国有企业股权结构优化的制度安排与定价机制研究
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摘要
股权结构是财务理论中一个十分重要而复杂的问题。国内外一系列实证研究表明，股权结构通过其治理效应来影响公司的绩效。分析股权结构的治理效应通过股东的特性和股权集中度，即股权结构的“质”与“量”两方面来展开。我国国有企业股权结构的特点表现为国有股主体不明确，股权高度集中于国有股。这种股权结构的不合理性影响了其治理效应的发挥。因而有必要从“质”与“量”两方面优化国有企业的股权结构。本文第一章提出通过国有资本管理体制改革和国有股减持的制度安排，从上述两方面来优化国有企业的股权结构。
第二章则从国有企业股权结构的现状入手，从理论与现实上探讨了优化国有企业股权结构的意义。
本文第三章论述了新的国有资本管理体制怎样从“质”上优化国有企业的股权结构。党的十六大提出深化国有资本管理体制改革，国有资产监督管理委员会的成立顺应了这一要求。国资委作为国有资产行政管理的专职机构，成为国有股的所有者代表，它通过签订契约将国有股授予自主经营、自负盈亏的中介经营机构，使后者真正成为国有股的“人格化”主体，从“质”上优化国有企业的股权结构。同时，国资委作为专司国有股减持监督管理的机构，有利于国有股减持规范、有序、顺利的进行。因此，新的国有资本管理体制为国有企业股权结构优化提供了可靠的制度基础。
国有股减持有助于降低国有企业的股权集中度，从“量”上优化国有企业的股权结构。目前国有股减持的方式多种多样，每一种都只是在试验之中，已实施的几种方案因不被市场接受先后失败。有鉴于此，本文第四章改进设计了两种国有股减持的方案，一种是内部型国有股减持，一种是外部型国有股减持。
定价问题是国有股减持的难点，本文第五章运用财务估价理论和方法，设计了一种国有股减持的定价方案，并以上市公司华北高速为模拟对象实施了该方案。这一价格既考虑了流通股的市价，又考虑了国有股权的内在价值，兼顾了国家股股东和流通股股东的利益。相对于市场流行的几种模式，有其突出优点，可以作为国有股减持的定价依据之一。
Ownership structure is an important and complex issue in finance theory. A series of positive research show that ownership structure influence the enterprise's performance by way of its governance effect. Analyzing the governance impact of ownership structure should be realizing by means of the characteristics of shareholder and intensive degree of ownership, namely the quality and quantity of ownership structure.
The main defect of our state-owned enterprise (SOE) is that shareholders are indefinitive, which restrict the governance effect. Thus, it is necessary to improve ownership structure of SOE from the aspects of quality and quantity. Chapter I holds that ownership structure of the SOE should be optimized by institutional arrangement of the reform of national capital management system and state-owned share reduction.
The chapter II discusses the purport of optimizing ownership structure of SOE from theory and practice by analyzing the actuality of ownership structure of the state-owned enterprises.
Chapter III discusses how the new national capital management system optimizes ownership structure of SOE from the aspect of quality. The 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the deepening of the reform of national capital management system. The newly established State Asset Management Commission meets this need. The State Asset Management Commission, acting as the pointed department of national capital administration, becomes the owner's representative. It entrusts the state share to capital performing organs through signing agreement, making the later the real owner of state-owned share, so as to optimizing ownership structure of the SOE from the aspect of quality. At the same time, the State Asset Management Commission, acting as the administrative organization of reducing state-owned share, will do good to the carrying out of reducing state-owned share smoothly and orderly. So new national capital management system set forth the solid institutional base of optimizing ownership struct
ure.
Reducing state-owned share is helpful to reduce the degree of ownership concentricity. There are many methods to reduce state-owned share, but none of them is
successful. Therefore Chapter IV put forward two designs of state-owned share reduction. One is internal type of state-owned share reduction; the other is external type of state-owned share reduction.
The pricing issue is the nodus of reducing state-owned share, Chapter V design a pricing plan of state-owned share reduction on the base of financial appraisal theory and
method, and put it into practice by the simulation subject of listed company--Huabei
Expresswy CO..LTP. This pricing plan considers the value of both circulative share and state-owned share, so it protects interests of both sides. It gains advantage over other pricing plans that have been implemented, thus it can be one of the bases of the pricing of state-owned share reduction.
