上市公司利益转移型关联交易研究
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摘要
关联交易，是指在关联方之间转移资源或义务的事项，而不论是否收取款项。关联交易既具有促进公司规模经营、减少交易过程中的不确定性、降低交易成本、有助于公司集团整体战略目标的实现等积极作用，也存在违背市场公平竞争原则，在关联方之间转移资金和利润，进而损害公司和股东利益等诸多负面影响。
本文首先综述了关联交易、利益转移型关联交易的定义和基本分类，引入了利益转移型关联交易模型，并进行了定性分析。同时，通过对上市公司利益转移型关联交易定量分析得出结论：上市公司中即使是无效率经济的关联交易常常发生；利益转移型关联交易在我国上市公司中普遍存在；控制方股东获得了从上市公司转移走的利润，而上市公司的小股东与其他利益方的利益受到了严重侵害。另外，在国有股权虚置、上市公司管理层形成较严重的内部人控制的情况下，管理层会利用控制方股东的国有控股权将利润转移至自己开办的私人公司中，而不是转移至控制方国有股东手中。由于管理层实际上在上市公司没有任何股权，这种转移利润的关联交易的隐蔽性更强，危害更大。在此基础上，本文分析了我国上市公司利益转移型关联交易存在问题的原因，提出了规范关联交易的管理对策，即通过优化公司股权结构，健全公司的治理机制；引进独立董事制度，形成科学的决策机制；完善法律规制，加强关联交易监管；明确公平定价原则，维护关联交易的公平性；完善关联交易披露制度，加强信息披露检查；保护中小股东权益，完善股东诉讼制度等。
总之，本文对上市公司利益转移型关联交易问题作了一个较全面的定性和定量分析，并就如何规范关联交易提出了管理对策，这不但为今后的进一步研究提供思路，也为我国加强上市公司关联交易监管提供参考。
"Related party transaction" (RPT) means a transaction in which resources or liabilities are transferred between related parties, weather or not it involves any. A RPT on one hand, could help enlarge the scale of a business, decrease the uncertainty in course of the transaction, lower the costs of transaction, and realize the strategic objectives of the whole business group. On the other hand, it may produce some negative impacts, such as breaking the law of fair competition, transferring capital and profits between related parties, and thereby impair the interests of the companies and shareholders.
Firstly, this paper explicates definition on RPT and interests-transferring RPT and basic theory, analyzes mechanism of RPT generation and interests -transferring model, and conies to a conclusion: the majority of shareholders obtain benefits from listed companies in the course of interests -transferring, but the small shareholders and other related party have been impaired. Moreover, under the share rights default and existing serious interior-people control in the management layer, the management layer would transfer profit to private companies by taking advantage of state-owned share rights, not to the side of state-owned shareholders. This kind of RPT has more strong negativeness and hazard because of non-existence of share-right in the management layer.
Based on above, this paper analyzes the course on RPT's wide existence among listed companies, proposes management measures of regulation on RPT, namely perfecting corporate governance mechanism through streamlining corporate share rights structure, forming scientific decision mechanism through adopting independent director system, optimizing law and regulation to strength supervision on RPT, encouraging medium-sized and small shareholders to take part in corporate management, ensuring fairness of RPT through clarifying pricing-fairly principle, perfecting releasing rules on RPT to strengthen check on information releasing; safeguarding rights and interests of medium-sized and small shareholders as well as perfecting action system of shareholder
and so on.
All in all, this paper makes an overall qualitative and quantitative analysis on interests-transferring RPT and propose some management measures in order to protect the interests of the investors, and maintain the stability of security market.
本文首先综述了关联交易、利益转移型关联交易的定义和基本分类，引入了利益转移型关联交易模型，并进行了定性分析。同时，通过对上市公司利益转移型关联交易定量分析得出结论：上市公司中即使是无效率经济的关联交易常常发生；利益转移型关联交易在我国上市公司中普遍存在；控制方股东获得了从上市公司转移走的利润，而上市公司的小股东与其他利益方的利益受到了严重侵害。另外，在国有股权虚置、上市公司管理层形成较严重的内部人控制的情况下，管理层会利用控制方股东的国有控股权将利润转移至自己开办的私人公司中，而不是转移至控制方国有股东手中。由于管理层实际上在上市公司没有任何股权，这种转移利润的关联交易的隐蔽性更强，危害更大。在此基础上，本文分析了我国上市公司利益转移型关联交易存在问题的原因，提出了规范关联交易的管理对策，即通过优化公司股权结构，健全公司的治理机制；引进独立董事制度，形成科学的决策机制；完善法律规制，加强关联交易监管；明确公平定价原则，维护关联交易的公平性；完善关联交易披露制度，加强信息披露检查；保护中小股东权益，完善股东诉讼制度等。
总之，本文对上市公司利益转移型关联交易问题作了一个较全面的定性和定量分析，并就如何规范关联交易提出了管理对策，这不但为今后的进一步研究提供思路，也为我国加强上市公司关联交易监管提供参考。
"Related party transaction" (RPT) means a transaction in which resources or liabilities are transferred between related parties, weather or not it involves any. A RPT on one hand, could help enlarge the scale of a business, decrease the uncertainty in course of the transaction, lower the costs of transaction, and realize the strategic objectives of the whole business group. On the other hand, it may produce some negative impacts, such as breaking the law of fair competition, transferring capital and profits between related parties, and thereby impair the interests of the companies and shareholders.
