我国非银行金融机构退出规制改革研究
摘要
金融规制作为政府经济调控职能之一,越来越受到重视并发挥着重要的作用。各国对历次金融危机的救助和治理就充分说明了这一点。尽管我们对政府之手调控宏观经济的能力存在着较多的争议和诟病。但不可否认的是,在危机来临时,政府大规模的救援计划和重振经济的政策措施仍然是危机机构的救命稻草。所以对政府在经济中的地位和作用问题我们基本达成了共识,那就是虽然政府也会失灵,金融规制的种种政策效果还不尽如人意,我们仍然需要动用社会的必要资源去纠正市场失灵造成的各种不合意现象。
金融规制按阶段不同,划分为事前规制——预防性规制,事中规制——经营性规制,事后规制——退出规制。在以往的金融规制实践中,我们过于重视了金融规制部门的事前规制职能而忽略了金融规制的事后职能。虽然事前规制和事中规制很重要,但从某种意义来说,事后规制即非银行金融机构退出规制的地位和作用更加重要。因为,非银行金融机构退出规制是整个金融安全网的最后环节,对个别问题机构处理不当将会导致“传染效应”,局部危机会扩散至整个金融体系,造成系统性危机。结果会造成债权人心理恐慌,打击人们对金融机构的信心,拖累经济体系的运行。非银行金融机构退出规制是政府微观经济规制职能的体现,其目的在于防范问题机构退出造成的金融体系动荡,维护金融稳定,从而保护金融市场的有效竞争。金融规制部门根据自身的原则,采取相应的手段,对非银行金融机构退出进行规制。并有权依据法律法规,对符合标准的非银行金融机构采取必要的救助措施和市场退出措施。
研究非银行金融机构退出规制的理论框架包括：规制部门、规制体系和有关法律法规体系三个层次。规制部门是处置非银行金融机构退出的权责机构。规制体系包括规制目标与原则、规制手段和规制措施等。法律法规在非银行金融机构退出规制中有重要的作用,是整个规制的依据和标准。通过加强立法和执法可以有效约束和规范被规制者的行为。同时,法律法规对规制部门的行为也起到约束和规范的作用。
我国经过改革开放三十多年的发展,逐步建立起了较为完整的金融体系。各类非银行金融机构在经济建设中发挥着越来越重要的作用。但受传统计划经济的影响,我国目前的金融规制仍然存在着“跛行”态势,一方面,我们过于重视金融机构的进入规制,为金融机构设置了严格的市场进入门坎；另一方面,我国没有建立起相应的金融机构退出制度。受国家信用保护,金融行业垄断现象较为严重,市场竞争不足。金融机构经营状况较差,无法通过正常渠道退出市场,加剧了金融体系的风险。规制部门没有相应的预警机制及时发现存在问题的非银行金融机构。在危机出现时,往往不知所措,只能层层上报,逐级请示,最后延误了退出的时机。此外,由于缺乏必要的规制手段和措施,规制部门只能通过行政手段加以干预。在“维稳”的一元目标下,采取封闭处理的方式,不计成本的将大量社会资源投入到非银行金融机构拯救中,造成社会资源的浪费。这样做的结果导致社会公众的心理恐慌和对非银行金融机构的不信任。究其原因,我们认为中国的金融规制制度变迁是强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁相结合的过程。其中正式制度供给不足和非正式制度变迁缓慢是问题的症结所在。在制度演进过程中,由于利益集团的目标函数并不一致,所以在非银行金融机构退出过程中表现为复杂的利益交织和利益冲突现象。在经济全球化和金融机构竞争日益加剧的今天,非银行金融机构作为市场微观主体,必然要经历市场优胜劣汰的选择,出现危机导致破产也会是正常现象。金融规制部门不能被动应对,而应探索出一套行之有效的办法主动出击。因此,完善非银行金融机构退出规制对于当下处于转型时期的中国来说,具有十分重要的意义。
我国非银行金融机构退出规制改革应以稳定金融市场秩序,保护债权人合法利益为目的。以透明、及时、依法和审慎为原则。同时,要以市场化为导向,以成本收益为衡量标准。首先,完善非银行金融机构退出规制体制。要改革现有规制部门机构设置模式,建立以“一行三会”为主体,其他权责机关为辅的规制组织机构模式,重点发挥人民银行在退出规制中的核心作用,加强规制部门间协调,建立完善的联席会议制度,实现信息交流和共享。其次,完善非银行金融机构退出规制体系。按照事前规制、事中规制和事后规制的标准,建立包括风险预警体系、风险救助体系和应急处理机制在内的非银行金融机构退出规制体系。再次,完善有关非银行金融机构退出的法律法规体系,加强对非银行金融机构负责人的追查力度。最后,要加强规制环境的治理和完善。从改善社会信用环境,建立社会信用体系的角度出发,努力营造和谐良好的金融生态环境。
Financial regulation, as one of the functions of government economic control, play an important role and draws more and more attention. Countries'salvation and administration on previous financial crisis has fully demonstrated this point. Though we have controversy and criticism on government's ability of macroeconomic regulation, it is undeniable that government rescuing plans and large-scale political measures to revive the economy are still crisis agencies resorts. Therefore, we have basically reached a consensus on the position and function of the government in the economy. Although the government may fail to function, effects of the financial regulatory system and the various policies are not satisfied yet, we still need to use necessary community resources to correct a variety of undesirable phenomena due to market failures.
