡迷离的关头。波兰、匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克改革的迹象越来越清晰,与此同时,戈尔巴乔夫对其外交新思维的阐述也越来越频繁和直接。布什政府充分利用这一机会,把政策重心从与苏联之间进行军控谈判调整为关注东欧国家的政局演进,企图通过审慎地鼓励东欧国家的改革,把它们融合到以美国为首的西方世界中来。对白宫的外交政策设计师来讲,波兰是实现这一目标的突破口。在波兰国内政局动荡不稳的进程中,布什政府加强与波兰政府和反对派之间的联系,引导“革新”走渐变的道路。在波兰统一工人党丧失政权之后迅速扩散至整个东欧乃至苏联的社会主义制度崩溃的过程中,布什政府逐步推进所谓“变革”的谨慎的外交方式无疑发挥了重要的作用。
第五章：分析了美国隐蔽行动战略在波兰的实施,这是就美国政府对波兰反对派的政策所进行的考察。由于军管之后波兰反对派处于地下活动状态,美国政府对反对派的支持主要通过隐蔽行动的方式来实现。与同期美国在阿富汗、尼加拉瓜和安哥拉等国家主要是向叛乱分子提供武器、雇佣军、军事顾问和炸药等传统的方式不同,在波兰,美国的隐蔽行动采取了另外一种方式：以“推进民主运动”为旗号、以罗马教皇为合作伙伴,以波兰天主教会为政治渗透的渠道、以美国的非政府组织为媒介、以“自由欧洲电台”为宣传武器、以华沙大使馆为活动中心,向团结工会提供巨额的物资和资金以及信息援助。这些隐蔽行动“拯救”了团结工会,维持了它的生存和复兴,进一步加剧了波兰国内的政局动荡,加速了波兰共产主义体制向西方所谓的民主的和平转型,而美国政府自己却不留下任何可能被人抓住的把柄。
结论部分在前文分阶段论述美国对波兰外交政策的基础上,主要对美国此期的政策从整体上加以思考。80年代美国政府的公开外交于段与隐蔽行动战略密切配合,加剧了波兰的动荡形势,加速了该国的政局演变和制度的崩溃,进而引发了整个苏东阵营的连锁解体及制度崩溃的过程。这样,以波兰为缺口,美国的政策在东欧剧变、苏联解体与冷战结束中发挥了“加速器”的作用,这一作用不可低估。
1980s was the final decade and the decisive stage of the US-Soviet confrontation. Poland, which was the Warsaw Pact Group Ⅱ countries, was experiencing the instability of the political situation. During these ten years, Polish politics had gone through two stages:1980-1981Solidarity crisis and1981-1989years after martial law period.The policy of US to Poland was different in these two stages. Along with the recent years, multi-country reference materials declassified one after another which provided possibility to re-interpretation and re-analysis the US policy during the Polish crisis of1980-1981. Conducting "newly" research on the unsolved problems are meaningful. At present, the research of US policy to Poland during1981-1989is extremely weak. If we widely use the memoirs of the relevant national dignitaries, speech set, president public documents, Public offering of newspapers and periodicals, published journal articles, academic publications, oral histories and so on, coupled with the use of some online databases, we can also conduct meaningful research. That increasing comprehensive description and analysis of the policy of US to Poland of this period are both necessary and possible. In this sense, researching the foreign policy of the United States to Poland during1980-1989has the academic significance which cannot be ignored.
The structure of this paper is as follows:
Chapter one:Recalling the1945-1980U.S. policy of Poland. Generally speaking, the policy of US to Poland experienced the evolution from containment to differentiation.1956was the turning point of the U.S. policy of the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe. Previously, these countries were considered to be the "pliant Soviet satellites" and diplomatically equated to treat with Soviet Union; Since then, That the liberalization of the Eastern European countries tended to change the views of the United States, so it started to adjust the policy of peaceful evolution to replace the comprehensive containment. As a special country in the Soviet Union and Eastern camp, Poland opened the harbinger of U.S. policy adjustments. After1956Polish event, the US regarded it as "semi-independent satellite State" and "seeds of freedom" in the hostile camp which was worth cultivating, then adopted favorable treatment to it. The American government took some measures such as economic aid, trade concessions to win over Poland in order to pull Poland into the capitalist camp, and took the collapse of the Soviet Union and eastern socialist camp as the long-term goal. In the whole, the policy of US to Poland was different from other Eastern European countries.
Chapter two:Analysis of the United States foreign policy during the Polish crisis of1980-1981. This chapter emphatically analyzes responses and the countermeasure of the American and Soviet, combing the Polish crisis briefly in the foundation. Soviet Union had exerted all-around, the multi-channel pressures to Polish Unification Worker's Party Government, Urged its decisive suppression of counter-revolutionary forces to restore order in the country. The most important consideration of Washington was to prevent Soviet Union to dispatch troops to interfere, safeguard the Polish existing democratic reform achievement. To this end, on the one hand, it launched the public policy and diplomatic offensive, strived to coordinate their positions with allies to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it took providing economic aid to the Polish government for the bait, in order to encourage its behavior to maintain the restraint, and ensure the Polish domestic democratic reform to continue thoroughly.
Chapter three:Combing the Reagan administration policy of Poland, Which belongs to the policy inspection of government to government dimension. During this period,the core of Reagan administration foreign policy is relation with Soviet Union. After martial law, the policy of Poland was on the background of the U.S. strategic considerations, attached to the policy of the United States against the Soviet Union. While the Reagan administration announced the imposition of economic sanctions to the Polish government, it proposed the lifting of sanctions must have three conditions: Removal of martial law, Release of all arrested personnel, and Reconciliation with the Catholic Church and the opposition. In the "step-by-step" policy framework, the United States and Poland formed a new model that" Cancellation of the individual economic sanctions in exchange for Poland gradually move to satisfy the above three conditions".so, the original sanctions big stick became into a carrot to lure Poland for political compromise. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in1985, Jaruzelski sped up the domestic politics reform.U.S. policy for Poland began to go beyond "the step-by-step"to provide substantial economic aid as a bait to promote Poland's process of political pluralism.
Chapter four:Exploring the Bush administration's policy in Poland, which Similarly belongs to the policy inspection of government to government dimension. level. When Bush took office in January1989, the situation of the Soviet-Eastern Europe were changing.The Bush administration took full advantage of this opportunity, adjusted the focus of policy, attempted to encourage the reform of the Eastern European countries prudently for their integration into the US-led Western world. Poland is a breakthrough in achieving this goal. Bush strengthened the links between the Government and the opposition, Led innovation along the path of the gradient, in order to avoid social chaos and ensure a peaceful transition of the system.
Chapter five:Analysis of United States covert operations strategy in Poland, which is the policy of the U.S. government to the Polish opposition. Because the Polish opposition was in the underground, U.S. government's support for the opposition mainly through covert action. In Poland, the covert operations of the United States had taken a different approach:under the banner of "Promoting democracy movement", Pope John Paul II for partners, Polish Catholic Church for political penetration channels, Non-governmental organizations in the United States as a medium,"Radio Free Europe" as a propaganda weapon, Embassy in Warsaw as an activity center. Providing huge amount of material and financial resources and information assistance to solidarity. These covert actions saved the Solidarity, and accelerated the evolution of the political situation in Poland, while the United States Government did not leave any handles that may be caught.
In conclusion part, on the basis of primarily discussing the United States foreign policy to Poland, it was mainly thought and understood the United States policy as a whole for this period in this part. In the1980s, the policy of the United States to Poland accelerated the evolution of the political situation of the country and the collapse of the system. With the collapse of the socialist system in Poland, the entire process chain disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern camp and system was crashed. Thus, taking Poland as the gap, the policy of the United States played the role of the "accelerator" in the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Union that can't be underestimated.
引文
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② Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:93.
③ 在暴乱期间,自由欧洲电台的广播通过不加评论地重播本地广播的方式来暗示他们将会得到帮助。详见John Ranelagh. The Agency:The Rise and Decline of the CIA[M],New York,1986:308.
④ 巴恩斯致国务卿杜勒斯电,1956年10月24日下午3点。Records of the Department of Statement Relating to Internal Affairs of Hungary,1955-1959[micform],764.00/10-2456转引自郭洁.匈牙利事件：美国的政策与反应[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2011：88.
⑤ Ernest W. Lefever. Ethics and United States Foreign Policy[M].New York:Meridian Books,1958:151.
⑥ John C. Campbell. American Policy toward Communist Eastern Europe:The Choices Ahead[M]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Toronto:Copp Clark,xi,1965:4.
⑦ Charles Gati. Come Clear in Hungary[N].Washington Post, June 21,2006.
⑧ James B. Conant. My several lives:memoirs of a social inventor(American Biography Series)[M]. New York: Reprint Services Corp,1970:358.
⑨ Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:105.
① FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:131-134.
② FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:243-246.
③ FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:216-221.
④ FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:483.
⑤ FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,part.1,Section 2 of 19,No.6.
⑥ FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,part.1,Section 2 of 19,No.2. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v 10p1/d2(注：本文关十NSC5811/1文件的内容均来自这—网址。)
⑦ 1-9段
① 国家安全委员会出台的对南斯拉夫、波兰、东德的政策分别见文件:NSC5805/1、NSC5808/1、NSC5803.
② [美]肯尼迪著,阿兰·内文斯编.和平战略—肯尼迪言论集[M].北京编译社译.北京：世界知识出版社,1961：363.
③ [美]梅尔文·莱弗勒.人心之争：美国、苏联与冷战[M].孙闵欣,等译.上海：华东师范大学出版社,2012：128.关于措辞外交,参见Chris Tudda. The truth is our weapon:the rhetorical diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles[M].Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press,2006.
① 郭洁.匈牙利事件：美国的政策与反应[M].上海：上海人民出版社.2011：135.
② Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:105.
③ 更全面的论述,参见Lincoln Gordon ed.Eroding Empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M]. Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:78.
④ [美]肯尼迪著,阿兰·内文斯编.和平战略—肯尼迪言论集[M].北京编译社译.世界知识出版社,1961：136.
⑤ [美]肯尼迪著,阿兰·内文斯编.和平战略—肯尼迪言论集[M].北京编译社译.世界知识出版社,1961：363.
⑥ Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Griffith.Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe[J].Foreign Affairs,1961,39(4): 642-654.
① Patrick G. Vaughan. Beyond benign neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review,1999,64(1):3-28:4.
② Department of State Bulletin,May 30,1966:846.
③ FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.17,1998:112.
④ William E. Griffith,ed.Central and Eastern Europe:The Opening Curtain[M].Westview Press, Boulder,San Francisco,&London.1989:81.
① 钟成摘译.美国对东欧政策的演变及今后的建议[J].俄罗斯研究,1990,(4)：60-62.
② Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:116.
③ [美]亨利·基辛格.白宫岁月：基辛格回忆录全集[M].陈瑶华.等译.北京：世界知识出版社,2003：196
④ 钟成摘译.美国对东欧政策的演变及今后的建议[J].俄罗斯研究,1990,(4)：60-62.61.
⑤ Patrick G. Vaughan.Beyond benign neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review,1999,64(1):5.
⑥ Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:125.
⑦ 1976年10月7 日是总统竞选第二场电视辩论。在为白宫签署《赫尔辛基协议》以及与苏联携手缓和冷战的政策辩护时,福特一时情急,脱口而出：东欧不在苏联控制之下,在福特政府执政期间也不会在苏联控制之下。显然,福特犯了一个愚蠢的错误,对大选结果产生了极大的影响。
⑧ 1976年3月.国务院顾问赫尔姆特·索南费尔特(Helms Sonnenfeldt)在1975年12月美国驻欧洲使节会议上的讲话被泄露,内容主要是关于美国对东欧政策。他提出：目前东欧同苏联之间存在着不自然的关系,这种人为的、不自然的关系对世界和平的危险远比东西方冲突来得大。美国对东欧的政策应当“为促使东欧人与苏联人之间的关系演变成为一种有机的关系而努力”。这个讲话比较模糊,被广泛地传为是美国承认和支持苏联在东欧的霸权,被西方报刊称为“索南费尔特主义”。这个主义被来自伊利诺伊州的国会共和党人代表爱德华·德温斯基(Adward Derwinski)称为“压垮骆驼脊背的那根稻草”。
⑨ Mischief in Moscow's Frontyard. Time,June 12,1978:36.转引自 Patrick G Vaughan. Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J].The polish Review.1999,44(1):6.
① Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:126又见孙幼舵.卡特选择波兰作为发展东欧关系的重点—布热津斯基回忆录摘介[J].国际展望,1 984,(5)：24-25.
② 钟成摘译.美国对东欧政策的演变及今后的建议[J].俄罗斯研究,1990,(4)：61.
③ 一份于1996年解密,署期为1958年5月21日的美国国务院备忘录文件在论及阿尔巴尼亚、保加利亚、捷克斯洛伐克、匈牙利和罗马尼亚这几个“苏联统治下的国家”时,明确指出当时美国对东欧共产党国家的政策如同“光谱”,这些政策分为三类,明显各不相同。文件做出如下说明：(1)在光谱的一端,是美国对南斯拉夫和波兰的政策。美国通过财政援助和其他方式,鼓励这两个国家不同程度独立于苏联统治。(2) 在光谱的另一端,是美国对东德的政策。美国不承认东德是一个单独的国家,并同其没有关系,美国认为在东德有近35万苏军的情况下,东德是在苏联的军事统治之下。因此,国家安全委员会政策设计委员会认为没有必要修订对东德的政策。(3)在这两端之间,就是美国对其它苏联卫星国的政策。美国方面认为这些国家虽不及波兰的程度,但存在机会并可以通过进一步发展,向着独立于苏联的统治而演变。详见孙山亦.“光谱”的呈现：20世纪50年代美国对东欧国家的政策差别[J].暨南学报(哲社版),2011,(1)：118-125.
① Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:1.
② Nathaniel Mckitterick. East-West Trade:The Background of U. S Policy[M].New York,1966:36.
③ FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.17,1998:92.
④ FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.17,1998:67.
⑤ [美]雅各布·比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录fM].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981:161.
⑥ William E. Griffith, ed.Central and Eastern Europe:The Opening Curtain[M].Westview Press, Boulder,San Francisco,&London,1989:358.
① Bennett Kovrig.Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M]. New York:New York University Press,1991:126.
② [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1998：111.
① 刘同舜编.“冷战”、“遏制”和大西洋联盟——1945-1950年美国战略决策资料选编[M]._L海：复旦大学出版社,1993：224.
② [美]托尼·朱特.战后欧洲史[M].林骧华,唐敏,等译.北京：新星出版社,.2010：109.
③ Authur R. Rachwald. In Search of Poland:The Superpowers' Response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:25.
④ FRUS,1949,Vol.5,1976:502.
① FRUS,1948,Vol.4,1973:512.
② [美]丹·考德威尔.论美苏关系[M].何立译.北京：世界知识出版社,1984：28.
③ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland [M].Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:335.
④ FRUS,1947,Vol.4,1972:459.
⑤ 杨友孙.波兰社会主义剧变中的美国因素fD].博士论文.外交学院,2004：24.
① [美]雅各布比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录[M].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：38.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:133-138.
③ 黄宏,谷松主编.东欧剧变与执政党建设[Ml.北京：红旗出版社,1991：68.
④ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland [M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:367.
⑤ Document No.4. National Security Council Report NSC 5608/1, U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe.July 18.1956. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc4.pdf
⑥ 刘邦义.哥穆尔卡评传[M].北京：中共中央党校出版社,1995：101.
⑦ Department of State Bulletin1956年11月12日
⑧ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland [M].Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:346.
⑨ Bennett Kovrig. The myth of Liberation:East-Central Europe in U.S. diplomacy and politics since 1941[M]. Baltimore and London:the Johns Hopkins University Press,1973:178.
① Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland[M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:358.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:182-183.
③ NSC5616, U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary,October 31,1956. (http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/08-17.html)
① FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:463-466.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:622-630.
③ NSC5616, U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary, October 31,1956:111. (http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarcrhiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/08-17.htm)
① FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,1994:117-120.
② NSC5616, U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary, October 31,1956. (http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/08-17.htm)
③ FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,1994:232-236.
① FRUS,1947,Vol.4,1972:435.
② [美]雅各布比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录[M].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：71.
③ 黄宏,谷松主编.东欧剧变‘与执政党建设[M].北京：红旗出版社,1991：52.
④ 此次会谈内容包括：PL480 (Public Law480,又称农业贸易发展与援助法)协议、波兰最惠国待遇问题、美国的援助‘与贷款、波兰加入国际经济组织问题。
⑤ FRUS.1955-1957.Vol.25.1990:590.
⑥ FRUS.1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:582.
⑦ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland[M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge.1980:365.
⑧ 催丕.美国的遏制战略与巴黎统筹委员会、中国委员会论纲[J].东北师大学报：哲学社会科学版.2000,(2)：53.
⑨ FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25.1990:112-113.
⑩ 崔丕.美国的遏制战略与巴黎统筹委员会、中国委员会论纲[J].东北师大学报：哲学社会科学版,2000,(2)：53.
① Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland[M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:382.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：136.
① Bennett Kovrig.The myth of Liberation:East-Central Europe in U.S. diplomacy and politics since 1941 [M]. Baltimore and London:the Johns Hopkins University Press,1973:248.
① Patrick G. Vaughan.Beyond benign neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review,1999,64,(1):7.
① 金雁.从“东欧”到“新欧洲”[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2011：226.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：158.
① 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日).北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002：529.
② George Will.The Workers Who Dare to Unite.Newsweek,September I,1980.另外,早在1977年,纽约时报就发表了一篇文章,标题是“许多波兰人说骚乱比经济学更深入”。Flora Lewis.Many Poles Say the Unrest is Far Deeper than Economics. New York Times. January 26,1977.
① 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷)：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月1 5日)附件“格但斯克罢工工人提出并由厂际罢工委员会转交的要求".2002：537-538.
② 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日1.2002：528.
③ 王义祥.波兰的反对派是怎样形成气候的[J].俄罗斯研究,1999,(2)：11.
④ [波]沃伊切赫·盖乌任斯基,莱赫·斯泰凡斯基.波兰团结工会成立记[M].吴一,陈成译.外语教学与研究出版社,1982：125.
⑤ [波]沃伊切赫·盖乌任斯基,莱赫·斯泰凡斯基.波兰团结工会成立记[M].吴一,陈成译.外语教学与研究出版社,1982：121.
① 协议全文见Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.From solidarity to martial law:the polish crisis of 1980-1981:a documentary history [M].Document No.7:The Gdansk Agreement,August 31,1980,Budapest: Central European University Press,2007:70-80.(注：下文出现该注释均简称a documentary history[M])
② 王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机[M].成都：四川人民出版社,1988：312.
③ [英]本·福凯斯.东欧共产主义的兴衰[M].张金鉴译.北京：中央编译出版社,1998：233.
④ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日).2002：534.
① [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：4-5.
② [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：30.
③ 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：56.
① Document No.78:Solidarity NCC Presidium, Position Taken by the Presidium of the National Coordinating Commission and Leaders of the NSZZ. December 3,1981.a documentary history[M].2007:417-419.
① Document No.80:Protocol No.18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:425.
② Document No.80:Protocol No.18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:442.
③ Document No.80:Protocol No.18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:443.
④ [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：57.
⑤ Document No.84:Notes of Polish Ministry of Internal Affair and Ministry of Defense Meeting on Implementation of Martial Law, January 15,1982. a documentary history [M].2007:xlvi又见p.460.关于详细的行动计划,包括环形Ⅲ、杜鹃花行动、冷杉行动、枫树行动,见p.459.
⑥ [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：79.
⑦ 注：文件原文如此。
⑧ Document No.95:Notes of Polish Ministry of Internal Affair and Ministry of Defense Meeting on Implementation of Martial Law, January 15,1982. a documentary history[M].2007:515.
