特许经营复合体系
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摘要
2007年5月1日起实施的《商业特许经营管理条例》将特许经营定义为:商业特许经营是指拥有注册商标、企业标志、专利、专有技术等经营资源的企业,以合同形式将其拥有的经营资源许可给其他经营者使用;受许人按照合同约定在统一的经营模式下开展经营,并向特许人支付特许经营费用的经营活动。
目前,特许经营以各种形式存在于世界上九十多个国家,并且在继续增长。虽然我国引入特许经营模式的时间较晚,但在短短十多年的时间里却得到了迅猛地发展,市场发展潜力巨大,我国目前已经发展成为拥有众多特许经营体系的国家,并且发展速度相当惊人。
对特许经营企业的调查表明,有的特许经营企业采用纯粹的加盟店形式,有的特许经营企业则采用直营店和加盟店共存的形式,并且绝大多数的特许经营企业采用的是后者,即直营店和加盟店共存的复合形式。本文研究的主要对象就是特许经营复合体系,在这个复合体系中,不仅存在着由收取固定工资的经理所管理的直营店面,而且同时还存在着由独立的受许人所拥有的加盟店面。
文章没有深入地探讨特许经营体系的具体运作流程,而是把特许经营复合体系纳入到经济学的框架中,从特许经营主体双方在不确定条件下的投资决策角度出发对特许经营复合体系进行了分析。
文章首先简单介绍了研究的背景、思路等内容,然后详细地综述了特许经营理论以及特许经营复合体系的相关文献,接着就进入了文章的主体部分:利用经济学的分析框架,从特许经营主体双方在不确定条件下的投资决策出发构建了一个特许经营主体双方投资决策模型,并分别得出了特许人采用加盟店和直营店的区间范围,以及受许人投资特许经营体系和建立独立品牌店面的区间范围。特许人出于对成本收益的比较,只有当自己从受许人的加盟店中获得的收益大于从自己经营的直营店中获得的收益时,才会吸纳受许人成为自己的加盟商,从而拥有加盟店;只要特许人愿意提供特许经营契约,即使受许人的风险规避程度比特许人还要高,只要受许人认为从特许体系中获得的收益优于自己建立的独立品牌的收益,那么受许人就愿意加入到一个特许体系中成为这个特许体系的加盟店,这表明特许经营复合体系是使特许人和受许人利润最大化的一种形式,特许经营体系中加盟店和直营店共存的现象是特许人和受许人追求利润最大化的结果。
因为文章的分析建立在特许契约签订的前提假设下,即受许人只有在特许体系中才能够满足自身利润最大化的目标,所以,在这种情况下,特许体系中加盟店的数量就由特许人来决定了。通过对特许人的成本收益进行分析,从特许人利润最大化的要求出发,得出特许体系复合形式中加盟店的最佳比例,当特许人增加一个加盟店的边际成本等于增加一个加盟店的边际收益时,此时的加盟店比例就是最佳的加盟店的比例。影响加盟店比例的因素有加盟费、特许人开设直营店的预期收益、特许权使用率、受许人风险规避度、特许人风险规避度、特许人单店投资成本等。其中,加盟店比例分别和加盟费、特许权使用率、特许人单店的投资成本、特许人风险规避程度、受许人参与特许体系的确定性等值这五个变量成正相关关系,而和受许人风险规避程度、特许人开设直营店的预期收益这两个变量成负相关关系。
最后,文章运用世界特许经营前500强中餐饮行业、服务行业、儿童产品及服务行业、家装产品及服务行业的数据,对模型的预测进行验证,在验证的过程中,运用加盟费、特许权使用率、企业排名、企业经营年数等四个变量对加盟店比例进行回归,发现加盟费、企业排名和企业经营年数这三个变量都显著地影响加盟店的比例。
“Business Franchise Management regulations" which brought into effect on May 1, 2007 defines the franchise as follows: Business franchise is that the business enterprise which possesses a registered trademark, enterprise mark, patent and know-how resources permits other operators to use its resources in the form of the contract, at the same time, the franchisees operate under the unified business model in accordance with the contract, and pay the franchise fee to the franchisor.
Nowadays, more than ninety countries own the franchise systems which exist in various forms, furthermore, more and more countries will use the franchise systems to distribute products or services. Although it is later to introduce the franchise system in our country, the development of franchise system is rapid in a short period of time for more than a decade, and the market potentialities will be great. Currently, the number of franchise system of our country is most, and the speed of development is amazing.
The surveys for franchising businesses indicate that some franchise systems only own franchisee-owned units, and the others have both franchisee-owned and franchisor-owned units. Furthermore, the vast majority of franchise enterprises use the form of the latter. In other words, most franchise systems not only own franchisee-owned units but also franchisor-owned units. In this paper, the main target is the franchise dual system. In the dual system, there are not only franchisor-owned units but also franchisee-owned units. The franchisor-owned unit is controlled by the manager whose wage is fixed, but thefranchisee-owned unit is operated by the independent franchisee.