第二章则从国有企业股权结构的现状入手，从理论与现实上探讨了优化国有企业股权结构的意义。
本文第三章论述了新的国有资本管理体制怎样从“质”上优化国有企业的股权结构。党的十六大提出深化国有资本管理体制改革，国有资产监督管理委员会的成立顺应了这一要求。国资委作为国有资产行政管理的专职机构，成为国有股的所有者代表，它通过签订契约将国有股授予自主经营、自负盈亏的中介经营机构，使后者真正成为国有股的“人格化”主体，从“质”上优化国有企业的股权结构。同时，国资委作为专司国有股减持监督管理的机构，有利于国有股减持规范、有序、顺利的进行。因此，新的国有资本管理体制为国有企业股权结构优化提供了可靠的制度基础。
国有股减持有助于降低国有企业的股权集中度，从“量”上优化国有企业的股权结构。目前国有股减持的方式多种多样，每一种都只是在试验之中，已实施的几种方案因不被市场接受先后失败。有鉴于此，本文第四章改进设计了两种国有股减持的方案，一种是内部型国有股减持，一种是外部型国有股减持。
定价问题是国有股减持的难点，本文第五章运用财务估价理论和方法，设计了一种国有股减持的定价方案，并以上市公司华北高速为模拟对象实施了该方案。这一价格既考虑了流通股的市价，又考虑了国有股权的内在价值，兼顾了国家股股东和流通股股东的利益。相对于市场流行的几种模式，有其突出优点，可以作为国有股减持的定价依据之一。
Ownership structure is an important and complex issue in finance theory. A series of positive research show that ownership structure influence the enterprise's performance by way of its governance effect. Analyzing the governance impact of ownership structure should be realizing by means of the characteristics of shareholder and intensive degree of ownership, namely the quality and quantity of ownership structure.
The main defect of our state-owned enterprise (SOE) is that shareholders are indefinitive, which restrict the governance effect. Thus, it is necessary to improve ownership structure of SOE from the aspects of quality and quantity. Chapter I holds that ownership structure of the SOE should be optimized by institutional arrangement of the reform of national capital management system and state-owned share reduction.
The chapter II discusses the purport of optimizing ownership structure of SOE from theory and practice by analyzing the actuality of ownership structure of the state-owned enterprises.
Chapter III discusses how the new national capital management system optimizes ownership structure of SOE from the aspect of quality. The 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the deepening of the reform of national capital management system. The newly established State Asset Management Commission meets this need. The State Asset Management Commission, acting as the pointed department of national capital administration, becomes the owner's representative. It entrusts the state share to capital performing organs through signing agreement, making the later the real owner of state-owned share, so as to optimizing ownership structure of the SOE from the aspect of quality. At the same time, the State Asset Management Commission, acting as the administrative organization of reducing state-owned share, will do good to the carrying out of reducing state-owned share smoothly and orderly. So new national capital management system set forth the solid institutional base of optimizing ownership struct
ure.
Reducing state-owned share is helpful to reduce the degree of ownership concentricity. There are many methods to reduce state-owned share, but none of them is
successful. Therefore Chapter IV put forward two designs of state-owned share reduction. One is internal type of state-owned share reduction; the other is external type of state-owned share reduction.
The pricing issue is the nodus of reducing state-owned share, Chapter V design a pricing plan of state-owned share reduction on the base of financial appraisal theory and
method, and put it into practice by the simulation subject of listed company--Huabei
Expresswy CO..LTP. This pricing plan considers the value of both circulative share and state-owned share, so it protects interests of both sides. It gains advantage over other pricing plans that have been implemented, thus it can be one of the bases of the pricing of state-owned share reduction.