Firstly, this paper explicates definition on RPT and interests-transferring RPT and basic theory, analyzes mechanism of RPT generation and interests -transferring model, and conies to a conclusion: the majority of shareholders obtain benefits from listed companies in the course of interests -transferring, but the small shareholders and other related party have been impaired. Moreover, under the share rights default and existing serious interior-people control in the management layer, the management layer would transfer profit to private companies by taking advantage of state-owned share rights, not to the side of state-owned shareholders. This kind of RPT has more strong negativeness and hazard because of non-existence of share-right in the management layer.
Based on above, this paper analyzes the course on RPT's wide existence among listed companies, proposes management measures of regulation on RPT, namely perfecting corporate governance mechanism through streamlining corporate share rights structure, forming scientific decision mechanism through adopting independent director system, optimizing law and regulation to strength supervision on RPT, encouraging medium-sized and small shareholders to take part in corporate management, ensuring fairness of RPT through clarifying pricing-fairly principle, perfecting releasing rules on RPT to strengthen check on information releasing; safeguarding rights and interests of medium-sized and small shareholders as well as perfecting action system of shareholder
and so on.
All in all, this paper makes an overall qualitative and quantitative analysis on interests-transferring RPT and propose some management measures in order to protect the interests of the investors, and maintain the stability of security market.
引文
[1] 张维迎，马捷．恶性竞争的产权基础。经济研究，1999，(6)：11-20
[2] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学．上海：上海三联书店，1996
[3] 郑红亮．公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革．经济研究，1998(10)：20-27
[4] Samuelson P. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.Review of Economics and Statistics,1954,(36): 386-389
[5] 阿特金森，斯蒂格里茨．公共经济学．上海：上海三联书店，1994
[6] Watts R L, Zimmerman J L. Positive Accouting Theory, USA:Prentice-Hall,1986,
[7] Barclay M, Coifford H. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 1989,
[8] 富永健一．经济社会学．天津：南开大学出版社，1984
[9] 马晓康，余丽芳．关联方、职工福利与或有事项会计核算．北京：经济管理出版社，1999
[10] Adolf A., Berle,Jr., Gardiner C. The Modem Corporation and Private Property, USA:Mac Millan New york. 1963,
[11] Blair M. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21 Century.USA:the Brookings Institution. 1995,371-395
[12] 段亚林．非公平关联交易下的公司利益转移问题研究．深圳证券交易所综合研究所，2001
[13] 段亚林．论大股东股权滥用及实例．北京：经济管理出版社，2001
[14] 刘俊海．股份有限公司股东权的保护．北京：法律出版社，1997
[15] 钱德勒．看得见的手—美国企业的管理革命．北京：商务印书馆，1987，9-40
[16] 哈罗德·德姆塞茨．竞争的经济、法律和政治维度．上海：上海三联书店，1992
[17] Baker R J, Cary W L. Corporations: Cases and Materials. USA:The Foundation Press. 1959, 195
[18] Fama E F. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.Journal of Finance, 1970,25 (2):383-417
[19] 张开平．英美公司董事法律制度研究．北京：法律出版社，1998
[20] Dioip M I, Png P L. Monitoring Vis-(?)-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law.The American Economic Review,1992,82(3):556-565
[21] 谢识予．经济博弈论．上海：复旦大学出版社，1997
[22] 齐斌．证券市场信息披露法律监管．北京：法律出版社，2000
[23] 张立华．对我国上市公司关联交易信息批露的反思．经济师，2002(12)：123-124
[24] 陈湘永．我国上市公司内部人控制研究．管理世界，2000，(4)：103-109
[25] 高立平．近年来关于内部人控制失控问题及解决思路研究综述．教学与研究，2000，(10)：51-55
[26] 刘志光．完善股东诉讼制度．决策借鉴，2000，(3)：59-61
[27] 陈秀山，吴建辉．国有企业内部人控制成因与对策分析．经济理论与经济管理，1997，(3)：40-45
[28] 施信．对上市公司关联交易的监管思考．南开经济研究，2002(6)：75-76
[29] Coaessens S S, Djankov J F, Larry H P. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia. USA:World Bank,1999
[30] Berle A, Gardiner M. The Modem Corporation and Private Property. USA: MacMillan, 1932
[31] Burkart M, Denis G, Fausto P. Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economies, 1997,(12):693-728
