放松规制条件下电力传输企业的激励规制研究
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摘要
从上个世纪八十年代以来,世界上许多国家对电力产业开始了市场化改革。尽管各国电力产业的结构和改革方式各不相同,但其主要目标是:根据产品市场和资本市场的规律,在电力产业中引入市场机制,通过竞争、私有化和价格机制来进行资源配置和使用,提高资源的配置效率和企业内部的生产效率,从而带动社会的可持续发展。改革的主要特征是采取市场为导向的方法,运用生产和资本市场的规律,通过价格机制、竞争和私有化获得配置和内部效率,从而达到效率目标。
大多数国家的电力改革始初主要是在发电和电力供给端引入价格机制和竞争,而传输和配送功能由于它们的自然垄断特性而很少受影响。随着发电侧电力市场的建立和完善,输配电侧放松改制的改革也逐步展开。电力市场改革议程中最重要部分包括在仍保持规制的具有自然垄断属性的输配电环节引入“激励规制”机制替代传统的“成本服务”或“收益率”规制。在自然垄断的输配电环节建立激励性规制制度的目的是向企业提供激励以改进它们的投资和运行效率,以确保消费者从效率收益中获利。期望激励规制机制能够对规制企业提供更强的激励以有效的成本方式降低成本、改进服务质量,刺激(或至少不是阻碍)新的生产和服务的引入,以及促进受规制的基础设施服务的有效的投资和接入定价。
建立有效的输配电企业激励性规制机制的具体目标是:(1)电网所有者能够回收包括运行、维护和投资的全部成本;(2)必须有效地提供对维护、升级和扩展系统的长期激励;(3)定价机制应能提供良好的节点信号,指导市场参与者何时何处使用系统,以鼓励其有效利用输电系统。同输配电企业的规制内容相对应的是输配电企业的输配电价格的激励性规制、输配电企业的服务质量的激励性规制以及输配电网络的激励扩张激励性规制三个方面。这三个方面是相互联系、相互影响的。也是当前各国学者和电力市场改革的实践者重点关注和研究的三个重要方面。本文的研究也将从这三个方面展开。
毫无疑问,对输配电企业的输配电价格的激励性规制、服务质量的激励性规制以及输配电网络的激励扩张激励性规制的研究具有非常强的理论和政策含义,这些研究成果也对世界其他国家正在进行的电力行业改革产生了非常重要的影响,同时,在这些研究中争论的存在也表明,在对输电网络公司治理结构,激励规制模式以及投资模式的选择上,理论和实践尚没有找到最优的模式,各国在改革的过程中,在进行理论研究的同时,必须结合自己的国情,选择最适宜的治理和投资模式。
文章主要围绕前面提到的电力传输企业的激励规制目标展开论述,从以下几个方面进行了创新探索。
(1)对激励规制理论在电力传输企业应用中,需要解决的实践问题进行了归纳总结,这些问题主要包括:规制者从哪里获得企业的真实成本和机会成本分布的信息?规制者是否应该向被规制企业提供一个契约菜单?采用什么样的基准作为被规制企业成本、收益和其他绩效指标,以及如何随时间变化对基准进行修正?激励机制的强度应该怎样?激励机制应该具有全面性还是“局部性”?对这些问题的回答,特别是电力传输企业的激励规制的框架的确定具有非常重要的意义。
(2)尝试运用经济模型和比较分析方法在中国现阶段体制环境不变的条件下探索激励性规制目标模式的选择。在对影响激励规制强度的信息租金和规制合同实施过程中的因素进行分析的基础上,结合我国电力产业的实际状况,指出我国的电力产业选择具有相当激励强度的规制政策较为合适。
(3)对电力传输企业标竿激励涉及的绩效评价的技术方法、以及标竿激励规制方法和过程进行考察的基础上,进一步分析我国电力传输价格规制现状,结合我国电力传输企业的具体特征以及标尺竞争理论和绩效标竿方法,提出了价格上限规制和标尺竞争规制相结合的综合输电价格规制模型,特别是提出了基于Mulmquist指数的电力传输企业的生产效率的测度模型,并综合输电价格规制模型规制目标、结构设计、输入因素以及(RPI+X)+/-Z的X因子以及Z因子的设定进行了深入的研究。