引文
[1] Berle A, Means G. The modern corporation and private property. 1st edition. New York: Macmillom, 1932
[2] Jensen M, Meckling W. Theory of firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3 (5): 305～360
[3] Mc Connell J, Servaes H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(4): 595～612
[4] Xiaonian Xu, Yan Wang. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and firm's Performance: the case of Chinese stock companies. World Bank Working paper, 1997 (12): 301～305
[5] 孙永祥，黄祖辉．上市公司的股权结构与绩效．经济研究，1999(12)：23～30
[6] 陈晓，江东．股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性．经济研究，2000(8)：28～35
[7] 张兆国，陈华东，唐丽．试析我国上市公司资本结构的效应．会计研究，2002(6)：18～24
[8] 李维安，企业集团的公司治理——规模起点、治理边界及子公司治理．南开管理评论，1999(4)：21～30
[9] 郑红亮．公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革．经济研究，1998(10)：10～12
[10] 伍中信．国有资本减持：理论意义，财务运作与风险控制．会计研究，2001(8)：22～24
[11] Roe Mark J. Strong managers, weak owners: the political roots of American corporate finance. 1st edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994
[12] Alchian A, Kessel. Aspects of labor economics. 3rd edition. Princeton: Princeton University press, 1992
[13] Rasmusen Eric. Game and information: an introduction to game theory. 3rd edition Cambridge: Blackwell Publisher, 1994
[14] 豆建民．中国公司制思想研究．第一版，上海：上海财经大学出版社，1999
[15] 吴敬链．健全中国公司的治理结构，经贸导刊，2000(2)：2～5
[16] 高春涛．大股东“掠夺”行为及其治理．上市公司，2001(11)：13～15
[17] 郭复初．国家财务论．第一版．成都：西南财经大学出版社，1993
[18] 伍中信．现代财务经济导论——产权、信息与社会资本分析．第一版．上海：立信会计出版社，1999
[19] 郭复初．财务通论．第一版．上海：立信会计出版社，1997
[20] 马建堂，黄达，林岗．世纪之交的国企改革研究．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2000
[21] 王巍，李曙光．MBO管理者收购——从经理到股东．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，1999
[22] 王阳，李斌．从员工持股到管理者收购．第一版，北京：机械工业出版社，2000
[23] Jensen Michael, Meckling William. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Business, 1976, 52(3): 469～500
[24] MC Jenson. Discussion on LBO conference. Journal of Applied Corporate finance (summer), 1990(6): 6～37
[25] Casson Mark. The entrepreneur: an economic theory. 1st edition. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982
[26] AJ Weston. Corporate ownership structure and performance: the case of management buy outs. Journal of financial Economics, 1990, 27(1): 143～164
[27] 迟福林．中国职工持股规范运作与制度设计．第一版．北京：中国经济出版社，2001
[28] 余辉武．国有股减持与吸引外资进入A股市场．新疆财经，2001(1)：39～41
[29] 邢汉兵．鼓励外资并购，改善公司治理．经济论坛，2002(22)：55～56
[30] 王珊珊．浅析外资对我国国有企业的影响．新疆财经，2002(1)：36～37
[31] 张益明．外资并购中国上市公司的目标选择与方式分析．盐城工学院学报，2002(2)：35～36
[32] 戴庆华，吴忠，牟永红．外资并购国企：新时期深化国有企业改革的战略选择，现代管理科学，2002(12)：6～7
[33] 吴战篪．试论在会计理论基础上构建资产评估理论体系．国有资产管理，2003(1)：61～62
[34] 张少杰，股权双轨制和中国上市公司行为，财政研究，2003(1)：33～36
[35] 卢现祥．西方新制度经济学．第一版．北京：中国发展出版社，1996
[36] 汪平，财务估价论——现金流量与企业价值评估．第一版．上海：上海财经大学出版社，2000
[37] 伍中信，吴战篪．财务理论研究与财务学科发展，管理世界，2002(9)：131～135
[38] William F sharp, Gordon J Alexander, Jeffrey V Bailey. Investment. 5th edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1995
[39] Michael C Jensen. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 1986, 76(5): 323～329
[40] 陈小悦，陈晓，顾斌．中国股市的弱型效率的实证研究．会计研究，1997(9)：13～17
[41] Bradford Cornell. Corporate Valuation. 1st edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999
[42] Paul A Samuelson, William D Nordhaus. Economics. 16th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1998
