三度价格歧视理论及福利效应分析
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摘要
理论界对三度价格歧视的研究一般从两个方面进行,一是从厂商角度出发,研究厂商如何通过三度价格歧视达到利润最大化的目的;二是从消费者角度出发,研究三度价格歧视对社会福利(消费者剩余)的影响。本文正是分别从厂商角度和消费者角度对三度价格歧视进行一定深度的研究,得出了一些有价值的结论。
本文第三章主要研究了两厂商情形下的三度价格歧视的有效性问题,现有文献对于三度价格歧视的有效性问题的研究基本上都是基于垄断厂商情形,即市场上只有一个垄断厂商的情形,而本文将其研究的内容拓展到了两厂商情形,基于完全信息静态模型研究了竞争市场上的两厂商在线性需求函数和线性成本函数条件下的三度价格歧视的有效性问题,并分别给出了两厂商在两个子市场上,在单一价格条件下以及歧视价格条件下的最优销售量、最优价格和最大利润的计算公式,给出了各厂商价格歧视有效和价格歧视无异于单一价格的充要条件。
本文第四章主要基于多个子市场情形,对规模经济条件下边际成本的递减性与子市场价格变化趋势的关系进行探讨,证明了递减的边际成本是三度价格歧视条件下n个子市场价格均下降或上升的必要条件,将Stephen K. Layson[8]的结果拓展到n个子市场的情形。另外,对价格歧视造成的社会福利变动作了简要的分析。
The studies on third-degree price discrimination by theory circle generally go on from two respects: 1.From manufacturer’s point of views, they study how the manufacturer achieves the purpose that profits maximize through third-degree price discrimination. 2. From consumer’s point of views, they study the impact on social welfare (consumer's surplus) of third-degree price discrimination. This paper research third-degree price discrimination in terms of manufacturer angle and consumer separately, and have drawn some valuable conclusions.
In chapter 3, we chiefly study on the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination under two manufacturers, generally the studies on the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination in former papers were based on monopoly market, that is there is only one monopoly manufacturer in market. This paper expand the content of its research to the market conditions of two factories, based on a complete static information model and the linear demand functions and linear cost functions, the paper study the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination under two manufacturers, which compete in the same markets. It further respectively put forward the calculation formulas of the maximum sales volume and the maximum price and the maximum profit which belong to both manufacturers who is on the condition of common price or third-degree price discrimination in the two sub-markets, and also it put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to be effective or to be same as common price.
In chapter 4, based on more than two sub-markets conditions under economies of scale, the paper studies the relationship between the declining characteristic of Marginal cost and the change direction of the Price, it prove that if the price profit function under price discrimination is strictly quasiconcave and the n demand functions are downward sloping and independent ,a necessary condition for prices to either fall or rise in all sub-markets under price discrimination is that marginal cost be a declining function of total output. In addition,the paper also briefly analyzes the changes of social welfare by price discrimination actions.
本文第三章主要研究了两厂商情形下的三度价格歧视的有效性问题,现有文献对于三度价格歧视的有效性问题的研究基本上都是基于垄断厂商情形,即市场上只有一个垄断厂商的情形,而本文将其研究的内容拓展到了两厂商情形,基于完全信息静态模型研究了竞争市场上的两厂商在线性需求函数和线性成本函数条件下的三度价格歧视的有效性问题,并分别给出了两厂商在两个子市场上,在单一价格条件下以及歧视价格条件下的最优销售量、最优价格和最大利润的计算公式,给出了各厂商价格歧视有效和价格歧视无异于单一价格的充要条件。
本文第四章主要基于多个子市场情形,对规模经济条件下边际成本的递减性与子市场价格变化趋势的关系进行探讨,证明了递减的边际成本是三度价格歧视条件下n个子市场价格均下降或上升的必要条件,将Stephen K. Layson[8]的结果拓展到n个子市场的情形。另外,对价格歧视造成的社会福利变动作了简要的分析。
The studies on third-degree price discrimination by theory circle generally go on from two respects: 1.From manufacturer’s point of views, they study how the manufacturer achieves the purpose that profits maximize through third-degree price discrimination. 2. From consumer’s point of views, they study the impact on social welfare (consumer's surplus) of third-degree price discrimination. This paper research third-degree price discrimination in terms of manufacturer angle and consumer separately, and have drawn some valuable conclusions.