(4)在第三章关于输电服务价格激励规制的研究没有考虑电能量的变化,即基于“同网同质同价”的基础上,没有涉及到电能的质的不同。但是,电力供应中断和电力质量问题会给用户造成巨大的直接经济损失和间接经济损失。从另一个角度说,输电企业在条件允许的情况下,可以为使用者提供不同质量的电能产品。在对电力供应高度依赖的今天,输电价格(费用)规制(确定)的以质定价已经是输电价格不容回避的问题。在第四章中,通过Malmquist生产率指数将电力传输企业价格规制和传输服务质量激励有效结合,达成成本节约和服务质量之间均衡的桥梁,提出了电力传输企业服务质量规制激励模型——基于价格上限激励规制的修正模型。引入服务质量的考察内容,以保证用户供电质量和可靠性在标尺竞争条件下不会降低。
(5)由于在自然垄断行业的规制中,规制者和规制企业之间的信息不对称是一个非常重要的问题,其主要表现为对成本的不了解以及对降低成本的努力的不可观测,势必在激励规制工具选择中导致规制者与被规制者之间的博弈。通过采用电力企业的实际数据进行分析比较,考察监管部门在运用基于前沿面理论的绩效标杆激励规制政策对电力企业进行监管时,所面临的一些策略问题。实证分析的结果给为规制者进一步优化改进激励性规制政策提供了许多有益的启示。
(6)我国电力行业的结构性拆分已经初步完成,成立了独立的电网公司。但是我国的输电网络建设非常薄弱,输电网络建设的滞后已经成为制约发电市场竞争的“瓶颈”。在我国电力行业改革的背景下,传统的输电网络扩展模式正面临着巨大的挑战,如何在现有的公司治理和股权结构下,向电网公司提供正确的投资激励,使输电网络公司进行有效的网络扩展,这是摆在我们面前的一大课题。因此在第五章对电力传输企业的价格规制与电力传输容量之间的关系进行分析;然后分别探讨了当前传输容量扩展的两种主要模式(激励规制模式、传输权模式)一般运行机理和在实践中运用存在的问题和启示,进一步结合我国的当前的实际情况,探索我国电力传输容量扩展的可行模式——金融传输权市场。
总之,我国电力产业的体制改革正进入一个新的阶段,独立的电力传输网络和监管机构已经成立。在我国电力行业改革的背景下,传统的输电网的价格规制和网络络扩展模式正面临着巨大的挑战,如何在现有的公司治理和股权结构下,确定有效的价格规制模式,如何向电网公司提供正确的投资激励,使输电网络公司进行有效的网络扩展,以及如何对网络扩展进行规划和审核都是摆在新的电力监管机构面前的难题。对这些问题进行研究,对我国正在进行的电力改革具有很好的参考价值,针对性强,也对其他基础产业规制改革也能起到一定的借鉴作用,因此具有一定的学术意义和适用价值。
Since the early 1980's,many countries have implemented electricity sector reforms.Although their electricity industry structure and reform mode varies,but its essential target is:According to the product market and the capital market rule, introducing the market mechanism into the electricity industry,carrying on the resource configure through competition,privatization and price mechanism, enhancing the resource configure efficiency and enterprise internal production efficiency,thus to impetus society's sustainable development.The main characteristic of reform is to adopt the method of marketing and capital market rule,through the price mechanism,competition and privatization to obtain the disposition and internal efficiency,thus to achieve the efficiency goal.