The article does not discuss the operation process of the franchise system clearly, but puts the franchise dual system into the framework of economics, and analyses the dual system based on the risk investment between franchisor and franchisee.
The article first briefly introduces the research background as well as the ideas, then overviews the knowledge of franchising and then followed by the main part of the article: this paper uses an analysis framework of neo-classical economics. First the paper constructs a model under the uncertain conditions, and then the paper draws respectively the franchisor’s ranges of franchisor-owned units and franchisee-owned units, at the same time, the paper also draws the franchisee’s ranges of franchisee-owned units and units of the independent brands. Franchisor based on cost-benefit comparison will own franchisee-owned units when his benefits from the franchisee-owned units are better than the benefits from the franchisor-owned units. As long as franchisor is willing to provide the franchise contract and the franchisee’s benefits from franchisee-owned units are better than the benefits from the units of the independent brands, the franchisee is willing to join the franchise system. Therefor, the franchise dual system is a form from which both the franchisor and the franchisee can get the most profits.
Because the analysis is built on the assumption that the franchise contract has been signed, that is, it is that only in the franchise system the franchisee will be able to maximize his profits. Therefore, in this case, the numbers of franchisee-owned units are decided by the franchisor. The paper draws the optimal proportion of the franchisee-owned units based on the maximizing profits of franchisor through the cost-benefit analysis of the franchisor. When the marginal cost of a franchisee-owned unit equals to the marginal revenue of a franchisee-owned unit, the proportion is optimal. There are many factors affect the proportion such as the fixed fee, the royalty, the expected income of franchisor from the franchisor-owned units, the franchisee’s degree of risk aversion, the franchisor’s degree of risk aversion, the investment cost of a franchisor-owned unit, the certainty equivalent of franchisee who join the franchise system and so on. The paper draw some following conclusions: the correlation between the fixed fee and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the royalty and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the investment cost of a franchisor-owned unit and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the franchisor’s degree of risk aversion and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the certainty equivalent of franchisee who join the franchise system and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the franchisee’s degree of risk aversion and the optimal proportion is negative; the correlation between the expected income of franchisor from the franchisor-owned units and the optimal proportion is negative.
Lastly, the article uses the data from the world's top 500 franchise systems and tests the model. The paper uses the data of food industry, children's products & services industry, home industry and service industry. The paper also tests the correlation between the factors which affect the optimal proportion and the optimal proportion; furthermore, the paper draws a conclusion that the fixed fee, the position and the franchise development time affect the optimal proportion significantly.
目前,特许经营以各种形式存在于世界上九十多个国家,并且在继续增长。虽然我国引入特许经营模式的时间较晚,但在短短十多年的时间里却得到了迅猛地发展,市场发展潜力巨大,我国目前已经发展成为拥有众多特许经营体系的国家,并且发展速度相当惊人。
对特许经营企业的调查表明,有的特许经营企业采用纯粹的加盟店形式,有的特许经营企业则采用直营店和加盟店共存的形式,并且绝大多数的特许经营企业采用的是后者,即直营店和加盟店共存的复合形式。本文研究的主要对象就是特许经营复合体系,在这个复合体系中,不仅存在着由收取固定工资的经理所管理的直营店面,而且同时还存在着由独立的受许人所拥有的加盟店面。
文章没有深入地探讨特许经营体系的具体运作流程,而是把特许经营复合体系纳入到经济学的框架中,从特许经营主体双方在不确定条件下的投资决策角度出发对特许经营复合体系进行了分析。
文章首先简单介绍了研究的背景、思路等内容,然后详细地综述了特许经营理论以及特许经营复合体系的相关文献,接着就进入了文章的主体部分:利用经济学的分析框架,从特许经营主体双方在不确定条件下的投资决策出发构建了一个特许经营主体双方投资决策模型,并分别得出了特许人采用加盟店和直营店的区间范围,以及受许人投资特许经营体系和建立独立品牌店面的区间范围。特许人出于对成本收益的比较,只有当自己从受许人的加盟店中获得的收益大于从自己经营的直营店中获得的收益时,才会吸纳受许人成为自己的加盟商,从而拥有加盟店;只要特许人愿意提供特许经营契约,即使受许人的风险规避程度比特许人还要高,只要受许人认为从特许体系中获得的收益优于自己建立的独立品牌的收益,那么受许人就愿意加入到一个特许体系中成为这个特许体系的加盟店,这表明特许经营复合体系是使特许人和受许人利润最大化的一种形式,特许经营体系中加盟店和直营店共存的现象是特许人和受许人追求利润最大化的结果。
因为文章的分析建立在特许契约签订的前提假设下,即受许人只有在特许体系中才能够满足自身利润最大化的目标,所以,在这种情况下,特许体系中加盟店的数量就由特许人来决定了。通过对特许人的成本收益进行分析,从特许人利润最大化的要求出发,得出特许体系复合形式中加盟店的最佳比例,当特许人增加一个加盟店的边际成本等于增加一个加盟店的边际收益时,此时的加盟店比例就是最佳的加盟店的比例。影响加盟店比例的因素有加盟费、特许人开设直营店的预期收益、特许权使用率、受许人风险规避度、特许人风险规避度、特许人单店投资成本等。其中,加盟店比例分别和加盟费、特许权使用率、特许人单店的投资成本、特许人风险规避程度、受许人参与特许体系的确定性等值这五个变量成正相关关系,而和受许人风险规避程度、特许人开设直营店的预期收益这两个变量成负相关关系。
最后,文章运用世界特许经营前500强中餐饮行业、服务行业、儿童产品及服务行业、家装产品及服务行业的数据,对模型的预测进行验证,在验证的过程中,运用加盟费、特许权使用率、企业排名、企业经营年数等四个变量对加盟店比例进行回归,发现加盟费、企业排名和企业经营年数这三个变量都显著地影响加盟店的比例。
“Business Franchise Management regulations" which brought into effect on May 1, 2007 defines the franchise as follows: Business franchise is that the business enterprise which possesses a registered trademark, enterprise mark, patent and know-how resources permits other operators to use its resources in the form of the contract, at the same time, the franchisees operate under the unified business model in accordance with the contract, and pay the franchise fee to the franchisor.
