基于博弈视角的中国安全生产管制体制运行研究
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摘要
改革开放之后,我国经济得到了快速发展,但安全生产问题已成为制约经济发展的重要因素。建国后,国家对企业安全生产问题十分重视。为了更好地解决我国面临的安全生产问题,我国的安全生产管制体制几经变迁,最终形成了“国家监察、地方监管、企业负责”的管制体制,但目前该体制的运行效果还不是很理想。造成这种状况的主要原因在于：安全生产管制体制涉及的三方主体之间的利益目标并不一致,三方主体为了各自利益互相进行博弈,这就不免会对政府管制效果产生消极影响。只有对这种利益不一致前提下的三方主体关系进行分析,寻找使我国现行安全生产体制有效运行的方法和途径,才能充分发挥我国现行安全生产管制体制对企业安全生产的保障作用,大幅度降低工伤事故发生率,促进社会经济健康有序发展。
在此背景下,本文以“基于博弈视角的中国安全生产管制体制运行研究”为题进行研究。本文首先对其他学者的研究成果进行了综述,在此基础上,展开了本文的研究。本文的研究内容可分为三大部分：
第一部分是论文的第3章。首先,介绍了我国的安全生产管制体制现状；其次,介绍了美国、英国、日本的安全生产管制体制现状；最后,分析了美国、英国、日本安全生产管制体制建设经验对我国的借鉴意义。第一部分为下文的研究提供了必要性支持。
第二部分是论文的第4-7章。主要分析了安全生产管制体制中涉及的三方主体之间的博弈关系。
第4章针对“目前我国安全生产监管实践的主流是好的,但也存在某些腐败现象”的现实,分两种情况——存在腐败的情况和正常情况,对完全信息条件下的地方政府监管机制进行分析。
在第5章中,首先,运用委托代理理论来分析不完全信息条件下地方政府与企业之间建立契约激励机制的可能性和有效性：其次,运用信号理论建立信号博弈模型来分析解决企业逆向选择问题的途径。
在第6章中,首先,对安全生产管制体制中的中央政府和地方政府的关系进行分析；其次,构建完全信息博弈模型来分析完全信息条件下中央政府监察机制有效性问题；最后,运用委托代理理论分析不完全信息条件下针对地方约激励机制设计问题。
在第7章中,运用演化经济学理论分析了不完全信息条件下中央政府施对企业行为的间接影响。第7章中讨论分析的中央政府监察措施只包括施和惩罚措施。
第三部分是论文的第8章。在第二部分研究的基础上,第三部分阐我国安全生产管制体制运行效果的对策。
第9章是论文的研究结论和未来展望。首先,对前文研究进行总指出研究的不足；最后,对未来的研究方向进行展望。
本文主要在以下几个方面进行了创新：(1)运用博弈方法论证监管无限次博弈中企业进行安全生产投资的收益大小对企业策略选择结合委托代理理论,运用博弈方法建立了存在瞒报情况下的契约激励建立信号博弈模型分析安全生产监管过程中可能会出现的逆向选择(?)用演化博弈方法研究了中央政府奖惩措施对企业行为的间接影响。
After the reform and opening, the Chinese economy has got rapid development, but safety producting problems have already become the important restricting factors to economy's development. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of China attaches great importance to the problem of the enterprises' safety producting. In order to solve the problems better which safety producting problem our nation faced, our country's safety producting regulating system undergoes several changes, eventually form the safety producting regulating system as follows: "state monitoring, local regulating, enterprise responsible", but now the system's operation effect is not very ideal. The reason which causes this condition is as follows: the interests goals of three subjects which are involved in the safety producting regulating system are not consistent, the three subjects game each other for their respective benefits, it is unavoidable make negative influences to the government regulating effect. Only analyze the three subjects'relationship under the premise that the interests of the three subjects is not consistent, look for the methods and ways which could make the current safety producting regulating system effective operation, we could bring the current safety producting regulating system into full play in the enterprises'safety producting security role, greatly reduce the industrial accident rate, promote the social economy's healthy and orderly development.