According to different stages, financial regulation is divided into three kinds: pre-Regulation-preventive regulation,in-regulation-business regulation, after-regulation—out of regulation. In the past, we put too much emphasis on the pre-regulatory functions of financial regulation departments and neglect the after-regulatory functions. Thought both the pre-regulation and after-regulation are very important, in a sense, the after-regulation i.e., the status and role of non-bank financial institutions out of regulation are more important. Because non-bank financial institutions out of regulation is the last part of the financial safety net, the misconduct of individual agency will cause "contagion effect", thus, the local crisis will spread to the entire financial system, resulting in a systemic crisis. The results will cause psychological fear of creditors, reduce people's confidence in financial institutions, and drag the economy running. Non-bank financial institutions out of regulation are the embodiment of government micro-economic regulation functions. The purpose is to prevent financial system instability caused by the quit of problematic institutions and to maintain financial stability, thus, to protect effective competition in the financial markets. Financial regulation department under its own principles, take appropriate means to regulate the exit the non-bank financial institutions. According to the laws and regulations, it has right to take the necessary measures of relief and market exit for those standard non-bank financial institutions.
The theoretical framework of non-bank financial institutions out of regulation includes three levels:regulatory departments, regulatory systems and laws and regulations. Regulatory departments have powers and responsibilities to handle the problem of non-bank financial institutions. Regulation system includes objectives and principles of regulation, regulatory mechanisms, and regulatory means and so on. Laws and regulations play an important role in the non-bank financial institutions out of regulation, and they are the basis and standards of the regulation. By strengthening and enforcement of legislation, the behavior of those being regulated can effectively be restrained and regulated. Meanwhile, the laws and regulations also play the same role in the behavior department of regulation.
China has gradually established a more complete financial system through 30 years of development of reform and opening up. Various non-bank financial institutions are playing more important roles in economic development. However, because of the impact of the traditional planned economy, China's current financial regulatory system remains a "limp" state. On one hand, we put too much emphasis on the entered regulation of financial institutions and set a strict threshold of market access; on the other hand, we haven't set up exit mechanism for financial institutions. We are protected by the national credit, there are more severe the financial industry monopoly, market competition is not enough. Under poor operating conditions, financial institutions can't exit market through normal channels, so this increases the risk of the financial system. Regulatory departments have no appropriate warning mechanism to detect problems in the non-bank financial institutions.In times of crisis, Regulatory departments are often at a loss, and delay time to exit with sequential reports. In addition, being lack of the necessary regulatory mechanisms and measures, regulatory departments can intervene only by administrative means. For the singular goal of "holding stability", in the way of dealing closely, enormous social resources will be used to save non-bank financial institutions regardless of cost, thus causing waste of public resources. The result leads to the public psychological panic and the mistrust of non-bank financial institutions. We believe that the changes of China's financial regulatory system are the process of combining of mandatory system changes and induced institutional changes. Lack of a formal system in which supply and informal institutional change is the crux of the problem slowly. The sticking point lies in the inefficient supply of formal regulation and the slow changes of informal regulation. In the process of evolution of the system, because the objective function of interest groups is not uniform, the exit process of non-bank financial institutions shows the complex situation of intertwined interests and conflict of interest. With economic globalization and increasing financial sector competition, non-bank financial institutions, as the main market microstructure, must experience the survival of the fittest. The appearance of crisis and the bankruptcy would be normal phenomenon. Financial regulatory departments can not give a passive response; they should find an effective way to take the initiative actions. Therefore, to complete the non-bank financial institutions'exit regulation is of great significance for China during the current transitional period.