[2] Jensen M, Meckling W. Theory of firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3 (5): 305～360
[3] Mc Connell J, Servaes H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(4): 595～612
[4] Xiaonian Xu, Yan Wang. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and firm's Performance: the case of Chinese stock companies. World Bank Working paper, 1997 (12): 301～305
[5] 孙永祥，黄祖辉．上市公司的股权结构与绩效．经济研究，1999(12)：23～30
[6] 陈晓，江东．股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性．经济研究，2000(8)：28～35
[7] 张兆国，陈华东，唐丽．试析我国上市公司资本结构的效应．会计研究，2002(6)：18～24
[8] 李维安，企业集团的公司治理——规模起点、治理边界及子公司治理．南开管理评论，1999(4)：21～30
[9] 郑红亮．公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革．经济研究，1998(10)：10～12
[10] 伍中信．国有资本减持：理论意义，财务运作与风险控制．会计研究，2001(8)：22～24
[11] Roe Mark J. Strong managers, weak owners: the political roots of American corporate finance. 1st edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994
[12] Alchian A, Kessel. Aspects of labor economics. 3rd edition. Princeton: Princeton University press, 1992
[13] Rasmusen Eric. Game and information: an introduction to game theory. 3rd edition Cambridge: Blackwell Publisher, 1994
[14] 豆建民．中国公司制思想研究．第一版，上海：上海财经大学出版社，1999
[15] 吴敬链．健全中国公司的治理结构，经贸导刊，2000(2)：2～5
[16] 高春涛．大股东“掠夺”行为及其治理．上市公司，2001(11)：13～15
[17] 郭复初．国家财务论．第一版．成都：西南财经大学出版社，1993
[18] 伍中信．现代财务经济导论——产权、信息与社会资本分析．第一版．上海：立信会计出版社，1999
[19] 郭复初．财务通论．第一版．上海：立信会计出版社，1997
[20] 马建堂，黄达，林岗．世纪之交的国企改革研究．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2000
[21] 王巍，李曙光．MBO管理者收购——从经理到股东．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，1999
[22] 王阳，李斌．从员工持股到管理者收购．第一版，北京：机械工业出版社，2000
[23] Jensen Michael, Meckling William. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Business, 1976, 52(3): 469～500
[24] MC Jenson. Discussion on LBO conference. Journal of Applied Corporate finance (summer), 1990(6): 6～37
[25] Casson Mark. The entrepreneur: an economic theory. 1st edition. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982
[26] AJ Weston. Corporate ownership structure and performance: the case of management buy outs. Journal of financial Economics, 1990, 27(1): 143～164
[27] 迟福林．中国职工持股规范运作与制度设计．第一版．北京：中国经济出版社，2001
[28] 余辉武．国有股减持与吸引外资进入A股市场．新疆财经，2001(1)：39～41
[29] 邢汉兵．鼓励外资并购，改善公司治理．经济论坛，2002(22)：55～56
[30] 王珊珊．浅析外资对我国国有企业的影响．新疆财经，2002(1)：36～37
[31] 张益明．外资并购中国上市公司的目标选择与方式分析．盐城工学院学报，2002(2)：35～36
[32] 戴庆华，吴忠，牟永红．外资并购国企：新时期深化国有企业改革的战略选择，现代管理科学，2002(12)：6～7
[33] 吴战篪．试论在会计理论基础上构建资产评估理论体系．国有资产管理，2003(1)：61～62
[34] 张少杰，股权双轨制和中国上市公司行为，财政研究，2003(1)：33～36
[35] 卢现祥．西方新制度经济学．第一版．北京：中国发展出版社，1996
[36] 汪平，财务估价论——现金流量与企业价值评估．第一版．上海：上海财经大学出版社，2000
[37] 伍中信，吴战篪．财务理论研究与财务学科发展，管理世界，2002(9)：131～135
[38] William F sharp, Gordon J Alexander, Jeffrey V Bailey. Investment. 5th edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1995
[39] Michael C Jensen. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 1986, 76(5): 323～329
[40] 陈小悦，陈晓，顾斌．中国股市的弱型效率的实证研究．会计研究，1997(9)：13～17
[41] Bradford Cornell. Corporate Valuation. 1st edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999
[42] Paul A Samuelson, William D Nordhaus. Economics. 16th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1998