中国上市公司大股东兼任高管的影响因素与经济后果分析
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摘要
大股东兼任高管（或简称为“兼任高管”，即Affiliated Management）作为大股东增强对上市公司控制的一种手段，早已被学术界所讨论（La Porta et al，1999；Claessens et al，2000）。但哪些因素会影响这种控制手段的运用，以及这种控制手段到底带来了何种经济后果，迄今为止尚未得到学术界系统而深入的研究（Claessens et al，2002）。本文试图运用中国上市公司的大样本数据，结合我国特有的制度背景，对此问题进行实证分析，以弥补这方面的研究不足。
参考Claessens et al（2000），本文研究中的大股东兼任高管包括“上市公司的高管即是上市公司的大股东（对自然人大股东而言）”以及“上市公司的高管同时也在大股东单位任职”这两种情况。
本文发现，大股东持股比例越高，股权制衡程度越低，出现大股东兼任高管的概率越高，暗示了兼任高管可能有助于大股东获取控制权收益，而其他股东将对上述行为进行抵制。本文还发现，民企发生大股东兼任高管的概率更高，可能是由于我国产权保护较差，民企大股东更有动机通过兼任高管增强对上市公司的控制。此外，法制环境与兼任高管现象密切相关。针对国企的分析还显示，上市公司的层级结构也与兼任高管现象有关。
本文的另一实证结果表明，大股东兼任高管的公司发生违法违规行为的概率更高，且民营企业大股东更倾向于利用兼任高管从事违法违规行为。进一步的分析显示，民营企业大股东兼任高管主要涉及虚假陈述、擅自改变资金用途、大股东占用上市公司资产等违法违规行为，而国有企业大股东兼任高管主要涉及虚假会计处理和虚假陈述等违法违规行为。
最后，本文的实证结果发现，当大股东兼任上市公司高管时，公司价值显著较低，且这些兼任高管所在公司进行了规模更大、频率更高的关联交易。这些实证结果表明了，兼任高管有助于大股东增强其对上市公司的控制，以获取更多的控制权收益，从而损害了公司价值。但大股东兼任高管对盈余信息含量并没有显著影响。
本研究有助于学术界更好地了解上市公司大股东兼任高管现象。鉴于我国大股东兼任高管产生了诸多负面影响，监管者应该对此现象加强监管。
Affiliated management is one of the channels that large shareholder could use toenhance their control (La Porta et al，1999；Claessens et al，2000；Claessens etal，2002). Affiliated management is widespread in Chinese stock market. However,up to now, there is little study investigating the determinants or implications ofaffiliated management. Using the data of affiliated management from the Chineselisted companies, this paper will contribute to the study of affiliated management.
Consistent with the literature (Claessens et al，2000；Claessens et al，2002),the management in listed company is defined as affiliated management if themanagement is the controlling shareholder, or the management is an employee of thecontrolling shareholder.
The empirical evidences show that affiliated management is associated with highlarge shareholder ownership and low concentration of other shareholder holdings,which implies that large shareholder would like to use affiliated management toenhance their control and other shareholder would boycott such behavior. This paperalso finds that non-state-owned firms are more likely to appoint affiliatedmanagement probably due to high demand for control since the general property rightprotection is poor. Meanwhile, legal environment is associated with affiliatedmanagement. Further evidences from state-owned enterprises show that the layer oflisted company is also associated with affiliated management.
This paper also finds that the companies with affiliated management are morelikely to conduct illegal activities, which is more severe in private companies. But thespecific kinds of illegal activities are different in private and state owned listedcompanies. The private listed companies with affiliated management are more likelyto manipulate information disclosure, deliberately change the use of funds, encounterexpropriations by the large shareholders and so forth; the state owned listedcompanies with affiliated management are more likely to misstate financialstatements and manipulate information disclosure. The evidence implies that the largeshareholder will use the affiliated management to conduct the illegal activities in order to get private benefit of control.
The empirical evidence also illustrates that the market value of the listed firmswith affiliated managers will be significantly lower than the other listed firms. Furtherevidence shows that the size and frequency of the related party transactions in thefirms with affiliated management are significantly higher than the other firms, but theinformativeness of earnings in those two types of firms is almost the same. This mayimply that the large shareholder will use affiliated management to enhance the controlof listed firms, in order to obtain private benefit of control, which will in turn hurt thebenefit of minority shareholders and decrease the firm value.