China's reform and opening up 30 years of development, has gradually established a more complete financial system. Various non-bank financial institutions in economic development, playing an increasingly important role. However, the impact of the traditional planned economy current non-bank financial institutions'exit regulation reform in China should be to stabilize financial markets and to protect the legitimate interests of creditors according to the principle of transparent, timely, prudence. Meanwhile, we should take the market as a direction, and should be measured by cost-benefit. First of all, to improve the non-bank financial institutions exit regulation system. We should reform the existing regulatory departments'organizational model and establish a "line 3 will be" as the subject, other competent authorities supplemented by regulatory organization model. People's bank plays a central role in strengthening the regulation. We increase coordination, establish and improve the joint conference system, to achieve information exchange and sharing. Second, to improve the non-bank financial institutions exit regulation system. In accordance with the standard of pre-regulation, in-regulation and after-regulation of standards, the early warning systems should be established, including risk, emergency rescue system for handling mechanism, and non-bank financial institutions exit regulation system. Thirdly, to perfect non-bank financial institutions'exit regulations, to strengthen the intensity in charge of the problem of non-bank financial institutions. Finally, to strengthen regulatory environment and improve governance. from the point of view of the social credit environment and social credit system, we should make efforts to create a harmonious financial environment.
金融规制按阶段不同,划分为事前规制——预防性规制,事中规制——经营性规制,事后规制——退出规制。在以往的金融规制实践中,我们过于重视了金融规制部门的事前规制职能而忽略了金融规制的事后职能。虽然事前规制和事中规制很重要,但从某种意义来说,事后规制即非银行金融机构退出规制的地位和作用更加重要。因为,非银行金融机构退出规制是整个金融安全网的最后环节,对个别问题机构处理不当将会导致“传染效应”,局部危机会扩散至整个金融体系,造成系统性危机。结果会造成债权人心理恐慌,打击人们对金融机构的信心,拖累经济体系的运行。非银行金融机构退出规制是政府微观经济规制职能的体现,其目的在于防范问题机构退出造成的金融体系动荡,维护金融稳定,从而保护金融市场的有效竞争。金融规制部门根据自身的原则,采取相应的手段,对非银行金融机构退出进行规制。并有权依据法律法规,对符合标准的非银行金融机构采取必要的救助措施和市场退出措施。
研究非银行金融机构退出规制的理论框架包括：规制部门、规制体系和有关法律法规体系三个层次。规制部门是处置非银行金融机构退出的权责机构。规制体系包括规制目标与原则、规制手段和规制措施等。法律法规在非银行金融机构退出规制中有重要的作用,是整个规制的依据和标准。通过加强立法和执法可以有效约束和规范被规制者的行为。同时,法律法规对规制部门的行为也起到约束和规范的作用。
我国经过改革开放三十多年的发展,逐步建立起了较为完整的金融体系。各类非银行金融机构在经济建设中发挥着越来越重要的作用。但受传统计划经济的影响,我国目前的金融规制仍然存在着“跛行”态势,一方面,我们过于重视金融机构的进入规制,为金融机构设置了严格的市场进入门坎；另一方面,我国没有建立起相应的金融机构退出制度。受国家信用保护,金融行业垄断现象较为严重,市场竞争不足。金融机构经营状况较差,无法通过正常渠道退出市场,加剧了金融体系的风险。规制部门没有相应的预警机制及时发现存在问题的非银行金融机构。在危机出现时,往往不知所措,只能层层上报,逐级请示,最后延误了退出的时机。此外,由于缺乏必要的规制手段和措施,规制部门只能通过行政手段加以干预。在“维稳”的一元目标下,采取封闭处理的方式,不计成本的将大量社会资源投入到非银行金融机构拯救中,造成社会资源的浪费。这样做的结果导致社会公众的心理恐慌和对非银行金融机构的不信任。究其原因,我们认为中国的金融规制制度变迁是强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁相结合的过程。其中正式制度供给不足和非正式制度变迁缓慢是问题的症结所在。在制度演进过程中,由于利益集团的目标函数并不一致,所以在非银行金融机构退出过程中表现为复杂的利益交织和利益冲突现象。在经济全球化和金融机构竞争日益加剧的今天,非银行金融机构作为市场微观主体,必然要经历市场优胜劣汰的选择,出现危机导致破产也会是正常现象。金融规制部门不能被动应对,而应探索出一套行之有效的办法主动出击。因此,完善非银行金融机构退出规制对于当下处于转型时期的中国来说,具有十分重要的意义。
我国非银行金融机构退出规制改革应以稳定金融市场秩序,保护债权人合法利益为目的。以透明、及时、依法和审慎为原则。同时,要以市场化为导向,以成本收益为衡量标准。首先,完善非银行金融机构退出规制体制。要改革现有规制部门机构设置模式,建立以“一行三会”为主体,其他权责机关为辅的规制组织机构模式,重点发挥人民银行在退出规制中的核心作用,加强规制部门间协调,建立完善的联席会议制度,实现信息交流和共享。其次,完善非银行金融机构退出规制体系。按照事前规制、事中规制和事后规制的标准,建立包括风险预警体系、风险救助体系和应急处理机制在内的非银行金融机构退出规制体系。再次,完善有关非银行金融机构退出的法律法规体系,加强对非银行金融机构负责人的追查力度。最后,要加强规制环境的治理和完善。从改善社会信用环境,建立社会信用体系的角度出发,努力营造和谐良好的金融生态环境。
