工程监理企业质量行为的政府监督与激励机制研究
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摘要
我国基础设施建设投入的不断增加和加入WTO,给我国的工程监理企业带来一个前所未有的发展机遇,同时也给政府主管部门及工程监理企业带来挑战——在计划经济条件下形成并逐渐发展起来的工程质量政府监督机构的体制及监督模式已经不能适应当前形势发展的需要。2000 年颁布实施的《建设工程质量管理条例》就是深化我国工程质量政府监督管理体制改革的直接体现,与已往的工程质量政府监督管理政策相比较,新条例呈现出的主要特点之一就是强调政府主管部门要加强对工程监理企业质量行为的监督与管理。
然而,我国工程项目建设监理制的实施比较晚,各种配套政策法规还不健全,对工程监理企业质量行为监督管理的研究和应用还不够深入,这已严重影响我国建设工程的质量和制约我国的工程监理企业参与国际竞争。委托代理理论一般认为监督与激励具有替代效应,因此,本文试图通过在政府监督的基础上引入激励机制来对政府监督作新的理论突破和创新,以完善建设工程政府监督管理的理论,提高监督管理水平,增强我国工程监理企业的竞争力,迎接当前国际化发展的机遇与挑战。
本文首先在分析了工程监理企业质量行为的内涵及现阶段存在的质量行为问题之后,把博弈理论应用到政府对工程监理企业质量行为的监督管理分析中,通过博弈分析寻找出提高工程监理企业质量行为的途径,同时对政府监督机构进行经济学上的分析,由此引出建立激励机制的政府监督。
随后,针对激励机制问题,在分析了政府与工程监理企业、业主与工程监理企业的关系后,就政府对工程监理企业实施激励的模式的选择进行分析,通过分析提出建立声誉激励的机制及实施声誉激励的条件。至此,结合业主对工程监理企业的物质激励就形成了精神与物质相结合的双重激励机制,这对提高工程监理企业的质量行为、确保工程质量和提高投资效益方面具有很重要的意义。
在本文的最后首次把可拓综合评判方法运用到对工程监理企业质量行为的评价中,除建立一套比较完备的工程监理企业质量行为的综合评价指标体系外,还进行了可拓综合评价的案例分析,应用结果表明此种方法是简单有效、科学且符合实际。
With the constant increase of our country's infrastructure construction and Chinese entering WTO, there is an unprecedented opportunity to our engineering supervision enterprises. But at the same time, they bring challenges to the responsible department of the government and engineering supervision enterprise——System and model of engineering quality supervision organ, which formed and developed gradually in planned economy condition, can not adapt to demand of changing situation any more. "Quality management rule of the construction project ", which issued and implemented in 2000, is the direct embodiment of deepening system reform of the engineering quality surveillance and management in our country. Compare with the past project quality surveillance and management policy, one of new regulations' main characteristic demonstrates that it put emphasis on strengthening to supervise quality behavior of each main body participated in engineering construction.
However, the implementation of our country's project construction supervisory system is later, various kinds of related policies and regulations are still imperfect, research and application of supervising quality behavior management don't deepen as well, and this has already influenced the quality of the construction project of our country and restricted management enterprise to participate in the international competition seriously. In general, the Principal-Agent theory considers that supervise and incentive having effect of substituting. Therefore, The text attempts to analyze supervision and management of supervision quality behavior with incentive theory, so as to break through and innovate the theory, and perfect theory on government's supervision and management of project quality, raise management level of supervising, strengthen the competitiveness of our country's supervision enterprises, meet the opportunities and challenges of present internationalized development.
First of all, the text analyzed the definition of construction supervision enterprises' quality behavior and existing problem at the present stage, and applied game theory to analyze supervision and management of engineering quality supervisory organ to engineering supervision enterprises' quality behavior. Furthermore, the text found out the way of improving construction supervision enterprise's quality behavior, and carried on analyzing economically the supervisory
organ of engineering quality at the same time, therefore drew the government who sets up incentive mechanism to supervise. Afterwards, to the question that the incentive mechanism is designed, after analyzing the relationship between responsible department of the government and engineering supervision enterprises, owner and engineering supervision enterprises, the text carried on the choice analysis of the government to engineering supervision enterprises' incentive mode, and put forward mechanism of setting up reputation incentive and it's condition. So far, combining owner to material incentive of engineering supervision enterprise formed the double incentive mechanism, it's very important to improve engineering enterprise's quality behavior, guarantee engineering quality, and raise investment benefits. The text lastly applied extension to engineering supervision quality behavior of comprehensive appraisal, set up a set of comprehensive evaluation index system of engineering supervision enterprise's quality behavior, at the same time, it applied extension comprehensive appraisal method to appraisal of some project construction supervision enterprise's quality behavior, its result indicates this kind of method is simple and effective, science and corresponding to reality.
