基于委托—代理理论的政府对企业R&D支出激励模型与实证研究
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摘要
当今世界,全球竞争越来越体现在经济和科技实力的竞争。研究与开发(Research and Development,R&D)日益成为建设创新型国家众多因素中较为关键和具有决定性的因素,足够的科技投入是提高国家创新能力、促进经济社会发展的必要条件。在全社会科技投入中,政府财政科技投入起引导作用,企业R&D投入居主体地位,所以探讨政府对企业增加R&D投入的影响效用和激励机制,建立最优激励模型,求解最优激励方案,并进而提高全社会科技投入强度,是管理学研究的一个重要课题。
本文的主要研究内容包括三个方面:一是将时滞因素和研发报酬率因素纳入政府科技投入对企业研发支出的影响分析当中,分析各种因素对企业R&D支出的影响效用,并以山东省为例进行实证研究。二是基于委托—代理理论框架研究政府对企业科技投入的激励模型,分为4种情形求解出最优激励合同,并结合山东省的科技系统进行实证研究。三是根据模型的研究结果,提出五条对策建议。
根据本文分析,主要得出两点结论:一是在政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的影响效用分析中,我省政府科技投入的时滞约为2年,政府向企业进行直接科技资助以及向高校进行研发投入均能够对企业的R&D支出产生杠杆效应,政府对科研院所的科技投入并不能确定其对企业R&D支出的影响。另外,通过创造良好的科研环境提高总体科技研发报酬率能够很好的激励企业进行R&D投入。二是通过委托—代理理论对政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的作用机制进行分析,可以看出,在信息对称情况下,激励合同应当更多采用事前补助的形式,并减少企业承担的风险和收益的比例;在信息不对称情况下,必须使企业承担一定的风险,如果能够引入一个与产出相关的可观测变量,激励合同可以得到进一步优化,从我省对专业设备制造企业的科研投入情况看,政府科技投入的力度还有待进一步提高。
本文建立的政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的激励模型及激励合同求解方法可以丰富管理学的理论和方法,具有理论创新意义;对我省政府激励企业增加科技投入的实证研究,其分析结果可以直接提供给有关科技和产业管理部门作为决策参考,具有较大的应用价值。
Nowadays, global competitions are more focused on economic and scientific strength. Research and development is becoming more crucial and decisive than other factors affecting the contribution of creative country day by day, and enough scientific input is a necessary requisite to improving the innovative capability of the country and prompting the development of economics and society. Among scientific input of the whole society, government financial scientific input plays a leading role with enterprise R&D input as the main part. Therefore, as an important issue in management research, the effect and excitation mechanism that government improves scientific input to enterprises could be discussed by building an optimal excitation model and solving it to increase society scientific input.
There are three main parts in this paper. Firstly, time lag factor and rate factor of return for research is brought in the effect analysis of government scientific input to enterprise research output and the influence of sorts of factors to enterprise R&D input is analyzed and studied by using the data of Shandong. Secondly, based on principal-agent theory framework, excitation model of government scientific input to enterprise is built and solved under 4 different conditions to get corresponding optimal incentive contracts with a demonstration combined with the scientific system of Shandong province. Thirdly, there are 5 suggestions according to the result of the model.
According to the analysis in this paper, there are two conclusions: one is that it is leverage effect to enterprise R&D output made by directly scientific financial aid from government to enterprise and research input from government to higher schools and scientific input from government to research institutions couldn’t be sure to influence enterprise R&D output yet besides good scientific environment could improve the return rate of whole scientific research ,which encourages enterprises to increase R&D input, after analyzing the effect of government scientific input to enterprise R&D output with 2-year lag time of government scientific input of Shandong Province. The other is that by means of the effect mechanism of principal-agent theory to the effect of government scientific input to enterprise R&D output, it shows that incentive contract should use preliminary complement and reduce the balance between risks enterprises bear and benefits with symmetric information otherwise enterprises should bear some risk with information asymmetry moreover incentive contract could be further optimized if a visible variable relevant to industry is introduced in the model. According to scientific input to special equipment manufactures of Shandong, strength of government scientific input has to be further improved.
