不确定条件下的制造商—供应商研发合作
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摘要
制造商协同供应商合作研发情形下,除需面临单企业组织研发时的传统技术与市场不确定性之外,还将进一步产生与各合作方之间决策和动机一致性相关的新问题,使得研发合作中不确定性的形式、影响以及管理都表现的相较于传统单企业组织研发而言更为复杂。
企业间合作初始目标常常是不现实的,未预期的环境变化将使得企业最初目标或成合作的障碍。研发能否成功突破技术之限制、研发产品所能达到的市场绩效以及合作伙伴是否会履约等都是不确定的。在此不确定情形下,企业的研发投资决策,往往在其揭示之间就需提前进行,这势必影响企业的决策。基于上述考量,本文以制造商-供应商的研发合作为研究之主线,在不确定条件下,探讨合作中的研发决策,并尝试进行以下几个方面的研究:1)研发合作中存在哪些不确定性;2)这些不确定性条件下,制造商-供应商研发合作的决策受到何种影响;3)存在这些不确定性情况下,如何管理制造商-供应商研发合作。具体来说,论文主要开展以下几个方面的研究工作:
首先,全面识别多企业组织研发合作中可能存在的各种不确定性形式;分析这些不确定性的具体来源及其表现形式;归纳不同不确定性在研发合作项目层次的存在形式;分析不确定性对企业研发合作产生的影响。
其次,引入前述研发合作中的不确定性,考虑研发期权价值,建立双方决策博弈模型,分析制造商-供应商产品研发任务共同分担的动态决策过程。
再次,引入不确定性,考虑研发期权价值,建立双方决策博弈模型,分析制造商及供应商对工艺研发投资成本共同分担的动态决策过程。
最后,引入不确定性,在双边道德风险模型下,研究制造商-供应商产品研发合作报酬契约的设计。
论文的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面:
①全面分析了企业研发合作所面临的不确定性。分析了企业研发合作下的技术、市场及行为不确定性成因,结合传统研发不确定性矩阵和联盟风险模型,建立了研发合作的不确定性模型,分析了不确定对研发合作的影响,并构建了不确定性及企业研发合作决策相互作用机制的系统动力学模型。
②研究不确定条件下,制造商及供应商产品研发任务共担及工艺研发投资共担两种情况的决策。建立了决策博弈模型,结果表明受技术不确定影响,研发投资具有可行性阀值限制;受行为不确定影响,企业会选择最适任务或投资的分担比例,且供应商的任务分担受其相对边际利润及开发能力限制。
③研究不确定条件下,基于双边道德风险模型,设计合作研发报酬契约。契约设计中,探讨了具体如何实现制造商与供应商间一定量产品收益转移,分享产出,以实现双方努力动机的激励。模型推演得到了最优契约,契约中部件技术价格随供应商研发努力的成本参数降低,随制造商成本参数增加。
When manufacture and supplier collaborate R&D, it face not only the traditional market uncertainty and technology uncertainty under singular enterprise organization, but also the new problem produced by consistency of collaborative parties’decision and incentive, this cause the form, influence and management of uncertainty under collaborative R&D more complexity compare to the R&D by singular enterprise organization.
The original enterprises’cooperating objects are frequently unpractical. The unexpected changes of environment probably lead the original enterprises’objects being obstacle of cooperate. Under the collaborative R&D, enterprises need analyze the uncertainty before decision making; it would decide eventual resource devotion by apperception of uncertainties degree existent in collaborative R&D. The enterprise must making decision by the start stage of collaborative R&D, but whether the R&D could breakthrough the restriction of technology, the market performance new product could achieve and whether of not the partner would devote enough resource all are uncertainty. Under the uncertain condition, the innovating investment decisions by enterprises are always ahead of the future uncertainty open out, thus, the uncertainty under collaborative R&D would influence the decision making by enterprises. Based on forward consideration, this thesis would take the collaborative R&D by manufacture and supplier as the research masterstroke, discuss the uncertainty and its influence and reactivity, and attempt to carry through the research of several aspects underside: 1) what uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D and what is its different compare to the singular enterprise organization; 2)how these uncertainties influence the decision making of manufacture and supplier’s collaborative R&D; 3) how manufacture and supplier reactive with the uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D. Concretely, the following research has been developed in this thesis.