① 郭增麟.波兰独立之路[M].北京：北京图书馆出版社,1998：210.
② 王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机[Ml.成都：四川人民出版社,1988：309.
③ 法新社记者1981年12月10日电,埃利·马库思.波兰对莫斯科的切身的地理战略价值.转引自参考消息,1981年12月26口.
① Andrew A. Michta.Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:150.
② Mark Kramer.Poland 1980-1981:Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project,Issue 5,1995:119.
① 1997年华沙会议上,苏斯洛火委员会前秘书在11月8日接受采访时向克雷默提供这一信息。见作者脚注4Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J].Cold War Interna-tional History Project.Special Working Paper No.1:10.
② a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅰ.又见 Document No.2, Extract from Protocol No.210 of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,August 25,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:50又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No.01547：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年8月25日).2002：348.
③ Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne. The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimensions, a document-ary history [M].2007:10.
① The New York Times, November 16,1980.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis [J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5(Spring 1995):119.
③ 注：这是发表官方权威性评论时使用的专用名字。
④ Thomas M. Cynkin. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis[M]. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillam Press,1988:48,51.关于苏联媒体在波兰危机中的作用：参见Sidney L. Ploss. Moscow and the Polish Crisis[M]. Western Press,1986;Douglas J.MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981 [M]. University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:33;Jerry F. Hough.The polish Crisis:American Policy Options, A Staff Paper[M], The Brookings Institution,1982:28-32,41-44.
① Vladimir Wozoniuk.Understanding Soviet Foerign Policy, Readings and Documents[M].McgrawHill Publishing Company,1990:218.
② Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, September 10,1981. a documentary history [M].2007：348-349.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷)：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年9月10日),2002：623,625.
③刘祖熙.刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M1.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：167.
④ Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimensions. a document-ary history[M].2007:9.
⑤[俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫.人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：246.
⑥ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 16,1981,.a documentary history[M].2007：265.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06046：苏共中央关于勃列日涅夫与卡尼亚电话交谈情况的会议记录(1981年4月16日).2002：605.
① 从1980年g9月到1981年10月,卡尼亚单独与勃列日涅夫通话次数大约有20-25次。见Paczkowski, Andrzej. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989:A View from Inside.//InThe Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation, edited by Olav Njolstad. New York:Frank Cass,2004:399. Note 8.
② Document No.39,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2,1981.a documentary history[M].2007:240.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06044：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月2日).2002：574.
③ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：220.
④ Document No.39,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2,1981.a documentary history[M].2007:239.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06044：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月2日).2002：587-588.
⑤ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 16,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：265.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06046：苏共中央关于勃列日涅夫与卡尼亚电话 交谈情况的会议记录(1981年4月16日).2002：604.
① Document No.53, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting on Brezhnev Kania Conversation,June 18,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:307-309.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06048：苏共中央关于勃列日涅夫与卡尼亚谈话情况的会议记录(1981年6月18日).2002：613-616.
② Document No.61, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, Septemberl8,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：348-350.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06049：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年9月10日).2002：623-624.
③ Document No.16, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, October 31,1980. a documentary history[M].2007：130.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06143：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月31日).2002：550.
① Andrew A. Michta.Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:150.
② Document No.9:CPSU CC Politburo Report on Topics for Discussion with the Polish Leadership.September 3,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:86又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No.01549：苏共中央政治局关于同波兰领导人谈话的提纲(1980年9月3日).2002：353.
③ Document No.9:CPSU CC Politburo Report on Topics for Discussion with the Polish Leadership.September 3,1980.a documentary history[M].2007:83-86又见沈志华沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第3 1卷),No.01549：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年9月3日).2002：349-353.
④ 卡尼亚(1980年9月6日—1981年1O月18日任第一书记)、平科夫斯基(1980年8月24日一1981年2月11日任部长会议主席)和雅鲁泽尔斯基(1968年任国防部长、1981年2月11日任部长会议主席、10月18日任第一书记)。
① [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年一盖莱克答记者问[M].十欣,鲁海.萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：220.
② 王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机[M].成都：四川人民出版社,1988：313.
③ Document No.15:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting. October 29,1980,.a documentary history[M].2007:123-128.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06041：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(]980年10月29日),2002：539-545.
① Document No.18:Letter from Erich Honecker to Leonid Brezhnev.November 26,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:134-135关于东欧国家领导人在波兰危机中的反应.详见New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (CWIHP11)(winter 1998):3-133其中,保加利亚领导人(p.96-101)、捷克斯洛伐克领导人(p.60-76),匈牙利领导人(p.77-89)。
② Document No.22:Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow. December 5,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:141-161.
③ Document No.22:Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow. December 5,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:141.
④ 注：目前集中公布的苏联历史档案解密材料中还没有这次会议的正式记录。解密的美国国家每日情报中有间接引证：Poland. National Intelligence Daily, February 27,1981; Situation Report:Poland. National Intelligence Daily, March 4,1981.
① [俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫.人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：249.
② Mark Kramer.Poland.1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):119.
③ 徐鹏堂.波兰统一工人党丧失执政地位的原因及教训(上-访中国原驻波兰大使刘彦顺[J].中共党史研究,2006,(2)：89.
④ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, September 10,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：348-349.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06049：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年9月10日).2002：623,625.
① Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:lnternal and International Dimension. a documentary history[M].2007:9.
② Thomas M. Cynkin. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis [M]. Basingstoke, Hampshire:Macmil-lam Press,1988:128.
① Document No.50:CPSU CC Letter to the PUWP CC. June 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:294-298.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):119.
③ Thomas M. Cynkin. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis[M].Basingstoke. Hampshire: Macmillam Press,1988:142.
① Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59.March 2009:10-11.
② 刘彦顺.身兼三职的雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].百年潮,2004,(8)：55.
③ Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59. March 2009:10-11.
④ Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):120.
① a documentary history [M],2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅱ.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project. Issue 5(Spring 1995):121.
③ Document No.15:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting. October 29,1980. a documentary history[M].2007：124.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编《第33卷),No.06041：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月29日).2002：539-545.
④[俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：244.另注：关于此次军演的目的一直存在争议。有人认为演习的目的是为了向波兰政府施加压力,促使他们动用自己的军队进行镇压。1997年举行的华沙会议上库利科夫和格里布科夫承认,1980年末军事演习中部分军队的调动和三个月后的行动都是受莫斯科命令,是出于政治原因。Raymond L. GarthotT. The Conference on Poland,1980-1982:Internal Crisis, International Dimension[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10 (1998 March):231.也有人认为,军演不排除苏联利用华约的军队来支持波兰政府镇压团结工会的可能行。
⑤ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, January 22,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：184.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06042：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年1月22日).2002：574.
① Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension. a documentary history[M].2007:27-28.
② 夏义善主编.苏联外交六十五年纪事：勃列日涅夫时期(1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1987：800.
③ [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：68.
④ 郭增麟.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：175-176.
① Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During The Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J]. Special Working Paper No.1. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Tanslator's Note 3.p37
② Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:lnternal and International Dimensions.a document-ary history[M].2007:14.
③ Document No.14:Transcript of Bulgarian(BCP CC)Politburo Meeting, October 25,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:124-125又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06041：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月29日).2002：539-545.
④ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981 [M]. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:34.
⑤ Document No.16,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,October 31,1980.a documentary history[M].2007:129.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06143：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年10月31日).2002：550.
① Document No.39,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:241,243.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06044：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月2日).2002：589,592.
② Document No.43,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,April 9,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:259.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No,06045：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月9日).2002：595.
③ Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59. March 2009:13-14,11.
① Document No.38,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26.1981.a documentary history[M].2007:235.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年3月26 日).2002：584-585.
② [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：71.
③ Document No.38,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26.1981. a documentary history[M].2007:234.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于报告与波兰代表会谈结果的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：585.
④ Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1:17.
⑤ Document No.38,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26,1981.a documentary history[M]. 2007:235. 或者Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Document No.10, Cold War International History Project. Special Working Paper No.1:89-91.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于报告与波兰代表会谈结果的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：585.
⑥ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷).No01554：关于苏联援助波兰贷的款备查材料(1981年12月).2002：385-386.
⑦ Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project. Special Working Paper No.1.p.17.
① Document No.16,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, October 31,1980, a documentary history [M].2007：130.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷)：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月31日).2002：551.
② Document No.15,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting.October 29,1980. a documentary history[M].2007：127.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06041：苏共中央政治局关于准备同波兰党政代表团会谈的会议记录(1980年1O月29日).2002：544.
③ Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:19.
④ [俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫.人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：246.
⑤ Document No.55, Information on Andrei Gromyko's Talk with the PUWP Leadership, July 3-5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:313.
① Document No.56, Report to HSWP CC Politburo with Verbatim Transcript of July 21 Telephone Conversation between Kania and Brezhnev, July 22,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:317.
② Document No.58, Record of Brezhnev-Honecker Meeting in the Crimea, August 3,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:331.
③ Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1.p.18.又见本文脚注 Translator's note 269, pp.157-158.又见 Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M].Stanford,Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:19.
④ Document No.81,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：446-453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06051：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：633-637.
① Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimensions, a document-ary history[M].2007:27.
② 关于苏联与波兰的经济关系更详细的论述.参见Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1:17-22.
③ Zbigniew Brzezinski. White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:3-48,34又见[美]布热津斯基.实力与原则：1977-1981年国家安全顾问回忆录1977-1981[M].邱应觉.等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1 985：528.
① Poland's prospects over the next six month:The economic cost to the USSR of intervening in Poland.
② Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:168.
③ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：249.
④ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：248.
① Document No.22, Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow, December 5,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:141-161.
② Document No.81,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10.1981. a documentary history[M].2007：446-453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06051：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：633-1637.
① 郭春生.勃列日涅夫18年[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：281.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：526.
③ [俄]A.利亚霍夫斯基.阿富汗战争的悲剧[M].刘宪平译.北京：社会科学文献出版社.2004：164：夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1987：716.
④ 郭春生.勃列日涅夫18年[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：281.
⑤ 夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社.1987：719.
⑥ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：486.
① 郭春生.勃列日涅夫18年[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：283.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].,邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531.
③ [美]吉米·卡特.忠于信仰——一位美国总统的回忆录[M].卢君甫,等译.北京：新华出版社,1985：680-681.
④ a documentary history[M].2007:xxxiv.
⑤ 注释：由于推行新东方政策,西德改善了与苏东共产主义政府的关系,谋求经济利益。因此对波兰的团结工会运动的反应非常平淡,甚至对它破坏了稳定表示不满。10月末,在美英法德召开的四国会议上,西德代表通知美国,缓和不能成为苏联入侵波兰的牺牲品。暗示即使苏联军队入侵波兰,波恩与莫斯科之间的政治和经济联系也将会继续下去。布热津斯基把西德的这一立场称为“德国日益上升的芬兰化的最好证据”。详见Zbigniew Brzezinski,White House Diary, Obris, a journal of world affairs, Vol.32, Winter 1988:34.
⑥ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：528.
⑦ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:168.
⑧ 注释：1993年东德宣布文献公开,柏林自由大学(Free University)的研究小组首席教授曼弗雷德·威尔克(Manfred Wilke)提出了自己的看法,为什么莫斯科拒绝入侵：对阿富汗的战争已经发起了一年前,伊朗危机创造了对苏联的南部侧翼新的关注,加上美国的果断表现,这就是苏联为何不采取这一步骤的关键原因。见Stephen Kinzer. Honnecker Sought Drive into Poland. New York Times, January 12,1993.
① [波]亚当·沙夫.处在十字路口的共产主义运动：波兰的教训[M].1981年德文版。转引自：王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机fM].成都：四川人民出版社,1988：6.
② Andrew A. Michta. Red Eagle[M]. Hoover Institution Press,1990:150.
③ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶夫关十波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日).2002：530.
① 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：12.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：153.
③ 见表一Chien-Wen Kou.The Variety in the Behaviors of Communism Armies during Political Crises:China, Romania, Poland, and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s[PH.D]. the University of Texas at Austin,May,1999:187.
① Andrew A.Michta.Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:149.
② a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅳ.
① Document No.5:CPSU CC Politburo Commission Order to Enhance Readiness of Military Units for Possible Use in Poland. August 28,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:64-65另见Mark Cramer.In Case Military Assistance is Provided to Poland. Soviet Preparations for Military Contingencies, August 1980[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11:102-109.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981, Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):1,116-126.
③ Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59. March 2009:8.
④ Document No.54,CIA National Intelligence Daily.USSR-Poland:Polish Military Attitudes,June 20,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:310.
⑤ [波]雅努什·罗利茨.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：48.
① 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：153.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：163.
③ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社2001：153.
④ 数字来自Mark Kramer.The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59.March 2009:20.
⑤ [美]理查德·尼克松.尼克松回忆录(中)[M].裘克安,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1979：26.
① [美]理查德·尼克松.1999：不战而胜[M].王观声,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1989：31.
② [苏]赫鲁晓夫.赫鲁晓夫回忆录[M].张岱云,等译.北京：东方出版社,1988：281.
③ 茹莹.论70年代以来“经济武器”在美国对苏外交中的运用[J].世界历史,1995,(6)：7.
① 夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社.1987：724.
② 夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1987：718.
③ a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅳ.
④ Andrew A. Michta.Red Eagle[M]. Hoover Institution Press,1990:159.
⑤ Zbigniew Brzezinski. White House Diary.Obris, a journal of world affairs,Vol.32,Winter 1988,3-48,40.
⑥ Mattheww. J. Ouimet.The Rise And Fall of The Brezhnev Doctrine In Soviet Foreign Policy[M].The University Of North Carolina Press,2003:168.
⑦ Document No.81 Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,December 10,1981. a documentary history [M].2007：446-453,450,453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06051：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：637,640.
① 吴永强.波兰军管前后[J].世界知识.1982,(2)：8.
② 波兰外债多数是中长期贷款,还债期从1979年进入高峰,大部集中在1981-1984年。波外债的五分之三以上是从西方的500多家私人银行借的,利息一般都在10%以上,有的高达18-20%。1975年还本付息15亿美元,占当年外汇收入的26%；1977年偿付31亿美元,占当年外汇收入的45%；1979年还63亿美元,占当年外汇收入的75%；1980年还84亿美元,占当年外汇收入83%；1981年还96亿美元,占当年外汇收入的130%。见：波兰利用外资的情况和教训[J].宏观经济研究,1982,(20)：30.
① 李琼.苏联-阿富汗-美国：1979-1989年三国四方在阿富汗地区的一场博弈[PH.D].华东师范大学,2008：155.
② Document No.38:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:235.或者Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project,Special Working Paper No.1.p.89-91.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于报告与波兰代表会谈结果的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：584.
③ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06052：苏共中央政治局关于同奇莱克会谈总结的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：645.
④ Robin Edmonds. Soviet Foreign policy-The Brezhnev Years[M].Oxford University Press,1983:202.
⑤ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年-盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣.鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：113.
⑥ Charles Gati, Soviet Empire:Alive but Not Well//Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World[M],New York:1986:614-615.; Patrick G. Vaughan:Beyond benign neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review.1999,64(1):3-28,20.
① 在苏联解体前,雅鲁泽尔斯基坚决否认苏联曾经有在1981年入侵波兰的意图：甚至迟至1991年夏天,在一次采访中,他对这件事也是采取回避态度。自1991年底以来,雅鲁泽尔斯基开始在公共场合抛出“更小的罪恶”的辩解,并且成为此后关于这个问题的所有评论的基本主题,包括他的两部回忆录：为什么戒严(华沙：1992)和链条与避难所(巴黎,1992)。毫无疑问,在苏联解体之前他的谨慎还是归因于他长期对苏联意愿的顺从。见Mark Kramer.Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland:New Light on the Mystery of December 1981[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(1998):5-14,11.
② 注释：文献原文如此。Document No.89:Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to Secretary of State. "General Wojciech Jaruzelski". December 16,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:478.
③ Document No.89:Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to Secretary of State."General Wojciech Jaruzelski".December 16,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:478-479.
① 徐鹏堂.波兰统一工人党丧失执政地位的原因及教训(上)—访中国原驻波兰大使刘彦顺[J].中共党史研究,2006,(2)：90.
② 见波兰《论坛报》,1990年12月13日,转引自郭增麟.波兰：从军管到交权——政治转轨中的雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].2001,(2)：48-54,51.
③ a documentary history[M].2007:xlvi.
① Chien-Wen Kou.The Variety in the Behaviors of Communism Armies during Political Crises:China, Romania, Poland, and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s[PH.D].the University of Texas at Austin,May,1999:187-188. (3)刘祖熙：军事管制防止了大规模的内战和外国军队的入侵,给社会带来了安定,使生产得以恢复。见：刘祖熙.刘邦义著.波兰战后的三次危机.北京：世界知识出版社[M],1992：173.
① 1995年,雅鲁泽尔斯基第一次被起诉。2001年,华沙地方法院法庭又就此事举行听证调查。雅鲁泽尔斯基坚持辩解,在当时的形势下,如果小采取戒严行动,苏联就可能派兵干预,波兰就会陷入全面的混乱,期间还有1100多名证人和2400多份书面证词。2007年,卡托维兹国家纪念研究所向华沙一家地方法院起诉。这是第三次了。参见孔寒冰.为什么要审判雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].世界知识,2007,(10)：42-43.又见Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan.On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981:Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of Poland[J].Cold War International History Project Working Paper 21,Washington:Woodrow Wilson Center,1997:33-39.
② Mark Kramer.aruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland:New Light on the Mystery of December 1981[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(1998):5-14.
① 关于这个电话的主题双方发生了争议。苏联官员后来说,雅鲁泽尔斯基请求一旦行动失败,苏联给予援助。雅鲁泽尔斯基坚持他是要确信莫斯科是把这个行动看作一件波兰的内部事务。见Wojciech Jaruzelski.Commentary[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (1998):32-39,35.又见Mark Kramer. Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland:New Light on the Mystery of December 1981[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(1998):5-14. documentary history[M].2007:xlv.
① Document NO.72:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting on Rusakov's Trip to Eastern Europe,October 29,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:395-399,397.
② "Even if Poland were to be ruled by solidarity,so be it."见 Vojtech Mastny.The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-81 and the End of the Cold War[J].Europe-Asia Studies 51,No.2 (1999):189-211.或 Cold War Interna-tional History Project,Working Paper No.23.1998:204.
① Document No.81:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：446-453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No 01552：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：372.(第33卷),No 06051,2002：632.
② Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1译者的注解,第288条。又见Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue No.5(Spring 1995):122.
③ Francis J.Meehan. Reflections on the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (winter 1998):43-47,44.
④ Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1译者的注解,第282条。
⑤ Document No.41:EAST German Report of Discussion with Marshal Viktor Kulikov, April 7,1981. a document-ary history[M].2007:246-254.又见 Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1译者的注解,第284条.
⑥在征得阿诺什金的同意后,克莱默复印了这个笔记薄中的部分内容,随后翻译并做了注解。见Mark Kramer.The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(Winter 1998):17-31.
① "You know what you said to me then. How could you let them do this to me—in front of the Americans!"见 Malcolm Byrne. New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1981 [J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(Winter 1998):4.
② Wojciech Jaruzelski. Commentary[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998):32-39.
① Bennett Kovrig. Of walls and bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:117.
② [美]亨利·基辛格.白宫岁月(第一册)[M].陈瑶华,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1980：196.
③ Bennett Kovrig. Of walls and bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:118.
① 关于欧洲安全与合作会议最后成果所产生的广泛影响,意大利校际马基雅维利冷战研究中心(The Italian inter-university Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies(CIMA))与冷战国际史项目CWIHP于2006年4月27-29日在意大利城市Artimino合作召开了学术研讨会,主题为"From Helsinki to Gorbachev,1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation".关于此次会议的概述,刊登在Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16:Duccio Basosi, Matteo Gerlini, and Angela Romano:From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985:The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation, Villa Medicea "La Ferdinanda" (Artimino, Italy) 27-29 April 2006:528-535.