然而,我国工程项目建设监理制的实施比较晚,各种配套政策法规还不健全,对工程监理企业质量行为监督管理的研究和应用还不够深入,这已严重影响我国建设工程的质量和制约我国的工程监理企业参与国际竞争。委托代理理论一般认为监督与激励具有替代效应,因此,本文试图通过在政府监督的基础上引入激励机制来对政府监督作新的理论突破和创新,以完善建设工程政府监督管理的理论,提高监督管理水平,增强我国工程监理企业的竞争力,迎接当前国际化发展的机遇与挑战。
本文首先在分析了工程监理企业质量行为的内涵及现阶段存在的质量行为问题之后,把博弈理论应用到政府对工程监理企业质量行为的监督管理分析中,通过博弈分析寻找出提高工程监理企业质量行为的途径,同时对政府监督机构进行经济学上的分析,由此引出建立激励机制的政府监督。
随后,针对激励机制问题,在分析了政府与工程监理企业、业主与工程监理企业的关系后,就政府对工程监理企业实施激励的模式的选择进行分析,通过分析提出建立声誉激励的机制及实施声誉激励的条件。至此,结合业主对工程监理企业的物质激励就形成了精神与物质相结合的双重激励机制,这对提高工程监理企业的质量行为、确保工程质量和提高投资效益方面具有很重要的意义。
在本文的最后首次把可拓综合评判方法运用到对工程监理企业质量行为的评价中,除建立一套比较完备的工程监理企业质量行为的综合评价指标体系外,还进行了可拓综合评价的案例分析,应用结果表明此种方法是简单有效、科学且符合实际。
With the constant increase of our country's infrastructure construction and Chinese entering WTO, there is an unprecedented opportunity to our engineering supervision enterprises. But at the same time, they bring challenges to the responsible department of the government and engineering supervision enterprise——System and model of engineering quality supervision organ, which formed and developed gradually in planned economy condition, can not adapt to demand of changing situation any more. "Quality management rule of the construction project ", which issued and implemented in 2000, is the direct embodiment of deepening system reform of the engineering quality surveillance and management in our country. Compare with the past project quality surveillance and management policy, one of new regulations' main characteristic demonstrates that it put emphasis on strengthening to supervise quality behavior of each main body participated in engineering construction.
However, the implementation of our country's project construction supervisory system is later, various kinds of related policies and regulations are still imperfect, research and application of supervising quality behavior management don't deepen as well, and this has already influenced the quality of the construction project of our country and restricted management enterprise to participate in the international competition seriously. In general, the Principal-Agent theory considers that supervise and incentive having effect of substituting. Therefore, The text attempts to analyze supervision and management of supervision quality behavior with incentive theory, so as to break through and innovate the theory, and perfect theory on government's supervision and management of project quality, raise management level of supervising, strengthen the competitiveness of our country's supervision enterprises, meet the opportunities and challenges of present internationalized development.
First of all, the text analyzed the definition of construction supervision enterprises' quality behavior and existing problem at the present stage, and applied game theory to analyze supervision and management of engineering quality supervisory organ to engineering supervision enterprises' quality behavior. Furthermore, the text found out the way of improving construction supervision enterprise's quality behavior, and carried on analyzing economically the supervisory
organ of engineering quality at the same time, therefore drew the government who sets up incentive mechanism to supervise. Afterwards, to the question that the incentive mechanism is designed, after analyzing the relationship between responsible department of the government and engineering supervision enterprises, owner and engineering supervision enterprises, the text carried on the choice analysis of the government to engineering supervision enterprises' incentive mode, and put forward mechanism of setting up reputation incentive and it's condition. So far, combining owner to material incentive of engineering supervision enterprise formed the double incentive mechanism, it's very important to improve engineering enterprise's quality behavior, guarantee engineering quality, and raise investment benefits. The text lastly applied extension to engineering supervision quality behavior of comprehensive appraisal, set up a set of comprehensive evaluation index system of engineering supervision enterprise's quality behavior, at the same time, it applied extension comprehensive appraisal method to appraisal of some project construction supervision enterprise's quality behavior, its result indicates this kind of method is simple and effective, science and corresponding to reality.