Firstly, based on Das and Teng’s risk model, distinguish, conclude and analysis the uncertainties and their exhibit form exist in collaborative R&D completely. Distinguished diversified uncertainty probably exist in multi-enterprise organization collaborative R&D, concluded these uncertainties’real source and their exhibition form, concluded differ uncertainties exist in which levels of collaborative R&D, simultaneity, analysis the influence to cooperate by uncertainties, and construct the system dynamics model of the random disturb influence to the collaborative R&D between enterprises by Forrester’s system dynamic method.
Secondly, in product development, the resource invested and the development assignments assumed by enterprise organization are greatly lying on the tradeoff with the anticipate income, utilize game theory, inducting the uncertainties under collaborative R&D recognized before to analysis the dynamic decision making process of R&D assignment sharing by manufacture and supplier. Taking the differ situations of manufacture R&D alone and manufacture-supplier R&D assignment sharing as the research object, the two parties’decision-making game was built, the influence of uncertainties to collaborative product development decision were analyzed and the differ product development situations were compared.
Thirdly, utilize game theory, inducting the uncertainties under collaborative R&D recognized before to analysis the dynamic decision making process of R&D investment sharing by manufacture and supplier of supplier’s technology R&D. Taking the two situations of supplier investment alone and manufacture-supplier joint investment as the research object, the two parties’decision-making Stackelberg game was built, the influence of uncertainty to decision were analyzed and the differ investment situations were compared.
Lastly, within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensate contract, we take consideration of the incentive of supplier’s effort and the incentive of manufacture‘s own effort. Through a component technology price, the contract realized transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, shared the output, and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint of supplier participate in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decrease with the supplier’s cost parameter of R&D effort, and increase with the manufacture’s cost parameter of R&D effort.
In conclusion, the innovation of this thesis can be summarized three aspects:
①distinguish, conclude and analysis the form, origin and their infection to the R&D cooperative relation of the uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D completely. The collaborative R&D of multi-enterprise would be faced not only the technology and market uncertainty inherently exist in R&D project, it also faced the behavior uncertainty from cooperate. The behavior uncertainty comes from inside level of R&D project, is a endogenesis technology; the technology uncertainty and market uncertainty are come from project level and outside level, are exogenous uncertainty. When market uncertainty is high, enterprise’s desire of long term cooperate are high; when technology higher, enterprise wouldn’t build long term collaborative relation; and behavior uncertainty higher, participators‘s confidence be lower to the partner’s action of carry out the agreement, and it more possibly reduced the devotion in cooperation, so will depress the overall performance of R&D cooperate.
②Based on the condition of uncertainty, research the dynamic decision making process of R&D assignment sharing by manufacture and supplier and R&D investment sharing by manufacture and supplier of supplier’s technology R&D. Results shown the exist of technology uncertainty would reduced the devotion to collaborative R&D,come into being a technology feasibility threshold, probably lead the enterprise not carry R&D. Collaborative R&D could advance the devotion of enterprise’s R&D investment; extend the consideration technology feasible set. Behavior uncertainty in cooperate would reduce the devotion and feasible set, meanwhile, in product development assignment share, the supplier join cooperation only relatively marginal profit and develop ability could reach some degree, choose a best proportion of assignment sharing; in process development, manufacture also have a best proportion of investment sharing, and the proportion increase by technology feasible of R&D.