Under this background, this paper is concentrated on "The Study on the Chinese Safety Producting Regulating System's Operation from the Perspective of Game". In this paper, first, summarize the other scholars'research results, and based on this, launched the article's research. The article's research contents can be divided into three sections:
The first part is the chapter 3. Firstly, introduce the Chinese safety producting regulating system; secondly, introduce the safety producting regulating system of the United States, Britain, Japan; finally, study the reference which the safety producting regulating system construction experience the America, Britain, Japan give to our country. The first part provides a necessity support to the below research.
The second part is chapter 4～7. Mainly analyses the three subjects'relationship of the game.
Chapter 4 is aimed at the reality "at present, the mainstream of our country's safety producting regulating practice is good, but there also have some corruption phenomenon", distinguish two kinds of circumstance——the circumstance under the condition of corruption and normal circumstance, analyse the local government's regulating mechanism under the condition of complete information.
In chapter 5, firstly, use the principal-agent theory to analyze the possibility and effectiveness of contract incentive mechanism which is established by the local government and enterprises under the condition of incomplete information; secondly, use the signal theory establish signal game model to analyze the approach of solving the problem of enterprises'adverse selection.
In chapter 6, firstly, analyze the relationship of the central government and local government in the safety producting regulating system; secondly, construct the game model under the condition of the complete information to analyze the validity problem of the central government's surveillance mechanism which is under the condition of complete information; Finally, use the principal-agent theory analyse contracts incentive mechanism design problem which aim at local government under the condition of incomplete information.
In chapter 7, use evolutionary economics theory analyse the problem of the central government monitoring measures' indirect impact which is put on enterprise's behavior under the condition of incomplete information. The central government's monitoring measures which is discussed and analysed in the chapter 7 only include measures of reward and punishment.
The third part is the chapter 8. On the basis of the second part's research, the third part expounds the countermeasures of improving Chinese safety producting regulating system's operation effect.
The chapter 9 is the research conclusion and prospect. Firstly, summarizes the above research; secondly, point out the insufficiency; finally, give the prospect for the future research direction.
The paper mainly innovate in the following aspects:(1) use game method demonstrates the influence of safety producting investment's profit which aim at the enterprise's strategy choice in the course of the game which have infinite times; (2) combining with the principal-agent theory, use game method to establish the contract incentive model under the condition of existing the conceal; (3) establish a signal game-theory to analyse adverse selection problem which may appear in the course of safety producting regulating; (4) use the evolutionary game method to study the indirect impact of the central government's measures of reward and punishment on enterprise's behavior.
在此背景下,本文以“基于博弈视角的中国安全生产管制体制运行研究”为题进行研究。本文首先对其他学者的研究成果进行了综述,在此基础上,展开了本文的研究。本文的研究内容可分为三大部分：
第一部分是论文的第3章。首先,介绍了我国的安全生产管制体制现状；其次,介绍了美国、英国、日本的安全生产管制体制现状；最后,分析了美国、英国、日本安全生产管制体制建设经验对我国的借鉴意义。第一部分为下文的研究提供了必要性支持。
第二部分是论文的第4-7章。主要分析了安全生产管制体制中涉及的三方主体之间的博弈关系。
第4章针对“目前我国安全生产监管实践的主流是好的,但也存在某些腐败现象”的现实,分两种情况——存在腐败的情况和正常情况,对完全信息条件下的地方政府监管机制进行分析。
在第5章中,首先,运用委托代理理论来分析不完全信息条件下地方政府与企业之间建立契约激励机制的可能性和有效性：其次,运用信号理论建立信号博弈模型来分析解决企业逆向选择问题的途径。
在第6章中,首先,对安全生产管制体制中的中央政府和地方政府的关系进行分析；其次,构建完全信息博弈模型来分析完全信息条件下中央政府监察机制有效性问题；最后,运用委托代理理论分析不完全信息条件下针对地方约激励机制设计问题。
在第7章中,运用演化经济学理论分析了不完全信息条件下中央政府施对企业行为的间接影响。第7章中讨论分析的中央政府监察措施只包括施和惩罚措施。
第三部分是论文的第8章。在第二部分研究的基础上,第三部分阐我国安全生产管制体制运行效果的对策。
第9章是论文的研究结论和未来展望。首先,对前文研究进行总指出研究的不足；最后,对未来的研究方向进行展望。
本文主要在以下几个方面进行了创新：(1)运用博弈方法论证监管无限次博弈中企业进行安全生产投资的收益大小对企业策略选择结合委托代理理论,运用博弈方法建立了存在瞒报情况下的契约激励建立信号博弈模型分析安全生产监管过程中可能会出现的逆向选择(?)用演化博弈方法研究了中央政府奖惩措施对企业行为的间接影响。