Financial regulation, as one of the functions of government economic control, play an important role and draws more and more attention. Countries'salvation and administration on previous financial crisis has fully demonstrated this point. Though we have controversy and criticism on government's ability of macroeconomic regulation, it is undeniable that government rescuing plans and large-scale political measures to revive the economy are still crisis agencies resorts. Therefore, we have basically reached a consensus on the position and function of the government in the economy. Although the government may fail to function, effects of the financial regulatory system and the various policies are not satisfied yet, we still need to use necessary community resources to correct a variety of undesirable phenomena due to market failures.
According to different stages, financial regulation is divided into three kinds: pre-Regulation-preventive regulation,in-regulation-business regulation, after-regulation—out of regulation. In the past, we put too much emphasis on the pre-regulatory functions of financial regulation departments and neglect the after-regulatory functions. Thought both the pre-regulation and after-regulation are very important, in a sense, the after-regulation i.e., the status and role of non-bank financial institutions out of regulation are more important. Because non-bank financial institutions out of regulation is the last part of the financial safety net, the misconduct of individual agency will cause "contagion effect", thus, the local crisis will spread to the entire financial system, resulting in a systemic crisis. The results will cause psychological fear of creditors, reduce people's confidence in financial institutions, and drag the economy running. Non-bank financial institutions out of regulation are the embodiment of government micro-economic regulation functions. The purpose is to prevent financial system instability caused by the quit of problematic institutions and to maintain financial stability, thus, to protect effective competition in the financial markets. Financial regulation department under its own principles, take appropriate means to regulate the exit the non-bank financial institutions. According to the laws and regulations, it has right to take the necessary measures of relief and market exit for those standard non-bank financial institutions.
The theoretical framework of non-bank financial institutions out of regulation includes three levels:regulatory departments, regulatory systems and laws and regulations. Regulatory departments have powers and responsibilities to handle the problem of non-bank financial institutions. Regulation system includes objectives and principles of regulation, regulatory mechanisms, and regulatory means and so on. Laws and regulations play an important role in the non-bank financial institutions out of regulation, and they are the basis and standards of the regulation. By strengthening and enforcement of legislation, the behavior of those being regulated can effectively be restrained and regulated. Meanwhile, the laws and regulations also play the same role in the behavior department of regulation.