② 戈登·克雷格、亚历山大·乔治.武力与治国方略—我们时代的外交问题[M].时殷弘,周桂银,石斌译.北京：商务印书馆,2004：247.
① 布热津斯基回忆录摘介,卡特选择波兰作为发展东欧关系的重点[J].国际展望,1984,(5)：24.
② Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension, a documentary history[M].2007:.9.
③ 布热津斯基回忆录摘介,卡特选择波兰作为发展东欧关系的重点[J].国际展望,1984,(5)：25.
④ 关于欧安会与美国的人权外交,参看Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe [M].New York:New York University Press,1991第四章.
⑤ Bennett Kovrig.Of Walls and Bridges:The United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:126.
⑥ Bennett Kovrig.Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:126.
⑦ Brian Trenor.The 1976 Presidential Campaign and "The Ultimate Polish Joke"[J].NC State University, Madison Historical Review,Vol.8,May 2011:34.
① Andrzej Korbonski. "Poland," Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Teresa Rakowski-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, Bloomington, Indiana,1979:67参见Patrick G. Vaughan, Beyond Benign Neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J].The polish Review,1999,44(1):3-28,12注释34.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：526.
③ 警示备忘录(Alert Memo)是中情局根据收集到的情报就事态发展的紧急状态向高层决策者发出警告,在总统收到之后第二天出现在《过家每日情报》中。关于波兰危机的《国家每日情报》的部分文章国内研究者可以通过DNSA和DDRS数据库检索到。
① Patrick G. Vaughan. Beyond Benign Neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J].The polish Review, 1999,44(1):3-28,14.
② 美国国务院的反应与总统是不一致的,它寻求低调以避免挑衅苏联的反应。8月18日,国务院代理发言人David Passage强调：“它是波兰人民和政府去解决的事”,“我们相信任何来自美国更深入的评论对波兰局势的演进没有帮助”。这一观点可参见Graham Hovey. U.S. Wary in Comments on Strikes. New York Times, August 19,1980; David Binder. No Urgency Over Polish Crisis Apparent in Washington. New York Times, August 23,1980; Washington's Policy is to Live and Let Live-Please.New York Times, The Week in Review, August 24,1980.
③ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531.
④ Patrick G. Vaughan. Beyond Benign Neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J]. The polish Review,1999,44(1)：3-28,16.布热津斯基认为,这一战略在苏联入侵阿富汗后一直是缺失的。
⑤ Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee,Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland", with Attach-ment, September 23,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:87-90.
⑥ 据时任中情局执行秘书的罗伯特·盖茨回忆,同一天(8月27日),吉斯卡尔·德斯坦给盖莱克写了一封信,表示“希望波兰能够找到与民族愿望相协调的解决问题的办法”。盖茨说很难确定这个呼吁是否或者在多大程度上对波兰领导人产生了任何影响。参见Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:10.
⑦ Document No.8,President Carter's Letter to Allies on Poland. September 1,1980. a documentary history [M].2007：81-82.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531Carter Urges Allies to Assist Poles,New York Times,3 September 1980,A1.
① [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：527.
② Chronology of Events.a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅰ.
③ 这个委员会主要由总统的多数关于国际事务的高级顾问组成。
④ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:163.
⑤ Lincoln Gordon ed. Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M]. Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:119.
① Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:163.有见 Chronology of Events.a documentary history [M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅱ.
② Document No.10, Special Coordination Committee, Summary of Conclusions," Meeting on Poland," with Attachment.September 23,1980.a documentary history[M].2007:89.关于此次会议,还可参见Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:164.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘等译.北京：世界知识出版社1985:465.Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:28.
③ Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee, Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland," with Attachment.September 23,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:87-88.又见 Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981 [M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:12-13.
④ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:164.
① Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee,Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland." with Attachment.September 23,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:88.
② Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee,Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland," with Attachment.September 23,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:88-89.
③ Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary.Obris, ajournal of world affairs, Winter 1988:33.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[Ml.邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社.1985：465.
④ Andrew A. Michta. Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:159.
① 布热津斯基的《白宫口记》详细记录了从12月1日至10日政府高层每天的反应及决策过程。
② 库克林斯基(Kuklinski)上校(1930-2004),1930年出生于波兰首都华沙,17岁参加人民军,陆军军官学校毕业后,在反空降兵部队工作,后调入总参谋部工作。1956年至1968年期间,是当时总参谋长雅鲁泽尔斯基将军的心腹,参与了1968年华约对捷克斯洛伐克入侵的筹备工作,后被派往越南,在印度支那国际停战委员会工作。在这期间,他开始为美国中央情报局服务。1975年被派往莫斯科军事学院学习,回国后被热宁为总参谋部战略防御计划处处长,不久晋升为波兰军队总参谋部作战司副司长。波兰危机期间,他是苏联元帅库利科夫和波兰首脑雅鲁泽尔斯基将军之间的联络官,1981年参与起草了波兰实行军管的有关文件。同年11月在中情局俄罗斯及东欧处主任戴维·福登安排下成功出逃美国。在长达11年时间里,他为中情局提供了1200万字的绝密情报。在波兰危机期间,他是美国获取情报的得天独厚的人力资源。目前西方学术界最权威的评论库克林斯基的生活及其经历的著作是Benjamin Weiser. A Secret Life[M].New York:Public Affairs,2004国内的成果是2001年群众出版社出版的郭增麟编著的《情报发自华沙》,以上对库克林斯基的简要介绍即参照此书。
③ 在整个危机期间,布热津斯基首先寻求的目标是避免以前政府所犯的错误,对苏联入侵提供有力的阻遏作用,因此他鼓励总统采用公共政策以对苏联形成压力。对于苏联是否会干涉,他是存在怀疑的。在回忆录里,他把苏联干涉可能引起的后果分析得很全面：葬送欧洲政治上的缓和；破坏东西方经济合作；促使北约组织增加预算：西欧各国共产党同苏联之间的关系出现紧张状况：不结盟运动进一步脱离苏联；苏联集团其他地方出现骚乱：美-中之间公开地进行军事合作。见[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基著,邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘等译.实力与原则.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：528.
④据帕克洛夫斯基称,除了西方这几个领导人之外,卡特还给中国和印度领导人发了信件,通知波兰局势。Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension.a documentary history[M].2007:16.不过,在布热津斯基的《白宫日记》里没有提到这一情节。
⑤ Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs,Winter,1988:35.
① DDRS,CK3100048657. Zbigniew Brzezinski. White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter1988.32：36-37.注：在布热津斯基的《白宫日记》里,这封信的末尾还有这么一句：“我们准备发表的声明是这个观点的公开表达”。这是与DDRS解密文件稍有不同的地方。
② Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J].Obris,a journal of world affairs,Winter 1988,32:37在《白宫日记》中布热津斯基对信件准备的过程,与国务卿马斯基、中情局长特纳、国防部长布朗讨论(是发表公开声明还是私下通知苏联,讨论结果是先给勃列日涅夫发一个快讯,通知他美国将发表声明)以及公开声明发布过程有详细的记录。
③ Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J].Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:38.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社.1985：466.
① Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J].Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:39-41.由此说明美国政府决策者的审慎。
② 发出去的这封总统密电原文附在特别委员会会议记录后面。见Document No.23,Minutes of U.S. Special Coordination Committee Meeting, December 7,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:164.
③ Document No.23,Minutes of U.S. Special Coordination Committee Meeting, December 7,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:162-163. Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary.Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:41. Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:167-168.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：529.
① Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988.32:44.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘.等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：530.
① [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：526.
② 这一信息由当时在华盛顿的较有影响的波兰中央委员会成员和波兰统一工人党机关刊物《政治》的主编米克茨斯洛夫·拉科夫斯基转达给华沙。参见Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension,.a documentary history[M].2007:9.
③ Arthur R. Rachwald. In Search of Poland:the Superpowers' Response to Solidarity,1980-1989 [M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:49.
④ 因为美国的对外援助法不允许直接向共产主义国家提供援助,农业贷款是当卡特在寻求以向波兰提供实际的援助来改善他的政治地位的时候能够利用的为数不多的几个项目之一。卡特把这一姿态叫做“我们对整个波兰民族—工人、政府和教会—在这个演进和变革的困难时期所表现出来的尊严的敬意的一种表达”。参见Steven R. Weisman. Carter Lauds Entire Polish Nation and Grants $670 Million For Grain. New York Times, September 13,1980.
⑤ Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:48.
⑥ New York Times, August 28,1980.转引自 Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989 [M].Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:48.另外,卡特通过电视镜头宣布这一决定无疑是考虑到了波裔美国人投票者。说明在大选年里美国政府的波兰政策客观上是受到影响的。
① 参见Arthur R. Rachwald.In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity.1980-1989 [M].Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:48.
② Lincoln Gordon [et al.].Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M].Washington. D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:121.
③ 有分析家称,如果卡特政府的任期还没有结束,如果美国的经济更加繁荣一些,国务卿马斯基和布热津斯基一起努力有可能赢得总统的支持,使该计划在国会得以通过,尤其是与西欧联合起来提供援助。当然,他们也承认,不管在华盛顿还是华沙,困难都不能低估。Lincoln Gordon [et al.].Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe [M].Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:122.
④ Reagan Castigating the "Betrayal" of Workers' Aspirations. Washington Post, September 2,1980.
① Arthur R. Rachwald. In Search of Poland:the Superpowers'Response to Solidarity,1980-1989 [M].Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:49.
② 当国会有分析称波兰已经陷入严重的经济困境,对波兰的经济援助存在更高的风险时,布热津斯基大为光火,仍然极力推动政府劝说私人银行向波兰提供贷款。
③ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company,New York,1984:241.
⑤ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：527.
⑥ Chronology of Events, a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅰ.
⑦ Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:164; Chronology of Events, a documentary history [M]. 2007:xxxii.
① 当时美国的通货膨胀率为13%,利率为20%,失业率7.5%。参见Donald T. Regan.(唐·里甘,里根政府财政部长)For the Record:From Wall Street to Washington[M].NY:St. Martin Press,1988:170.
② 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社.2003：1033.
③ 美国国务院.美国外交政策现行文件(1984).华盛顿GPO1986：27.转引自刘金质著.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1032.
④ [英]理查德·克罗卡特.50年战争[M].王振西主译.北京：新华出版社,2003：438.
⑤ Donald T. Regan.For the Record:From Wall Street to Washington[M].NY:St. Martin Press,1988:329.
⑥ Raymond L. Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:the Brookings Institution,1994:7.
① Washington Post,October 27,1981.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[Ml.《里根自传》翻译组译北京：东方出版社：1991：234.
③ Washington Post. February 16,1980.转引自刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1113.
④ Raymond L. Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:the Brookings Institution,1994:8.
⑤ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1113.
⑥ [美]梅尔文·莱弗勒.人心之争：美国、苏联与冷战[M].孙闵欣,等译.上海：华东师范大学出版社,2012：418.
⑦ Ronald Reagan.National Security Strategy of the United States[M]. Virginia:Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.,1988:77.
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根回忆录[M].萨本望,李庆功,等译.北京：中国工人出版社,1991：291.又见[美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,1991：264.
② Ronald Reagan.An American Life.NY:Simon and Schuter,1990:301.
③ [美]罗纳德·里根.里根回忆录[M].,萨本望,李庆功,等译.北京：中国工人出版社,1991：291.又见[美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,1991：264.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan.and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company, New York,1984:240.
⑤ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company, New York,1984:241.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company, New York,1984:241.
② 1月28日,黑格的信公布,在媒体中引起了小小的轰动。第二天,多勃雷宁公布了葛罗米柯的反应,“重申”了12月5日华约莫斯科会议发布的联合公报,2月11日,莫斯科公布了葛罗米柯回复的正文。CIA135.
③ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:227. 又见 Peter Schweizer.Victory:The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union[M],New York:Atlantic Monthly Press,1994:6.
④ 指实施军事管制的时间表。
⑤ Document No.31:National Intelligence Estimate(NIE12.6-81). Poland's Prospects over the Next Six Months,January 27,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:193-211.
⑥ 横向结构运动或称地平线运动,是统一工人党政治凝聚力下降、思想涣散的形势下基层党组织进行的跨地区、跨行业、跨部门的横向串联活动,主张扩大党内民主,对党的现行制度进行改革。
① Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:229.
② 郭增麟.情报发自华沙[M].北北京：群众出版社,2001：169.
① Public Papers of the President of the United States(1981),"Statement by the Press Secretary on the Situation in Poland, March 26,1981". http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html; Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:33.
② Document No.40:CIA Alert Memorandum "Poland".April 3,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:245.
③ 关于这次会议的规模,说法不一。也有说13个省,14个省。来自19个省的600名代表。张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：64.
① New York Times,Thursday 16,1981:11-13.
② 关于这两次会议的记录,详见a documentary history[M], Document No.44:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 16,1981.2007:265-266又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06046：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月16日)2002:603.a documentary history[M]. Document No.45:Extract from Protocol No.7 from CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,April 23,1981.2007:267-272又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No01550：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月23日).2002：354.
③ Document No.50:CPSU CC Letter to the PUWP CC,June 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:294-298.
④ 《纽约时报》在9日以醒目的标题“我们不会置波兰于不顾,苏联警告说”报道了此封信件。New York Times,June 9,1981:Al.
⑤ New York Times,June 12,1981:A3.
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,1991：266.
② 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1193.
③ Document No.63:CPSU CC Communication to the PUWP CC,"Intensifying Anti-Soviet Feelings in Poland," September 14,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:357-359.
④ 关于波兰军队的态度在波兰局势中的作用一直是中情局重视的一个方面。6月20日,一份解密的国家每日情报就分析了苏联与波兰关系中的波兰军队的态度。Document No.54:CIA National Intelligence Daily,"USSR-Poland:Polish Military Attitudes",June 20,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:310-311.
① 出现这样的出入,麦凯琴分析称,可能是由于大使馆没有看到库克林斯基提供的这份最新情报。
② Document No.65:Message from Ryszard Kuklinski to CIA,September 15,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:363-364.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:240.
① New York Times, Thursday],1981.
② Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:245.
③ Document No.75:Memorandum from Alexander Haig to President Reagan, "U.S. Assistance Program for Poland",December 1,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:409.
④ Document No.75:Memorandum from Alexander Haig to President Reagan, "U.S. Assistance Program for Poland",December 1,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:410.
① 关于危机期间里根政府的政策,参见Mark Kramer.The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis.1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J].Cold War International History Project. Special Working Paper No.59.March 2009:36.
② 黑格在回忆录毕提到这一情节时说：“我们和我们的盟国强烈要求波兰成为IMF的成员国,这样可以促进和临督经济改革,但是波兰从他们自己的利益出发需要申请成员资格。可以理解的是,没有苏联的同意,他们不能选择这样做。这个不能立即实现”。见Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:246.
③ 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：204,203.
④ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1192.
⑤ Mark Kramer. Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 11, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Spring1995:55.
① 原来,CIA在收到库克林斯基的军管计划的复印件后,美国政府就将此事通知了教皇约翰·保罗二世,希望用他的影响阻挠已经计划好的行动,克格勃在梵蒂冈的一个情报员将这个消息透露了出去。Mark Kramer.The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J].Cold War International History Project,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,Working Paper59, March 2009:1.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：28.
③ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：32.
④ 苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录,沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编,第31卷,NoO1552.2002：375.第33卷,No06051.2002：635.另见：Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1.April 1999:162.又:a documentary history[M], 2007:448.
⑤ 参见译者注释第280条,Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1:162.
① Raymond L. Garthoff. The Conference on Poland,1980-1982:Internal Crisis,International Dimensions[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10 (1998 March):229-232.
② Rosenberg Tina.The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M]. New York:Random House, 1995:208.更多关于美国政府官员的解释,参见Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:213-214以及注释3、4.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York,Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:247.
④ Rosenberg Tina.The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M].New York:Random House, 1995:210.
⑤ Francis J. Meehan. Reflections on the Polish Crisis, New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11,winter 1998:46.
⑥ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：148.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北北京：群众出版社,2001：55,146.
③ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：147.
① Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M]. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:215.另见:Drew Middleton.Soviet Action inside Poland Being Studied.Military Analysis.New York Times.December.21,1981:A19.
② Douglas J. MacEachin.U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981 [M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:234.
③ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland.1980-1981[M]. University Park. PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:220.
④ Douglas J. MacEachin.U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park. PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:233-234.
① Douglas J. MacEachin.U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:214-215.
② Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:229.
③ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:230.
① Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:215-216.
② Rosenberg Tina. The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M].New York:Random House,1995:206.
③ Eric Chenoweth and Jerzy B. Warman.Solidarity Abandoned--Why Reagan Didn't Help[J].The New Republic,Vol.195, No.2 and 3 (July 14 and 21.1986):20.
④ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:212.
① Francis J. Meehan. Reflections on the Polish Crisis, New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(CWIHP11) (winter 1998):46.
② Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:212-213.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:41.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:247
⑤ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:213.
⑥ New York Times, November 15,1956.
⑦ Rosenberg Tina. The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M].New York:Random House,1995:210.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:240.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[Ml.北京：群众出版社,2001：148.
③ Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project,Issue 5,Spring 1995:118.
④ Mark Kramer. Poland.1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project. Issue 5,Spring 1995:118.
① 刘彦顺.身兼三职的雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].百年潮,2004,(8)：53-59,56.
② Mark Kramer.Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,Spring 1995:119.
③ Mark Kramer.Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,Spring 1995:121.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company, 1984:239.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York, Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:239.
② Thomas M. Cynkin.Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis[M].Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillam Press,1988:147.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:242.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:242.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：528.
① [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2001：20.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan.and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Compa-ny,1984:248.
② Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland,1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:42.
③ Peter Schweizer, ed. Reagan's War:the Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Commu-nism [M]. New York:Doubleday,2002:165-166. Raymond Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M].Washington D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:80.
④ New York Times,Dec.22.1981:A1.
① Doc.No.88:CIA National Intelligence Daily, "Poland:Test of Government's Measures", Decem-ber 14,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:476-477.
② 注：现在看到的这份解密文献,有的地方删除一个字,有的地方删除半行,有的地方删除半段或者一整段。
③ Ronald Reagan.An American Life[M].New York:Simon and Schuter,1990:270.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:248.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:249.
② Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:249.
③ Washington Post, Dec.14,1981:A 1.
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:47.
⑤ Doc.No.87:Speech by Pope Ⅱ Concerning Martial Law. December 13,1981. a documentary history [M].2007: 475.
⑥ Doc.No.90:Appeal from Pope John Paul Ⅱ to Wojciech Jaruzelski, December 18,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:480-481.
① Andrzej Paczkowski, trans.by Jane Cave.The Spring will be Ours:Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom[M]. University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press,2003:451.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University.2008:50.
② The President's New Conference.PPPUS. December 17,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
③ Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:51.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:251-252.
① Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland. PPPUS, December 23,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：171.
① Malcolm Byrne.New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11,Winter 1998:3-14.
② Doc.No.91:Protocol No.16 of PUWP CC Secretariat Meeting, December 19,1981. a documentary history[M]. 2007:482-495:483.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy. and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:83.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:53.
③ The President's New Conference.PPPUS. December 17,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:53-54.
① Peter Schweizer, ed. Reagan's War:the Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism[M]. New York:Doubleday,2002:166.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：265.
③ Peter Schweizer, ed. Reagan's War:the Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism[M]. New York:Doubleday,2002:165.
④ Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland. PPPUS, December 23,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：266.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：266-267.
③ Doc.No.92:Hotline Communication from Leonid Brezhenev to Ronald Reagan Regarding Martial Law in Poland, December 25,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:496-498.
① Richard Pipes.Vixi:Memoirs of a Non-Belonger[M].New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press,2004:173.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：267.
③ [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：268.
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:62.
⑤ Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland.December 29,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
⑥ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1172.