Major national electricity reform mainly is to introduce price mechanism and competition into the electricity generation and the electricity supply end,but the transmitting and allocation function is affected little owing to their monopoly nature. Along with the electricity generation side electricity market's establishment and consummation,the power distribution side relaxation remanufacture reform also gradually develops.The most important part of electricity market reform agenda includes introducing "Incentive" regulation instead of traditional "Cost Service" or "Return Ratio" into the maintaining power distribution link with monopoly nature. The goal of establishing excitability rules and regulations in power distribution is to provide incentive to enterprises to improve their investing and operating efficiency,as well as guarantee consumers to make a profit from the efficiency enhancement.The expectation incentive regulation mechanism can provide a stronger incentive to regular enterprises to reduce the cost,to improve service quality with effective cost, to stimulate(or at least not hindrance)new production and service's introduction,as well to promote effective investment and meeting price of regulated infrastructure service.
The concrete goals of establishing effective power distribution enterprise excitability regulation mechanism are:(1)electrical network owner can recycle all cost including the movement,the maintenance and the investment;(2)must effectively provide long-term incentive to maintenance,promotion and expansion system;(3)price mechanism ought to be able to provide the excellent node signal, instructs the market participant where and when to use system to encourage its effective transmission system.Corresponding to power distribution enterprise regulations,there are three aspects:excitability regulations of power distribution price, excitability regulations of service quality,as well as excitability regulations of incentive expansion of power distribution network.These three aspects are related mutually,and are also paid attention to by various countries' scholar and electricity market reform practitioner.This research will also launch from these three aspects.
Undoubtedly,research of power distribution enterprise's power distribution price's excitability regulations,service quality's excitability regulations as well as power distribution network's incentive expansion excitability regulation has extremely strong theory and policy meaning,and these research results will also have important influences on electricity profession reform carried on by other countries. Simultaneously,the argument in these research also indicates,on choosing governing pattern,incentive regulation mode and investment mode of electric transmission net work company,theories and practices have still not found the most superior pattern. Countries in the reform process must unify its own condition with suitable government and investment pattern.
This paper mainly elaborates incentive regulation goal of electricity transmission enterprise mentioned above,and innovates as the following aspects:
(1)Summarized practical problems which needed to solve in incentive regulation theory's application in electricity transmission enterprise.These questions mainly include:Where do the regulators obtain the information of enterprise's real cost and opportunity cost distribution? What type of datum to take as target of regulated enterprises' cost,income and other achievements,and how to revise the datum according to time variation? What intensity should the incentive mechanism have? Should the incentive mechanism have the integrity or the "topicality"? Answers to these questions will have vital significance to our electric market reform,especially to the determination of the incentive regulation frame.
(2)Attempted to use economic model and comparative analysis method to explore excitability regulation goal pattern under the Chinese present invariable environment.On the foundation of analyzing information rent which affects incentive regulation intensity and factors of regulation contract's implementation,along with our actual condition of electricity industry,pointed out regulation policy with excitation density is appropriate.
(3)Inspected achievement appraisal technical method involved in incentive regulation and rod incentive regulation method and process.On the foundation of further analyzing present situation of our electric transmission price regulation, unifying concrete characteristic of electric transmission enterprises and rod competition theory and achievement rod method,proposed a comprehensive electric transmission price control model which combines price upper limit control and rod competition control,especially a measure model of production efficiency of electric transmission enterprise based on Malmquist index.As well as conducted thorough research synthesizing regulation goal,structure design,input factors,X factor of (RPI+X)+/-Z and hypothesis of Z factor of electric transmission price control model.
(4)In the third chapter,the article does not take variation of electric energy when researching electric transmission service price incentive regulation.However, electricity supply interrupt and electricity quality may create huge direct and indirect economic loss to users.From another perspective,electric transmission enterprise may provide users electrical energy product of different quality if condition permitted. In the fourth chapter,through the Malmquist productivity index to combine electricity transmission enterprise's price regulation and transmission grade of service incentive effectively,achieved balance between cost saving and grade of service,proposed electricity transmission enterprise grade of service regulation incentive model--Based on price upper limit incentive regulation revision model.Introduced grade of service inspection content to guarantee user's power supply quality and reliability will not reduce under the rod competition condition.
