资本结构、公司治理与债权人利益保护研究
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摘要
债权人是企业重要的利益相关者,虽然投资者保护一直是理论界研究的热点,但从经济学、法学和会计学等方面并结合我国具体情况对债权人利益保护进行综合研究的却相对较少。基于此,本文从资本制度、资本结构、公司治理和法律保障等方面深入系统地研究了债权人利益保护问题。
实现注册资本信用与资产信用的结合,并更突出资产信用,建立适应债权人需要的资本信用模式是从资本制度出发实现债权人利益保护作用的理念基础。债权人在企业中的地位和作用是由企业的所有权理论决定的。“状态依存所有权”虽然从理论上可以使债权人行使相机控制权,但是在实践中却因种种原因难以奏效,因此需要发挥债权人的主动监督作用。经理与债权人之间的冲突可以通过代理人的代理成本支出达到缓和。
资本结构理论的发展史就是一部债权人利益保护的演进史：以杜兰特为代表的传统资本结构理论所秉持的股东利益至上理念使他们完全忽略了对债权人利益的保护；以MM定理为起点而发展起来的权衡理论开始将债权人利益保护纳入其研究视野；以信息不对称为核心的新资本结构理论则将债权人利益保护作为其研究的重要组成部分。
我国上市公司中普遍存在的“内部人控制”问题和不完善的资本市场,使掌握企业实际控制权的经营者对资本结构决策和投资决策均表现出不同的特征。从表面上看,我国上市公司中所出现的股权融资偏好似乎能够提高公司的偿债能力,有利于债权人利益的保护,但实际上并非如此,因为不持有公司股份或持有股份非常低的内部人的控制权收益主要来自于在职消费、偷懒、无限扩张公司规模所带来的声誉效应等,严重的在职消费将耗损企业大量的自由现金流,内部人的偷懒和过度投资行为将严重降低公司的盈利能力和偿债能力,股权融资所带来的大量自由现金流无疑为公司内部人的这些行为提供了良好的机会。因此,内部人缺乏约束的在职消费和过度投资行为将损害债权人的利益。
由于与债权人利益保护相关的制度、法规的不完善和严重的“内部人控制“问题,我国上市公司的资产负债率与企业价值之间呈显著的负相关关系,进一步的实证检验表明：我国高成长性上市公司有更强的动机通过投资不足行为侵犯债权人利益；低成长性上市公司有更强的动机通过资产替代行为侵犯债权人利益；不同类型的负债对上市公司投资行为存在着显著的影响,实证结果表明：短期负债和长期负债均有助于控制高成长性公司的投资不足问题,但短期负债对于投资不足的控制作用并没有比长期负债更突出；相对于商业信用债权人而言,低成长性公司的银行债权人利益受到了更大的损害,需要予以保护,相对于低股权集中度的公司而言,高股权集中度公司的债权人利益更容易受到大股东资产替代和投资不足等行为的侵害；对于低成长性公司而言,第一大股东为非国有股的公司有更大的动机通过资产替代行为侵犯债权人利益,对于高成长性公司而言,第一大股东为国有股的公司有更大的动机通过投资不足侵犯债权人利益。
在我国债权人利益保护相对较弱的情况下,有必要尽快建立适应我国市场经济发展要求的立体化的债权人利益保障机制,其内容应该包括：以资本制度为核心的债权人利益保护的预防机制、以公司治理为核心的债权人利益保护的控制机制和以破产法为核心的债权人利益保护的补救机制。
Creditors are important stakeholders in business, although the investor protection has been a hot spot in the study of the theory, but in economics, law and accounting to protect the benefits of creditors in terms of a comprehensive study was relatively small. Based on this, this paper will do an in-depth systematic study of the protection of creditor's benefits from capitalist system, capital structure, corporate governance and legal protection.
It is the conceptual basis to realize the protection of creditor's benefits that to achieve the combination of registered capital credit and assets credit which focus on assets credit, and to establish the capital credit model which is satisfy to the creditor's needs. It is decided by the corporate ownership theory that the creditor's position and role in the enterprise. "State-contingent ownership" Although in theory allows the creditor to exercise contingent control, but in practice, it is ineffective because of various reasons. So there is requiring the active supervision played by the creditor. The conflict between managers and creditors can be more detente through the agency costs.
History of the development of capital structure theory is a history of the evolution of the creditors benefits protection:the Durant who represented the traditional theory of capital structure uphold the supreme interests of shareholders so that they completely ignore the concept of the protection of the benefits of creditors; MM theory as a starting point has being to study the creditors benefits protection problems; information asymmetry as the core of the new capital structure theory has regard the creditors benefits protection as an important part of its research.
