负债公司及高新技术企业经理薪酬契约结构研究
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摘要
薪酬管理是企业人力资源管理的核心内容。经理人作为公司的中、高层管理人员对公司的发展起着举足轻重的作用。因此建立有效的经理激励约束机制已经成为深化企业改革的重要方面。
本文主要思想来源于委托-代理模型,用于解决委托人与代理人由于信息不对称而引发的道德风险问题。
对于负债公司,债务索取与薪酬索取的不同优先权对合理设计经理激励契约有重要的意义。公司债务的出现产生了“契约替换”效应,即经理的契约由于风险债务而产生了变化。本文通过已有的定理及假设条件,分析讨论了当公司存在债务时,与均衡状态下相比,经理的薪酬结构变化。得出主要结论:当经理薪酬优于债务索取被考虑时,绩效薪酬将低于均衡水平下的绩效薪酬,而固定工资则高于均衡水平下的基本工资;当债务索取优于经理薪酬被考虑时,绩效薪酬将高于均衡水平下的绩效薪酬,而固定工资则低于均衡水平下的基本工资。这一结论为公司薪酬管理委员会正确合理地制定负债公司高管人员的薪酬契约可起到了一定的指导作用。
对于高新技术公司,股权激励作为一种有效的长期激励手段,在经理的薪酬契约中占有很大的比重。本文假设公司存在长期项目与中期项目两种不同类型的项目,得出股东在清算时应给予经理在中期项目上的持股激励数量和股票期权数量需要满足的条件;另外还得到了经理在期末为公司在长期项目与中期项目上创造的价值分别关于持股数量和股票期权数量的具体数学表达式,很好地解决了关于中国高成长性企业的经理激励问题。
Compensation management is the key part in human resources management of enterprises. As middle and top administrative staffs, managers play a very important role in the course of enterprise development. Consequently, it has been significant project that constructs the efficient manager’s incentive and constraint mechanism for deepening enterprise’s reform.
The main thought of this article stems from principal-agent model which had been used for solving moral hazard problems because of information asymmetry between principal and agent.
When a corporation is in the case of insolvency, the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a“contract substitution”effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’claims and creditors’claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. Through existing theorems and assumed conditions, this article mainly discusses changes of managerial compensation structure when being insolvent comparing to equilibrium state and obtains conclusions as follows: if managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms. The conclusion has great guiding significance when formulating compensation contract for remuneration committee.
For high-tech enterprises, stock-option incentives occupy very great proportion in the manager's remuneration contracts as an efficient and long-term incentive mean. This article draws the following conclusions being based on assumption that there are two different kinds of items: long-term project and medium-project that when liquidating, conditions need to be fulfilled referring to amounts of stock-hold and stock-option in manager’s remuneration contracts in view of the medium-project and corresponding mathematics expression formulae about corporation’s values which are created due to long-term project and medium-project so that manager’s incentive problem is solved comparatively good for high-tech enterprises.
本文主要思想来源于委托-代理模型,用于解决委托人与代理人由于信息不对称而引发的道德风险问题。
对于负债公司,债务索取与薪酬索取的不同优先权对合理设计经理激励契约有重要的意义。公司债务的出现产生了“契约替换”效应,即经理的契约由于风险债务而产生了变化。本文通过已有的定理及假设条件,分析讨论了当公司存在债务时,与均衡状态下相比,经理的薪酬结构变化。得出主要结论:当经理薪酬优于债务索取被考虑时,绩效薪酬将低于均衡水平下的绩效薪酬,而固定工资则高于均衡水平下的基本工资;当债务索取优于经理薪酬被考虑时,绩效薪酬将高于均衡水平下的绩效薪酬,而固定工资则低于均衡水平下的基本工资。这一结论为公司薪酬管理委员会正确合理地制定负债公司高管人员的薪酬契约可起到了一定的指导作用。
对于高新技术公司,股权激励作为一种有效的长期激励手段,在经理的薪酬契约中占有很大的比重。本文假设公司存在长期项目与中期项目两种不同类型的项目,得出股东在清算时应给予经理在中期项目上的持股激励数量和股票期权数量需要满足的条件;另外还得到了经理在期末为公司在长期项目与中期项目上创造的价值分别关于持股数量和股票期权数量的具体数学表达式,很好地解决了关于中国高成长性企业的经理激励问题。
Compensation management is the key part in human resources management of enterprises. As middle and top administrative staffs, managers play a very important role in the course of enterprise development. Consequently, it has been significant project that constructs the efficient manager’s incentive and constraint mechanism for deepening enterprise’s reform.