③Within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensate contract, taking consideration of the incentive of supplier’s effort and the incentive of manufacture‘s own effort. Through a component technology price, the contract realized transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, shares the output, and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint of supplier participate in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decrease with the supplier’s cost parameter of R&D effort, and increase with the manufacture’s cost parameter of R&D effort.
企业间合作初始目标常常是不现实的,未预期的环境变化将使得企业最初目标或成合作的障碍。研发能否成功突破技术之限制、研发产品所能达到的市场绩效以及合作伙伴是否会履约等都是不确定的。在此不确定情形下,企业的研发投资决策,往往在其揭示之间就需提前进行,这势必影响企业的决策。基于上述考量,本文以制造商-供应商的研发合作为研究之主线,在不确定条件下,探讨合作中的研发决策,并尝试进行以下几个方面的研究:1)研发合作中存在哪些不确定性;2)这些不确定性条件下,制造商-供应商研发合作的决策受到何种影响;3)存在这些不确定性情况下,如何管理制造商-供应商研发合作。具体来说,论文主要开展以下几个方面的研究工作:
首先,全面识别多企业组织研发合作中可能存在的各种不确定性形式;分析这些不确定性的具体来源及其表现形式;归纳不同不确定性在研发合作项目层次的存在形式;分析不确定性对企业研发合作产生的影响。
其次,引入前述研发合作中的不确定性,考虑研发期权价值,建立双方决策博弈模型,分析制造商-供应商产品研发任务共同分担的动态决策过程。
再次,引入不确定性,考虑研发期权价值,建立双方决策博弈模型,分析制造商及供应商对工艺研发投资成本共同分担的动态决策过程。
最后,引入不确定性,在双边道德风险模型下,研究制造商-供应商产品研发合作报酬契约的设计。
论文的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面:
①全面分析了企业研发合作所面临的不确定性。分析了企业研发合作下的技术、市场及行为不确定性成因,结合传统研发不确定性矩阵和联盟风险模型,建立了研发合作的不确定性模型,分析了不确定对研发合作的影响,并构建了不确定性及企业研发合作决策相互作用机制的系统动力学模型。
②研究不确定条件下,制造商及供应商产品研发任务共担及工艺研发投资共担两种情况的决策。建立了决策博弈模型,结果表明受技术不确定影响,研发投资具有可行性阀值限制;受行为不确定影响,企业会选择最适任务或投资的分担比例,且供应商的任务分担受其相对边际利润及开发能力限制。
③研究不确定条件下,基于双边道德风险模型,设计合作研发报酬契约。契约设计中,探讨了具体如何实现制造商与供应商间一定量产品收益转移,分享产出,以实现双方努力动机的激励。模型推演得到了最优契约,契约中部件技术价格随供应商研发努力的成本参数降低,随制造商成本参数增加。
When manufacture and supplier collaborate R&D, it face not only the traditional market uncertainty and technology uncertainty under singular enterprise organization, but also the new problem produced by consistency of collaborative parties’decision and incentive, this cause the form, influence and management of uncertainty under collaborative R&D more complexity compare to the R&D by singular enterprise organization.
The original enterprises’cooperating objects are frequently unpractical. The unexpected changes of environment probably lead the original enterprises’objects being obstacle of cooperate. Under the collaborative R&D, enterprises need analyze the uncertainty before decision making; it would decide eventual resource devotion by apperception of uncertainties degree existent in collaborative R&D. The enterprise must making decision by the start stage of collaborative R&D, but whether the R&D could breakthrough the restriction of technology, the market performance new product could achieve and whether of not the partner would devote enough resource all are uncertainty. Under the uncertain condition, the innovating investment decisions by enterprises are always ahead of the future uncertainty open out, thus, the uncertainty under collaborative R&D would influence the decision making by enterprises. Based on forward consideration, this thesis would take the collaborative R&D by manufacture and supplier as the research masterstroke, discuss the uncertainty and its influence and reactivity, and attempt to carry through the research of several aspects underside: 1) what uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D and what is its different compare to the singular enterprise organization; 2)how these uncertainties influence the decision making of manufacture and supplier’s collaborative R&D; 3) how manufacture and supplier reactive with the uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D. Concretely, the following research has been developed in this thesis.