China has gradually established a more complete financial system through 30 years of development of reform and opening up. Various non-bank financial institutions are playing more important roles in economic development. However, because of the impact of the traditional planned economy, China's current financial regulatory system remains a "limp" state. On one hand, we put too much emphasis on the entered regulation of financial institutions and set a strict threshold of market access; on the other hand, we haven't set up exit mechanism for financial institutions. We are protected by the national credit, there are more severe the financial industry monopoly, market competition is not enough. Under poor operating conditions, financial institutions can't exit market through normal channels, so this increases the risk of the financial system. Regulatory departments have no appropriate warning mechanism to detect problems in the non-bank financial institutions.In times of crisis, Regulatory departments are often at a loss, and delay time to exit with sequential reports. In addition, being lack of the necessary regulatory mechanisms and measures, regulatory departments can intervene only by administrative means. For the singular goal of "holding stability", in the way of dealing closely, enormous social resources will be used to save non-bank financial institutions regardless of cost, thus causing waste of public resources. The result leads to the public psychological panic and the mistrust of non-bank financial institutions. We believe that the changes of China's financial regulatory system are the process of combining of mandatory system changes and induced institutional changes. Lack of a formal system in which supply and informal institutional change is the crux of the problem slowly. The sticking point lies in the inefficient supply of formal regulation and the slow changes of informal regulation. In the process of evolution of the system, because the objective function of interest groups is not uniform, the exit process of non-bank financial institutions shows the complex situation of intertwined interests and conflict of interest. With economic globalization and increasing financial sector competition, non-bank financial institutions, as the main market microstructure, must experience the survival of the fittest. The appearance of crisis and the bankruptcy would be normal phenomenon. Financial regulatory departments can not give a passive response; they should find an effective way to take the initiative actions. Therefore, to complete the non-bank financial institutions'exit regulation is of great significance for China during the current transitional period.
China's reform and opening up 30 years of development, has gradually established a more complete financial system. Various non-bank financial institutions in economic development, playing an increasingly important role. However, the impact of the traditional planned economy current non-bank financial institutions'exit regulation reform in China should be to stabilize financial markets and to protect the legitimate interests of creditors according to the principle of transparent, timely, prudence. Meanwhile, we should take the market as a direction, and should be measured by cost-benefit. First of all, to improve the non-bank financial institutions exit regulation system. We should reform the existing regulatory departments'organizational model and establish a "line 3 will be" as the subject, other competent authorities supplemented by regulatory organization model. People's bank plays a central role in strengthening the regulation. We increase coordination, establish and improve the joint conference system, to achieve information exchange and sharing. Second, to improve the non-bank financial institutions exit regulation system. In accordance with the standard of pre-regulation, in-regulation and after-regulation of standards, the early warning systems should be established, including risk, emergency rescue system for handling mechanism, and non-bank financial institutions exit regulation system. Thirdly, to perfect non-bank financial institutions'exit regulations, to strengthen the intensity in charge of the problem of non-bank financial institutions. Finally, to strengthen regulatory environment and improve governance. from the point of view of the social credit environment and social credit system, we should make efforts to create a harmonious financial environment.
引文
①人民网.金融机构管理规定[EB/OL]..http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/gwyfg/1994/239021199402.html, 1994.08.05
②强制性市场退出与主动性市场退出的详细区别参看附录表1-1
①陈瑞华.信息经济学[M].天津：南开大学出版社,2003：15
②StiglitzJ, and X.weiss, (1981) Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information[J], American Economic Review, Vol,71:343-410
①Hyman Minsky, "Stabilizing an unstable Economy", New Haven:Yale University Press,1986
①刘宇飞.中央银行的两难选择：救助或不救助[J].当代金融家,2005(3)：21
①刘宇飞.中央银行的两难选择：救助或不救助[J].当代金融家,2005(3)：21
①刘俊.各国金融机构处理的比较法研究[M].上海：上海世纪出版集团,2008：155-163
②值得提出的是,大部分的有关金融机构退出的研究成果都是以银行为研究对象。这主要是因为银行是现代金融市场的主体。在我国的金融机构体系中,银行机构,不论从资产总量还是经营规模来说,都具有举足轻重的地位。
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①中国新闻网.中国首例非银行金融机构破产案再次追加分配[EB/OL]. http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/ci-gnci/ news/2010/01-26/2093089.shtml.2010.01.26
②网易.金融机构破产条例初稿已制定[EB/OL]. http://news.163.com/09/0623/10/5CG3DROJ000120GR. html. 2009.06.23
③网易.金融机构破产条例初稿已制定[EB/OL]. http://news.163.com/09/0623/10/5CG3DROJ000120GR.html.2009. 06.23
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②能力型重组的含义是把非银行金融机构内部独特能力与外部市场定位结合起来以形成竞争优势,从而实现扭亏为盈。
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