① 关于美国与西欧国家在波兰危机上的分歧,参见Helene Sjursen. The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis:International Relations in the Second Cold War[M], NewYork:Palgrave Macmillan,2003.
② Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:249.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:66-67.
① Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:63.
② 天然气管道交易是70年代能源危机之后,西欧国家为解决能源恐慌而采取的一项与苏联之间进行能源合作的项目。根据双方之间达成的意向,西欧在两三年内向苏联提供总额约11O亿美元的贷款,苏联用这些贷款从西欧订购用于铺设从西伯利亚的乌连戈伊天然气田到捷克边境的天然气管道。管道建成后,苏联从1984年起,在25年内每年向法国、联邦德国和意大利等国输送共计1.37万亿立方英尺的天然气,以此来偿还贷款。据估计,通过这笔交易,苏联每年会有80-100亿美元的进账。这笔交易是东西方之间达成的最大一笔交易,因而被国际舆论称为“世纪性交易”。见资中筠主编.战后美国外交史：从杜鲁门到里根[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：930-933：931.另外,关于美欧在天然气管道问题上的分歧以及苏联的抗议更系统的分析可参见：刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1174-1185.
③ 资中筠主编.战后美国外交史：从杜鲁门到里根[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：931.
④ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1177.
⑤ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1180.
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：268.
② [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2001：4.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland,1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:94.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:95.
① Raymond Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:45.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].北京：东方出版社,2001：257-258.
③ 里根在新墨西哥州的讲话,路透社1982年3月2日报道。转引自资中筠主编.战后美国外交史——从杜鲁门到里根(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：865.
④ 资中筠主编.战后美国外交史——从杜鲁门到里根(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：863.
⑤ [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：278.
① http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:141.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:142.
② 关于这一人事任免中的细节,参见Ronald Reagan. An American Life[M]. NY:Simon and Schuter,1990: 254-256.271.360-362.
③ 资中筠主编.战后美国外交史——从杜鲁门到里根(下)fM].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：876.
④ George Shultz. Toil and Triumph[M]. New York:Charles Schribner's Sons,1993:137.
⑤ George Shultz. Toil and Triumph[M]. New York:Charles Schribner's Sons,1993:138.
⑥ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-54.pdf
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:157.
① Radio Address to the Nation on Solidarity and United States Relations With Poland.October 9,1982. PPPUS. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
② Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers'response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:54.
① Remarks on Signing the Human Rights and Day of Prayer for Poland Proclamations,December 10,1982. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html
② Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:174.
③ Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:75.
④ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf
① Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:84.
① 由于苏联出口石油换取外汇收入是其经济体制的一个支柱,石油价格的骤降对这个国家后来的崩溃产生了重要的影响。不少西方学者从这个角度分析导致苏联解体的原因。参见[西]拉斐.风云突变的时代：一个西班牙记者眼中的俄罗斯[M].傅石球译.上海：复旦大学出版社,2006；[俄]E.T.盖达尔.帝国的消亡——当代俄罗斯的教训[M].王尊贤译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2008.
② 邢广程.苏联高层决策70年——从列宁到戈尔巴乔夫(第五分册)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1998：17.
③ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M],北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1346.
① [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤.良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：90.
② 沈志华.苏联历史档案选编.No06052：苏共中央政治局关于同奇莱克会谈总结的会议记录,1982年1月4日.2002：647.
③ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版 社,1992：84.
① [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].,郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：84.
② 沈志华.苏联历史档案选编.No06053.苏共中央政治局关于与雅鲁泽尔斯基谈话总结的会议,1984年4月26日.2002：653-657.
③ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：85.
④ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：88.
⑤ [俄]米·谢·戈尔巴乔夫.“真相”与自由：戈尔巴乔夫回忆录[M],述弢,等译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002：243.
① [苏]阿·切尔尼亚耶夫.在戈尔巴乔夫身边六年[M].徐葵,等译.北京：世界知识出版社.2001：41.
② [苏]米·谢·戈尔巴乔夫.改革与新思维[M].苏群译.北京：新华出版社,1987：153.
③ [俄]戈尔巴乔夫.[日]池出大作.世纪的精神教训[M].孙立川译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004：373.
④ [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：96.
① Andrzej Paczkowski. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989//Olay Njolstad,ed. The Last Decade of the Cold War[M].London:Frank Cass,2004:388.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:280.
③ Andrzej Paczkowski. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989//Olay Njolstad,ed.The Last Decade of the Cold War[M].London:Frank Cass,2004:389.
① Andrzej Paczkowski. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989//Olay Njolstad,ed.The Last Decade of the Cold War[M].London:Frank Cass,2004:389.
② Gregory F. Domber, Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:284.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:299.
① 这里有一个小插曲：当怀特海德走下飞机后,欢迎他的波兰副外交部长吉纳斯告诉他,瓦文萨不能到华沙来见他,因为他已经用完了他在格但斯克船厂电工的所有假日。怀特海德对阻止他与瓦文萨会见很惊讶,沮丧。在最后关头他决定赌一把,他说,如果瓦文萨不能来见他,他就飞到格但斯克,不与雅鲁泽尔斯基见面。在宾馆房间里,波兰政府改变了态度,告诉他吉纳斯一直被误解了。按照计划好的日程,瓦文萨会来到华沙。
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:314.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:315-316.
① Statement on the Lifting of Economic Sanctions Against Poland.February 19,1987.PPPUS. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:358-359.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:379.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:386.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:388.
① Charles Gati.The Bloc that Failed:Soviet-East European Politics in Transformation[M].Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1990:166-167.
② 西方将此新方针称为“辛纳屈主义”(Sinatra Doctrine)又译西纳特拉主义或仙纳杜拉主义,该说法取自美国歌手法兰克·辛纳屈20世纪60年代一首脍炙人口的名为"My Way"(《我行我素》或《走我自己的路》)的歌曲,意指苏联允许每个东欧国家走自己的路。参见郭洁.东欧剧变与苏联历来的东欧政策是什么关系//陆南泉,黄宗良,郑异凡,马龙闪,左凤荣主编.苏联真相：对101个重要问题的思考(下)[M].北京：新华出版社,2010：1331.
③ 刘金质著.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1390.
③ [加]夏尔-菲利普·大卫.白宫的秘密[M].李旦,王健,徐翊,等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1998：353.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声.陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：13. 刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：4.
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M]·胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：11.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：47.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈 刚.朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社.2000：43.
① James A. Baker. Thomas M. DeFrank.The Politics of Diplomacy:Revolution, War, and Peace,1989-1992[M]. New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,1995:68.
② Oberdorfer Don.From the Cold War to a New Era:the United States and the Soviet Union,1983-1991 [M]. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1998:333.
③ James A. Baker, Thomas M. DeFrank.The Politics of Diplomacy:Revolution, War, and Peace,1989-1992[M].. New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,1995:68.
④ [加]夏尔-菲利普·大卫.白宫的秘密[M].李旦,王健,徐翊,等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1998：356.
⑤ James A. Baker, Thomas M. DeFrank.The Politics of Diplomacy:Revolution,War,and Peace,1989-1992 [M]. New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,1995:69.
① 在后里根时代,巨额的联邦赤字使得预算紧缩,进行经济援助对布什政府而言难度很大。
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：43.
③ 赖斯的报告最终发展成第23号国家安全指令：《美国与苏联的关系》(NSD23),1989年9月22日布什总统批准通过。National Security Directive 23:United States Relations with the Soviet Union.September 22,1989. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),U.S.,NSC Policy Papers,RG273.
④ Beschloss Michael and Strobe Talbott. At the Highest Levels:The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War[M].Boston:Little, Brown,1993:34.
① Beschloss Michael and Strobe Talbott. At the Highest Levels:The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War[M]. Boston:Little. Brown,1993:49.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
③ Christopher Alan. Maynard. From the Shadow of Reagan:George Bush and the End of the Cold War[PH.D]. Louisiana State University,2001:72.
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：182-183.
③ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：183.
④ 这份文件的内容尚未解密,在布什总统图书馆网站上可以看到已经解密的题目和日期。Bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/paper.html.
① 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1391.
② 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：225.
③ [苏]米·谢·戈尔巴乔夫.改革与新思维[M].苏群译.北京：新华出版社,1987：105.
④ 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：225.
⑤ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：41.这一认识顽固地影响着华盛顿决策者。里根、布什及其多数高级官员对80年代东欧局势的演变所持的谨慎态度,都是出自这一顾虑。由此不难看出,“解放”战略的后遗症是多么深刻地影响着美国的外交政策,这种记忆反复地强化着美国决策者关于美国对东欧影响力有限性的认识。这是促使美国三任政府在 80年代波兰危机以及波兰剧变中保持谨慎反应的一个重要影响因素。
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：52.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D]. the George Washington University,2007:392.
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：41.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：52.
① 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：113.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：184.
③ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：185.
④ Doc.3. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate.Election'89:Solidarity's Victory Raises Questions. June 6,1989.详见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：186.
② Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.10(OL). http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
③ 一份1989年6月16日从华沙发回国务院的电报,“政治局成员警告在雅鲁泽尔斯基竞选问题上美国已经被拖进一场战争”。参见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy(OL).注释12.http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
④ 约翰·戴维斯,1983-1987年任波兰临时代办,1987-1988年任波兰代办,1988-1990年任波兰大使。
① Doc.3. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, Election'89:Solidarity's Victory Raises Questions. June 6,1989.详见Gregory F. Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② Doc.4. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, How to Elect Jaruzelski Without Voting for Him, and Will He Run? June 23,1989.详见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.. the Nation Security Archive.(OL) http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① Gregory F. Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：280.
③ Elections in Poland, Department of state Bulletin,89.2149 (1989):78. General OneFile. Web.12 Jan.2013. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA7938865&v=2.1&u=s8492775&it=r&p=GPS&sw=w
① Gregory F.Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL) http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：102.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：102.
④ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社·1992：319.
⑤ 根据会议期间其他在场的人回忆,布什总统可能夸大了雅鲁泽尔斯基敞开心扉的程度,这次谈话对雅鲁泽尔斯基的思想产生的影响就成了一个怎么解释的事情了。1999年11月23日作者乔治·多姆博对戴维斯的采访。Gregory F.Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S.Embassy.13. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
⑥ Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.14. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：107
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：108.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：105.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：104.
① 在537张有效选票中,获得赞成票270张(反对票233张,弃权票34张),以仅比法定半数多1票的优势当选为波兰总统。
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[Ml.胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：123.
③ 孔寒冰.东欧史[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2010：450.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：117-118.
⑤ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：186.
① 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：187-188.
② [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：322.
① Doc.6. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate,Conversation With General Kiszczak. August 11,1989详见Gregory F. Domber ed. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：124.
③ Doc.7. Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, Solidarity-Government Dialogue. August 12,1989.详见Gregory F. Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① Doc.8. Cable from Moscow to Secstate, If Solidarity Takes Charge, What Will the Soviets Do? August 16,1989.详见Gregory F. Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：125.
② Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:600.
③ 拉科夫斯基说,这次会话时间很长,持续40分钟。戈尔巴乔夫说苏联共产党密切注视着波兰人民共和国形势的发展,表示“我们同你们在一起”。在谈到农民党、民主党同意参加团结工会组阁的政府时,戈尔巴乔夫对他说,你们应该建立新党,老的党不会再有所作为。拉科夫斯基说,我们根本没有谈要达成妥协的问题,这很容易理解。谈话是在22日在总统和政府问题上作出妥协之后进行的。苏联大使馆始终按着脉搏,很清楚正在发生的事,它肯定不会把对这些问题的了解仅仅据为己有。但是我从他那里听到的是我们应该要求反对派忠于“圆桌会议”达成的协议,同我们一样,他认为我们应该坚持谅解路线。他宣布,苏联共产党将不改变它对波兰、对波兰统一工人党的政策。但是如果反对派开始攻击波党、攻击制度所取得的成就,那么苏联就要改变它对波兰的政策——‘‘请你们把这点告诉反对派”。按照拉科夫斯基的解释,这次交谈的内容被说成是戈尔巴乔夫向波党施加压力,迫其交权纯粹是西方一些报纸(《卫报》《华盛顿邮报》《洛杉矶时报》)的记者故意歪曲事实、胡编乱造。[波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基著,郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：325-327.
① 从80年代后半期,这两个党开始越来越强调自己的思想特性,试图确立自己在波兰政治中的地位,摆脱卫星党身份。统一工人党迟迟没有意识到这一问题的严重性,为瓦文萨私下策划分裂执政联盟提供了机会 。
② Doc.9. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, Bronislam Geremek Explains Next Steps Toward a Solidarity Gover-ment. August 19,1989.详见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive. (OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSA EBB/NSAEBB42/
③ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：188.
④ Richard Nixon. American Foreign Policy:The Bush Agenda [J].Foreign Affairs.1989,68(1):199-219.
⑤ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：50.
① Jack F.Matlock, Jr. Autopsy on an Empire:The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union[M].New York:Random House,1995:177.Anatoly Chernyaev, trans.by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucher. My Six Year with Gorbachev[M].State College,P.A.:Penn State Press,2000:201.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：51.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：52.
④ 后来布什回忆说：“幸运的是,我们的政府从一开始就赶上了东欧的变革。由于着意于东欧,我们延缓了与苏联在军备控制上的谈判。对于波兰朝气蓬勃的发展,我们立即予以肯定。我们处于有利的地位,因此,当自由主义浪潮在这一地区蔓延时,我们可以促进它并充分地利用它。”详见[美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：165.
⑤ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M1.胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
① 白建才.“第三种选择,’:冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：347.
① 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：34.
② 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：30.
③ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：31.
④ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：34-35.
⑤ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：57-58.
⑥ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：59.
① [南]米利伏耶维奇.波兰在十字路口[M].王洛林,寇滨译.北京：世界知识出版社,1981：9.
② FRUS,1949,Vol.5:1976:502-516.
③ 李振城主编.无硝烟的战争[M].天津：天津社会科学院出版社,1991:141.
① Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:293.
② Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:295.
③ [美]托尼·朱特.战后欧洲史[M].林骧华,唐敏,等译.北京：新星出版社,2010：539.
① [美]托尼·朱特.战后欧洲史[M].林骧华,唐敏.等译.北京：新星出版社.2010：539.
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④ 王和.波兰事件中的天主教会[J].国际共运教研参考,1982.(5)：39.
① 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：194.
② 郭增麟.波兰独立之路[M].北京：北京图书馆出版社,1998：222.
③ Carl Bernstein.The Holy Alliance, Time, February 24,1992:14-35另见[美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：80.于力人编著.中央情报局50年[M].北京：时事出版社,1998：679.
① 注：如无特别注释,以下内容均参考Carl Bernstein.The Holy Alliance,Time, February 24,1992:14-35.
① 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：215.
② [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：68.
③ [苏]葛罗米柯.永志不忘[M](下).伊吾译.北京：世界知识出版社,1989：55.
④ 郭增麟.波兰独立之路[M].北京：北京图书馆出版社,1998：230.
① 美国关于劳联-产联对团结工会支持的代表性研究成果Gregory F. Domber. The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc[J]. The Polish Review vol. LII,2007,(3):277-304;James M. Shevis.The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):31-35;Arch Puddington. Surviving the Underground:How American Unions Helped Solidarity Win研究劳联-产联主席柯克兰德的专著：Arch Puddington. lane Kirkland: Champion of American Labor[M]. Hoboken, NJ:John Wiley and Sons,2005;Jonathan Kwitney, Man of the Century[M],New York:Holt,1997.
② 刘建飞.美国与反共主义：论美国对社会主义国家的意识形态外交[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001：99.
③ Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M]. New York:Holt,1997:378.
④ Gregory F. Domber.The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc.The Polish Review,vol. LII, 2007,(3):277.
⑤ Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:378.
⑥ [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：72.
⑦ James M. Shevis. The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):31-32.
① James M. Shevis. The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):32
② Peter Schweizer.Victory:The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union[M]. New York:Atlantic Monthly Press,1994:75.
③ Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:237.
④ [美]彼得·施魏策尔里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：88-89.
⑤ Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M],New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:238.
① Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:378.
② Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:11.
③ Gregory F. Domber. The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc[J]. The Polish Review Vol.LIl,2007,(3):296.
② Idesbald Goddeeris. Solidarnosc,the Western World,and the End of the Cold War[J],European Review,2008,16 (1):60.
① James M. Shevis.The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):32
② Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:237.
③ 1987年和1988年,美国国会决定直接拨款给团结工会,瓦文萨先后两次在表达了“对国会决定提供资金的感激”的同时,又明确表示他们将把这些钱用作“团结工会的社会基金”,言下之意团结工会接受了西方的钱,但表面上又要表示和西方政府之间没有政治联系。对此决定,瓦文萨在给柯克兰德的私人通信中是这样解释的：他们一直宣称接受来自兄弟工会和对波兰工会为了生存权力而斗争表示支持的社会机构的援助,如果接受了来自美国政府的补助金,就与团结工会的基本原则发生冲突,即团结工会运动是独立的。他还表示,他们不想被人指控“团结工会是外国利益的代言人”。所以,他向柯克兰德请求,所有来自美国财政部的捐款都能通过劳联-产联这个渠道。详见Gregory F. Domber. The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc[J]. The Polish Review vol.LII,2007,(3):300-303.
④ Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:237.
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① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[D]. The George Washington University,2007:201.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[D]. The George Washington University,2007:201.
③ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-45.pdf
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② George R. Urban. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy[M]. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press,1997:123-125.
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① Michael Nelson. War of the Black Heavens[M]. Syracuse,N.Y.:Syracuse University Press,1997:158.
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① Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].The George Washington University,2007:199-200.
② 注：此处用词借用白建才先生的表述。见白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：346.
③ Gregory F.Domber ed. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.the Nation Security Archive (OL). http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].The George Washington University,2007:200.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland,1981-1989[PH.D].The George Washington University,2007:330.
② 白建才.“第三种选择”:冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：342.
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④胡莹.1980年代初波兰危机与与苏联的对策[J].学术论坛,2005(1).
① 徐鹏堂.波兰统—工人党丧失执政地位的原因及教训(上)——访中国原驻波兰大使刘彦顺[J].中共党史研究,2006,(2);徐鹏堂.波兰统—工人党丧失执政地位的原因及教训(下)——访中国原驻波兰大使刘彦顺[J].中共党史研究,2006,(3);刘彦顺.波兰统—工人党是怎样由盛而衰的[J].俄罗斯研究,2002,(1).汪亭友.波兰剧变的主要原因与历史教训[J].科学社会主义.2009,(5);郭洁.东欧剧变的“苏联因素”探析[J].历史教学,2010,(18).
① 关于东欧对苏联的战略意义.参见Lincoln Gordon ed.Eroding empire:Westem relations with Eastern Europe[M]. Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:19-20.又见[美]保罗·肯尼迪.大国的兴衰：1500-2000年的经济变迁与军事冲突[M].梁于华,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1990：406.
② [美]约翰·刘易斯·加迪斯.长和平：冷战史考察[Ml.潘亚玲译.上海：上海人民出版社,2011：206.
③ [美]约翰·刘易斯·加迪斯.长和平：冷战史考察[M].潘亚玲译.上海：上海人民出版社,2011：208.
① John C. Campbell. American Policy toward Communist Eastern Europe:The Choices Ahead[M]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Toronto:Copp Clark,ⅹⅰ.1965:12.
② U. S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States(以下简写为FRUS).1949. Vol.5.1976:43.
③ Walter LaFeber. America, Russia, and the Cold War,1945-1984[M]. New York:Knopf,1985:136.
④ Lincoln Gordon [et al.].Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M].Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:72-73.
⑤ Charles Gati.Come Clear in Hungary[N].Washington Post, June 21,2006.
⑥ [美]梅尔文·莱弗勒.人心之争：美国、苏联与冷战[M].孙闵欣,等译.L海：华东师范大学出版社,2012:100.