In chapter 3, we chiefly study on the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination under two manufacturers, generally the studies on the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination in former papers were based on monopoly market, that is there is only one monopoly manufacturer in market. This paper expand the content of its research to the market conditions of two factories, based on a complete static information model and the linear demand functions and linear cost functions, the paper study the effectivity of third-degree price discrimination under two manufacturers, which compete in the same markets. It further respectively put forward the calculation formulas of the maximum sales volume and the maximum price and the maximum profit which belong to both manufacturers who is on the condition of common price or third-degree price discrimination in the two sub-markets, and also it put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to be effective or to be same as common price.
In chapter 4, based on more than two sub-markets conditions under economies of scale, the paper studies the relationship between the declining characteristic of Marginal cost and the change direction of the Price, it prove that if the price profit function under price discrimination is strictly quasiconcave and the n demand functions are downward sloping and independent ,a necessary condition for prices to either fall or rise in all sub-markets under price discrimination is that marginal cost be a declining function of total output. In addition,the paper also briefly analyzes the changes of social welfare by price discrimination actions.
引文
[1] 唐小我,付崇伦.价格歧视有效性研究.电子科技大学学报,1996,25(2):200-205
[2] 唐小我.三度价格歧视的数量分析.管理工程学报,1999,13(1):37-39
[3] Richard S. Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Discrimination. American Economic Review, 1981, 71(1):242-247
[4] Varian, Hal R, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare. American Economic Review, 1985, 75(4):870-875
[5] Varian, Hal R. Price Discrimination. New York: Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1989,75-78
[6] Marius S. Third Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(5):1259-1262
[7] Jeffrey H A, and Jeffrey K, Mackie M. Price Discrimination and Patent Policy. Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19(2):253-265
[8] Layson S K. Third-Degree Price Discrimination under Economies of Scale. Southern Economic, 1994; 61(2):61-62
[9] 傅英定,成孝予,唐应辉. 最优化理论与方法.四川:电子科技大学出版社,1996,26-32
[10] 泰勒尔,产业组织理论[M],北京:中国人民人学出版社,1997,156-204
[11] 伊恩·M·道布斯,王志平,崔世平译. 管理经济学. 上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003,128-190
[12] 瓦尔特·尼科尔森.微观经济理论.北京:中国经济出版社,1999,125-205
[13] 陈岱孙.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(1-4 卷).北京:经济科学出版社,1996,485-489
[14] 王玉霞.价格歧视理论中的若干问题.财经问题研究,2000,204(2):18-21
[15] Pigou, Arthur C. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan Company, 1920:204-206
[16] [美]H·范里安. 微观经济学:现代观点. 上海:三联书店,上海人民出版社, 1994,301-305
[17] 文瑶玲.价格歧视理论及思考.价格与市场,2005,205(2):9-11
[18] 平狄克和鲁宾费尔德.微观经济学(第四版).北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997,202-203
[19] 唐小我,曾勇等.管理经济分析:理论与应用.成都:电子科技大学出版社,2004,324-340