[32] Varian H. Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, USA: Norton & Company, Inc., 1992
[33] Jensen M, William M. Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(3):305-360
[34] Bergstrom C, Kristian R. Partnership of Equity in Dual-Class Firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1990,(14):255-269
[35] 国际会计准则委员会．国际会计准则2000．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000
[36] 蒋义宏，李树华．证券市场会计问题实证研究．上海：上海财经大学出版社，1998
[37] Come R, Sandle T. The Theory of Externality, Public Goods and Club Goods. USA:Cambridge University Press,1986
[38] Beaver W. Financial Reporting: An Accomting Revolution, Second Edition, USA:Prentice-Hall, 1989
[39] 中国财政部．企业会计准则——关联方关系及其交易的披露，1997
[40] 曹心华．对通过关联交易操纵利润的剖析．经济管理，2002(8)：36
[41] Grossman S, Hart O. An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 1983, 10(1):7-45
[2] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学．上海：上海三联书店，1996
[3] 郑红亮．公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革．经济研究，1998(10)：20-27
[4] Samuelson P. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.Review of Economics and Statistics,1954,(36): 386-389
[5] 阿特金森，斯蒂格里茨．公共经济学．上海：上海三联书店，1994
[6] Watts R L, Zimmerman J L. Positive Accouting Theory, USA:Prentice-Hall,1986,
[7] Barclay M, Coifford H. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 1989,
[8] 富永健一．经济社会学．天津：南开大学出版社，1984
[9] 马晓康，余丽芳．关联方、职工福利与或有事项会计核算．北京：经济管理出版社，1999
[10] Adolf A., Berle,Jr., Gardiner C. The Modem Corporation and Private Property, USA:Mac Millan New york. 1963,
[11] Blair M. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21 Century.USA:the Brookings Institution. 1995,371-395
[12] 段亚林．非公平关联交易下的公司利益转移问题研究．深圳证券交易所综合研究所，2001
[13] 段亚林．论大股东股权滥用及实例．北京：经济管理出版社，2001
[14] 刘俊海．股份有限公司股东权的保护．北京：法律出版社，1997
[15] 钱德勒．看得见的手—美国企业的管理革命．北京：商务印书馆，1987，9-40
[16] 哈罗德·德姆塞茨．竞争的经济、法律和政治维度．上海：上海三联书店，1992
[17] Baker R J, Cary W L. Corporations: Cases and Materials. USA:The Foundation Press. 1959, 195
[18] Fama E F. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.Journal of Finance, 1970,25 (2):383-417
[19] 张开平．英美公司董事法律制度研究．北京：法律出版社，1998
[20] Dioip M I, Png P L. Monitoring Vis-(?)-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law.The American Economic Review,1992,82(3):556-565
[21] 谢识予．经济博弈论．上海：复旦大学出版社，1997
[22] 齐斌．证券市场信息披露法律监管．北京：法律出版社，2000
[23] 张立华．对我国上市公司关联交易信息批露的反思．经济师，2002(12)：123-124
[24] 陈湘永．我国上市公司内部人控制研究．管理世界，2000，(4)：103-109
[25] 高立平．近年来关于内部人控制失控问题及解决思路研究综述．教学与研究，2000，(10)：51-55
[26] 刘志光．完善股东诉讼制度．决策借鉴，2000，(3)：59-61
[27] 陈秀山，吴建辉．国有企业内部人控制成因与对策分析．经济理论与经济管理，1997，(3)：40-45
[28] 施信．对上市公司关联交易的监管思考．南开经济研究，2002(6)：75-76
[29] Coaessens S S, Djankov J F, Larry H P. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia. USA:World Bank,1999
[30] Berle A, Gardiner M. The Modem Corporation and Private Property. USA: MacMillan, 1932
[31] Burkart M, Denis G, Fausto P. Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economies, 1997,(12):693-728
[32] Varian H. Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, USA: Norton & Company, Inc., 1992
[33] Jensen M, William M. Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(3):305-360
[34] Bergstrom C, Kristian R. Partnership of Equity in Dual-Class Firms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1990,(14):255-269
[35] 国际会计准则委员会．国际会计准则2000．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000
[36] 蒋义宏，李树华．证券市场会计问题实证研究．上海：上海财经大学出版社，1998
[37] Come R, Sandle T. The Theory of Externality, Public Goods and Club Goods. USA:Cambridge University Press,1986
[38] Beaver W. Financial Reporting: An Accomting Revolution, Second Edition, USA:Prentice-Hall, 1989
[39] 中国财政部．企业会计准则——关联方关系及其交易的披露，1997
[40] 曹心华．对通过关联交易操纵利润的剖析．经济管理，2002(8)：36
[41] Grossman S, Hart O. An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 1983, 10(1):7-45
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