(5)Because it is a very important question for the asymmetric information between regulator and regulated enterprise's in the nature monopoly regulation,which main performance is that the cost was not understood the effects to reduce the cost was not observed,this will cause the game between the regulator and regulated enterprises in the choice of incentive regulation tools.The most main dispute of the price caps incentive regulation policy lies in the determination of efficiency improvement foundation and how to transform them to the tariff change value(X factor).The regulator may use the different Regulatory benchmarking to determine the method to obtain X factor,in other words,the regulator and regulated enterprises can the same rules and regulations carry on game when they use these method. However,it is extremely little brings to people's attention for the question which the game or the strategy behavior between regulator and regulated initiate.Which strategy behavior did the application of the price caps lead to? When the electricity utilities was Supervised by the incentive benchmarking deregulation based on DEA,Some strategy questions was inspected and analyzed through the actual data in electric power enterprise.The results of Empirical Analysis provide much beneficial enlightenment to optimize incentive regulation policy.
(6)Constitutive split of electricity profession in China has completed initially. But our country's electric transmission network construction is extremely weak,and the lag of electric transmission network construction has already become the "bottleneck" of electricity generation market competition.Under electricity profession reform background,traditional electric transmission network expansion pattern is facing huge challenge.How to provide correct investment inspiration to electric network company to effectively expand network of electric transmission company under existing govern and stock right structure is a big topic before us.Therefore to analyze relationship between price regulation and transmission capacity of electric transmission company in the fifth chapter,and discussed tow patterns(incentive regulation pattern,transmission right pattern)of present transmission capacity expansion separately,further explore feasible pattern of electric transmission capacity expansion--Financial transmission right market.
In brief,organizational reform of our country's electricity industry is entering a new stage,and independent electricity transmission network and supervising organization has already established.Under our country's electricity profession reform background,traditional power transmission network price regulation and network expansion pattern are facing huge challenge.How to determine effective price regulation pattern,to provide correct investment inspiration to electric network company and cause electric transmission network company to expand effectively under existed govern and stock right structure are all difficult problems to new electric supervising organization.Research to these questions have good reference value to our electric reform,and will play model role to other foundation industry reform, therefore has academic significance and suitable value.
大多数国家的电力改革始初主要是在发电和电力供给端引入价格机制和竞争,而传输和配送功能由于它们的自然垄断特性而很少受影响。随着发电侧电力市场的建立和完善,输配电侧放松改制的改革也逐步展开。电力市场改革议程中最重要部分包括在仍保持规制的具有自然垄断属性的输配电环节引入“激励规制”机制替代传统的“成本服务”或“收益率”规制。在自然垄断的输配电环节建立激励性规制制度的目的是向企业提供激励以改进它们的投资和运行效率,以确保消费者从效率收益中获利。期望激励规制机制能够对规制企业提供更强的激励以有效的成本方式降低成本、改进服务质量,刺激(或至少不是阻碍)新的生产和服务的引入,以及促进受规制的基础设施服务的有效的投资和接入定价。