⑦ 郭洁.匈牙利事件：美国的政策与反应[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2011：86.
① Donald P. Steury, ed.. On the Front Lines of the Cold War:Documents on the intelligence War in Berlin,1946-1961,Washington,D.C.:Center for the Study of Intelligence.1999:178-180转引自郭洁.匈牙利事件：美国的政策与反应[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2011：88.
② Department of State Bulletin, July 13,1953.
③ Public Papers of the Presidents:Dwight D.Eisenhower, July 1,1953.
④ Lincoln Gordon [et al.]. Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M].Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1987:21.
⑤ H.W. Brands, Jr..Cold Warrior:Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy[M].New York:Columbia University Press,1988:124.
⑥ James B. Conant. My several lives:memoirs of a social inventor (American Biography Series)[M]. New York: Reprint Services Corp,1970:557.
① FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.8,1988:112-114.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.24,1989:20-22.
③ 时殷弘,张振江.1956年波兰事件及美国的有关政策[J].国际论坛,1999.(2)：16.
④ [美]雅各布·比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录[M].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：38.
⑤ 郭洁.东欧剧变与苏联历来的东欧政策是什么关系?[G]//陆南泉,黄宗良,郑异凡等主编.苏联真相：对101个重要问题的思考[M].北京：新华出版社,2010：1323-1324.
⑥ 世界知识出版社编辑.关于波兰目前局势[M].北京：世界知识出版社.1957：10.
① [苏]赫鲁晓夫.最后的遗言—赫鲁晓夫回忆录续集[M]..上海国际问题研究所,上海市政协编译组译.北京：东方出版社,1988：320.
② [波]扬·普塔辛斯基.哥穆尔卡的改革探索[M].于欣,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：47.
③ FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,Washington,1990:181.
④ Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:103.
⑤ [南]韦利科·米丘诺维奇.莫斯科的岁月(1956-1985)[M].达洲,等译.上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1980：90.
① [美]德怀特·D.艾森豪威尔.艾森豪威尔回忆录(第三册)[M].樊迪,静海,等译.北京：东方出版社,2007：255.
② 胡舶.冷战阴影下的匈牙利事件：大国的应策与互动[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2004：180.
③ 黄宏,谷松主编.东欧剧变与执政党建设[M].北京：红旗出版社,1991：68.
④ New York Times. October 25.1956.
⑤ [美]威廉·科尔比.情报生涯三十年——美国中央情报局前局长科尔比回忆录[M].纪晴译.北京：群众出版社社1982：134.
⑥ [美]斯蒂芬·安布罗斯.艾森豪威尔传(下)(1952-1969)[M].徐问铨,等译.北京：中国社会科学出版社,1989：367.
⑦ New York Times.October 25.1956.
⑧ 驻匈公使馆致国务院电,1956年11月1日Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Hungary,195521959.Department of State Decimal Files,764.00/112156转引自郭洁.美国对匈牙十月危机的反应[J].国际政治研究,2009,(4)：164.
① 胡舶.冷战阴影下的匈牙利事件：大国的应策与互动[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2004：199.
② Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:93.
③ 在暴乱期间,自由欧洲电台的广播通过不加评论地重播本地广播的方式来暗示他们将会得到帮助。详见John Ranelagh. The Agency:The Rise and Decline of the CIA[M],New York,1986:308.
④ 巴恩斯致国务卿杜勒斯电,1956年10月24日下午3点。Records of the Department of Statement Relating to Internal Affairs of Hungary,1955-1959[micform],764.00/10-2456转引自郭洁.匈牙利事件：美国的政策与反应[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2011：88.
⑤ Ernest W. Lefever. Ethics and United States Foreign Policy[M].New York:Meridian Books,1958:151.
⑥ John C. Campbell. American Policy toward Communist Eastern Europe:The Choices Ahead[M]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Toronto:Copp Clark,xi,1965:4.
⑦ Charles Gati. Come Clear in Hungary[N].Washington Post, June 21,2006.
⑧ James B. Conant. My several lives:memoirs of a social inventor(American Biography Series)[M]. New York: Reprint Services Corp,1970:358.
⑨ Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:105.
① FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:131-134.
② FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:243-246.
③ FRUS,1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:216-221.
④ FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:483.
⑤ FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,part.1,Section 2 of 19,No.6.
⑥ FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,part.1,Section 2 of 19,No.2. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v 10p1/d2(注：本文关十NSC5811/1文件的内容均来自这—网址。)
⑦ 1-9段
① 国家安全委员会出台的对南斯拉夫、波兰、东德的政策分别见文件:NSC5805/1、NSC5808/1、NSC5803.
② [美]肯尼迪著,阿兰·内文斯编.和平战略—肯尼迪言论集[M].北京编译社译.北京：世界知识出版社,1961：363.
③ [美]梅尔文·莱弗勒.人心之争：美国、苏联与冷战[M].孙闵欣,等译.上海：华东师范大学出版社,2012：128.关于措辞外交,参见Chris Tudda. The truth is our weapon:the rhetorical diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles[M].Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press,2006.
① 郭洁.匈牙利事件：美国的政策与反应[M].上海：上海人民出版社.2011：135.
② Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:105.
③ 更全面的论述,参见Lincoln Gordon ed.Eroding Empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M]. Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:78.
④ [美]肯尼迪著,阿兰·内文斯编.和平战略—肯尼迪言论集[M].北京编译社译.世界知识出版社,1961：136.
⑤ [美]肯尼迪著,阿兰·内文斯编.和平战略—肯尼迪言论集[M].北京编译社译.世界知识出版社,1961：363.
⑥ Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Griffith.Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe[J].Foreign Affairs,1961,39(4): 642-654.
① Patrick G. Vaughan. Beyond benign neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review,1999,64(1):3-28:4.
② Department of State Bulletin,May 30,1966:846.
③ FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.17,1998:112.
④ William E. Griffith,ed.Central and Eastern Europe:The Opening Curtain[M].Westview Press, Boulder,San Francisco,&London.1989:81.
① 钟成摘译.美国对东欧政策的演变及今后的建议[J].俄罗斯研究,1990,(4)：60-62.
② Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:116.
③ [美]亨利·基辛格.白宫岁月：基辛格回忆录全集[M].陈瑶华.等译.北京：世界知识出版社,2003：196
④ 钟成摘译.美国对东欧政策的演变及今后的建议[J].俄罗斯研究,1990,(4)：60-62.61.
⑤ Patrick G. Vaughan.Beyond benign neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review,1999,64(1):5.
⑥ Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:125.
⑦ 1976年10月7 日是总统竞选第二场电视辩论。在为白宫签署《赫尔辛基协议》以及与苏联携手缓和冷战的政策辩护时,福特一时情急,脱口而出：东欧不在苏联控制之下,在福特政府执政期间也不会在苏联控制之下。显然,福特犯了一个愚蠢的错误,对大选结果产生了极大的影响。
⑧ 1976年3月.国务院顾问赫尔姆特·索南费尔特(Helms Sonnenfeldt)在1975年12月美国驻欧洲使节会议上的讲话被泄露,内容主要是关于美国对东欧政策。他提出：目前东欧同苏联之间存在着不自然的关系,这种人为的、不自然的关系对世界和平的危险远比东西方冲突来得大。美国对东欧的政策应当“为促使东欧人与苏联人之间的关系演变成为一种有机的关系而努力”。这个讲话比较模糊,被广泛地传为是美国承认和支持苏联在东欧的霸权,被西方报刊称为“索南费尔特主义”。这个主义被来自伊利诺伊州的国会共和党人代表爱德华·德温斯基(Adward Derwinski)称为“压垮骆驼脊背的那根稻草”。
⑨ Mischief in Moscow's Frontyard. Time,June 12,1978:36.转引自 Patrick G Vaughan. Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J].The polish Review.1999,44(1):6.
① Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:126又见孙幼舵.卡特选择波兰作为发展东欧关系的重点—布热津斯基回忆录摘介[J].国际展望,1 984,(5)：24-25.
② 钟成摘译.美国对东欧政策的演变及今后的建议[J].俄罗斯研究,1990,(4)：61.
③ 一份于1996年解密,署期为1958年5月21日的美国国务院备忘录文件在论及阿尔巴尼亚、保加利亚、捷克斯洛伐克、匈牙利和罗马尼亚这几个“苏联统治下的国家”时,明确指出当时美国对东欧共产党国家的政策如同“光谱”,这些政策分为三类,明显各不相同。文件做出如下说明：(1)在光谱的一端,是美国对南斯拉夫和波兰的政策。美国通过财政援助和其他方式,鼓励这两个国家不同程度独立于苏联统治。(2) 在光谱的另一端,是美国对东德的政策。美国不承认东德是一个单独的国家,并同其没有关系,美国认为在东德有近35万苏军的情况下,东德是在苏联的军事统治之下。因此,国家安全委员会政策设计委员会认为没有必要修订对东德的政策。(3)在这两端之间,就是美国对其它苏联卫星国的政策。美国方面认为这些国家虽不及波兰的程度,但存在机会并可以通过进一步发展,向着独立于苏联的统治而演变。详见孙山亦.“光谱”的呈现：20世纪50年代美国对东欧国家的政策差别[J].暨南学报(哲社版),2011,(1)：118-125.
① Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:1.
② Nathaniel Mckitterick. East-West Trade:The Background of U. S Policy[M].New York,1966:36.
③ FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.17,1998:92.
④ FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.17,1998:67.
⑤ [美]雅各布·比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录fM].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981:161.
⑥ William E. Griffith, ed.Central and Eastern Europe:The Opening Curtain[M].Westview Press, Boulder,San Francisco,&London,1989:358.
① Bennett Kovrig.Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M]. New York:New York University Press,1991:126.
② [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1998：111.
① 刘同舜编.“冷战”、“遏制”和大西洋联盟——1945-1950年美国战略决策资料选编[M]._L海：复旦大学出版社,1993：224.
② [美]托尼·朱特.战后欧洲史[M].林骧华,唐敏,等译.北京：新星出版社,.2010：109.
③ Authur R. Rachwald. In Search of Poland:The Superpowers' Response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:25.
④ FRUS,1949,Vol.5,1976:502.
① FRUS,1948,Vol.4,1973:512.
② [美]丹·考德威尔.论美苏关系[M].何立译.北京：世界知识出版社,1984：28.
③ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland [M].Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:335.
④ FRUS,1947,Vol.4,1972:459.
⑤ 杨友孙.波兰社会主义剧变中的美国因素fD].博士论文.外交学院,2004：24.
① [美]雅各布比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录[M].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：38.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:133-138.
③ 黄宏,谷松主编.东欧剧变与执政党建设[Ml.北京：红旗出版社,1991：68.
④ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland [M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:367.
⑤ Document No.4. National Security Council Report NSC 5608/1, U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe.July 18.1956. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc4.pdf
⑥ 刘邦义.哥穆尔卡评传[M].北京：中共中央党校出版社,1995：101.
⑦ Department of State Bulletin1956年11月12日
⑧ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland [M].Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:346.
⑨ Bennett Kovrig. The myth of Liberation:East-Central Europe in U.S. diplomacy and politics since 1941[M]. Baltimore and London:the Johns Hopkins University Press,1973:178.
① Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland[M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:358.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:182-183.
③ NSC5616, U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary,October 31,1956. (http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/08-17.html)
① FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:463-466.
② FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25,1990:622-630.
③ NSC5616, U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary, October 31,1956:111. (http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarcrhiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/08-17.htm)
① FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,1994:117-120.
② NSC5616, U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary, October 31,1956. (http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB14/08-17.htm)
③ FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.10,1994:232-236.
① FRUS,1947,Vol.4,1972:435.
② [美]雅各布比姆.出使苏联东欧回忆录[M].潘益世,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：71.
③ 黄宏,谷松主编.东欧剧变‘与执政党建设[M].北京：红旗出版社,1991：52.
④ 此次会谈内容包括：PL480 (Public Law480,又称农业贸易发展与援助法)协议、波兰最惠国待遇问题、美国的援助‘与贷款、波兰加入国际经济组织问题。
⑤ FRUS.1955-1957.Vol.25.1990:590.
⑥ FRUS.1955-1957.Vol.25,1990:582.
⑦ Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland[M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge.1980:365.
⑧ 催丕.美国的遏制战略与巴黎统筹委员会、中国委员会论纲[J].东北师大学报：哲学社会科学版.2000,(2)：53.
⑨ FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.25.1990:112-113.
⑩ 崔丕.美国的遏制战略与巴黎统筹委员会、中国委员会论纲[J].东北师大学报：哲学社会科学版,2000,(2)：53.
① Piotr S. Wandycz. The United Stated and Poland[M]. Massachusetts and London:Harvard University Press Cambridge,1980:382.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：136.
① Bennett Kovrig.The myth of Liberation:East-Central Europe in U.S. diplomacy and politics since 1941 [M]. Baltimore and London:the Johns Hopkins University Press,1973:248.
① Patrick G. Vaughan.Beyond benign neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review,1999,64,(1):7.
① 金雁.从“东欧”到“新欧洲”[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2011：226.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：158.
① 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日).北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002：529.
② George Will.The Workers Who Dare to Unite.Newsweek,September I,1980.另外,早在1977年,纽约时报就发表了一篇文章,标题是“许多波兰人说骚乱比经济学更深入”。Flora Lewis.Many Poles Say the Unrest is Far Deeper than Economics. New York Times. January 26,1977.
① 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷)：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月1 5日)附件“格但斯克罢工工人提出并由厂际罢工委员会转交的要求".2002：537-538.
② 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日1.2002：528.
③ 王义祥.波兰的反对派是怎样形成气候的[J].俄罗斯研究,1999,(2)：11.
④ [波]沃伊切赫·盖乌任斯基,莱赫·斯泰凡斯基.波兰团结工会成立记[M].吴一,陈成译.外语教学与研究出版社,1982：125.
⑤ [波]沃伊切赫·盖乌任斯基,莱赫·斯泰凡斯基.波兰团结工会成立记[M].吴一,陈成译.外语教学与研究出版社,1982：121.
① 协议全文见Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.From solidarity to martial law:the polish crisis of 1980-1981:a documentary history [M].Document No.7:The Gdansk Agreement,August 31,1980,Budapest: Central European University Press,2007:70-80.(注：下文出现该注释均简称a documentary history[M])
② 王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机[M].成都：四川人民出版社,1988：312.
③ [英]本·福凯斯.东欧共产主义的兴衰[M].张金鉴译.北京：中央编译出版社,1998：233.
④ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶关于波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日).2002：534.
① [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：4-5.
② [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：30.
③ 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：56.
① Document No.78:Solidarity NCC Presidium, Position Taken by the Presidium of the National Coordinating Commission and Leaders of the NSZZ. December 3,1981.a documentary history[M].2007:417-419.
① Document No.80:Protocol No.18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:425.
② Document No.80:Protocol No.18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:442.
③ Document No.80:Protocol No.18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:443.
④ [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：57.
⑤ Document No.84:Notes of Polish Ministry of Internal Affair and Ministry of Defense Meeting on Implementation of Martial Law, January 15,1982. a documentary history [M].2007:xlvi又见p.460.关于详细的行动计划,包括环形Ⅲ、杜鹃花行动、冷杉行动、枫树行动,见p.459.
⑥ [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：79.
⑦ 注：文件原文如此。
⑧ Document No.95:Notes of Polish Ministry of Internal Affair and Ministry of Defense Meeting on Implementation of Martial Law, January 15,1982. a documentary history[M].2007:515.
① 郭增麟.波兰独立之路[M].北京：北京图书馆出版社,1998：210.
② 王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机[Ml.成都：四川人民出版社,1988：309.
③ 法新社记者1981年12月10日电,埃利·马库思.波兰对莫斯科的切身的地理战略价值.转引自参考消息,1981年12月26口.
① Andrew A. Michta.Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:150.
② Mark Kramer.Poland 1980-1981:Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project,Issue 5,1995:119.
① 1997年华沙会议上,苏斯洛火委员会前秘书在11月8日接受采访时向克雷默提供这一信息。见作者脚注4Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J].Cold War Interna-tional History Project.Special Working Paper No.1:10.
② a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅰ.又见 Document No.2, Extract from Protocol No.210 of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,August 25,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:50又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No.01547：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年8月25日).2002：348.
③ Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne. The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimensions, a document-ary history [M].2007:10.
① The New York Times, November 16,1980.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis [J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5(Spring 1995):119.
③ 注：这是发表官方权威性评论时使用的专用名字。
④ Thomas M. Cynkin. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis[M]. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillam Press,1988:48,51.关于苏联媒体在波兰危机中的作用：参见Sidney L. Ploss. Moscow and the Polish Crisis[M]. Western Press,1986;Douglas J.MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981 [M]. University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:33;Jerry F. Hough.The polish Crisis:American Policy Options, A Staff Paper[M], The Brookings Institution,1982:28-32,41-44.
① Vladimir Wozoniuk.Understanding Soviet Foerign Policy, Readings and Documents[M].McgrawHill Publishing Company,1990:218.
② Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, September 10,1981. a documentary history [M].2007：348-349.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷)：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年9月10日),2002：623,625.
③刘祖熙.刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M1.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：167.
④ Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimensions. a document-ary history[M].2007:9.
⑤[俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫.人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：246.
⑥ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 16,1981,.a documentary history[M].2007：265.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06046：苏共中央关于勃列日涅夫与卡尼亚电话交谈情况的会议记录(1981年4月16日).2002：605.
① 从1980年g9月到1981年10月,卡尼亚单独与勃列日涅夫通话次数大约有20-25次。见Paczkowski, Andrzej. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989:A View from Inside.//InThe Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation, edited by Olav Njolstad. New York:Frank Cass,2004:399. Note 8.
② Document No.39,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2,1981.a documentary history[M].2007:240.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06044：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月2日).2002：574.
③ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：220.
④ Document No.39,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2,1981.a documentary history[M].2007:239.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06044：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月2日).2002：587-588.
⑤ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 16,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：265.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06046：苏共中央关于勃列日涅夫与卡尼亚电话 交谈情况的会议记录(1981年4月16日).2002：604.
① Document No.53, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting on Brezhnev Kania Conversation,June 18,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:307-309.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06048：苏共中央关于勃列日涅夫与卡尼亚谈话情况的会议记录(1981年6月18日).2002：613-616.
② Document No.61, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, Septemberl8,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：348-350.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06049：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年9月10日).2002：623-624.
③ Document No.16, Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, October 31,1980. a documentary history[M].2007：130.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06143：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月31日).2002：550.
① Andrew A. Michta.Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:150.
② Document No.9:CPSU CC Politburo Report on Topics for Discussion with the Polish Leadership.September 3,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:86又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No.01549：苏共中央政治局关于同波兰领导人谈话的提纲(1980年9月3日).2002：353.
③ Document No.9:CPSU CC Politburo Report on Topics for Discussion with the Polish Leadership.September 3,1980.a documentary history[M].2007:83-86又见沈志华沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第3 1卷),No.01549：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年9月3日).2002：349-353.
④ 卡尼亚(1980年9月6日—1981年1O月18日任第一书记)、平科夫斯基(1980年8月24日一1981年2月11日任部长会议主席)和雅鲁泽尔斯基(1968年任国防部长、1981年2月11日任部长会议主席、10月18日任第一书记)。
① [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年一盖莱克答记者问[M].十欣,鲁海.萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：220.
② 王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机[M].成都：四川人民出版社,1988：313.
③ Document No.15:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting. October 29,1980,.a documentary history[M].2007:123-128.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06041：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(]980年10月29日),2002：539-545.
① Document No.18:Letter from Erich Honecker to Leonid Brezhnev.November 26,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:134-135关于东欧国家领导人在波兰危机中的反应.详见New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (CWIHP11)(winter 1998):3-133其中,保加利亚领导人(p.96-101)、捷克斯洛伐克领导人(p.60-76),匈牙利领导人(p.77-89)。
② Document No.22:Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow. December 5,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:141-161.