It could enrich management theory and methods that the excitation model and approach to solving incentive contract of government scientific input to enterprise R&D output in this paper, which has theoretical innovative significance. Results of demonstration for encouragement of Shandong government for enterprise to increase scientific input which has more using value could help relevant scientific and industrial management department to make decisions.
本文的主要研究内容包括三个方面:一是将时滞因素和研发报酬率因素纳入政府科技投入对企业研发支出的影响分析当中,分析各种因素对企业R&D支出的影响效用,并以山东省为例进行实证研究。二是基于委托—代理理论框架研究政府对企业科技投入的激励模型,分为4种情形求解出最优激励合同,并结合山东省的科技系统进行实证研究。三是根据模型的研究结果,提出五条对策建议。
根据本文分析,主要得出两点结论:一是在政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的影响效用分析中,我省政府科技投入的时滞约为2年,政府向企业进行直接科技资助以及向高校进行研发投入均能够对企业的R&D支出产生杠杆效应,政府对科研院所的科技投入并不能确定其对企业R&D支出的影响。另外,通过创造良好的科研环境提高总体科技研发报酬率能够很好的激励企业进行R&D投入。二是通过委托—代理理论对政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的作用机制进行分析,可以看出,在信息对称情况下,激励合同应当更多采用事前补助的形式,并减少企业承担的风险和收益的比例;在信息不对称情况下,必须使企业承担一定的风险,如果能够引入一个与产出相关的可观测变量,激励合同可以得到进一步优化,从我省对专业设备制造企业的科研投入情况看,政府科技投入的力度还有待进一步提高。
本文建立的政府科技投入对企业R&D支出的激励模型及激励合同求解方法可以丰富管理学的理论和方法,具有理论创新意义;对我省政府激励企业增加科技投入的实证研究,其分析结果可以直接提供给有关科技和产业管理部门作为决策参考,具有较大的应用价值。
Nowadays, global competitions are more focused on economic and scientific strength. Research and development is becoming more crucial and decisive than other factors affecting the contribution of creative country day by day, and enough scientific input is a necessary requisite to improving the innovative capability of the country and prompting the development of economics and society. Among scientific input of the whole society, government financial scientific input plays a leading role with enterprise R&D input as the main part. Therefore, as an important issue in management research, the effect and excitation mechanism that government improves scientific input to enterprises could be discussed by building an optimal excitation model and solving it to increase society scientific input.
There are three main parts in this paper. Firstly, time lag factor and rate factor of return for research is brought in the effect analysis of government scientific input to enterprise research output and the influence of sorts of factors to enterprise R&D input is analyzed and studied by using the data of Shandong. Secondly, based on principal-agent theory framework, excitation model of government scientific input to enterprise is built and solved under 4 different conditions to get corresponding optimal incentive contracts with a demonstration combined with the scientific system of Shandong province. Thirdly, there are 5 suggestions according to the result of the model.
According to the analysis in this paper, there are two conclusions: one is that it is leverage effect to enterprise R&D output made by directly scientific financial aid from government to enterprise and research input from government to higher schools and scientific input from government to research institutions couldn’t be sure to influence enterprise R&D output yet besides good scientific environment could improve the return rate of whole scientific research ,which encourages enterprises to increase R&D input, after analyzing the effect of government scientific input to enterprise R&D output with 2-year lag time of government scientific input of Shandong Province. The other is that by means of the effect mechanism of principal-agent theory to the effect of government scientific input to enterprise R&D output, it shows that incentive contract should use preliminary complement and reduce the balance between risks enterprises bear and benefits with symmetric information otherwise enterprises should bear some risk with information asymmetry moreover incentive contract could be further optimized if a visible variable relevant to industry is introduced in the model. According to scientific input to special equipment manufactures of Shandong, strength of government scientific input has to be further improved.
It could enrich management theory and methods that the excitation model and approach to solving incentive contract of government scientific input to enterprise R&D output in this paper, which has theoretical innovative significance. Results of demonstration for encouragement of Shandong government for enterprise to increase scientific input which has more using value could help relevant scientific and industrial management department to make decisions.
引文
①中国科技部官方概念。
②数据来源:2010年科技统计公报。
③数据来源:2009年国家科技统计资料汇编。
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[4] Hamberg D.,R&D Essays on the Economics of Re-search & Development. New York: Random House 1966.