建立有效的输配电企业激励性规制机制的具体目标是:(1)电网所有者能够回收包括运行、维护和投资的全部成本;(2)必须有效地提供对维护、升级和扩展系统的长期激励;(3)定价机制应能提供良好的节点信号,指导市场参与者何时何处使用系统,以鼓励其有效利用输电系统。同输配电企业的规制内容相对应的是输配电企业的输配电价格的激励性规制、输配电企业的服务质量的激励性规制以及输配电网络的激励扩张激励性规制三个方面。这三个方面是相互联系、相互影响的。也是当前各国学者和电力市场改革的实践者重点关注和研究的三个重要方面。本文的研究也将从这三个方面展开。
毫无疑问,对输配电企业的输配电价格的激励性规制、服务质量的激励性规制以及输配电网络的激励扩张激励性规制的研究具有非常强的理论和政策含义,这些研究成果也对世界其他国家正在进行的电力行业改革产生了非常重要的影响,同时,在这些研究中争论的存在也表明,在对输电网络公司治理结构,激励规制模式以及投资模式的选择上,理论和实践尚没有找到最优的模式,各国在改革的过程中,在进行理论研究的同时,必须结合自己的国情,选择最适宜的治理和投资模式。
文章主要围绕前面提到的电力传输企业的激励规制目标展开论述,从以下几个方面进行了创新探索。
(1)对激励规制理论在电力传输企业应用中,需要解决的实践问题进行了归纳总结,这些问题主要包括:规制者从哪里获得企业的真实成本和机会成本分布的信息?规制者是否应该向被规制企业提供一个契约菜单?采用什么样的基准作为被规制企业成本、收益和其他绩效指标,以及如何随时间变化对基准进行修正?激励机制的强度应该怎样?激励机制应该具有全面性还是“局部性”?对这些问题的回答,特别是电力传输企业的激励规制的框架的确定具有非常重要的意义。
(2)尝试运用经济模型和比较分析方法在中国现阶段体制环境不变的条件下探索激励性规制目标模式的选择。在对影响激励规制强度的信息租金和规制合同实施过程中的因素进行分析的基础上,结合我国电力产业的实际状况,指出我国的电力产业选择具有相当激励强度的规制政策较为合适。
(3)对电力传输企业标竿激励涉及的绩效评价的技术方法、以及标竿激励规制方法和过程进行考察的基础上,进一步分析我国电力传输价格规制现状,结合我国电力传输企业的具体特征以及标尺竞争理论和绩效标竿方法,提出了价格上限规制和标尺竞争规制相结合的综合输电价格规制模型,特别是提出了基于Mulmquist指数的电力传输企业的生产效率的测度模型,并综合输电价格规制模型规制目标、结构设计、输入因素以及(RPI+X)+/-Z的X因子以及Z因子的设定进行了深入的研究。
(4)在第三章关于输电服务价格激励规制的研究没有考虑电能量的变化,即基于“同网同质同价”的基础上,没有涉及到电能的质的不同。但是,电力供应中断和电力质量问题会给用户造成巨大的直接经济损失和间接经济损失。从另一个角度说,输电企业在条件允许的情况下,可以为使用者提供不同质量的电能产品。在对电力供应高度依赖的今天,输电价格(费用)规制(确定)的以质定价已经是输电价格不容回避的问题。在第四章中,通过Malmquist生产率指数将电力传输企业价格规制和传输服务质量激励有效结合,达成成本节约和服务质量之间均衡的桥梁,提出了电力传输企业服务质量规制激励模型——基于价格上限激励规制的修正模型。引入服务质量的考察内容,以保证用户供电质量和可靠性在标尺竞争条件下不会降低。
(5)由于在自然垄断行业的规制中,规制者和规制企业之间的信息不对称是一个非常重要的问题,其主要表现为对成本的不了解以及对降低成本的努力的不可观测,势必在激励规制工具选择中导致规制者与被规制者之间的博弈。通过采用电力企业的实际数据进行分析比较,考察监管部门在运用基于前沿面理论的绩效标杆激励规制政策对电力企业进行监管时,所面临的一些策略问题。实证分析的结果给为规制者进一步优化改进激励性规制政策提供了许多有益的启示。
(6)我国电力行业的结构性拆分已经初步完成,成立了独立的电网公司。但是我国的输电网络建设非常薄弱,输电网络建设的滞后已经成为制约发电市场竞争的“瓶颈”。在我国电力行业改革的背景下,传统的输电网络扩展模式正面临着巨大的挑战,如何在现有的公司治理和股权结构下,向电网公司提供正确的投资激励,使输电网络公司进行有效的网络扩展,这是摆在我们面前的一大课题。因此在第五章对电力传输企业的价格规制与电力传输容量之间的关系进行分析;然后分别探讨了当前传输容量扩展的两种主要模式(激励规制模式、传输权模式)一般运行机理和在实践中运用存在的问题和启示,进一步结合我国的当前的实际情况,探索我国电力传输容量扩展的可行模式——金融传输权市场。
总之,我国电力产业的体制改革正进入一个新的阶段,独立的电力传输网络和监管机构已经成立。在我国电力行业改革的背景下,传统的输电网的价格规制和网络络扩展模式正面临着巨大的挑战,如何在现有的公司治理和股权结构下,确定有效的价格规制模式,如何向电网公司提供正确的投资激励,使输电网络公司进行有效的网络扩展,以及如何对网络扩展进行规划和审核都是摆在新的电力监管机构面前的难题。对这些问题进行研究,对我国正在进行的电力改革具有很好的参考价值,针对性强,也对其他基础产业规制改革也能起到一定的借鉴作用,因此具有一定的学术意义和适用价值。
Since the early 1980's,many countries have implemented electricity sector reforms.Although their electricity industry structure and reform mode varies,but its essential target is:According to the product market and the capital market rule, introducing the market mechanism into the electricity industry,carrying on the resource configure through competition,privatization and price mechanism, enhancing the resource configure efficiency and enterprise internal production efficiency,thus to impetus society's sustainable development.The main characteristic of reform is to adopt the method of marketing and capital market rule,through the price mechanism,competition and privatization to obtain the disposition and internal efficiency,thus to achieve the efficiency goal.