③ Document No.22:Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow. December 5,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:141.
④ 注：目前集中公布的苏联历史档案解密材料中还没有这次会议的正式记录。解密的美国国家每日情报中有间接引证：Poland. National Intelligence Daily, February 27,1981; Situation Report:Poland. National Intelligence Daily, March 4,1981.
① [俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫.人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：249.
② Mark Kramer.Poland.1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):119.
③ 徐鹏堂.波兰统一工人党丧失执政地位的原因及教训(上-访中国原驻波兰大使刘彦顺[J].中共党史研究,2006,(2)：89.
④ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, September 10,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：348-349.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06049：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年9月10日).2002：623,625.
① Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:lnternal and International Dimension. a documentary history[M].2007:9.
② Thomas M. Cynkin. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis [M]. Basingstoke, Hampshire:Macmil-lam Press,1988:128.
① Document No.50:CPSU CC Letter to the PUWP CC. June 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:294-298.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):119.
③ Thomas M. Cynkin. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis[M].Basingstoke. Hampshire: Macmillam Press,1988:142.
① Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59.March 2009:10-11.
② 刘彦顺.身兼三职的雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].百年潮,2004,(8)：55.
③ Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59. March 2009:10-11.
④ Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):120.
① a documentary history [M],2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅱ.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project. Issue 5(Spring 1995):121.
③ Document No.15:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting. October 29,1980. a documentary history[M].2007：124.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编《第33卷),No.06041：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月29日).2002：539-545.
④[俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：244.另注：关于此次军演的目的一直存在争议。有人认为演习的目的是为了向波兰政府施加压力,促使他们动用自己的军队进行镇压。1997年举行的华沙会议上库利科夫和格里布科夫承认,1980年末军事演习中部分军队的调动和三个月后的行动都是受莫斯科命令,是出于政治原因。Raymond L. GarthotT. The Conference on Poland,1980-1982:Internal Crisis, International Dimension[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10 (1998 March):231.也有人认为,军演不排除苏联利用华约的军队来支持波兰政府镇压团结工会的可能行。
⑤ Document No.61,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, January 22,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：184.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No 06042：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年1月22日).2002：574.
① Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension. a documentary history[M].2007:27-28.
② 夏义善主编.苏联外交六十五年纪事：勃列日涅夫时期(1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1987：800.
③ [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：68.
④ 郭增麟.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：175-176.
① Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During The Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J]. Special Working Paper No.1. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Tanslator's Note 3.p37
② Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:lnternal and International Dimensions.a document-ary history[M].2007:14.
③ Document No.14:Transcript of Bulgarian(BCP CC)Politburo Meeting, October 25,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:124-125又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06041：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月29日).2002：539-545.
④ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981 [M]. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:34.
⑤ Document No.16,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,October 31,1980.a documentary history[M].2007:129.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06143：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年10月31日).2002：550.
① Document No.39,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 2,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:241,243.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No.06044：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月2日).2002：589,592.
② Document No.43,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,April 9,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:259.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No,06045：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月9日).2002：595.
③ Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59. March 2009:13-14,11.
① Document No.38,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26.1981.a documentary history[M].2007:235.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年3月26 日).2002：584-585.
② [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：71.
③ Document No.38,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26.1981. a documentary history[M].2007:234.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于报告与波兰代表会谈结果的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：585.
④ Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1:17.
⑤ Document No.38,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26,1981.a documentary history[M]. 2007:235. 或者Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Document No.10, Cold War International History Project. Special Working Paper No.1:89-91.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于报告与波兰代表会谈结果的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：585.
⑥ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷).No01554：关于苏联援助波兰贷的款备查材料(1981年12月).2002：385-386.
⑦ Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project. Special Working Paper No.1.p.17.
① Document No.16,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, October 31,1980, a documentary history [M].2007：130.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷)：苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录(1980年10月31日).2002：551.
② Document No.15,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting.October 29,1980. a documentary history[M].2007：127.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06041：苏共中央政治局关于准备同波兰党政代表团会谈的会议记录(1980年1O月29日).2002：544.
③ Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:19.
④ [俄]罗伊·麦德维杰夫.人们所不知道的安德罗波夫[M].徐葵,张达楠,何香译.北京：新华出版社,2001：246.
⑤ Document No.55, Information on Andrei Gromyko's Talk with the PUWP Leadership, July 3-5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:313.
① Document No.56, Report to HSWP CC Politburo with Verbatim Transcript of July 21 Telephone Conversation between Kania and Brezhnev, July 22,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:317.
② Document No.58, Record of Brezhnev-Honecker Meeting in the Crimea, August 3,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:331.
③ Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1.p.18.又见本文脚注 Translator's note 269, pp.157-158.又见 Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M].Stanford,Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:19.
④ Document No.81,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：446-453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06051：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：633-637.
① Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimensions, a document-ary history[M].2007:27.
② 关于苏联与波兰的经济关系更详细的论述.参见Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1:17-22.
③ Zbigniew Brzezinski. White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:3-48,34又见[美]布热津斯基.实力与原则：1977-1981年国家安全顾问回忆录1977-1981[M].邱应觉.等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1 985：528.
① Poland's prospects over the next six month:The economic cost to the USSR of intervening in Poland.
② Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:168.
③ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：249.
④ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：248.
① Document No.22, Minutes of Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow, December 5,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:141-161.
② Document No.81,Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10.1981. a documentary history[M].2007：446-453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06051：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：633-1637.
① 郭春生.勃列日涅夫18年[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：281.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：526.
③ [俄]A.利亚霍夫斯基.阿富汗战争的悲剧[M].刘宪平译.北京：社会科学文献出版社.2004：164：夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1987：716.
④ 郭春生.勃列日涅夫18年[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：281.
⑤ 夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社.1987：719.
⑥ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：486.
① 郭春生.勃列日涅夫18年[M].北京：人民出版社,2009：283.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].,邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531.
③ [美]吉米·卡特.忠于信仰——一位美国总统的回忆录[M].卢君甫,等译.北京：新华出版社,1985：680-681.
④ a documentary history[M].2007:xxxiv.
⑤ 注释：由于推行新东方政策,西德改善了与苏东共产主义政府的关系,谋求经济利益。因此对波兰的团结工会运动的反应非常平淡,甚至对它破坏了稳定表示不满。10月末,在美英法德召开的四国会议上,西德代表通知美国,缓和不能成为苏联入侵波兰的牺牲品。暗示即使苏联军队入侵波兰,波恩与莫斯科之间的政治和经济联系也将会继续下去。布热津斯基把西德的这一立场称为“德国日益上升的芬兰化的最好证据”。详见Zbigniew Brzezinski,White House Diary, Obris, a journal of world affairs, Vol.32, Winter 1988:34.
⑥ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：528.
⑦ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:168.
⑧ 注释：1993年东德宣布文献公开,柏林自由大学(Free University)的研究小组首席教授曼弗雷德·威尔克(Manfred Wilke)提出了自己的看法,为什么莫斯科拒绝入侵：对阿富汗的战争已经发起了一年前,伊朗危机创造了对苏联的南部侧翼新的关注,加上美国的果断表现,这就是苏联为何不采取这一步骤的关键原因。见Stephen Kinzer. Honnecker Sought Drive into Poland. New York Times, January 12,1993.
① [波]亚当·沙夫.处在十字路口的共产主义运动：波兰的教训[M].1981年德文版。转引自：王逸舟,苏绍智.波兰危机fM].成都：四川人民出版社,1988：6.
② Andrew A. Michta. Red Eagle[M]. Hoover Institution Press,1990:150.
③ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06134：瓦赫拉麦耶夫关十波兰局势给国内的报告(1980年9月15日).2002：530.
① 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：12.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：153.
③ 见表一Chien-Wen Kou.The Variety in the Behaviors of Communism Armies during Political Crises:China, Romania, Poland, and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s[PH.D]. the University of Texas at Austin,May,1999:187.
① Andrew A.Michta.Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:149.
② a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅳ.
① Document No.5:CPSU CC Politburo Commission Order to Enhance Readiness of Military Units for Possible Use in Poland. August 28,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:64-65另见Mark Cramer.In Case Military Assistance is Provided to Poland. Soviet Preparations for Military Contingencies, August 1980[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11:102-109.
② Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981, Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,(Spring 1995):1,116-126.
③ Mark Kramer. The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59. March 2009:8.
④ Document No.54,CIA National Intelligence Daily.USSR-Poland:Polish Military Attitudes,June 20,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:310.
⑤ [波]雅努什·罗利茨.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣,鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：48.
① 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：153.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：163.
③ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社2001：153.
④ 数字来自Mark Kramer.The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.59.March 2009:20.
⑤ [美]理查德·尼克松.尼克松回忆录(中)[M].裘克安,等译.北京：商务印书馆,1979：26.
① [美]理查德·尼克松.1999：不战而胜[M].王观声,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1989：31.
② [苏]赫鲁晓夫.赫鲁晓夫回忆录[M].张岱云,等译.北京：东方出版社,1988：281.
③ 茹莹.论70年代以来“经济武器”在美国对苏外交中的运用[J].世界历史,1995,(6)：7.
① 夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社.1987：724.
② 夏义善编.苏联外交六十五年纪事(勃列日涅夫时期1964-1982)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1987：718.
③ a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅳ.
④ Andrew A. Michta.Red Eagle[M]. Hoover Institution Press,1990:159.
⑤ Zbigniew Brzezinski. White House Diary.Obris, a journal of world affairs,Vol.32,Winter 1988,3-48,40.
⑥ Mattheww. J. Ouimet.The Rise And Fall of The Brezhnev Doctrine In Soviet Foreign Policy[M].The University Of North Carolina Press,2003:168.
⑦ Document No.81 Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,December 10,1981. a documentary history [M].2007：446-453,450,453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06051：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：637,640.
① 吴永强.波兰军管前后[J].世界知识.1982,(2)：8.
② 波兰外债多数是中长期贷款,还债期从1979年进入高峰,大部集中在1981-1984年。波外债的五分之三以上是从西方的500多家私人银行借的,利息一般都在10%以上,有的高达18-20%。1975年还本付息15亿美元,占当年外汇收入的26%；1977年偿付31亿美元,占当年外汇收入的45%；1979年还63亿美元,占当年外汇收入的75%；1980年还84亿美元,占当年外汇收入83%；1981年还96亿美元,占当年外汇收入的130%。见：波兰利用外资的情况和教训[J].宏观经济研究,1982,(20)：30.
① 李琼.苏联-阿富汗-美国：1979-1989年三国四方在阿富汗地区的一场博弈[PH.D].华东师范大学,2008：155.
② Document No.38:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, March 26,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:235.或者Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project,Special Working Paper No.1.p.89-91.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06043：苏共中央政治局关于报告与波兰代表会谈结果的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：584.
③ 沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06052：苏共中央政治局关于同奇莱克会谈总结的会议记录(1981年3月26日).2002：645.
④ Robin Edmonds. Soviet Foreign policy-The Brezhnev Years[M].Oxford University Press,1983:202.
⑤ [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年-盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣.鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：113.
⑥ Charles Gati, Soviet Empire:Alive but Not Well//Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World[M],New York:1986:614-615.; Patrick G. Vaughan:Beyond benign neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980[J].The Polish Review.1999,64(1):3-28,20.
① 在苏联解体前,雅鲁泽尔斯基坚决否认苏联曾经有在1981年入侵波兰的意图：甚至迟至1991年夏天,在一次采访中,他对这件事也是采取回避态度。自1991年底以来,雅鲁泽尔斯基开始在公共场合抛出“更小的罪恶”的辩解,并且成为此后关于这个问题的所有评论的基本主题,包括他的两部回忆录：为什么戒严(华沙：1992)和链条与避难所(巴黎,1992)。毫无疑问,在苏联解体之前他的谨慎还是归因于他长期对苏联意愿的顺从。见Mark Kramer.Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland:New Light on the Mystery of December 1981[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(1998):5-14,11.
② 注释：文献原文如此。Document No.89:Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to Secretary of State. "General Wojciech Jaruzelski". December 16,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:478.
③ Document No.89:Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to Secretary of State."General Wojciech Jaruzelski".December 16,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:478-479.
① 徐鹏堂.波兰统一工人党丧失执政地位的原因及教训(上)—访中国原驻波兰大使刘彦顺[J].中共党史研究,2006,(2)：90.
② 见波兰《论坛报》,1990年12月13日,转引自郭增麟.波兰：从军管到交权——政治转轨中的雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].2001,(2)：48-54,51.
③ a documentary history[M].2007:xlvi.
① Chien-Wen Kou.The Variety in the Behaviors of Communism Armies during Political Crises:China, Romania, Poland, and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s[PH.D].the University of Texas at Austin,May,1999:187-188. (3)刘祖熙：军事管制防止了大规模的内战和外国军队的入侵,给社会带来了安定,使生产得以恢复。见：刘祖熙.刘邦义著.波兰战后的三次危机.北京：世界知识出版社[M],1992：173.
① 1995年,雅鲁泽尔斯基第一次被起诉。2001年,华沙地方法院法庭又就此事举行听证调查。雅鲁泽尔斯基坚持辩解,在当时的形势下,如果小采取戒严行动,苏联就可能派兵干预,波兰就会陷入全面的混乱,期间还有1100多名证人和2400多份书面证词。2007年,卡托维兹国家纪念研究所向华沙一家地方法院起诉。这是第三次了。参见孔寒冰.为什么要审判雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].世界知识,2007,(10)：42-43.又见Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan.On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981:Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of Poland[J].Cold War International History Project Working Paper 21,Washington:Woodrow Wilson Center,1997:33-39.
② Mark Kramer.aruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland:New Light on the Mystery of December 1981[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(1998):5-14.
① 关于这个电话的主题双方发生了争议。苏联官员后来说,雅鲁泽尔斯基请求一旦行动失败,苏联给予援助。雅鲁泽尔斯基坚持他是要确信莫斯科是把这个行动看作一件波兰的内部事务。见Wojciech Jaruzelski.Commentary[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (1998):32-39,35.又见Mark Kramer. Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland:New Light on the Mystery of December 1981[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(1998):5-14. documentary history[M].2007:xlv.
① Document NO.72:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting on Rusakov's Trip to Eastern Europe,October 29,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:395-399,397.
② "Even if Poland were to be ruled by solidarity,so be it."见 Vojtech Mastny.The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-81 and the End of the Cold War[J].Europe-Asia Studies 51,No.2 (1999):189-211.或 Cold War Interna-tional History Project,Working Paper No.23.1998:204.
① Document No.81:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10,1981. a documentary history[M].2007：446-453.又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No 01552：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年12月10日).2002：372.(第33卷),No 06051,2002：632.
② Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1译者的注解,第288条。又见Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project, Issue No.5(Spring 1995):122.
③ Francis J.Meehan. Reflections on the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (winter 1998):43-47,44.
④ Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1译者的注解,第282条。
⑤ Document No.41:EAST German Report of Discussion with Marshal Viktor Kulikov, April 7,1981. a document-ary history[M].2007:246-254.又见 Mark Kramer. Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981 [J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1译者的注解,第284条.
⑥在征得阿诺什金的同意后,克莱默复印了这个笔记薄中的部分内容,随后翻译并做了注解。见Mark Kramer.The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(Winter 1998):17-31.
① "You know what you said to me then. How could you let them do this to me—in front of the Americans!"见 Malcolm Byrne. New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1981 [J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(Winter 1998):4.
② Wojciech Jaruzelski. Commentary[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998):32-39.
① Bennett Kovrig. Of walls and bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:117.
② [美]亨利·基辛格.白宫岁月(第一册)[M].陈瑶华,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1980：196.
③ Bennett Kovrig. Of walls and bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:118.
① 关于欧洲安全与合作会议最后成果所产生的广泛影响,意大利校际马基雅维利冷战研究中心(The Italian inter-university Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies(CIMA))与冷战国际史项目CWIHP于2006年4月27-29日在意大利城市Artimino合作召开了学术研讨会,主题为"From Helsinki to Gorbachev,1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation".关于此次会议的概述,刊登在Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16:Duccio Basosi, Matteo Gerlini, and Angela Romano:From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985:The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation, Villa Medicea "La Ferdinanda" (Artimino, Italy) 27-29 April 2006:528-535.
② 戈登·克雷格、亚历山大·乔治.武力与治国方略—我们时代的外交问题[M].时殷弘,周桂银,石斌译.北京：商务印书馆,2004：247.
① 布热津斯基回忆录摘介,卡特选择波兰作为发展东欧关系的重点[J].国际展望,1984,(5)：24.
② Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension, a documentary history[M].2007:.9.
③ 布热津斯基回忆录摘介,卡特选择波兰作为发展东欧关系的重点[J].国际展望,1984,(5)：25.
④ 关于欧安会与美国的人权外交,参看Bennett Kovrig. Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe [M].New York:New York University Press,1991第四章.
⑤ Bennett Kovrig.Of Walls and Bridges:The United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:126.
⑥ Bennett Kovrig.Of Walls and Bridges:the United States and Eastern Europe[M].New York:New York University Press,1991:126.
⑦ Brian Trenor.The 1976 Presidential Campaign and "The Ultimate Polish Joke"[J].NC State University, Madison Historical Review,Vol.8,May 2011:34.
① Andrzej Korbonski. "Poland," Communism in Eastern Europe, edited by Teresa Rakowski-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, Bloomington, Indiana,1979:67参见Patrick G. Vaughan, Beyond Benign Neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J].The polish Review,1999,44(1):3-28,12注释34.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：526.
③ 警示备忘录(Alert Memo)是中情局根据收集到的情报就事态发展的紧急状态向高层决策者发出警告,在总统收到之后第二天出现在《过家每日情报》中。关于波兰危机的《国家每日情报》的部分文章国内研究者可以通过DNSA和DDRS数据库检索到。
① Patrick G. Vaughan. Beyond Benign Neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J].The polish Review, 1999,44(1):3-28,14.
② 美国国务院的反应与总统是不一致的,它寻求低调以避免挑衅苏联的反应。8月18日,国务院代理发言人David Passage强调：“它是波兰人民和政府去解决的事”,“我们相信任何来自美国更深入的评论对波兰局势的演进没有帮助”。这一观点可参见Graham Hovey. U.S. Wary in Comments on Strikes. New York Times, August 19,1980; David Binder. No Urgency Over Polish Crisis Apparent in Washington. New York Times, August 23,1980; Washington's Policy is to Live and Let Live-Please.New York Times, The Week in Review, August 24,1980.
③ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531.
④ Patrick G. Vaughan. Beyond Benign Neglect:Zbigniew Brzezinski and the polish crisis[J]. The polish Review,1999,44(1)：3-28,16.布热津斯基认为,这一战略在苏联入侵阿富汗后一直是缺失的。
⑤ Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee,Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland", with Attach-ment, September 23,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:87-90.
⑥ 据时任中情局执行秘书的罗伯特·盖茨回忆,同一天(8月27日),吉斯卡尔·德斯坦给盖莱克写了一封信,表示“希望波兰能够找到与民族愿望相协调的解决问题的办法”。盖茨说很难确定这个呼吁是否或者在多大程度上对波兰领导人产生了任何影响。参见Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:10.
⑦ Document No.8,President Carter's Letter to Allies on Poland. September 1,1980. a documentary history [M].2007：81-82.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531Carter Urges Allies to Assist Poles,New York Times,3 September 1980,A1.
① [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：527.
② Chronology of Events.a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅰ.
③ 这个委员会主要由总统的多数关于国际事务的高级顾问组成。
④ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:163.
⑤ Lincoln Gordon ed. Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M]. Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:119.
① Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M]. New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:163.有见 Chronology of Events.a documentary history [M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅱ.
② Document No.10, Special Coordination Committee, Summary of Conclusions," Meeting on Poland," with Attachment.September 23,1980.a documentary history[M].2007:89.关于此次会议,还可参见Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:164.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘等译.北京：世界知识出版社1985:465.Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:28.
③ Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee, Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland," with Attachment.September 23,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:87-88.又见 Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981 [M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:12-13.
④ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:164.
① Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee,Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland." with Attachment.September 23,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:88.
② Document No.10,Special Coordination Committee,Summary of Conclusions, "Meeting on Poland," with Attachment.September 23,1980. a documentary history[M].2007:88-89.
③ Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary.Obris, ajournal of world affairs, Winter 1988:33.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[Ml.邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社.1985：465.
④ Andrew A. Michta. Red Eagle[M].Hoover Institution Press,1990:159.
① 布热津斯基的《白宫口记》详细记录了从12月1日至10日政府高层每天的反应及决策过程。
② 库克林斯基(Kuklinski)上校(1930-2004),1930年出生于波兰首都华沙,17岁参加人民军,陆军军官学校毕业后,在反空降兵部队工作,后调入总参谋部工作。1956年至1968年期间,是当时总参谋长雅鲁泽尔斯基将军的心腹,参与了1968年华约对捷克斯洛伐克入侵的筹备工作,后被派往越南,在印度支那国际停战委员会工作。在这期间,他开始为美国中央情报局服务。1975年被派往莫斯科军事学院学习,回国后被热宁为总参谋部战略防御计划处处长,不久晋升为波兰军队总参谋部作战司副司长。波兰危机期间,他是苏联元帅库利科夫和波兰首脑雅鲁泽尔斯基将军之间的联络官,1981年参与起草了波兰实行军管的有关文件。同年11月在中情局俄罗斯及东欧处主任戴维·福登安排下成功出逃美国。在长达11年时间里,他为中情局提供了1200万字的绝密情报。在波兰危机期间,他是美国获取情报的得天独厚的人力资源。目前西方学术界最权威的评论库克林斯基的生活及其经历的著作是Benjamin Weiser. A Secret Life[M].New York:Public Affairs,2004国内的成果是2001年群众出版社出版的郭增麟编著的《情报发自华沙》,以上对库克林斯基的简要介绍即参照此书。
③ 在整个危机期间,布热津斯基首先寻求的目标是避免以前政府所犯的错误,对苏联入侵提供有力的阻遏作用,因此他鼓励总统采用公共政策以对苏联形成压力。对于苏联是否会干涉,他是存在怀疑的。在回忆录里,他把苏联干涉可能引起的后果分析得很全面：葬送欧洲政治上的缓和；破坏东西方经济合作；促使北约组织增加预算：西欧各国共产党同苏联之间的关系出现紧张状况：不结盟运动进一步脱离苏联；苏联集团其他地方出现骚乱：美-中之间公开地进行军事合作。见[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基著,邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘等译.实力与原则.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：528.
④据帕克洛夫斯基称,除了西方这几个领导人之外,卡特还给中国和印度领导人发了信件,通知波兰局势。Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne.The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension.a documentary history[M].2007:16.不过,在布热津斯基的《白宫日记》里没有提到这一情节。
⑤ Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs,Winter,1988:35.
① DDRS,CK3100048657. Zbigniew Brzezinski. White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter1988.32：36-37.注：在布热津斯基的《白宫日记》里,这封信的末尾还有这么一句：“我们准备发表的声明是这个观点的公开表达”。这是与DDRS解密文件稍有不同的地方。
② Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J].Obris,a journal of world affairs,Winter 1988,32:37在《白宫日记》中布热津斯基对信件准备的过程,与国务卿马斯基、中情局长特纳、国防部长布朗讨论(是发表公开声明还是私下通知苏联,讨论结果是先给勃列日涅夫发一个快讯,通知他美国将发表声明)以及公开声明发布过程有详细的记录。
③ Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J].Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:38.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社.1985：466.
① Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J].Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:39-41.由此说明美国政府决策者的审慎。
② 发出去的这封总统密电原文附在特别委员会会议记录后面。见Document No.23,Minutes of U.S. Special Coordination Committee Meeting, December 7,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:164.
③ Document No.23,Minutes of U.S. Special Coordination Committee Meeting, December 7,1980. a documentary history [M].2007:162-163. Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary.Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988,32:41. Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:167-168.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：529.
① Zbigniew Brzezinski.White House Diary[J]. Obris, a journal of world affairs, Winter 1988.32:44.[美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘.等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：530.
① [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：526.
② 这一信息由当时在华盛顿的较有影响的波兰中央委员会成员和波兰统一工人党机关刊物《政治》的主编米克茨斯洛夫·拉科夫斯基转达给华沙。参见Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, The Polish Crisis:Internal and International Dimension,.a documentary history[M].2007:9.
③ Arthur R. Rachwald. In Search of Poland:the Superpowers' Response to Solidarity,1980-1989 [M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:49.
④ 因为美国的对外援助法不允许直接向共产主义国家提供援助,农业贷款是当卡特在寻求以向波兰提供实际的援助来改善他的政治地位的时候能够利用的为数不多的几个项目之一。卡特把这一姿态叫做“我们对整个波兰民族—工人、政府和教会—在这个演进和变革的困难时期所表现出来的尊严的敬意的一种表达”。参见Steven R. Weisman. Carter Lauds Entire Polish Nation and Grants $670 Million For Grain. New York Times, September 13,1980.
⑤ Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:48.
⑥ New York Times, August 28,1980.转引自 Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989 [M].Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:48.另外,卡特通过电视镜头宣布这一决定无疑是考虑到了波裔美国人投票者。说明在大选年里美国政府的波兰政策客观上是受到影响的。
① 参见Arthur R. Rachwald.In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity.1980-1989 [M].Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:48.
② Lincoln Gordon [et al.].Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe[M].Washington. D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:121.
③ 有分析家称,如果卡特政府的任期还没有结束,如果美国的经济更加繁荣一些,国务卿马斯基和布热津斯基一起努力有可能赢得总统的支持,使该计划在国会得以通过,尤其是与西欧联合起来提供援助。当然,他们也承认,不管在华盛顿还是华沙,困难都不能低估。Lincoln Gordon [et al.].Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe [M].Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:122.
④ Reagan Castigating the "Betrayal" of Workers' Aspirations. Washington Post, September 2,1980.
① Arthur R. Rachwald. In Search of Poland:the Superpowers'Response to Solidarity,1980-1989 [M].Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:49.
② 当国会有分析称波兰已经陷入严重的经济困境,对波兰的经济援助存在更高的风险时,布热津斯基大为光火,仍然极力推动政府劝说私人银行向波兰提供贷款。
③ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：531.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company,New York,1984:241.
⑤ [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：527.
⑥ Chronology of Events, a documentary history[M].2007:ⅹⅹⅹⅰ.
⑦ Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:164; Chronology of Events, a documentary history [M]. 2007:xxxii.
① 当时美国的通货膨胀率为13%,利率为20%,失业率7.5%。参见Donald T. Regan.(唐·里甘,里根政府财政部长)For the Record:From Wall Street to Washington[M].NY:St. Martin Press,1988:170.
② 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社.2003：1033.
③ 美国国务院.美国外交政策现行文件(1984).华盛顿GPO1986：27.转引自刘金质著.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1032.
④ [英]理查德·克罗卡特.50年战争[M].王振西主译.北京：新华出版社,2003：438.
⑤ Donald T. Regan.For the Record:From Wall Street to Washington[M].NY:St. Martin Press,1988:329.
⑥ Raymond L. Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:the Brookings Institution,1994:7.
① Washington Post,October 27,1981.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[Ml.《里根自传》翻译组译北京：东方出版社：1991：234.
③ Washington Post. February 16,1980.转引自刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1113.
④ Raymond L. Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:the Brookings Institution,1994:8.
⑤ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1113.
⑥ [美]梅尔文·莱弗勒.人心之争：美国、苏联与冷战[M].孙闵欣,等译.上海：华东师范大学出版社,2012：418.
⑦ Ronald Reagan.National Security Strategy of the United States[M]. Virginia:Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.,1988:77.
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根回忆录[M].萨本望,李庆功,等译.北京：中国工人出版社,1991：291.又见[美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,1991：264.
② Ronald Reagan.An American Life.NY:Simon and Schuter,1990:301.
③ [美]罗纳德·里根.里根回忆录[M].,萨本望,李庆功,等译.北京：中国工人出版社,1991：291.又见[美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,1991：264.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan.and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company, New York,1984:240.
⑤ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company, New York,1984:241.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].Macmilian Publishing Company, New York,1984:241.
② 1月28日,黑格的信公布,在媒体中引起了小小的轰动。第二天,多勃雷宁公布了葛罗米柯的反应,“重申”了12月5日华约莫斯科会议发布的联合公报,2月11日,莫斯科公布了葛罗米柯回复的正文。CIA135.
③ Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:227. 又见 Peter Schweizer.Victory:The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union[M],New York:Atlantic Monthly Press,1994:6.
④ 指实施军事管制的时间表。
⑤ Document No.31:National Intelligence Estimate(NIE12.6-81). Poland's Prospects over the Next Six Months,January 27,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:193-211.
⑥ 横向结构运动或称地平线运动,是统一工人党政治凝聚力下降、思想涣散的形势下基层党组织进行的跨地区、跨行业、跨部门的横向串联活动,主张扩大党内民主,对党的现行制度进行改革。
① Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:229.
② 郭增麟.情报发自华沙[M].北北京：群众出版社,2001：169.
① Public Papers of the President of the United States(1981),"Statement by the Press Secretary on the Situation in Poland, March 26,1981". http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html; Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:33.
② Document No.40:CIA Alert Memorandum "Poland".April 3,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:245.
③ 关于这次会议的规模,说法不一。也有说13个省,14个省。来自19个省的600名代表。张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：64.
① New York Times,Thursday 16,1981:11-13.
② 关于这两次会议的记录,详见a documentary history[M], Document No.44:Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, April 16,1981.2007:265-266又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第33卷),No06046：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月16日)2002:603.a documentary history[M]. Document No.45:Extract from Protocol No.7 from CPSU CC Politburo Meeting,April 23,1981.2007:267-272又见沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编(第31卷),No01550：苏共中央关于波兰局势的会议记录(1981年4月23日).2002：354.
③ Document No.50:CPSU CC Letter to the PUWP CC,June 5,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:294-298.
④ 《纽约时报》在9日以醒目的标题“我们不会置波兰于不顾,苏联警告说”报道了此封信件。New York Times,June 9,1981:Al.
⑤ New York Times,June 12,1981:A3.
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,1991：266.
② 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1193.
③ Document No.63:CPSU CC Communication to the PUWP CC,"Intensifying Anti-Soviet Feelings in Poland," September 14,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:357-359.
④ 关于波兰军队的态度在波兰局势中的作用一直是中情局重视的一个方面。6月20日,一份解密的国家每日情报就分析了苏联与波兰关系中的波兰军队的态度。Document No.54:CIA National Intelligence Daily,"USSR-Poland:Polish Military Attitudes",June 20,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:310-311.
① 出现这样的出入,麦凯琴分析称,可能是由于大使馆没有看到库克林斯基提供的这份最新情报。
② Document No.65:Message from Ryszard Kuklinski to CIA,September 15,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:363-364.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:240.
① New York Times, Thursday],1981.
② Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:245.
③ Document No.75:Memorandum from Alexander Haig to President Reagan, "U.S. Assistance Program for Poland",December 1,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:409.
④ Document No.75:Memorandum from Alexander Haig to President Reagan, "U.S. Assistance Program for Poland",December 1,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:410.
① 关于危机期间里根政府的政策,参见Mark Kramer.The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis.1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J].Cold War International History Project. Special Working Paper No.59.March 2009:36.
② 黑格在回忆录毕提到这一情节时说：“我们和我们的盟国强烈要求波兰成为IMF的成员国,这样可以促进和临督经济改革,但是波兰从他们自己的利益出发需要申请成员资格。可以理解的是,没有苏联的同意,他们不能选择这样做。这个不能立即实现”。见Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:246.
③ 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：204,203.
④ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1192.
⑤ Mark Kramer. Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 11, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Spring1995:55.
① 原来,CIA在收到库克林斯基的军管计划的复印件后,美国政府就将此事通知了教皇约翰·保罗二世,希望用他的影响阻挠已经计划好的行动,克格勃在梵蒂冈的一个情报员将这个消息透露了出去。Mark Kramer.The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981:An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski[J].Cold War International History Project,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,Working Paper59, March 2009:1.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：28.
③ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：32.
④ 苏共中央政治局关于波兰局势的会议记录,沈志华主编.苏联历史档案选编,第31卷,NoO1552.2002：375.第33卷,No06051.2002：635.另见：Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1.April 1999:162.又:a documentary history[M], 2007:448.
⑤ 参见译者注释第280条,Mark Kramer.Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis,1980-1981[J]. Cold War International History Project, Special Working Paper No.1:162.
① Raymond L. Garthoff. The Conference on Poland,1980-1982:Internal Crisis,International Dimensions[J]. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10 (1998 March):229-232.
② Rosenberg Tina.The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M]. New York:Random House, 1995:208.更多关于美国政府官员的解释,参见Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:213-214以及注释3、4.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York,Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:247.
④ Rosenberg Tina.The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M].New York:Random House, 1995:210.
⑤ Francis J. Meehan. Reflections on the Polish Crisis, New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11,winter 1998:46.
⑥ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：148.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北北京：群众出版社,2001：55,146.
③ 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[M].北京：群众出版社,2001：147.
① Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M]. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:215.另见:Drew Middleton.Soviet Action inside Poland Being Studied.Military Analysis.New York Times.December.21,1981:A19.
② Douglas J. MacEachin.U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981 [M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:234.
③ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland.1980-1981[M]. University Park. PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:220.
④ Douglas J. MacEachin.U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park. PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:233-234.
① Douglas J. MacEachin.U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:214-215.
② Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:229.
③ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:230.
① Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park,PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:215-216.
② Rosenberg Tina. The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M].New York:Random House,1995:206.
③ Eric Chenoweth and Jerzy B. Warman.Solidarity Abandoned--Why Reagan Didn't Help[J].The New Republic,Vol.195, No.2 and 3 (July 14 and 21.1986):20.
④ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:212.
① Francis J. Meehan. Reflections on the Polish Crisis, New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11(CWIHP11) (winter 1998):46.
② Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:212-213.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:41.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:247
⑤ Douglas J. MacEachin. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland,1980-1981[M].University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2002:213.
⑥ New York Times, November 15,1956.
⑦ Rosenberg Tina. The Haunted Land:Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism[M].New York:Random House,1995:210.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:240.
② 郭增麟编著.情报发自华沙[Ml.北京：群众出版社,2001：148.
③ Mark Kramer. Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project,Issue 5,Spring 1995:118.
④ Mark Kramer. Poland.1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J].Cold War International History Project. Issue 5,Spring 1995:118.
① 刘彦顺.身兼三职的雅鲁泽尔斯基[J].百年潮,2004,(8)：53-59,56.
② Mark Kramer.Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,Spring 1995:119.
③ Mark Kramer.Poland,1980-1981 Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis[J]. Cold War International History Project, Issue 5,Spring 1995:121.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism,Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company, 1984:239.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York, Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:239.
② Thomas M. Cynkin.Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis[M].Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillam Press,1988:147.
③ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:242.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan,and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:242.
② [美]兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基.实力与原则[M].邱应觉,梅仁毅,王家湘,等译.北京：世界知识出版社,1985：528.
① [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2001：20.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan.and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Compa-ny,1984:248.
② Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland,1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:42.
③ Peter Schweizer, ed. Reagan's War:the Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Commu-nism [M]. New York:Doubleday,2002:165-166. Raymond Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M].Washington D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:80.
④ New York Times,Dec.22.1981:A1.
① Doc.No.88:CIA National Intelligence Daily, "Poland:Test of Government's Measures", Decem-ber 14,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:476-477.
② 注：现在看到的这份解密文献,有的地方删除一个字,有的地方删除半行,有的地方删除半段或者一整段。
③ Ronald Reagan.An American Life[M].New York:Simon and Schuter,1990:270.
④ Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:248.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:249.
② Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:249.
③ Washington Post, Dec.14,1981:A 1.
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:47.
⑤ Doc.No.87:Speech by Pope Ⅱ Concerning Martial Law. December 13,1981. a documentary history [M].2007: 475.
⑥ Doc.No.90:Appeal from Pope John Paul Ⅱ to Wojciech Jaruzelski, December 18,1981. a documentary history [M].2007:480-481.
① Andrzej Paczkowski, trans.by Jane Cave.The Spring will be Ours:Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom[M]. University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press,2003:451.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University.2008:50.
② The President's New Conference.PPPUS. December 17,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
③ Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:51.
① Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M].New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:251-252.
① Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland. PPPUS, December 23,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：171.
① Malcolm Byrne.New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1981[J].Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11,Winter 1998:3-14.
② Doc.No.91:Protocol No.16 of PUWP CC Secretariat Meeting, December 19,1981. a documentary history[M]. 2007:482-495:483.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy. and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:83.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:53.
③ The President's New Conference.PPPUS. December 17,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:53-54.
① Peter Schweizer, ed. Reagan's War:the Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism[M]. New York:Doubleday,2002:166.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：265.
③ Peter Schweizer, ed. Reagan's War:the Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism[M]. New York:Doubleday,2002:165.
④ Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland. PPPUS, December 23,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：266.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：266-267.
③ Doc.No.92:Hotline Communication from Leonid Brezhenev to Ronald Reagan Regarding Martial Law in Poland, December 25,1981. a documentary history[M].2007:496-498.
① Richard Pipes.Vixi:Memoirs of a Non-Belonger[M].New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press,2004:173.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：267.
③ [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：268.
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:62.
⑤ Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland.December 29,1981. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
⑥ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1172.
① 关于美国与西欧国家在波兰危机上的分歧,参见Helene Sjursen. The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis:International Relations in the Second Cold War[M], NewYork:Palgrave Macmillan,2003.
② Alexander M. Haig. Caveat:Realism. Reagan, and Foreign Policy[M]. New York:Macmilian Publishing Company,1984:249.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].George Washington University,2008:66-67.
① Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:63.
② 天然气管道交易是70年代能源危机之后,西欧国家为解决能源恐慌而采取的一项与苏联之间进行能源合作的项目。根据双方之间达成的意向,西欧在两三年内向苏联提供总额约11O亿美元的贷款,苏联用这些贷款从西欧订购用于铺设从西伯利亚的乌连戈伊天然气田到捷克边境的天然气管道。管道建成后,苏联从1984年起,在25年内每年向法国、联邦德国和意大利等国输送共计1.37万亿立方英尺的天然气,以此来偿还贷款。据估计,通过这笔交易,苏联每年会有80-100亿美元的进账。这笔交易是东西方之间达成的最大一笔交易,因而被国际舆论称为“世纪性交易”。见资中筠主编.战后美国外交史：从杜鲁门到里根[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：930-933：931.另外,关于美欧在天然气管道问题上的分歧以及苏联的抗议更系统的分析可参见：刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1174-1185.
③ 资中筠主编.战后美国外交史：从杜鲁门到里根[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：931.
④ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1177.
⑤ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1180.
① [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：268.
② [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2001：4.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland,1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:94.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:95.
① Raymond Garthoff.The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:45.
② [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].北京：东方出版社,2001：257-258.
③ 里根在新墨西哥州的讲话,路透社1982年3月2日报道。转引自资中筠主编.战后美国外交史——从杜鲁门到里根(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：865.
④ 资中筠主编.战后美国外交史——从杜鲁门到里根(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：863.
⑤ [美]罗纳德·里根.里根自传：一个美国人的生活[M].《里根自传》翻译组译.北京：东方出版社,2001：278.
① http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:141.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:142.
② 关于这一人事任免中的细节,参见Ronald Reagan. An American Life[M]. NY:Simon and Schuter,1990: 254-256.271.360-362.
