高管股权激励与会计舞弊
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摘要
股权激励是一把“双刃剑”,运用得当则会起到降低代理成本、长期激励的积极作用,如果运用不当也会带来新的道德风险,如高管人员粉饰财务报表、虚构利润及虚假陈述等舞弊行为。在中国,随着上市公司股权激励相关管理办法的颁布,诸多公司开始实施股权激励,运用股权激励来激励企业经理人员,已成为人们的共识和政策取向,股权激励越来越受到重视。因此,在我国上市公司大规模实施股权激励计划之际,通过系统地研究股权激励的实施对经营者进行会计舞弊的影响来反映股权激励的效果很有必要,无论是对高管股权激励的顺利实施还是对会计舞弊的防范与治理都具有重要意义。
该论文综合运用规范研究与实证研究的方法展开分析：
首先,运用规范研究的方法,对有关股权激励和会计舞弊的相关理论进行综述和评价。对国内外的研究成果加以综合,从高管股权激励这一角度出发,推导出我国上市公司管理层基于提高自身报酬这一目的进行会计舞弊的动机。
其次,以2005—2009年间被中国证监会认定为会计舞弊的77家A股上市公司及按年、行业、规模选择配对的77家没有被证监会认定为会计舞弊的上市公司为样本,考察了高管股权激励与会计舞弊的关系。通过建立Logistic回归分析模型进行实证检验。
实证结果表明：中国上市公司股权激励与会计舞弊呈不显著的正相关关系；董事会会议次数与会计舞弊显著正相关；资产负债率与会计舞弊显著正相关。由此可知中国上市公司股权激励促使公司经营者为谋求自身收益最大化而采用虚假报告等手段进行会计舞弊,股权激励在提高公司业绩方面起到积极作用的同时也产生了负面作用,但是由于在中国股权激励的强度较小,股权激励激发会计舞弊的负面作用并不太明显。因此,当前我国上市公司实施股权激励计划需要把握好最优的股权激励强度以尽可能地规避其负面效果。
Equity incentive is a "two-edged sword", it can decrease the cost of agent and get active effects of long-term incentive in suitable condition, otherwise, it brings with some new moral hazard and produces corrupt practice such as information manipulation, fabricating profits and false statements. In our country, many companies begin to implement equity incentive plan and it has become the consensus and policy orientation that using equity incentive to inspirit top managers in recent years. With the related measures gradually forming, equity incentive has been received more and more focused. So it is necessary to recognize the effects of equity incentive objectively through systematic study of the influence of the implementation of equity incentive on accounting frauds in the time when the equity incentive plan will be implemented in a large scale. It is very significant whether to the smooth implementation of executive equity incentive or to the prevention and management of accounting fraud.
This paper comprehensively uses normative and empirical method for the analysis.
Firstly, reviews and evaluates the related theory about executive equity incentive and accounting fraud using normative research method.Analyzes synthetically the research achievements at home and abroad and deduces from the executives equity incentive angle that Chinese listed company management have the motivation to make accounting fraud for the purpose of improving their remuneration.
Secondly, examines the association between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud in Chinese listed firms by logistic regression, using a sample of 77 firms accused of accounting fraud by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) during the period 2005-2009 and 77 matched firms (matching on industry, year and firm size) not accused of accounting fraud.
The empirical results show that it is positively associated between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud in Chinese listed companies but not significantly; the number of board meetings is positively associated with accounting frauds significantly; Asset-liability ratio has a significant positive correlation with accounting fraud. Predictably, Chinese listed company equity incentives prompted the company operators to make accounting fraud by means of false report for their income maximization. Equity incentives play a role in producing negative effect as it has active effects in improving companies'performance, but due to the strength of Chinese equity incentives is small, the negative effect of accounting fraud inspired by equity incentives is not quite apparent. Hence, it is necessary to grasp the optimal equity incentives strength as possible to avoid its negative effects when the listed companies implement equity incentive plan.