Managers who control the corporate actually have shown different characteristics when they do capital structure decision-making and investment decision-making, because of "insider control" which is prevalent in Chinese listed companies. Seeing from its appearance, Chinese listed companies'equity financing preference to be able to improve the company's solvency and is benefit to creditors benefit protection. But in fact, it is not the case because the insider's control gain mainly comes from company-paid consumption, lazy, reputation effects from unlimited expansion and etc, although they do not hold shares or holds few of shares. Serious company-paid consumption is a loss of companies' free cash flow. The insider's laziness and over-investment activities will be seriously to reduce the company's profitability and solvency. Free cash flow from equity financing provides a good opportunity for insiders. So insider's company-paid consumption without constraint and over-investment behavior will harm the creditor benefits.
As imperfection of protect systems related to creditors benefits, regulatory system and "insider control" issue, Chinese listed companies' asset-liability ratio was significantly negative to companies'value, further empirical tests show that:high-growth of listed companies have a stronger motivation for acts of infringement by insufficient investment in the benefits of creditors; low growth of listed companies have a stronger motivation through asset substitution to violate the benefits of creditors; different types of debts have a significant impact on listed companies investment behavior, The empirical results show that:short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities will help to control the high-growth company that under-investment, there is no more prominent that short-term liabilities than the long-term liabilities for the control of under-investment. In relation to commercial credit creditors, the bank creditor's benefit of low-growth companies has been more damaged, and it is need to be protected.
As opposed to a low degree of corporate equity concentration, a high degree of equity concentration, creditors benefits is more vulnerable to major shareholders such as asset substitution and underinvestment in acts of infringement; For low-growth companies, the largest shareholder who is the non-state-owned shares of the company has a greater motivation for acts of infringement through asset substitution interests of creditors, for high-growth companies, the largest shareholder who is the state-owned shares has a greater motivation for acts of assets substitution to damage creditors benefits.
In the case of creditors benefits protection is relatively weak, it is necessary to establish the creditors benefits three-dimensional guarantee mechanism as soon as possible to meet the development requirements of Chinese market economy. Its contents should include:the creditor benefits protection preventive mechanism of which the capitalist system is the core, the creditor benefits protection control mechanism of which the corporate governance is the core, the creditor benefits protection remedial mechanism of which the bankruptcy law is the core.
实现注册资本信用与资产信用的结合,并更突出资产信用,建立适应债权人需要的资本信用模式是从资本制度出发实现债权人利益保护作用的理念基础。债权人在企业中的地位和作用是由企业的所有权理论决定的。“状态依存所有权”虽然从理论上可以使债权人行使相机控制权,但是在实践中却因种种原因难以奏效,因此需要发挥债权人的主动监督作用。经理与债权人之间的冲突可以通过代理人的代理成本支出达到缓和。
资本结构理论的发展史就是一部债权人利益保护的演进史：以杜兰特为代表的传统资本结构理论所秉持的股东利益至上理念使他们完全忽略了对债权人利益的保护；以MM定理为起点而发展起来的权衡理论开始将债权人利益保护纳入其研究视野；以信息不对称为核心的新资本结构理论则将债权人利益保护作为其研究的重要组成部分。
我国上市公司中普遍存在的“内部人控制”问题和不完善的资本市场,使掌握企业实际控制权的经营者对资本结构决策和投资决策均表现出不同的特征。从表面上看,我国上市公司中所出现的股权融资偏好似乎能够提高公司的偿债能力,有利于债权人利益的保护,但实际上并非如此,因为不持有公司股份或持有股份非常低的内部人的控制权收益主要来自于在职消费、偷懒、无限扩张公司规模所带来的声誉效应等,严重的在职消费将耗损企业大量的自由现金流,内部人的偷懒和过度投资行为将严重降低公司的盈利能力和偿债能力,股权融资所带来的大量自由现金流无疑为公司内部人的这些行为提供了良好的机会。因此,内部人缺乏约束的在职消费和过度投资行为将损害债权人的利益。
由于与债权人利益保护相关的制度、法规的不完善和严重的“内部人控制“问题,我国上市公司的资产负债率与企业价值之间呈显著的负相关关系,进一步的实证检验表明：我国高成长性上市公司有更强的动机通过投资不足行为侵犯债权人利益；低成长性上市公司有更强的动机通过资产替代行为侵犯债权人利益；不同类型的负债对上市公司投资行为存在着显著的影响,实证结果表明：短期负债和长期负债均有助于控制高成长性公司的投资不足问题,但短期负债对于投资不足的控制作用并没有比长期负债更突出；相对于商业信用债权人而言,低成长性公司的银行债权人利益受到了更大的损害,需要予以保护,相对于低股权集中度的公司而言,高股权集中度公司的债权人利益更容易受到大股东资产替代和投资不足等行为的侵害；对于低成长性公司而言,第一大股东为非国有股的公司有更大的动机通过资产替代行为侵犯债权人利益,对于高成长性公司而言,第一大股东为国有股的公司有更大的动机通过投资不足侵犯债权人利益。
在我国债权人利益保护相对较弱的情况下,有必要尽快建立适应我国市场经济发展要求的立体化的债权人利益保障机制,其内容应该包括：以资本制度为核心的债权人利益保护的预防机制、以公司治理为核心的债权人利益保护的控制机制和以破产法为核心的债权人利益保护的补救机制。
Creditors are important stakeholders in business, although the investor protection has been a hot spot in the study of the theory, but in economics, law and accounting to protect the benefits of creditors in terms of a comprehensive study was relatively small. Based on this, this paper will do an in-depth systematic study of the protection of creditor's benefits from capitalist system, capital structure, corporate governance and legal protection.