[5] Busom I. An empirical evaluation of the effects of R&D subsides[J]. Economics of Innovation and New Techology,2000.9(2):111~148.
[6] Lach S. Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D evidence from Israel[J].Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002(50):369~390.
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[11]姜宁,黄万.政府补贴对企业R&D投入的影响——基于我国高技术产业的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010(7):28~33.
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[16]姚洋,章琦.中国工业企业技术效率分析[J].经济研究,2001(10):13~19.
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[27]吉亚辉,冯进.政府对高科技企业资金投入的制度创新分析——基于西部的研究[J].社会科学辑刊,2008(2):92~94.
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②数据来源:2010年科技统计公报。
③数据来源:2009年国家科技统计资料汇编。
[1]程华等.政府科技投入与企业R&D——实证研究与政策选择[M].北京科学出版社,2009.
[2]柯学文.外国政府科技投入及政策简析[J].中国财政,2003(10):63~64.
[3] Guellec D, Pottelsberghe B V. The effect of public expenditure to business R&D [R]. Paris: OECD Working Papers, 2000.
[4] Hamberg D.,R&D Essays on the Economics of Re-search & Development. New York: Random House 1966.
[5] Busom I. An empirical evaluation of the effects of R&D subsides[J]. Economics of Innovation and New Techology,2000.9(2):111~148.
[6] Lach S. Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D evidence from Israel[J].Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002(50):369~390.
[7] Gerhand S, Schibany A, Gretzmacher N. Input Additionality effects of R&D sbsidies in Austria : empirical evidence from firm-level panel data [J]. Technology Information Policy Consulting, 2004.
[8] Levin, R. C. and Reiss , P. C. , 1984 , "Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure", in Griliches, Z.( ed. ) , R&D , Patents and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[9]许治,师萍.政府科技投入对企业R&D支出影响的实证分析[J].研究与发展管理,2005(3):22~26.
[10]杨洵,师萍.中国政府科技投入对企业研发支出的影响[J].云南社会科学,2006(1):62~65.
[11]姜宁,黄万.政府补贴对企业R&D投入的影响——基于我国高技术产业的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010(7):28~33.
[12]赵付民,苏盛安,邹珊刚.我国政府科技投入对大中型工业企业R&D投入的影响分析.研究与发展管理,2006(2):81~87.
[13]师萍,许治,张炳南.政府公共R&D对企业R&D的效应分析[J].中国科技论坛,2007(4):24~28.
[14]解维敏,唐清泉,陆姗姗.政府R&D资助,企业R&D支出与自主创新—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2009(6):86~99.
[15]张日新,江伟钦.政府促进对企业研发投入的影响:广东个案[J].改革,2009(7):120~124.
[16]姚洋,章琦.中国工业企业技术效率分析[J].经济研究,2001(10):13~19.
[17]童光荣,高杰.中国政府R&D支出对企业R&D支出诱导效应及其时滞分析[J].中国科技论坛.2004,(4):97～99.
[18]贾美娟,陈守明.政府科技资助对企业自身科技投入的效应分析[J].上海管理科学,2008.5:70~74.
[19]朱平芳,徐伟民.政府的科技激励政策对大中型工业企业R&D投入及其专利产出的影响——上海市的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(6):45~53.
[20] LERNER J, SHANE H, TSAI A.Do Equity Financing Cycles Matter? Evidence from Biotechnology Alliances[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 67(3):411-446.
[21] HOLMSTROM B, PAUL M. Multi-task principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design[J].Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1991(7):24-52.
[22] Segerstrom, p. S. Innovation Imitation and Economic Growth[J]:Journal of Political Economy, 1991,vol 99
[23] Tassey, The Economics of R&D Policy,[M] Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc, 1997
[24] Tassey, Policy Issues for R&D Investment in a Knowledge-based Economy[J].Journal of Technology Transfer,2004 Vol.29, No.2.
[25]王春梅,袁继祖.我国科技产品开发中企业与政府的R&D博弈分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2006(4):98~101
[26]蒋长流,纵玲玲.基于动态博弈的政府与中小企业技术创新行为分析[J].技术经济,2007(3): 14~16.
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