The main thought of this article stems from principal-agent model which had been used for solving moral hazard problems because of information asymmetry between principal and agent.
When a corporation is in the case of insolvency, the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a“contract substitution”effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’claims and creditors’claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. Through existing theorems and assumed conditions, this article mainly discusses changes of managerial compensation structure when being insolvent comparing to equilibrium state and obtains conclusions as follows: if managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms. The conclusion has great guiding significance when formulating compensation contract for remuneration committee.
For high-tech enterprises, stock-option incentives occupy very great proportion in the manager's remuneration contracts as an efficient and long-term incentive mean. This article draws the following conclusions being based on assumption that there are two different kinds of items: long-term project and medium-project that when liquidating, conditions need to be fulfilled referring to amounts of stock-hold and stock-option in manager’s remuneration contracts in view of the medium-project and corresponding mathematics expression formulae about corporation’s values which are created due to long-term project and medium-project so that manager’s incentive problem is solved comparatively good for high-tech enterprises.
引文
[1]俞乔.市场有效,周期异常与股价波动[J].经济研究,1994,9:8-15.
[2]陈小悦,陈晓,顾斌.中国股市弱式有效的实证检验[J].会计研究,1997,9:13-17.
[3]胡朝霞.中国股市弱式有效研究[J].投资研究,1998,1:28-34.
[4]吴世农.我国证券市场效率的分析[J].经济研究,1996,4:13-19.
[5]杨兵,苏锦霞,周宁.证券市场的有效性研究[J],兰州大学学报(自然科学版),2002,5: 19-22.
[6]彭作祥,庞皓.资本市场有效性假说与AR-X-GARCH模型的应用[J].西南师范大学学报(自然科学版),2002,3:303-308.
[7]宋逢明.无套利均衡分析[M].北京:清华大学出版社,1999.10,(9): 143-147.
[8]童毅华.经理股权激励机理及其在浙江的实证研究[D].浙江:浙江师范大学,2005.
[9]胡经生.经理股票期权:作为凸性激励的相关问题及其在中国的应用研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2005.
[10]周春生,王汀汀.员工持股计划与股票期权激励制度研究[J].上证研究(上海证券交易所编),2002, 6: 45-8
[11]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996.
[12]熊敏鹏,余顺坤,袁家海。公司薪酬设计与管理[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2006.
[13]杨益,黄锐波。高新科技企业薪酬制度设计[M].广东:广东经济出版社,2003.
[14] Baker, G.P., Wruck, K.H., 1989. Organizational changes and value creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The case of the O.M. Scott & Sons Company. Journal of Financial Economics 25[J], 163–190.
[15] Bebchuk, L.A., 2001. Ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy[J]. Journal of Finance 57, 445–460.
[16] Berkovitch, E., Israel, R., Spiegel, Y., 2000. Managerial compensation and capital structure[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 9, 549–584.
[17] Conyon, M., Murphy, K., 2000. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J]. Economic Journal 110, 640–671.
[18] Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1994. A theory of debt and equity: Diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1027–1054.
[19] Eberhart, A.C., Moore, W.T., Ronfeldt, R.L., 1990. Security pricing and deviations from the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings[J]. The Journal of Finance 45, 1457–1469.
[20] Edmans, A., 2006. Inside Debt. MIT Sloan School of Management, Mimeo. Franks, J.R.,Nyborg, K., 1996. Control rights, debt structure, and the loss of private benefits: The case of the U.K. insolvency code[M]. Review of Financial Studies 9, 1165–1210.
[21] Franks, J.R., Tourous, W.N., 1989. An empirical investigation of U.S. firms in reorganization[J]. The Journal of Finance 44, 747–769.
[22] Franks, J., Torous, W., 2002. A comparison of English and American bankruptcy procedures. In: McCahery, J., Moerland, P., Raaijmakers, T., Renneboog, L. (Eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity[M]. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 457–469.