After the reform and opening, the Chinese economy has got rapid development, but safety producting problems have already become the important restricting factors to economy's development. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of China attaches great importance to the problem of the enterprises' safety producting. In order to solve the problems better which safety producting problem our nation faced, our country's safety producting regulating system undergoes several changes, eventually form the safety producting regulating system as follows: "state monitoring, local regulating, enterprise responsible", but now the system's operation effect is not very ideal. The reason which causes this condition is as follows: the interests goals of three subjects which are involved in the safety producting regulating system are not consistent, the three subjects game each other for their respective benefits, it is unavoidable make negative influences to the government regulating effect. Only analyze the three subjects'relationship under the premise that the interests of the three subjects is not consistent, look for the methods and ways which could make the current safety producting regulating system effective operation, we could bring the current safety producting regulating system into full play in the enterprises'safety producting security role, greatly reduce the industrial accident rate, promote the social economy's healthy and orderly development.
Under this background, this paper is concentrated on "The Study on the Chinese Safety Producting Regulating System's Operation from the Perspective of Game". In this paper, first, summarize the other scholars'research results, and based on this, launched the article's research. The article's research contents can be divided into three sections:
The first part is the chapter 3. Firstly, introduce the Chinese safety producting regulating system; secondly, introduce the safety producting regulating system of the United States, Britain, Japan; finally, study the reference which the safety producting regulating system construction experience the America, Britain, Japan give to our country. The first part provides a necessity support to the below research.
The second part is chapter 4～7. Mainly analyses the three subjects'relationship of the game.
Chapter 4 is aimed at the reality "at present, the mainstream of our country's safety producting regulating practice is good, but there also have some corruption phenomenon", distinguish two kinds of circumstance——the circumstance under the condition of corruption and normal circumstance, analyse the local government's regulating mechanism under the condition of complete information.
In chapter 5, firstly, use the principal-agent theory to analyze the possibility and effectiveness of contract incentive mechanism which is established by the local government and enterprises under the condition of incomplete information; secondly, use the signal theory establish signal game model to analyze the approach of solving the problem of enterprises'adverse selection.
In chapter 6, firstly, analyze the relationship of the central government and local government in the safety producting regulating system; secondly, construct the game model under the condition of the complete information to analyze the validity problem of the central government's surveillance mechanism which is under the condition of complete information; Finally, use the principal-agent theory analyse contracts incentive mechanism design problem which aim at local government under the condition of incomplete information.
In chapter 7, use evolutionary economics theory analyse the problem of the central government monitoring measures' indirect impact which is put on enterprise's behavior under the condition of incomplete information. The central government's monitoring measures which is discussed and analysed in the chapter 7 only include measures of reward and punishment.
The third part is the chapter 8. On the basis of the second part's research, the third part expounds the countermeasures of improving Chinese safety producting regulating system's operation effect.
The chapter 9 is the research conclusion and prospect. Firstly, summarizes the above research; secondly, point out the insufficiency; finally, give the prospect for the future research direction.
The paper mainly innovate in the following aspects:(1) use game method demonstrates the influence of safety producting investment's profit which aim at the enterprise's strategy choice in the course of the game which have infinite times; (2) combining with the principal-agent theory, use game method to establish the contract incentive model under the condition of existing the conceal; (3) establish a signal game-theory to analyse adverse selection problem which may appear in the course of safety producting regulating; (4) use the evolutionary game method to study the indirect impact of the central government's measures of reward and punishment on enterprise's behavior.
引文
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