考虑消费者行为的退货策略与供应链协调问题研究
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摘要
随着科技的发展和生产技术的进步，产品的种类和功能越来越多样化，而受“消费者就是上帝”的消费观念的影响，消费者退货变得司空见惯。此外，日益竞争的市场和企业的销售模式也加剧了消费者的退货问题，企业不得不加强对消费者退货问题的管理。基于上述背景，本论文使用运筹学、博弈论、市场学和库存理论等相关理论和方法，研究了单零售商和单制造商组成的两级供应链中，零售商如何通过不同的销售和退货策略，来减少消费者的无缺陷退货（主要包括一般无缺陷退货、机会主义退货和连带退货等），并分别分析了风险中性和风险规避型零售商的预售和正常销售模式选择，以及制造商如何设计不同的回购合同来协调不同风险偏好、退货行为和销售模式的供应链。
具体来讲，本文主要研究了以下三个方面的内容：
1.单销售模式（正常销售模式）下的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调
首先，考虑了消费者的产品估价依赖于退货期限时的最优退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题。采用了无约束优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现零售商的退货期限依赖于产品的生命周期和消费者的退货率，其退货补偿依赖于退货期限决策。在考虑消费者评价不确定性和零售商退货期限的情况下，统一回购价格合同不能实现供应链的协调，而差异化回购价格合同可以实现供应链的协调。当产品的残余价值与退货期限相关时，差异化回购价格合同也失去效率，文章提出了依赖退货期限的差异化回购价格合同。
然后，考虑了消费者的产品估价与可观察到的退货现象或退货量相关时最优退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题。采用了无约束优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现在固定连带退货问题下零售商的退货价格策略为产品残余价值与连带退货行为之差，在依赖退货量的连带退货问题下零售商的退货价格策略依赖于产品残余价值、消费者估价和连带退货行为；在考虑消费者退货存在连带退货行为的情况下，传统的统一回购价格合同不能实现供应链的协调，我们提出了差异化回购价格合同，对滞销产品和消费者退回产品提供不同的回购价格，这样可以实现供应链的协调。
2.多销售模式（预售和正常销售集成模式）下的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调
首先，考虑了预售和正常销售集成模式下零售商的退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题，分析了企业的三种主要预售策略：不提供预售、提供部分退款退货的预售策略和提供全额退款退货的预售策略。采用了带约束的两阶段优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现全额退款退货策略和不提供退货策略都不是零售商预售时的最优退货策略。预售策略的效果依赖于预售阶段和正常销售阶段的需求相关性。零售商的预售策略并没有从实质上影响上游制造商的回购合同效率，制造商仍然可以提供传统的供应链回购合同协调零售商的预售和正常销售问题。
然后，考虑了预售和正常销售集成模式下消费者的机会主义退货行为，以及零售商的退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题。采用了带约束的两阶段优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现零售商的最优销售策略依赖于消费者特点和市场特点等因素，如消费者的产品估价、消费者分类（关注预售与否、产品估价高低等）和需求变化等。部分退款退货策略可以通过降低退货价格来减少机会主义退货的发生，特别是撇脂定价的部分退款退货策略可以完全消除机会主义退货行为。然而，这类撇脂定价策略却降低了零售商的销售收益，因为低估价类型消费者被排除出了预售市场。
3.风险规避型零售商的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调
研究了零售商为风险规避类型时的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调问题。该零售商的决策依据一类均值-方差（Mean-Variance）决策方法。采用了无约束优化的研究方法。研究发现零售商降低风险的策略选择依赖于降低订购量和退货价格两类决策的边际利润贡献率。此外，零售商的最优销售模式选择依赖于其最大容忍风险、需求和决策的边际贡献等。而且零售商的风险约束在很大程度上影响了供应链回购合同的协调效率，特别是当零售商的最大容忍风险较低时，供应商提供回购合同会导致自身利益受损，达不到协调的目标。
With the development of scientific and production technology, the productcategories and functions diversify dramatically. While influenced by the consumptionconcept of “consumer is god”, consumer return becomes commonly seen. Further, thefierce market competition and sales mode also exacerbate this consumer returnproblem, the enterprise has to strengthen the management on consumer returnproblem. Based on the above backdrop, by adopting theories and methods ofOperations Research, Game Theory, Marketing Science and Inventory Theories, thisthesis studies a two-echelon supply chain with one single manufacturer and one singleretailer, and investigates how the retailer develop different selling and return policiesto reduce the consumer’s false failure returns (including general false failure returns,opportunistic returns and network external return). Finally, this thesis studies theretailer’s choice on the normal and advance selling mode with risk-neutral andrisk-averse preference, and which kind of buy-back contract the manufacturer canadopt to coordinate the supply chain with different risk preference, return behaviorand sales mode consideration.