Firstly, based on Das and Teng’s risk model, distinguish, conclude and analysis the uncertainties and their exhibit form exist in collaborative R&D completely. Distinguished diversified uncertainty probably exist in multi-enterprise organization collaborative R&D, concluded these uncertainties’real source and their exhibition form, concluded differ uncertainties exist in which levels of collaborative R&D, simultaneity, analysis the influence to cooperate by uncertainties, and construct the system dynamics model of the random disturb influence to the collaborative R&D between enterprises by Forrester’s system dynamic method.
Secondly, in product development, the resource invested and the development assignments assumed by enterprise organization are greatly lying on the tradeoff with the anticipate income, utilize game theory, inducting the uncertainties under collaborative R&D recognized before to analysis the dynamic decision making process of R&D assignment sharing by manufacture and supplier. Taking the differ situations of manufacture R&D alone and manufacture-supplier R&D assignment sharing as the research object, the two parties’decision-making game was built, the influence of uncertainties to collaborative product development decision were analyzed and the differ product development situations were compared.
Thirdly, utilize game theory, inducting the uncertainties under collaborative R&D recognized before to analysis the dynamic decision making process of R&D investment sharing by manufacture and supplier of supplier’s technology R&D. Taking the two situations of supplier investment alone and manufacture-supplier joint investment as the research object, the two parties’decision-making Stackelberg game was built, the influence of uncertainty to decision were analyzed and the differ investment situations were compared.
Lastly, within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensate contract, we take consideration of the incentive of supplier’s effort and the incentive of manufacture‘s own effort. Through a component technology price, the contract realized transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, shared the output, and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint of supplier participate in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decrease with the supplier’s cost parameter of R&D effort, and increase with the manufacture’s cost parameter of R&D effort.
In conclusion, the innovation of this thesis can be summarized three aspects:
①distinguish, conclude and analysis the form, origin and their infection to the R&D cooperative relation of the uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D completely. The collaborative R&D of multi-enterprise would be faced not only the technology and market uncertainty inherently exist in R&D project, it also faced the behavior uncertainty from cooperate. The behavior uncertainty comes from inside level of R&D project, is a endogenesis technology; the technology uncertainty and market uncertainty are come from project level and outside level, are exogenous uncertainty. When market uncertainty is high, enterprise’s desire of long term cooperate are high; when technology higher, enterprise wouldn’t build long term collaborative relation; and behavior uncertainty higher, participators‘s confidence be lower to the partner’s action of carry out the agreement, and it more possibly reduced the devotion in cooperation, so will depress the overall performance of R&D cooperate.
②Based on the condition of uncertainty, research the dynamic decision making process of R&D assignment sharing by manufacture and supplier and R&D investment sharing by manufacture and supplier of supplier’s technology R&D. Results shown the exist of technology uncertainty would reduced the devotion to collaborative R&D,come into being a technology feasibility threshold, probably lead the enterprise not carry R&D. Collaborative R&D could advance the devotion of enterprise’s R&D investment; extend the consideration technology feasible set. Behavior uncertainty in cooperate would reduce the devotion and feasible set, meanwhile, in product development assignment share, the supplier join cooperation only relatively marginal profit and develop ability could reach some degree, choose a best proportion of assignment sharing; in process development, manufacture also have a best proportion of investment sharing, and the proportion increase by technology feasible of R&D.
③Within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensate contract, taking consideration of the incentive of supplier’s effort and the incentive of manufacture‘s own effort. Through a component technology price, the contract realized transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, shares the output, and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint of supplier participate in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decrease with the supplier’s cost parameter of R&D effort, and increase with the manufacture’s cost parameter of R&D effort.
引文
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