[20] 葛结根. 价格歧视战略与福利效应分析. 中南财经政法大学学报,2003,38(3):102-106
[21] 黎诣远. 微观经济分析. 北京:清华大学出版社, 2000,201-202
[22] 丹尼斯·卡尔顿,杰弗里·佩罗夫.现代产业组织.上海:上海人民出版社,1998,188-190
[23] 刘伟,曹书军,梁铄. 双赢的选择:论航空公司实施三度价格歧视. 中国物价, 2003,203-206
[24] 郭嘉莉. 浅谈我国电力市场的差别定价. 广西电力工程, 2000,54(1):156-158
[25] 杨凤玲.天然气价格歧视研究. 城市燃气,2004,26(7):56-59
[26] 何元庆,李红光,赵子健.铁路客运实行季节性差别定价的效益分析. 价格理论与实践, 2003,45(3):48-50
[27] 魏海峰.价格歧视在电信运营业中的运用. 通信企业管理, 2005,45(6):68-71
[28] 杨省贵.价格歧视在旅游产品定价中的应用. 经济师, 2004,23(10):47-50
[29] 何娟.价格歧视的社会福利分析.价格月刊,2003,34(6):23-26
[30] 张桂文.试析价格歧视对竞争与社会福利的影响.中国物价, 2002,32(10)42-46
[31] 衷建红. 关于价格歧视问题的探讨.中国物价,2002,45(3):35-39
[32] 祁玉军. 关于价格歧视的几点思考.价格理论与实践,2002,56(1):45-48
[33] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学. 上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996,48-56
[34] 张伯仑. 垄断竞争理论.北京:三联书店,1980,178-195
[35] 梁东黎,刘东.微观经济学.南京:南京大学出版社,1991:145-155
[2] 唐小我.三度价格歧视的数量分析.管理工程学报,1999,13(1):37-39
[3] Richard S. Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Discrimination. American Economic Review, 1981, 71(1):242-247
[4] Varian, Hal R, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare. American Economic Review, 1985, 75(4):870-875
[5] Varian, Hal R. Price Discrimination. New York: Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1989,75-78
[6] Marius S. Third Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result. American Economic Review, 1990, 80(5):1259-1262
[7] Jeffrey H A, and Jeffrey K, Mackie M. Price Discrimination and Patent Policy. Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 19(2):253-265
[8] Layson S K. Third-Degree Price Discrimination under Economies of Scale. Southern Economic, 1994; 61(2):61-62
[9] 傅英定,成孝予,唐应辉. 最优化理论与方法.四川:电子科技大学出版社,1996,26-32
[10] 泰勒尔,产业组织理论[M],北京:中国人民人学出版社,1997,156-204
[11] 伊恩·M·道布斯,王志平,崔世平译. 管理经济学. 上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003,128-190
[12] 瓦尔特·尼科尔森.微观经济理论.北京:中国经济出版社,1999,125-205
[13] 陈岱孙.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(1-4 卷).北京:经济科学出版社,1996,485-489
[14] 王玉霞.价格歧视理论中的若干问题.财经问题研究,2000,204(2):18-21
[15] Pigou, Arthur C. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan Company, 1920:204-206
[16] [美]H·范里安. 微观经济学:现代观点. 上海:三联书店,上海人民出版社, 1994,301-305
[17] 文瑶玲.价格歧视理论及思考.价格与市场,2005,205(2):9-11
[18] 平狄克和鲁宾费尔德.微观经济学(第四版).北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997,202-203
[19] 唐小我,曾勇等.管理经济分析:理论与应用.成都:电子科技大学出版社,2004,324-340
[20] 葛结根. 价格歧视战略与福利效应分析. 中南财经政法大学学报,2003,38(3):102-106
[21] 黎诣远. 微观经济分析. 北京:清华大学出版社, 2000,201-202
[22] 丹尼斯·卡尔顿,杰弗里·佩罗夫.现代产业组织.上海:上海人民出版社,1998,188-190
[23] 刘伟,曹书军,梁铄. 双赢的选择:论航空公司实施三度价格歧视. 中国物价, 2003,203-206
[24] 郭嘉莉. 浅谈我国电力市场的差别定价. 广西电力工程, 2000,54(1):156-158
[25] 杨凤玲.天然气价格歧视研究. 城市燃气,2004,26(7):56-59
[26] 何元庆,李红光,赵子健.铁路客运实行季节性差别定价的效益分析. 价格理论与实践, 2003,45(3):48-50
[27] 魏海峰.价格歧视在电信运营业中的运用. 通信企业管理, 2005,45(6):68-71
[28] 杨省贵.价格歧视在旅游产品定价中的应用. 经济师, 2004,23(10):47-50
[29] 何娟.价格歧视的社会福利分析.价格月刊,2003,34(6):23-26
[30] 张桂文.试析价格歧视对竞争与社会福利的影响.中国物价, 2002,32(10)42-46
[31] 衷建红. 关于价格歧视问题的探讨.中国物价,2002,45(3):35-39
[32] 祁玉军. 关于价格歧视的几点思考.价格理论与实践,2002,56(1):45-48
[33] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学. 上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996,48-56
[34] 张伯仑. 垄断竞争理论.北京:三联书店,1980,178-195
[35] 梁东黎,刘东.微观经济学.南京:南京大学出版社,1991:145-155