[23] Franks, J., Mayer, C., Renneboog, L., 2001. Who disciplines the management of poorly performing companies[J]? Journal of Financial Intermediation 10[J], 209–248.
[24] Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[M]. Econometrica 51, 7–45.
[25] Hart, O., Moore, J., 1995. Debt and seniority: An analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management[J]. The American Economic Review 85, 567–585.
[26] Holmstrom, B., 1979. Moral hazard and observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74–91.
[27] Innes, R.D., 1990. Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices[J]. Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45–67.
[28] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.
[29] John, T.A., John, K., 1993. Top-management compensation and capital structure[J]. Journal of Finance 48, 949–975.
[30] Laffont, J.J., Martimort, D., 1999. Theory of Incentives[M]. Princeton University Press.
[31] Leary, M.T., Roberts, M.R., 2005. Do firms rebalance their capital structures[J]? Journal of Finance 60, 2575–2619.
[32] Lutgens, C., 1991. Employee benefit plans in chapter 11 reorganizations[J]. Tax Management Compensation Planning Journal, 27–41.
[33] Murphy, K.J., 1999. Executive compensation. In: Ashenfelter, Orley, Card, David (Eds.)[M]. In: Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3. North Holland.
[34] Myers, S., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 147–175.
[35] Robe, M.A., 1999. Optimal vs. traditional securities under moral hazard[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 34, 161–189.
[36] Rogerson, W.P., 1985. The first-order approach to principal-agent problems[M]. Econometrica 53, 1357–1367.
[37] Smith Jr., C.W., Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263–292.
[38] Weiss, L.A., 1990. Bankruptcy resolution[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 285–314.
[39] Bengt Holmstrom, Jean Tirole. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring [J].Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 101: 678-709.
[40] Smith C., and R.Watts. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividends, and Compensation Policies [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 32: 263-92.
[41] Gaver.J.,and K.Gaver. Additional Evidence on the Association between The investment opportunity set and Corporate financing, Dividend, and Compensation policies[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993:125-60.
[42] Mehran.H. Executive compensation structure, Ownership, and Firm performance [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, 38: 163-184.
[43] Guay Wayne R. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants [J].Journal of Financial Economics, July 1999, Volume 53, Issue1:43-71.
[44] Palia D. The Endogeneity of Managerial Compensation in Firm Valuation: A solution [J].Review of Financial Studies, 2001, 14:735-64.
[45] Rosenberg Matts. Stock option compensation in Finland: an analysis of economic determinants, contracting frequency, and design [Z].Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Helsinki, 2002.Paper presented on the European Financial Management Association 2003 Annual Meeting.
[46] Kanari Uchida. The Determinants of the stock option use by Japanese companies [Z].The university of Kitakyushu, Aug 2003, working paper series NO.4-2003.
[47] Hemmer Thomas, Kim Oliver, Verrecchia Robert E. Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, Dec 2000, Volume 28, Issue 3:307-327.
[2]陈小悦,陈晓,顾斌.中国股市弱式有效的实证检验[J].会计研究,1997,9:13-17.
[3]胡朝霞.中国股市弱式有效研究[J].投资研究,1998,1:28-34.
[4]吴世农.我国证券市场效率的分析[J].经济研究,1996,4:13-19.
[5]杨兵,苏锦霞,周宁.证券市场的有效性研究[J],兰州大学学报(自然科学版),2002,5: 19-22.
[6]彭作祥,庞皓.资本市场有效性假说与AR-X-GARCH模型的应用[J].西南师范大学学报(自然科学版),2002,3:303-308.
[7]宋逢明.无套利均衡分析[M].北京:清华大学出版社,1999.10,(9): 143-147.
[8]童毅华.经理股权激励机理及其在浙江的实证研究[D].浙江:浙江师范大学,2005.
[9]胡经生.经理股票期权:作为凸性激励的相关问题及其在中国的应用研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2005.
[10]周春生,王汀汀.员工持股计划与股票期权激励制度研究[J].上证研究(上海证券交易所编),2002, 6: 45-8
[11]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996.
[12]熊敏鹏,余顺坤,袁家海。公司薪酬设计与管理[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2006.
[13]杨益,黄锐波。高新科技企业薪酬制度设计[M].广东:广东经济出版社,2003.
[14] Baker, G.P., Wruck, K.H., 1989. Organizational changes and value creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The case of the O.M. Scott & Sons Company. Journal of Financial Economics 25[J], 163–190.