More specifically, we study the main problem in three aspects as follows:
1. Return policy and buy-back contract coordination in the single selling modecase (only normal selling mode)
First, we study the retailer’s optimal return deadline policy and the buy-backcontract coordination when the consumer valuation depends on the return deadline. Itis found that the retailer’s optimal return deadline depends on the product life-cycleand the consumer return rate, and the retailer’s optimal refund policy depends on thereturn deadline. In this setting, we find that the traditional buy-back contract fails tocoordinate the supply chain, and when the product salvage value is related to thereturn deadline, the differentiated buy-back contract also fails, so we put forward adifferentiated buy-back contract contingent on the return deadline to coordinate thesupply chain.
Second, we consider a network external (NE) return problem, where the consumer valuation depends on the return phenomenon and return amount observed.In this setting, we explore the retailer’s optimal refund policy and the coordinationefficiency of the buy-back contract. It is found that the optimal refund is thedifference between the salvage value and the NE effect in the fixed NE case. And theoptimal refund depends on the salvage value, consumer valuation and NE effect in thenetwork external contingent on return amount case. With the NE return, thetraditional buy-back contract can’t coordinate the supply chain any more, and then weput forward a differentiated buy-back contract, with different refund to the unsoldproduct and consumer returns, to coordinate the supply chain.
2. Return policy and buy-back contract coordination in the multiple selling modescase (integrated mode of advance selling and normal selling)
First, we consider a multiple selling mode with advance selling and normalselling, and study the retailer’s three selling strategies: no advance selling, advanceselling with partial refund and advance selling with full refund. It is found that bothno advance selling and advance selling with full refund strategies are not optimalselling strategy. And the effect of advance selling depends on the correlation of thedemands in the normal selling period and advance selling period. Furthermore, theadvance selling strategy does not affect the coordination efficiency of the buy-backcontract essentially; the manufacturer still offers the buy-back contract to coordinatethe supply chain with multiple selling modes.
Second, we investigate the consumer’s opportunistic behavior in the multipleselling modes case. We also consider the retailer’s three selling strategies. It is foundthat the retailer’s optimal choice of the selling strategy depends on the characters ofboth consumer and market demand, such as consumer valuation, consumerclassification, and demand variance etc. And the partial refund policy can reduce theretailer’s risk by offering a lower refund, especially the partial refund policy withskimming pricing can eliminate the opportunistic return completely, however, thispricing policy also drops the retailer’s selling revenue.
3. Return policy and buy-back contract coordination with loss-averse retailer
We consider the return policy and buy-back contract coordination problem withone type of loss-averse retailer, where the loss-averse retailer adopts a Mean-Variance decision method to determine his optimal decisions. It is found that the retailer’spolicy to reduce his risk depends on the marginal profit of both decisions: reducingordering quantity and refund. Besides, the retailer’s optimal strategy on the sellingmode depends on his maximal risk tolerance, demand and marginal profit of hisdecisions. And the risk tolerance affects the coordination efficiency of the buy-backcontract to a large extent, especially when the maximal risk tolerance is low, thebuy-back contract will harm the interest of the manufacturer, and fail to coordinatethe supply chain.
具体来讲，本文主要研究了以下三个方面的内容：
1.单销售模式（正常销售模式）下的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调
首先，考虑了消费者的产品估价依赖于退货期限时的最优退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题。采用了无约束优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现零售商的退货期限依赖于产品的生命周期和消费者的退货率，其退货补偿依赖于退货期限决策。在考虑消费者评价不确定性和零售商退货期限的情况下，统一回购价格合同不能实现供应链的协调，而差异化回购价格合同可以实现供应链的协调。当产品的残余价值与退货期限相关时，差异化回购价格合同也失去效率，文章提出了依赖退货期限的差异化回购价格合同。
然后，考虑了消费者的产品估价与可观察到的退货现象或退货量相关时最优退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题。采用了无约束优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现在固定连带退货问题下零售商的退货价格策略为产品残余价值与连带退货行为之差，在依赖退货量的连带退货问题下零售商的退货价格策略依赖于产品残余价值、消费者估价和连带退货行为；在考虑消费者退货存在连带退货行为的情况下，传统的统一回购价格合同不能实现供应链的协调，我们提出了差异化回购价格合同，对滞销产品和消费者退回产品提供不同的回购价格，这样可以实现供应链的协调。
2.多销售模式（预售和正常销售集成模式）下的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调
首先，考虑了预售和正常销售集成模式下零售商的退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题，分析了企业的三种主要预售策略：不提供预售、提供部分退款退货的预售策略和提供全额退款退货的预售策略。采用了带约束的两阶段优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现全额退款退货策略和不提供退货策略都不是零售商预售时的最优退货策略。预售策略的效果依赖于预售阶段和正常销售阶段的需求相关性。零售商的预售策略并没有从实质上影响上游制造商的回购合同效率，制造商仍然可以提供传统的供应链回购合同协调零售商的预售和正常销售问题。
然后，考虑了预售和正常销售集成模式下消费者的机会主义退货行为，以及零售商的退货策略和供应链回购合同协调问题。采用了带约束的两阶段优化和博弈论的研究方法。研究发现零售商的最优销售策略依赖于消费者特点和市场特点等因素，如消费者的产品估价、消费者分类（关注预售与否、产品估价高低等）和需求变化等。部分退款退货策略可以通过降低退货价格来减少机会主义退货的发生，特别是撇脂定价的部分退款退货策略可以完全消除机会主义退货行为。然而，这类撇脂定价策略却降低了零售商的销售收益，因为低估价类型消费者被排除出了预售市场。
3.风险规避型零售商的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调