③ 资中筠主编.战后美国外交史——从杜鲁门到里根(下)fM].北京：世界知识出版社,1994：876.
④ George Shultz. Toil and Triumph[M]. New York:Charles Schribner's Sons,1993:137.
⑤ George Shultz. Toil and Triumph[M]. New York:Charles Schribner's Sons,1993:138.
⑥ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-54.pdf
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:157.
① Radio Address to the Nation on Solidarity and United States Relations With Poland.October 9,1982. PPPUS. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
② Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers'response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:54.
① Remarks on Signing the Human Rights and Day of Prayer for Poland Proclamations,December 10,1982. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html
② Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:174.
③ Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:75.
④ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf
① Arthur R. Rachwald. In search of Poland:the superpowers' response to Solidarity,1980-1989[M]. Stanford, Calif.:Hoover Institution Press,1990:84.
① 由于苏联出口石油换取外汇收入是其经济体制的一个支柱,石油价格的骤降对这个国家后来的崩溃产生了重要的影响。不少西方学者从这个角度分析导致苏联解体的原因。参见[西]拉斐.风云突变的时代：一个西班牙记者眼中的俄罗斯[M].傅石球译.上海：复旦大学出版社,2006；[俄]E.T.盖达尔.帝国的消亡——当代俄罗斯的教训[M].王尊贤译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2008.
② 邢广程.苏联高层决策70年——从列宁到戈尔巴乔夫(第五分册)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1998：17.
③ 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M],北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1346.
① [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤.良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：90.
② 沈志华.苏联历史档案选编.No06052：苏共中央政治局关于同奇莱克会谈总结的会议记录,1982年1月4日.2002：647.
③ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版 社,1992：84.
① [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].,郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：84.
② 沈志华.苏联历史档案选编.No06053.苏共中央政治局关于与雅鲁泽尔斯基谈话总结的会议,1984年4月26日.2002：653-657.
③ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：85.
④ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：88.
⑤ [俄]米·谢·戈尔巴乔夫.“真相”与自由：戈尔巴乔夫回忆录[M],述弢,等译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002：243.
① [苏]阿·切尔尼亚耶夫.在戈尔巴乔夫身边六年[M].徐葵,等译.北京：世界知识出版社.2001：41.
② [苏]米·谢·戈尔巴乔夫.改革与新思维[M].苏群译.北京：新华出版社,1987：153.
③ [俄]戈尔巴乔夫.[日]池出大作.世纪的精神教训[M].孙立川译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004：373.
④ [波]雅鲁泽尔斯基.雅鲁泽尔斯基选集1981-1987[M].郭增麟,等译.北京：人民出版社,1988：96.
① Andrzej Paczkowski. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989//Olay Njolstad,ed. The Last Decade of the Cold War[M].London:Frank Cass,2004:388.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:280.
③ Andrzej Paczkowski. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989//Olay Njolstad,ed.The Last Decade of the Cold War[M].London:Frank Cass,2004:389.
① Andrzej Paczkowski. Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989//Olay Njolstad,ed.The Last Decade of the Cold War[M].London:Frank Cass,2004:389.
② Gregory F. Domber, Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:284.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:299.
① 这里有一个小插曲：当怀特海德走下飞机后,欢迎他的波兰副外交部长吉纳斯告诉他,瓦文萨不能到华沙来见他,因为他已经用完了他在格但斯克船厂电工的所有假日。怀特海德对阻止他与瓦文萨会见很惊讶,沮丧。在最后关头他决定赌一把,他说,如果瓦文萨不能来见他,他就飞到格但斯克,不与雅鲁泽尔斯基见面。在宾馆房间里,波兰政府改变了态度,告诉他吉纳斯一直被误解了。按照计划好的日程,瓦文萨会来到华沙。
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:314.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:315-316.
① Statement on the Lifting of Economic Sanctions Against Poland.February 19,1987.PPPUS. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech srch.html
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:358-359.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:379.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:386.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].Washington University,2008:388.
① Charles Gati.The Bloc that Failed:Soviet-East European Politics in Transformation[M].Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1990:166-167.
② 西方将此新方针称为“辛纳屈主义”(Sinatra Doctrine)又译西纳特拉主义或仙纳杜拉主义,该说法取自美国歌手法兰克·辛纳屈20世纪60年代一首脍炙人口的名为"My Way"(《我行我素》或《走我自己的路》)的歌曲,意指苏联允许每个东欧国家走自己的路。参见郭洁.东欧剧变与苏联历来的东欧政策是什么关系//陆南泉,黄宗良,郑异凡,马龙闪,左凤荣主编.苏联真相：对101个重要问题的思考(下)[M].北京：新华出版社,2010：1331.
③ 刘金质著.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1390.
③ [加]夏尔-菲利普·大卫.白宫的秘密[M].李旦,王健,徐翊,等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1998：353.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声.陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：13. 刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：4.
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M]·胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：11.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：47.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈 刚.朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社.2000：43.
① James A. Baker. Thomas M. DeFrank.The Politics of Diplomacy:Revolution, War, and Peace,1989-1992[M]. New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,1995:68.
② Oberdorfer Don.From the Cold War to a New Era:the United States and the Soviet Union,1983-1991 [M]. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1998:333.
③ James A. Baker, Thomas M. DeFrank.The Politics of Diplomacy:Revolution, War, and Peace,1989-1992[M].. New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,1995:68.
④ [加]夏尔-菲利普·大卫.白宫的秘密[M].李旦,王健,徐翊,等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1998：356.
⑤ James A. Baker, Thomas M. DeFrank.The Politics of Diplomacy:Revolution,War,and Peace,1989-1992 [M]. New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,1995:69.
① 在后里根时代,巨额的联邦赤字使得预算紧缩,进行经济援助对布什政府而言难度很大。
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：43.
③ 赖斯的报告最终发展成第23号国家安全指令：《美国与苏联的关系》(NSD23),1989年9月22日布什总统批准通过。National Security Directive 23:United States Relations with the Soviet Union.September 22,1989. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),U.S.,NSC Policy Papers,RG273.
④ Beschloss Michael and Strobe Talbott. At the Highest Levels:The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War[M].Boston:Little, Brown,1993:34.
① Beschloss Michael and Strobe Talbott. At the Highest Levels:The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War[M]. Boston:Little. Brown,1993:49.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
③ Christopher Alan. Maynard. From the Shadow of Reagan:George Bush and the End of the Cold War[PH.D]. Louisiana State University,2001:72.
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：182-183.
③ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：183.
④ 这份文件的内容尚未解密,在布什总统图书馆网站上可以看到已经解密的题目和日期。Bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/paper.html.
① 刘金质.冷战史(下)[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2003：1391.
② 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：225.
③ [苏]米·谢·戈尔巴乔夫.改革与新思维[M].苏群译.北京：新华出版社,1987：105.
④ 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：225.
⑤ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：41.这一认识顽固地影响着华盛顿决策者。里根、布什及其多数高级官员对80年代东欧局势的演变所持的谨慎态度,都是出自这一顾虑。由此不难看出,“解放”战略的后遗症是多么深刻地影响着美国的外交政策,这种记忆反复地强化着美国决策者关于美国对东欧影响力有限性的认识。这是促使美国三任政府在 80年代波兰危机以及波兰剧变中保持谨慎反应的一个重要影响因素。
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：52.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D]. the George Washington University,2007:392.
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：41.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：52.
① 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：113.
② 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：184.
③ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：185.
④ Doc.3. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate.Election'89:Solidarity's Victory Raises Questions. June 6,1989.详见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：186.
② Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.10(OL). http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
③ 一份1989年6月16日从华沙发回国务院的电报,“政治局成员警告在雅鲁泽尔斯基竞选问题上美国已经被拖进一场战争”。参见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy(OL).注释12.http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
④ 约翰·戴维斯,1983-1987年任波兰临时代办,1987-1988年任波兰代办,1988-1990年任波兰大使。
① Doc.3. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, Election'89:Solidarity's Victory Raises Questions. June 6,1989.详见Gregory F. Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② Doc.4. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, How to Elect Jaruzelski Without Voting for Him, and Will He Run? June 23,1989.详见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.. the Nation Security Archive.(OL) http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① Gregory F. Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：280.
③ Elections in Poland, Department of state Bulletin,89.2149 (1989):78. General OneFile. Web.12 Jan.2013. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA7938865&v=2.1&u=s8492775&it=r&p=GPS&sw=w
① Gregory F.Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL) http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：102.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：102.
④ [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社·1992：319.
⑤ 根据会议期间其他在场的人回忆,布什总统可能夸大了雅鲁泽尔斯基敞开心扉的程度,这次谈话对雅鲁泽尔斯基的思想产生的影响就成了一个怎么解释的事情了。1999年11月23日作者乔治·多姆博对戴维斯的采访。Gregory F.Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S.Embassy.13. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
⑥ Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.14. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：107
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：108.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：105.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：104.
① 在537张有效选票中,获得赞成票270张(反对票233张,弃权票34张),以仅比法定半数多1票的优势当选为波兰总统。
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[Ml.胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：123.
③ 孔寒冰.东欧史[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2010：450.
④ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：117-118.
⑤ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：186.
① 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：187-188.
② [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：322.
① Doc.6. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate,Conversation With General Kiszczak. August 11,1989详见Gregory F. Domber ed. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：124.
③ Doc.7. Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, Solidarity-Government Dialogue. August 12,1989.详见Gregory F. Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① Doc.8. Cable from Moscow to Secstate, If Solidarity Takes Charge, What Will the Soviets Do? August 16,1989.详见Gregory F. Domber ed..Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive.(OL)http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
① [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：125.
② Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:600.
③ 拉科夫斯基说,这次会话时间很长,持续40分钟。戈尔巴乔夫说苏联共产党密切注视着波兰人民共和国形势的发展,表示“我们同你们在一起”。在谈到农民党、民主党同意参加团结工会组阁的政府时,戈尔巴乔夫对他说,你们应该建立新党,老的党不会再有所作为。拉科夫斯基说,我们根本没有谈要达成妥协的问题,这很容易理解。谈话是在22日在总统和政府问题上作出妥协之后进行的。苏联大使馆始终按着脉搏,很清楚正在发生的事,它肯定不会把对这些问题的了解仅仅据为己有。但是我从他那里听到的是我们应该要求反对派忠于“圆桌会议”达成的协议,同我们一样,他认为我们应该坚持谅解路线。他宣布,苏联共产党将不改变它对波兰、对波兰统一工人党的政策。但是如果反对派开始攻击波党、攻击制度所取得的成就,那么苏联就要改变它对波兰的政策——‘‘请你们把这点告诉反对派”。按照拉科夫斯基的解释,这次交谈的内容被说成是戈尔巴乔夫向波党施加压力,迫其交权纯粹是西方一些报纸(《卫报》《华盛顿邮报》《洛杉矶时报》)的记者故意歪曲事实、胡编乱造。[波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基著,郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：325-327.
① 从80年代后半期,这两个党开始越来越强调自己的思想特性,试图确立自己在波兰政治中的地位,摆脱卫星党身份。统一工人党迟迟没有意识到这一问题的严重性,为瓦文萨私下策划分裂执政联盟提供了机会 。
② Doc.9. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, Bronislam Geremek Explains Next Steps Toward a Solidarity Gover-ment. August 19,1989.详见Gregory F.Domber ed.. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy. the Nation Security Archive. (OL)http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSA EBB/NSAEBB42/
③ 刘祖熙,刘邦义.波兰战后的三次危机[M].北京：世界知识出版社,1992：188.
④ Richard Nixon. American Foreign Policy:The Bush Agenda [J].Foreign Affairs.1989,68(1):199-219.
⑤ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：50.
① Jack F.Matlock, Jr. Autopsy on an Empire:The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union[M].New York:Random House,1995:177.Anatoly Chernyaev, trans.by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucher. My Six Year with Gorbachev[M].State College,P.A.:Penn State Press,2000:201.
② [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：51.
③ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：52.
④ 后来布什回忆说：“幸运的是,我们的政府从一开始就赶上了东欧的变革。由于着意于东欧,我们延缓了与苏联在军备控制上的谈判。对于波兰朝气蓬勃的发展,我们立即予以肯定。我们处于有利的地位,因此,当自由主义浪潮在这一地区蔓延时,我们可以促进它并充分地利用它。”详见[美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M].胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：165.
⑤ [美]乔治·布什,布伦特·斯考克罗夫特.重组的世界：1989-1991年世界重大事件的回忆[M1.胡发贵,胡传声,陈刚,朱珊译.南京：江苏人民出版社,2000：40.
① 白建才.“第三种选择,’:冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：347.
① 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：34.
② 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：30.
③ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：31.
④ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：34-35.
⑤ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：57-58.
⑥ 白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：59.
① [南]米利伏耶维奇.波兰在十字路口[M].王洛林,寇滨译.北京：世界知识出版社,1981：9.
② FRUS,1949,Vol.5:1976:502-516.
③ 李振城主编.无硝烟的战争[M].天津：天津社会科学院出版社,1991:141.
① Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:293.
② Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:295.
③ [美]托尼·朱特.战后欧洲史[M].林骧华,唐敏,等译.北京：新星出版社,2010：539.
① [美]托尼·朱特.战后欧洲史[M].林骧华,唐敏.等译.北京：新星出版社.2010：539.
② [波]雅努什·罗利茨基.中断的十年—盖莱克答记者问[M].于欣.鲁海,萍如译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：175.
③ [苏]葛罗米柯.永织不忘(下)[M].伊吾译.北京：世界知识出版社.1989：541.
④ 王和.波兰事件中的天主教会[J].国际共运教研参考,1982.(5)：39.
① 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：194.
② 郭增麟.波兰独立之路[M].北京：北京图书馆出版社,1998：222.
③ Carl Bernstein.The Holy Alliance, Time, February 24,1992:14-35另见[美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：80.于力人编著.中央情报局50年[M].北京：时事出版社,1998：679.
① 注：如无特别注释,以下内容均参考Carl Bernstein.The Holy Alliance,Time, February 24,1992:14-35.
① 张文红.团结工会的兴与衰[M].北京：中国社会出版社,2008：215.
② [波]米·弗·拉科夫斯基.波兰剧变是怎样发生的[M].郭增麟,张庆环,袁倧贤,良全炳译.北京：世界知识出版社,1992：68.
③ [苏]葛罗米柯.永志不忘[M](下).伊吾译.北京：世界知识出版社,1989：55.
④ 郭增麟.波兰独立之路[M].北京：北京图书馆出版社,1998：230.
① 美国关于劳联-产联对团结工会支持的代表性研究成果Gregory F. Domber. The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc[J]. The Polish Review vol. LII,2007,(3):277-304;James M. Shevis.The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):31-35;Arch Puddington. Surviving the Underground:How American Unions Helped Solidarity Win研究劳联-产联主席柯克兰德的专著：Arch Puddington. lane Kirkland: Champion of American Labor[M]. Hoboken, NJ:John Wiley and Sons,2005;Jonathan Kwitney, Man of the Century[M],New York:Holt,1997.
② 刘建飞.美国与反共主义：论美国对社会主义国家的意识形态外交[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001：99.
③ Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M]. New York:Holt,1997:378.
④ Gregory F. Domber.The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc.The Polish Review,vol. LII, 2007,(3):277.
⑤ Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:378.
⑥ [美]彼得·施魏策尔.里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：72.
⑦ James M. Shevis. The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):31-32.
① James M. Shevis. The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):32
② Peter Schweizer.Victory:The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union[M]. New York:Atlantic Monthly Press,1994:75.
③ Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:237.
④ [美]彼得·施魏策尔里根政府是怎样搞垮苏联的[M].殷雄译.北京：新华出版社,2002：88-89.
⑤ Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M],New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:238.
① Jonathan Kwitney. Man of the Century[M].New York:Holt,1997:378.
② Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:11.
③ Gregory F. Domber. The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc[J]. The Polish Review Vol.LIl,2007,(3):296.
② Idesbald Goddeeris. Solidarnosc,the Western World,and the End of the Cold War[J],European Review,2008,16 (1):60.
① James M. Shevis.The AFL-CIO and Poland's Solidarity[J], World Affairs,1981,144(1):32
② Robert M. Gates. From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:237.
③ 1987年和1988年,美国国会决定直接拨款给团结工会,瓦文萨先后两次在表达了“对国会决定提供资金的感激”的同时,又明确表示他们将把这些钱用作“团结工会的社会基金”,言下之意团结工会接受了西方的钱,但表面上又要表示和西方政府之间没有政治联系。对此决定,瓦文萨在给柯克兰德的私人通信中是这样解释的：他们一直宣称接受来自兄弟工会和对波兰工会为了生存权力而斗争表示支持的社会机构的援助,如果接受了来自美国政府的补助金,就与团结工会的基本原则发生冲突,即团结工会运动是独立的。他还表示,他们不想被人指控“团结工会是外国利益的代言人”。所以,他向柯克兰德请求,所有来自美国财政部的捐款都能通过劳联-产联这个渠道。详见Gregory F. Domber. The AFL-CIO, the Reagan Administration and Solidarnosc[J]. The Polish Review vol.LII,2007,(3):300-303.
④ Robert M. Gates.From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War[M].New York:Simon and Schuster,1996:237.
① 孔寒冰.东欧史[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2010：450.
② [美]弗朗西斯·斯托纳·桑德斯.文化冷战与中央情报局[M].曹大鹏译.北京：国际文化出版公司,2002：40.
③ FRUS,1950,Vol.4.1980:276-304.
④ FRUS,1950.Vol.4.1980:311-313.
⑤ 毕波编.美国之音透视[M].山东：青岛出版社,1991：23.
① New York Times,Feburary 2,1982.
② BBC World Broadcasts,Feburaly 2,1982.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[D]. The George Washington University,2007:201.
② Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland. 1981-1989[D]. The George Washington University,2007:201.
③ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-45.pdf
④ Rebort F.Byrnes. US Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union:Selected Essays,1956-1988[M]. Westview Press,1989:78.
① 六种语言为：波兰语、匈牙利语、捷克语、斯洛伐克语、保加利亚语、罗马尼亚语。
② Arch Puddindton. Broadcasting Freedom:the Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty[M]. Lexington:University Press of Kentucky,2000:39-40.
③ George R. Urban. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy[M]. New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press,1997:91.
④ Lincoln Gordon ed.Eroding empire:Western relations with Eastern Europe [M].Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1987:104.
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② George R. Urban. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy[M]. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press,1997:123-125.
① Arch Puddindton.Broadcasting Freedom:the Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty[M]. Lexington:University Press of Kentucky,2000:270.
② George R. Urban. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy[M]. New Haven,Conn.:Yale University Press,1997:124.
③ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D]. The George Washington University,2007:203.
① Michael Nelson. War of the Black Heavens[M]. Syracuse,N.Y.:Syracuse University Press,1997:158.
② Michael Nelson. War of the Black Heavens[M]. Syracuse,N.Y:Syracuse University Press,1997:160.
① Gregory F. Domber.Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].The George Washington University,2007:199-200.
② 注：此处用词借用白建才先生的表述。见白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：346.
③ Gregory F.Domber ed. Solidarity's Coming Victory:Big or Too Big, Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy.the Nation Security Archive (OL). http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/
④ Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989[PH.D].The George Washington University,2007:200.
① Gregory F. Domber. Supporting the Revolution:America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland,1981-1989[PH.D].The George Washington University,2007:330.
② 白建才.“第三种选择”:冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：342.
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② Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:81.
③ Raymond Garthoff. The Great Transition:American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War[M]. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution,1994:32.
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⑥ 关于“美国在波兰的隐蔽行动”,白建才先生在其新著里有颇具启发性的分析。白建才.“第三种选择”：冷战期间美国对外隐蔽行动战略研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2011：332-347.
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[4]美国科学家联合会(FAS)网站：http://www.fas.org/
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[9]卡特总统图书馆网站：http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/
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[11]美国数字化国家安全档案(DNSA)数据库
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