It is the conceptual basis to realize the protection of creditor's benefits that to achieve the combination of registered capital credit and assets credit which focus on assets credit, and to establish the capital credit model which is satisfy to the creditor's needs. It is decided by the corporate ownership theory that the creditor's position and role in the enterprise. "State-contingent ownership" Although in theory allows the creditor to exercise contingent control, but in practice, it is ineffective because of various reasons. So there is requiring the active supervision played by the creditor. The conflict between managers and creditors can be more detente through the agency costs.
History of the development of capital structure theory is a history of the evolution of the creditors benefits protection:the Durant who represented the traditional theory of capital structure uphold the supreme interests of shareholders so that they completely ignore the concept of the protection of the benefits of creditors; MM theory as a starting point has being to study the creditors benefits protection problems; information asymmetry as the core of the new capital structure theory has regard the creditors benefits protection as an important part of its research.
Managers who control the corporate actually have shown different characteristics when they do capital structure decision-making and investment decision-making, because of "insider control" which is prevalent in Chinese listed companies. Seeing from its appearance, Chinese listed companies'equity financing preference to be able to improve the company's solvency and is benefit to creditors benefit protection. But in fact, it is not the case because the insider's control gain mainly comes from company-paid consumption, lazy, reputation effects from unlimited expansion and etc, although they do not hold shares or holds few of shares. Serious company-paid consumption is a loss of companies' free cash flow. The insider's laziness and over-investment activities will be seriously to reduce the company's profitability and solvency. Free cash flow from equity financing provides a good opportunity for insiders. So insider's company-paid consumption without constraint and over-investment behavior will harm the creditor benefits.
As imperfection of protect systems related to creditors benefits, regulatory system and "insider control" issue, Chinese listed companies' asset-liability ratio was significantly negative to companies'value, further empirical tests show that:high-growth of listed companies have a stronger motivation for acts of infringement by insufficient investment in the benefits of creditors; low growth of listed companies have a stronger motivation through asset substitution to violate the benefits of creditors; different types of debts have a significant impact on listed companies investment behavior, The empirical results show that:short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities will help to control the high-growth company that under-investment, there is no more prominent that short-term liabilities than the long-term liabilities for the control of under-investment. In relation to commercial credit creditors, the bank creditor's benefit of low-growth companies has been more damaged, and it is need to be protected.
As opposed to a low degree of corporate equity concentration, a high degree of equity concentration, creditors benefits is more vulnerable to major shareholders such as asset substitution and underinvestment in acts of infringement; For low-growth companies, the largest shareholder who is the non-state-owned shares of the company has a greater motivation for acts of infringement through asset substitution interests of creditors, for high-growth companies, the largest shareholder who is the state-owned shares has a greater motivation for acts of assets substitution to damage creditors benefits.
In the case of creditors benefits protection is relatively weak, it is necessary to establish the creditors benefits three-dimensional guarantee mechanism as soon as possible to meet the development requirements of Chinese market economy. Its contents should include:the creditor benefits protection preventive mechanism of which the capitalist system is the core, the creditor benefits protection control mechanism of which the corporate governance is the core, the creditor benefits protection remedial mechanism of which the bankruptcy law is the core.
引文
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