This paper provide evidence about the determinants and implications of largeshareholder control by the means of affiliated management, which will help thegovernment to regulate this widespread phenomenon in Chinese listed companies,and also contribute to the related academic literature.
参考Claessens et al（2000），本文研究中的大股东兼任高管包括“上市公司的高管即是上市公司的大股东（对自然人大股东而言）”以及“上市公司的高管同时也在大股东单位任职”这两种情况。
本文发现，大股东持股比例越高，股权制衡程度越低，出现大股东兼任高管的概率越高，暗示了兼任高管可能有助于大股东获取控制权收益，而其他股东将对上述行为进行抵制。本文还发现，民企发生大股东兼任高管的概率更高，可能是由于我国产权保护较差，民企大股东更有动机通过兼任高管增强对上市公司的控制。此外，法制环境与兼任高管现象密切相关。针对国企的分析还显示，上市公司的层级结构也与兼任高管现象有关。
本文的另一实证结果表明，大股东兼任高管的公司发生违法违规行为的概率更高，且民营企业大股东更倾向于利用兼任高管从事违法违规行为。进一步的分析显示，民营企业大股东兼任高管主要涉及虚假陈述、擅自改变资金用途、大股东占用上市公司资产等违法违规行为，而国有企业大股东兼任高管主要涉及虚假会计处理和虚假陈述等违法违规行为。
最后，本文的实证结果发现，当大股东兼任上市公司高管时，公司价值显著较低，且这些兼任高管所在公司进行了规模更大、频率更高的关联交易。这些实证结果表明了，兼任高管有助于大股东增强其对上市公司的控制，以获取更多的控制权收益，从而损害了公司价值。但大股东兼任高管对盈余信息含量并没有显著影响。
本研究有助于学术界更好地了解上市公司大股东兼任高管现象。鉴于我国大股东兼任高管产生了诸多负面影响，监管者应该对此现象加强监管。
Affiliated management is one of the channels that large shareholder could use toenhance their control (La Porta et al，1999；Claessens et al，2000；Claessens etal，2002). Affiliated management is widespread in Chinese stock market. However,up to now, there is little study investigating the determinants or implications ofaffiliated management. Using the data of affiliated management from the Chineselisted companies, this paper will contribute to the study of affiliated management.
Consistent with the literature (Claessens et al，2000；Claessens et al，2002),the management in listed company is defined as affiliated management if themanagement is the controlling shareholder, or the management is an employee of thecontrolling shareholder.
The empirical evidences show that affiliated management is associated with highlarge shareholder ownership and low concentration of other shareholder holdings,which implies that large shareholder would like to use affiliated management toenhance their control and other shareholder would boycott such behavior. This paperalso finds that non-state-owned firms are more likely to appoint affiliatedmanagement probably due to high demand for control since the general property rightprotection is poor. Meanwhile, legal environment is associated with affiliatedmanagement. Further evidences from state-owned enterprises show that the layer oflisted company is also associated with affiliated management.
This paper also finds that the companies with affiliated management are morelikely to conduct illegal activities, which is more severe in private companies. But thespecific kinds of illegal activities are different in private and state owned listedcompanies. The private listed companies with affiliated management are more likelyto manipulate information disclosure, deliberately change the use of funds, encounterexpropriations by the large shareholders and so forth; the state owned listedcompanies with affiliated management are more likely to misstate financialstatements and manipulate information disclosure. The evidence implies that the largeshareholder will use the affiliated management to conduct the illegal activities in order to get private benefit of control.
The empirical evidence also illustrates that the market value of the listed firmswith affiliated managers will be significantly lower than the other listed firms. Furtherevidence shows that the size and frequency of the related party transactions in thefirms with affiliated management are significantly higher than the other firms, but theinformativeness of earnings in those two types of firms is almost the same. This mayimply that the large shareholder will use affiliated management to enhance the controlof listed firms, in order to obtain private benefit of control, which will in turn hurt thebenefit of minority shareholders and decrease the firm value.
This paper provide evidence about the determinants and implications of largeshareholder control by the means of affiliated management, which will help thegovernment to regulate this widespread phenomenon in Chinese listed companies,and also contribute to the related academic literature.
引文
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