该论文综合运用规范研究与实证研究的方法展开分析：
首先,运用规范研究的方法,对有关股权激励和会计舞弊的相关理论进行综述和评价。对国内外的研究成果加以综合,从高管股权激励这一角度出发,推导出我国上市公司管理层基于提高自身报酬这一目的进行会计舞弊的动机。
其次,以2005—2009年间被中国证监会认定为会计舞弊的77家A股上市公司及按年、行业、规模选择配对的77家没有被证监会认定为会计舞弊的上市公司为样本,考察了高管股权激励与会计舞弊的关系。通过建立Logistic回归分析模型进行实证检验。
实证结果表明：中国上市公司股权激励与会计舞弊呈不显著的正相关关系；董事会会议次数与会计舞弊显著正相关；资产负债率与会计舞弊显著正相关。由此可知中国上市公司股权激励促使公司经营者为谋求自身收益最大化而采用虚假报告等手段进行会计舞弊,股权激励在提高公司业绩方面起到积极作用的同时也产生了负面作用,但是由于在中国股权激励的强度较小,股权激励激发会计舞弊的负面作用并不太明显。因此,当前我国上市公司实施股权激励计划需要把握好最优的股权激励强度以尽可能地规避其负面效果。
Equity incentive is a "two-edged sword", it can decrease the cost of agent and get active effects of long-term incentive in suitable condition, otherwise, it brings with some new moral hazard and produces corrupt practice such as information manipulation, fabricating profits and false statements. In our country, many companies begin to implement equity incentive plan and it has become the consensus and policy orientation that using equity incentive to inspirit top managers in recent years. With the related measures gradually forming, equity incentive has been received more and more focused. So it is necessary to recognize the effects of equity incentive objectively through systematic study of the influence of the implementation of equity incentive on accounting frauds in the time when the equity incentive plan will be implemented in a large scale. It is very significant whether to the smooth implementation of executive equity incentive or to the prevention and management of accounting fraud.
This paper comprehensively uses normative and empirical method for the analysis.
Firstly, reviews and evaluates the related theory about executive equity incentive and accounting fraud using normative research method.Analyzes synthetically the research achievements at home and abroad and deduces from the executives equity incentive angle that Chinese listed company management have the motivation to make accounting fraud for the purpose of improving their remuneration.
Secondly, examines the association between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud in Chinese listed firms by logistic regression, using a sample of 77 firms accused of accounting fraud by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) during the period 2005-2009 and 77 matched firms (matching on industry, year and firm size) not accused of accounting fraud.
The empirical results show that it is positively associated between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud in Chinese listed companies but not significantly; the number of board meetings is positively associated with accounting frauds significantly; Asset-liability ratio has a significant positive correlation with accounting fraud. Predictably, Chinese listed company equity incentives prompted the company operators to make accounting fraud by means of false report for their income maximization. Equity incentives play a role in producing negative effect as it has active effects in improving companies'performance, but due to the strength of Chinese equity incentives is small, the negative effect of accounting fraud inspired by equity incentives is not quite apparent. Hence, it is necessary to grasp the optimal equity incentives strength as possible to avoid its negative effects when the listed companies implement equity incentive plan.
引文
[1]刘峰,贺建刚,吴波.信息披露：实话实说[M1.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003年
[2]秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别：理论分析与经验证据[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006年
[3]秦江萍.上市公司会计舞弊：国外相关研究综述与启示[J].会计研究,2005(6)
[4]韩丹,闵亮,陈婷.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验[J].统计与决策,2007(9)：69-72
[5]胡国强,彭家生.股权激励与财务重述—基于中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据[J].财经科学,2009(11)：39-46
[6]罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷.高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008(8)：69-76
[7]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效—一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(11)：24-30
[8]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营业绩[J].经济研究,2000(3)：32-39
[9]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1)：58-65
[10]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)：29-34
[11]杨清香,余麟,陈娜.董事会特征与财务舞弊-来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2009(7)：64-70
[12]余颖.股票期权激励效果的博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究,2001(2)：56-57
[13]秦江萍.企业会计舞弊及其控制：基于博弈理论的分析[J].财经论丛,2005(4)：54-58
[14]顾斌,周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究,2007(2)：79-84
[15]刘浩,孙铮.西方股权激励契约结构研究综述—兼论对中国上市公司股权激励制度的启示[J].经济管理,2009(4)：166-172
[16]高锦萍,钟伟强.上市公司财务欺诈与股价操纵—基于中国证监会处罚公告的研究[J].经济问题探索,2005(1)：82-188
[17]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权,报酬与盈余管理-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7)：111-119
[18]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,等.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(4)：113-119
[19]陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000(1)：30-36
[20]夏纪军,刘晏.控制权与激励的冲突-兼论股权激励有效性的实证分析[J].经济研究,2008(3)：87-98
[21]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3).
[22]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2003(5)：74-82
[23]吴娓,涂燕,付强.财务造假、盈余管理与管理层期权激励[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版),2006.27(3)：72-176
[24]熊璟.上市公司操纵会计信息方法披露[J].财会研究,2006.(10)：45-147.