[15] Bebchuk, L.A., 2001. Ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy[J]. Journal of Finance 57, 445–460.
[16] Berkovitch, E., Israel, R., Spiegel, Y., 2000. Managerial compensation and capital structure[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 9, 549–584.
[17] Conyon, M., Murphy, K., 2000. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J]. Economic Journal 110, 640–671.
[18] Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1994. A theory of debt and equity: Diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1027–1054.
[19] Eberhart, A.C., Moore, W.T., Ronfeldt, R.L., 1990. Security pricing and deviations from the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings[J]. The Journal of Finance 45, 1457–1469.
[20] Edmans, A., 2006. Inside Debt. MIT Sloan School of Management, Mimeo. Franks, J.R.,Nyborg, K., 1996. Control rights, debt structure, and the loss of private benefits: The case of the U.K. insolvency code[M]. Review of Financial Studies 9, 1165–1210.
[21] Franks, J.R., Tourous, W.N., 1989. An empirical investigation of U.S. firms in reorganization[J]. The Journal of Finance 44, 747–769.
[22] Franks, J., Torous, W., 2002. A comparison of English and American bankruptcy procedures. In: McCahery, J., Moerland, P., Raaijmakers, T., Renneboog, L. (Eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity[M]. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 457–469.
[23] Franks, J., Mayer, C., Renneboog, L., 2001. Who disciplines the management of poorly performing companies[J]? Journal of Financial Intermediation 10[J], 209–248.
[24] Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[M]. Econometrica 51, 7–45.
[25] Hart, O., Moore, J., 1995. Debt and seniority: An analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management[J]. The American Economic Review 85, 567–585.
[26] Holmstrom, B., 1979. Moral hazard and observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74–91.
[27] Innes, R.D., 1990. Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices[J]. Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45–67.
[28] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.
[29] John, T.A., John, K., 1993. Top-management compensation and capital structure[J]. Journal of Finance 48, 949–975.
[30] Laffont, J.J., Martimort, D., 1999. Theory of Incentives[M]. Princeton University Press.
[31] Leary, M.T., Roberts, M.R., 2005. Do firms rebalance their capital structures[J]? Journal of Finance 60, 2575–2619.
[32] Lutgens, C., 1991. Employee benefit plans in chapter 11 reorganizations[J]. Tax Management Compensation Planning Journal, 27–41.
[33] Murphy, K.J., 1999. Executive compensation. In: Ashenfelter, Orley, Card, David (Eds.)[M]. In: Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3. North Holland.
[34] Myers, S., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 147–175.
[35] Robe, M.A., 1999. Optimal vs. traditional securities under moral hazard[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 34, 161–189.
[36] Rogerson, W.P., 1985. The first-order approach to principal-agent problems[M]. Econometrica 53, 1357–1367.
[37] Smith Jr., C.W., Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263–292.
[38] Weiss, L.A., 1990. Bankruptcy resolution[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 285–314.
[39] Bengt Holmstrom, Jean Tirole. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring [J].Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 101: 678-709.
[40] Smith C., and R.Watts. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividends, and Compensation Policies [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 32: 263-92.
[41] Gaver.J.,and K.Gaver. Additional Evidence on the Association between The investment opportunity set and Corporate financing, Dividend, and Compensation policies[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993:125-60.
[42] Mehran.H. Executive compensation structure, Ownership, and Firm performance [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, 38: 163-184.
[43] Guay Wayne R. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants [J].Journal of Financial Economics, July 1999, Volume 53, Issue1:43-71.
[44] Palia D. The Endogeneity of Managerial Compensation in Firm Valuation: A solution [J].Review of Financial Studies, 2001, 14:735-64.
[45] Rosenberg Matts. Stock option compensation in Finland: an analysis of economic determinants, contracting frequency, and design [Z].Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, Helsinki, 2002.Paper presented on the European Financial Management Association 2003 Annual Meeting.
[46] Kanari Uchida. The Determinants of the stock option use by Japanese companies [Z].The university of Kitakyushu, Aug 2003, working paper series NO.4-2003.
[47] Hemmer Thomas, Kim Oliver, Verrecchia Robert E. Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, Dec 2000, Volume 28, Issue 3:307-327.