Major national electricity reform mainly is to introduce price mechanism and competition into the electricity generation and the electricity supply end,but the transmitting and allocation function is affected little owing to their monopoly nature. Along with the electricity generation side electricity market's establishment and consummation,the power distribution side relaxation remanufacture reform also gradually develops.The most important part of electricity market reform agenda includes introducing "Incentive" regulation instead of traditional "Cost Service" or "Return Ratio" into the maintaining power distribution link with monopoly nature. The goal of establishing excitability rules and regulations in power distribution is to provide incentive to enterprises to improve their investing and operating efficiency,as well as guarantee consumers to make a profit from the efficiency enhancement.The expectation incentive regulation mechanism can provide a stronger incentive to regular enterprises to reduce the cost,to improve service quality with effective cost, to stimulate(or at least not hindrance)new production and service's introduction,as well to promote effective investment and meeting price of regulated infrastructure service.
The concrete goals of establishing effective power distribution enterprise excitability regulation mechanism are:(1)electrical network owner can recycle all cost including the movement,the maintenance and the investment;(2)must effectively provide long-term incentive to maintenance,promotion and expansion system;(3)price mechanism ought to be able to provide the excellent node signal, instructs the market participant where and when to use system to encourage its effective transmission system.Corresponding to power distribution enterprise regulations,there are three aspects:excitability regulations of power distribution price, excitability regulations of service quality,as well as excitability regulations of incentive expansion of power distribution network.These three aspects are related mutually,and are also paid attention to by various countries' scholar and electricity market reform practitioner.This research will also launch from these three aspects.
Undoubtedly,research of power distribution enterprise's power distribution price's excitability regulations,service quality's excitability regulations as well as power distribution network's incentive expansion excitability regulation has extremely strong theory and policy meaning,and these research results will also have important influences on electricity profession reform carried on by other countries. Simultaneously,the argument in these research also indicates,on choosing governing pattern,incentive regulation mode and investment mode of electric transmission net work company,theories and practices have still not found the most superior pattern. Countries in the reform process must unify its own condition with suitable government and investment pattern.
This paper mainly elaborates incentive regulation goal of electricity transmission enterprise mentioned above,and innovates as the following aspects:
(1)Summarized practical problems which needed to solve in incentive regulation theory's application in electricity transmission enterprise.These questions mainly include:Where do the regulators obtain the information of enterprise's real cost and opportunity cost distribution? What type of datum to take as target of regulated enterprises' cost,income and other achievements,and how to revise the datum according to time variation? What intensity should the incentive mechanism have? Should the incentive mechanism have the integrity or the "topicality"? Answers to these questions will have vital significance to our electric market reform,especially to the determination of the incentive regulation frame.