引文
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[3] 孟宪海,王綦正.法国建设管理体制的特点及其研究[J].建筑经济.1999(201).
[4] 孟宪海.德国建设管理体制的特点及其研究[J].建筑经济.1999 (200).
[5] Wilson, R., 1969, “The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainly”, La, Decision, No.171.
[6] Rose,S.1973,“The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem”, The American Economic Review 63:134-139.
[7] Holmstrom, B., 1979, “Moral Hazard and Observability”,Bell Journal of Economics 10:74-91.
[8] Grossman, S. &O.Hart, 1983, “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem”.Econometrica 51:7-45.
[9] Kreps,D.,and R.Wilson,1982,“Reputation and Imperfect Information”, Journal of Economic Theory 27;253-279.
[10] Milgrom,P.& J.Roberts,1982,“Predation,Reputation,and Entry Deterrence”, Journal of Economic theory 27;280-312.
[11] Fama, E.1980, “Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, p288-307.
[12] A.A.Alchian&H.Demsetz, 1972, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”, American Economic Review, 62(50), 777-795.
[13] Grossman,S. &O.Hart,1988,“One share-one vote and the market for corporate control”,J. of Financial Economics 20,175-202.
[14] Harris, M. &A.Raviv,1988,“Corporate governance:voting rights and majority rules”,J.of Financial Economics 20,203-235.
[15] Jensen, Michael C.,and Kevie J.Murphy,1990a,“CEOs Incentives –It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How”, Harvard Business Review,May-June,138-153.
[16] Mourdoch, J.1991, Executive Compensation: The Use of Incentive Contracts to Attenuate an Agency Problem. University of California,Los Angeles unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation.
[17] Demsetz, 1997: The Economics of the Business Firm. Cambridge University Press.
[18] George Baker. The use of performance measures in incentive contracting. The American Economic Review, 2002, 2:415-420.
[19] 拉丰,马赫蒂摩著.陈志俊等译.激励理论——委托代理模型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版 社.2002.
[20] 刘彤,《组织行为学》[M],中国物资出版社,1994,P70、200 .
[21] 张维迎.《企业的企业家——契约理论》[M].上海三联出版社,1995.
[22] 蒋炜,席酉民.道德风险下私有信息的价值分析[J].系统工程理论与实践.1997,8.
[23] 祝足,黄培清.信息不对称时对激励机制的选择[J].上海交通大学学报.1997,31(4).
[24] 郑绍濂,骆品亮.分成制与相对绩效评价机制及其效率研究[J].管理科学学报.1998,1(1).
[25] 敖志军,惠益民.存在道德危害的委托——代理模型中多重激励问题的研究[J].中国管理科学.1997,5(4).
[26] 王孟钧,王艳.建筑市场主体激励机制的博弈分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2001,(4):59-62.
[27] 卢毅,王康臣,张劲文.公路建设项目法人激励模型与机制[J].交通运输工程学报,2003,3(2).
[28] 田盈,薄勇健.建筑市场激励机制设计[J].重庆大学学报,2003,26(10).
[29] 秦旋.工程监理制度下的委托代理博弈分析[J].中国软科学,2004,(4):142-146.
[30] 阮金元,阮新.产品质量信息与质量信息反馈系统的建立研究[J].标准化报道,2000,21(2).
[31] 质量管理的基本原理与理论[EB/OL].http://www.printmarket.com.cn/iso/iso5s-24.asp.
[32] 张维迎,博弈论与信息经济学[M],上海,上海人民出版社,2001 版.
[33] George Akerlof .1970,“The Market for Lemons:Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,84,488-500.
[34] A .M.Spence , Job Market Signaling, Quarterly Journal of Economics,1974,87,355-377.
[35] Kreps,D.,Wilson.R.,Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economics Theory, 1982, 253-279.
[36] 雷亚萍,激励机制的综合模型及其相关因素分析[J],西北工业大学学报,2003,23(2)
[37] 贾中裕,经济、管理、数学的结合与发展[M],北京:经济管理出版社,2000.
[38] W.Macleod, 1983, “The Role of Exit Costs in the Theory of Cooperative Teams: A Theoretical Perspective”, Journal of Comparative Economics 17:521-529.
[39] W.Macleod, 1988, “Equity, Efficiency, and Incentives in Cooperative Teams”in Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labaur Managed Firms, Vol, 3:5-23.
[40] 周健临.管理学教程[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2001.
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