上市公司高管薪酬、机构投资者、债务结构与研发投资的关系研究
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摘要
研发活动指能够为人类、文化或者社会方面增加知识，并且能够利用这些知识去创造新的应用进行地系统性和创造性的活动，其具备创造性、新颖性、科学性的特点。如何从机制上保证上市公司能够确保对于研发投资的持续和高效的投入，进而增强企业的长期竞争能力是至关重要的。
本文首先从代理理论、信息不对称理论、公司治理理论、利益相关者理论的视角对高管薪酬、机构投资者以及债务机制这三大机制从理论上对于降低企业的代理成本、解决委托代理问题、降低信息不对称，作为公司治理的主要机制以及公司的主要利益相关者对于企业研发投资的影响机理进行了研究。并基于我国转轨经济的背景，引入产权理论，对我国上市公司的产权特征以及产权制度的发展沿革进行了深入的分析，并对不同产权性质的企业本身具有的行为异质性进行了理论分析。
其次，本文在考虑不同产权性质的基础上，对高管薪酬、机构投资者以及债务期限结构和研发投资之间的关系进行了实证分析。第一，从高管薪酬契约看，能够缓解和修正经理人员服务于其自身目标的薪酬契约为一个良好的契约（JensenandMeckling，1976；SmithandWatts，1992）。从对投资的影响来看，良好的薪酬契约应该能够抑制经理人员的过度投资倾向，促使其选择净现值为正且能够增加股东利益的项目。从本文的研究结论看，薪酬机制作为一种重要的激励机制，现金部分在国有上市公司起到了激励作用，高管持股在民营上市公司中更加有效。第二，无论是机构投资者整体，还是压力敏感型机构投资者以及压力抵制型机构投资者，对上市公司的研发投资是存在偏好的，但这个关系仅存于民营上市公司，对于国有上市公司机构投资者的持有决策与该企业的研发强度无关。从创造的角度本文得出的结论是，机构投资者发挥公司治理的职能有限，无论是压力敏感型还是压力抵制型，其均与研发投资呈显著的负相关关系，且只有压力敏感型机构投资者对于国有上市公司的创造作用不显著，其余无论是国有上市公司还是民营上市公司均表现出了显著的负相关关系。第三，从债务期限结构的角度来看，发现债务期限结构与公司的研发投资之间存在U型关系。而上述关系对于国有产权不成立，说明负债的公司治理作用在国有上市公司中影响较小，负债的治理作用在民营上市公司中有较好的表现。
最后，本文依据实证研究的结果，为我国上市公司保障和强化研发投资提供一定的理论支持、科学依据，提出了从产权制度改革、深化金融改革、积极发展机构投资者、优化高管薪酬机制、完善外部市场等政策建议。
R&D investment has becoming an important strategic investment decision-making behavior which affect companies survival and development, it can produce the human, cultural or social knowledge. It has characteristics of creativity, novelty, scientific. To enhancing the long-term competitiveness of companies, mechanisms which can ensure that listed companies have continuous and efficient R&D investment is essential. This thesis examined the functions of three different mechanisms which can motiviting and monitoring R&D spending:executive compensation, institutional investors, and debt maturity structure. In the context of the transition economies, performance objectives and behavioral characteristics of the state-owned and private listing companies has a lot of differences, the heterogeneity of this article distinguish between property rights of these issues were investigated.
Firstly, this article discuss the mechanisms of the three incentive and monitoring mechanisms from the agency theory, the theory of corporate governance, the stakeholders theory. Then from property rights theory, the thesis study the behavior of state-owned enterprises under our existing system.
Secondly, considering property rights heterogeneity, this thesis study on three motivating and monitoring mechanisms'governance roles based on R&D investment. The first, a good salary contract should help ease the manager of self-interest caused by the action of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling,1976; Smith and Watts,1992). Accordingly, the remuneration of contract in the company's investment decisions, should help coordinate the manager and shareholder interests, thus contributing to the manager to give up negative net present value of investment projects, inhibition manager over investment impulse. The conclusion is that the cash portion of the state-owned enterprises play a stimulating role and executive stock ownership is a effective mechanism in private listed companies. The second, institutional investors as a whole, or pressure-sensitive institutional investors as well as pressure-resist institutional investors prefer the listed company's R&D investment, but this relationship is only found in private enterprises, institutions investment for state-owned companies has nothing to do with the corporate R&D investment. The results derived from the creation point of this article is that institutional investors play the functions of corporate governance is the type of pressure-sensitive or pressure-resist was a significant negative correlation, with R&D expenditures and the only pressure-sensitive institutions investors create the role of state-owned enterprises was not significant, the remaining state-owned enterprises and private enterprises showed a significant negative correlation. The third, from the point of view of the debt maturity structure, the thesis found a U-shaped relationship between debt maturity structure and the companys'R&D investment. The relationship between the state-owned property is not established, the role of the liabilities of the corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, liabilities'governance role of private enterprise is in better performance.