(2)Attempted to use economic model and comparative analysis method to explore excitability regulation goal pattern under the Chinese present invariable environment.On the foundation of analyzing information rent which affects incentive regulation intensity and factors of regulation contract's implementation,along with our actual condition of electricity industry,pointed out regulation policy with excitation density is appropriate.
(3)Inspected achievement appraisal technical method involved in incentive regulation and rod incentive regulation method and process.On the foundation of further analyzing present situation of our electric transmission price regulation, unifying concrete characteristic of electric transmission enterprises and rod competition theory and achievement rod method,proposed a comprehensive electric transmission price control model which combines price upper limit control and rod competition control,especially a measure model of production efficiency of electric transmission enterprise based on Malmquist index.As well as conducted thorough research synthesizing regulation goal,structure design,input factors,X factor of (RPI+X)+/-Z and hypothesis of Z factor of electric transmission price control model.
(4)In the third chapter,the article does not take variation of electric energy when researching electric transmission service price incentive regulation.However, electricity supply interrupt and electricity quality may create huge direct and indirect economic loss to users.From another perspective,electric transmission enterprise may provide users electrical energy product of different quality if condition permitted. In the fourth chapter,through the Malmquist productivity index to combine electricity transmission enterprise's price regulation and transmission grade of service incentive effectively,achieved balance between cost saving and grade of service,proposed electricity transmission enterprise grade of service regulation incentive model--Based on price upper limit incentive regulation revision model.Introduced grade of service inspection content to guarantee user's power supply quality and reliability will not reduce under the rod competition condition.
(5)Because it is a very important question for the asymmetric information between regulator and regulated enterprise's in the nature monopoly regulation,which main performance is that the cost was not understood the effects to reduce the cost was not observed,this will cause the game between the regulator and regulated enterprises in the choice of incentive regulation tools.The most main dispute of the price caps incentive regulation policy lies in the determination of efficiency improvement foundation and how to transform them to the tariff change value(X factor).The regulator may use the different Regulatory benchmarking to determine the method to obtain X factor,in other words,the regulator and regulated enterprises can the same rules and regulations carry on game when they use these method. However,it is extremely little brings to people's attention for the question which the game or the strategy behavior between regulator and regulated initiate.Which strategy behavior did the application of the price caps lead to? When the electricity utilities was Supervised by the incentive benchmarking deregulation based on DEA,Some strategy questions was inspected and analyzed through the actual data in electric power enterprise.The results of Empirical Analysis provide much beneficial enlightenment to optimize incentive regulation policy.
(6)Constitutive split of electricity profession in China has completed initially. But our country's electric transmission network construction is extremely weak,and the lag of electric transmission network construction has already become the "bottleneck" of electricity generation market competition.Under electricity profession reform background,traditional electric transmission network expansion pattern is facing huge challenge.How to provide correct investment inspiration to electric network company to effectively expand network of electric transmission company under existing govern and stock right structure is a big topic before us.Therefore to analyze relationship between price regulation and transmission capacity of electric transmission company in the fifth chapter,and discussed tow patterns(incentive regulation pattern,transmission right pattern)of present transmission capacity expansion separately,further explore feasible pattern of electric transmission capacity expansion--Financial transmission right market.
In brief,organizational reform of our country's electricity industry is entering a new stage,and independent electricity transmission network and supervising organization has already established.Under our country's electricity profession reform background,traditional power transmission network price regulation and network expansion pattern are facing huge challenge.How to determine effective price regulation pattern,to provide correct investment inspiration to electric network company and cause electric transmission network company to expand effectively under existed govern and stock right structure are all difficult problems to new electric supervising organization.Research to these questions have good reference value to our electric reform,and will play model role to other foundation industry reform, therefore has academic significance and suitable value.
引文
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