Nowadays, more than ninety countries own the franchise systems which exist in various forms, furthermore, more and more countries will use the franchise systems to distribute products or services. Although it is later to introduce the franchise system in our country, the development of franchise system is rapid in a short period of time for more than a decade, and the market potentialities will be great. Currently, the number of franchise system of our country is most, and the speed of development is amazing.
The surveys for franchising businesses indicate that some franchise systems only own franchisee-owned units, and the others have both franchisee-owned and franchisor-owned units. Furthermore, the vast majority of franchise enterprises use the form of the latter. In other words, most franchise systems not only own franchisee-owned units but also franchisor-owned units. In this paper, the main target is the franchise dual system. In the dual system, there are not only franchisor-owned units but also franchisee-owned units. The franchisor-owned unit is controlled by the manager whose wage is fixed, but thefranchisee-owned unit is operated by the independent franchisee.
The article does not discuss the operation process of the franchise system clearly, but puts the franchise dual system into the framework of economics, and analyses the dual system based on the risk investment between franchisor and franchisee.
The article first briefly introduces the research background as well as the ideas, then overviews the knowledge of franchising and then followed by the main part of the article: this paper uses an analysis framework of neo-classical economics. First the paper constructs a model under the uncertain conditions, and then the paper draws respectively the franchisor’s ranges of franchisor-owned units and franchisee-owned units, at the same time, the paper also draws the franchisee’s ranges of franchisee-owned units and units of the independent brands. Franchisor based on cost-benefit comparison will own franchisee-owned units when his benefits from the franchisee-owned units are better than the benefits from the franchisor-owned units. As long as franchisor is willing to provide the franchise contract and the franchisee’s benefits from franchisee-owned units are better than the benefits from the units of the independent brands, the franchisee is willing to join the franchise system. Therefor, the franchise dual system is a form from which both the franchisor and the franchisee can get the most profits.
Because the analysis is built on the assumption that the franchise contract has been signed, that is, it is that only in the franchise system the franchisee will be able to maximize his profits. Therefore, in this case, the numbers of franchisee-owned units are decided by the franchisor. The paper draws the optimal proportion of the franchisee-owned units based on the maximizing profits of franchisor through the cost-benefit analysis of the franchisor. When the marginal cost of a franchisee-owned unit equals to the marginal revenue of a franchisee-owned unit, the proportion is optimal. There are many factors affect the proportion such as the fixed fee, the royalty, the expected income of franchisor from the franchisor-owned units, the franchisee’s degree of risk aversion, the franchisor’s degree of risk aversion, the investment cost of a franchisor-owned unit, the certainty equivalent of franchisee who join the franchise system and so on. The paper draw some following conclusions: the correlation between the fixed fee and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the royalty and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the investment cost of a franchisor-owned unit and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the franchisor’s degree of risk aversion and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the certainty equivalent of franchisee who join the franchise system and the optimal proportion is positive; the correlation between the franchisee’s degree of risk aversion and the optimal proportion is negative; the correlation between the expected income of franchisor from the franchisor-owned units and the optimal proportion is negative.
Lastly, the article uses the data from the world's top 500 franchise systems and tests the model. The paper uses the data of food industry, children's products & services industry, home industry and service industry. The paper also tests the correlation between the factors which affect the optimal proportion and the optimal proportion; furthermore, the paper draws a conclusion that the fixed fee, the position and the franchise development time affect the optimal proportion significantly.
引文
①中国连锁经营协会.特许经营中国实践[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2008
②http://finance.jrj.com.cn/news/2008-04-19/000003552621.html
①根据http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/整理
①根据http://www.sinatx.com/brand/848.html(2008.8.4)整理
①Bhattacharyya, S. & Lafontaine. F. Double Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts [J]. Journal of Economics, 1995, 26:761-781
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②http://finance.jrj.com.cn/news/2008-04-19/000003552621.html
①根据http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/整理
①根据http://www.sinatx.com/brand/848.html(2008.8.4)整理
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