Finally, according to the results of empirical research, policy recommendations of this thesis summarizes the shortcomings of this research and pointed out the direction of future research.
本文首先从代理理论、信息不对称理论、公司治理理论、利益相关者理论的视角对高管薪酬、机构投资者以及债务机制这三大机制从理论上对于降低企业的代理成本、解决委托代理问题、降低信息不对称，作为公司治理的主要机制以及公司的主要利益相关者对于企业研发投资的影响机理进行了研究。并基于我国转轨经济的背景，引入产权理论，对我国上市公司的产权特征以及产权制度的发展沿革进行了深入的分析，并对不同产权性质的企业本身具有的行为异质性进行了理论分析。
其次，本文在考虑不同产权性质的基础上，对高管薪酬、机构投资者以及债务期限结构和研发投资之间的关系进行了实证分析。第一，从高管薪酬契约看，能够缓解和修正经理人员服务于其自身目标的薪酬契约为一个良好的契约（JensenandMeckling，1976；SmithandWatts，1992）。从对投资的影响来看，良好的薪酬契约应该能够抑制经理人员的过度投资倾向，促使其选择净现值为正且能够增加股东利益的项目。从本文的研究结论看，薪酬机制作为一种重要的激励机制，现金部分在国有上市公司起到了激励作用，高管持股在民营上市公司中更加有效。第二，无论是机构投资者整体，还是压力敏感型机构投资者以及压力抵制型机构投资者，对上市公司的研发投资是存在偏好的，但这个关系仅存于民营上市公司，对于国有上市公司机构投资者的持有决策与该企业的研发强度无关。从创造的角度本文得出的结论是，机构投资者发挥公司治理的职能有限，无论是压力敏感型还是压力抵制型，其均与研发投资呈显著的负相关关系，且只有压力敏感型机构投资者对于国有上市公司的创造作用不显著，其余无论是国有上市公司还是民营上市公司均表现出了显著的负相关关系。第三，从债务期限结构的角度来看，发现债务期限结构与公司的研发投资之间存在U型关系。而上述关系对于国有产权不成立，说明负债的公司治理作用在国有上市公司中影响较小，负债的治理作用在民营上市公司中有较好的表现。
最后，本文依据实证研究的结果，为我国上市公司保障和强化研发投资提供一定的理论支持、科学依据，提出了从产权制度改革、深化金融改革、积极发展机构投资者、优化高管薪酬机制、完善外部市场等政策建议。
R&D investment has becoming an important strategic investment decision-making behavior which affect companies survival and development, it can produce the human, cultural or social knowledge. It has characteristics of creativity, novelty, scientific. To enhancing the long-term competitiveness of companies, mechanisms which can ensure that listed companies have continuous and efficient R&D investment is essential. This thesis examined the functions of three different mechanisms which can motiviting and monitoring R&D spending:executive compensation, institutional investors, and debt maturity structure. In the context of the transition economies, performance objectives and behavioral characteristics of the state-owned and private listing companies has a lot of differences, the heterogeneity of this article distinguish between property rights of these issues were investigated.
Firstly, this article discuss the mechanisms of the three incentive and monitoring mechanisms from the agency theory, the theory of corporate governance, the stakeholders theory. Then from property rights theory, the thesis study the behavior of state-owned enterprises under our existing system.
Secondly, considering property rights heterogeneity, this thesis study on three motivating and monitoring mechanisms'governance roles based on R&D investment. The first, a good salary contract should help ease the manager of self-interest caused by the action of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling,1976; Smith and Watts,1992). Accordingly, the remuneration of contract in the company's investment decisions, should help coordinate the manager and shareholder interests, thus contributing to the manager to give up negative net present value of investment projects, inhibition manager over investment impulse. The conclusion is that the cash portion of the state-owned enterprises play a stimulating role and executive stock ownership is a effective mechanism in private listed companies. The second, institutional investors as a whole, or pressure-sensitive institutional investors as well as pressure-resist institutional investors prefer the listed company's R&D investment, but this relationship is only found in private enterprises, institutions investment for state-owned companies has nothing to do with the corporate R&D investment. The results derived from the creation point of this article is that institutional investors play the functions of corporate governance is the type of pressure-sensitive or pressure-resist was a significant negative correlation, with R&D expenditures and the only pressure-sensitive institutions investors create the role of state-owned enterprises was not significant, the remaining state-owned enterprises and private enterprises showed a significant negative correlation. The third, from the point of view of the debt maturity structure, the thesis found a U-shaped relationship between debt maturity structure and the companys'R&D investment. The relationship between the state-owned property is not established, the role of the liabilities of the corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, liabilities'governance role of private enterprise is in better performance.
Finally, according to the results of empirical research, policy recommendations of this thesis summarizes the shortcomings of this research and pointed out the direction of future research.
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