[25]潘颖.股权激励、股权结构与公司业绩关系的实证研究[J].经济问题,2009(8)：107-109
[26]阎达五,王建英.上市公司利润操纵行为的财务指标特征研究[J].财务与会计,2001(10)
[27]娄权.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊行为之经验研究[J].证券市场导报,2003(10)：8-12
[28]罗福碧.上市公司股权激励条件下的信息操纵机理研究[D].重庆：重庆大学,2009.
[29]司茹.上市公司财务报告舞弊问题研究—基于公司内部治理的视角[D].辽宁：辽宁大学,2005.
[30]曹利.中国上市公司财务报告舞弊特征的实证研究[D].上海：复旦大学管理学院,2003.
[31]岳殿民.中国上市公司会计舞弊模式特征及识别研究[D].天津：天津财经大学,2008.
[32]DENIS D J,HANOUNA P, SARIN A. Is there a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?[J] Journal of Corporate Finance,2006.(12):467～488.
[33]GHOSH C, SIRMANS C F. Board Independence, Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance Economics,2003, (26):287～318.
[34]ERICKSON M, HANLON M, and MAYDEW E L. Is There a Link between Executive incentives and Accounting Fraud? [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2006, (44(1)):113～ 143.
[35]CONNOR J P, PRIEM R L and COOMBS J E,et al. Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting? [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2006, (49(3)):483～500.
[36]DECHOW P W, SLOAN R G and SWEENEY A P. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,(13 (10)).1～13.
[37]BAR-GILL 0, BEBCHUK L. Misreporting Corporate Performance [J]. Working Paper, Harvard Law School,2003.
[38]GOLDMAN E, SLEZAK S. An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,(80):603～626.
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[3]秦江萍.上市公司会计舞弊：国外相关研究综述与启示[J].会计研究,2005(6)
[4]韩丹,闵亮,陈婷.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验[J].统计与决策,2007(9)：69-72
[5]胡国强,彭家生.股权激励与财务重述—基于中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据[J].财经科学,2009(11)：39-46
[6]罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷.高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008(8)：69-76
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[8]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营业绩[J].经济研究,2000(3)：32-39
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[12]余颖.股票期权激励效果的博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究,2001(2)：56-57
[13]秦江萍.企业会计舞弊及其控制：基于博弈理论的分析[J].财经论丛,2005(4)：54-58
[14]顾斌,周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究,2007(2)：79-84
[15]刘浩,孙铮.西方股权激励契约结构研究综述—兼论对中国上市公司股权激励制度的启示[J].经济管理,2009(4)：166-172
[16]高锦萍,钟伟强.上市公司财务欺诈与股价操纵—基于中国证监会处罚公告的研究[J].经济问题探索,2005(1)：82-188
[17]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权,报酬与盈余管理-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7)：111-119
[18]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,等.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(4)：113-119
[19]陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000(1)：30-36
[20]夏纪军,刘晏.控制权与激励的冲突-兼论股权激励有效性的实证分析[J].经济研究,2008(3)：87-98
[21]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3).
[22]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2003(5)：74-82
[23]吴娓,涂燕,付强.财务造假、盈余管理与管理层期权激励[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版),2006.27(3)：72-176
[24]熊璟.上市公司操纵会计信息方法披露[J].财会研究,2006.(10)：45-147.
[25]潘颖.股权激励、股权结构与公司业绩关系的实证研究[J].经济问题,2009(8)：107-109
[26]阎达五,王建英.上市公司利润操纵行为的财务指标特征研究[J].财务与会计,2001(10)
[27]娄权.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊行为之经验研究[J].证券市场导报,2003(10)：8-12
[28]罗福碧.上市公司股权激励条件下的信息操纵机理研究[D].重庆：重庆大学,2009.
[29]司茹.上市公司财务报告舞弊问题研究—基于公司内部治理的视角[D].辽宁：辽宁大学,2005.
[30]曹利.中国上市公司财务报告舞弊特征的实证研究[D].上海：复旦大学管理学院,2003.
[31]岳殿民.中国上市公司会计舞弊模式特征及识别研究[D].天津：天津财经大学,2008.
[32]DENIS D J,HANOUNA P, SARIN A. Is there a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?[J] Journal of Corporate Finance,2006.(12):467～488.
[33]GHOSH C, SIRMANS C F. Board Independence, Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance Economics,2003, (26):287～318.
[34]ERICKSON M, HANLON M, and MAYDEW E L. Is There a Link between Executive incentives and Accounting Fraud? [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2006, (44(1)):113～ 143.
[35]CONNOR J P, PRIEM R L and COOMBS J E,et al. Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting? [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2006, (49(3)):483～500.
[36]DECHOW P W, SLOAN R G and SWEENEY A P. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,(13 (10)).1～13.
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