研究了零售商为风险规避类型时的退货决策和供应链回购合同协调问题。该零售商的决策依据一类均值-方差（Mean-Variance）决策方法。采用了无约束优化的研究方法。研究发现零售商降低风险的策略选择依赖于降低订购量和退货价格两类决策的边际利润贡献率。此外，零售商的最优销售模式选择依赖于其最大容忍风险、需求和决策的边际贡献等。而且零售商的风险约束在很大程度上影响了供应链回购合同的协调效率，特别是当零售商的最大容忍风险较低时，供应商提供回购合同会导致自身利益受损，达不到协调的目标。
With the development of scientific and production technology, the productcategories and functions diversify dramatically. While influenced by the consumptionconcept of “consumer is god”, consumer return becomes commonly seen. Further, thefierce market competition and sales mode also exacerbate this consumer returnproblem, the enterprise has to strengthen the management on consumer returnproblem. Based on the above backdrop, by adopting theories and methods ofOperations Research, Game Theory, Marketing Science and Inventory Theories, thisthesis studies a two-echelon supply chain with one single manufacturer and one singleretailer, and investigates how the retailer develop different selling and return policiesto reduce the consumer’s false failure returns (including general false failure returns,opportunistic returns and network external return). Finally, this thesis studies theretailer’s choice on the normal and advance selling mode with risk-neutral andrisk-averse preference, and which kind of buy-back contract the manufacturer canadopt to coordinate the supply chain with different risk preference, return behaviorand sales mode consideration.
More specifically, we study the main problem in three aspects as follows:
1. Return policy and buy-back contract coordination in the single selling modecase (only normal selling mode)
First, we study the retailer’s optimal return deadline policy and the buy-backcontract coordination when the consumer valuation depends on the return deadline. Itis found that the retailer’s optimal return deadline depends on the product life-cycleand the consumer return rate, and the retailer’s optimal refund policy depends on thereturn deadline. In this setting, we find that the traditional buy-back contract fails tocoordinate the supply chain, and when the product salvage value is related to thereturn deadline, the differentiated buy-back contract also fails, so we put forward adifferentiated buy-back contract contingent on the return deadline to coordinate thesupply chain.
Second, we consider a network external (NE) return problem, where the consumer valuation depends on the return phenomenon and return amount observed.In this setting, we explore the retailer’s optimal refund policy and the coordinationefficiency of the buy-back contract. It is found that the optimal refund is thedifference between the salvage value and the NE effect in the fixed NE case. And theoptimal refund depends on the salvage value, consumer valuation and NE effect in thenetwork external contingent on return amount case. With the NE return, thetraditional buy-back contract can’t coordinate the supply chain any more, and then weput forward a differentiated buy-back contract, with different refund to the unsoldproduct and consumer returns, to coordinate the supply chain.
2. Return policy and buy-back contract coordination in the multiple selling modescase (integrated mode of advance selling and normal selling)
First, we consider a multiple selling mode with advance selling and normalselling, and study the retailer’s three selling strategies: no advance selling, advanceselling with partial refund and advance selling with full refund. It is found that bothno advance selling and advance selling with full refund strategies are not optimalselling strategy. And the effect of advance selling depends on the correlation of thedemands in the normal selling period and advance selling period. Furthermore, theadvance selling strategy does not affect the coordination efficiency of the buy-backcontract essentially; the manufacturer still offers the buy-back contract to coordinatethe supply chain with multiple selling modes.
Second, we investigate the consumer’s opportunistic behavior in the multipleselling modes case. We also consider the retailer’s three selling strategies. It is foundthat the retailer’s optimal choice of the selling strategy depends on the characters ofboth consumer and market demand, such as consumer valuation, consumerclassification, and demand variance etc. And the partial refund policy can reduce theretailer’s risk by offering a lower refund, especially the partial refund policy withskimming pricing can eliminate the opportunistic return completely, however, thispricing policy also drops the retailer’s selling revenue.
3. Return policy and buy-back contract coordination with loss-averse retailer
We consider the return policy and buy-back contract coordination problem withone type of loss-averse retailer, where the loss-averse retailer adopts a Mean-Variance decision method to determine his optimal decisions. It is found that the retailer’spolicy to reduce his risk depends on the marginal profit of both decisions: reducingordering quantity and refund. Besides, the retailer’s optimal strategy on the sellingmode depends on his maximal risk tolerance, demand and marginal profit of hisdecisions. And the risk tolerance affects the coordination efficiency of the buy-backcontract to a large extent, especially when the maximal risk tolerance is low, thebuy-back contract will harm the interest of the manufacturer, and fail to coordinatethe supply chain.
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