基于讨价还价博弈的中国改革逻辑
摘要
秉持A.斯密以来的古典政治经济学思想的学术传统,本文将制度变迁看作相关参与人对社会契约不断调整、协议的非暴力讨价还价的博弈过程,从而,试图围绕中国改革开放以来渐进改革的制度现象,给出一种基于讨价还价理论的统一逻辑。
如果把类似于“小岗村”土地承包责任制、“温州”乡镇企业发展等自发的民间行为,看成一种客观、广义的讨价还价策略性行为,同时,把由此引起的国家政策变化,看成是某种市场与计划力量之间讨价还价博弈的均衡。本文将论证：由于讨价还价博弈的内在逻辑要求矛盾各方,既能就改革方案达成妥协的交易合作、又能就改革的预期收益进行讨价还价的博弈对抗；使得讨价还价博弈的制度改革均衡,不仅具有合作的效率、也同时包含对抗的公平价值观。这种“效率优先、兼顾公平”的中国特色改革,赋予中国改革以两个关键性实践内涵：一是通过非暴力讨价还价的制度调整,解放了与发展经济和提高生产力水平的制度约束；二是通过以市场为导向的经济运行体制改革,初步实现了“华盛顿共识”的改革目标——竞争、市场和产权配置资源的经济模式。
由此可见,本文主题是纯粹的制度改革理论研究,方法是通过将K.Binmore意义的讨价还价理论与J.Bucanann意义的功利主义思想相结合,致力于一种既涉及经济又关联政治的“科学理性”分析；考察社会制度是如何在人们社会行为的广义交易——讨价还价博弈——过程中发生、形成的。当然,讨价还价制度改革也并非中国当代社会变迁的全部故事,在现实情形下,后者,更像是一种混合的——上下互动、左右联动甚至内在反复——制度变迁过程。然而,本文的研究视角拟表明,中国社会经济发展的核心原因,恰恰是本文所讨论的讨价还价制度机制；这种广义讨价还价的社会改革程序,是中国制度改革取得相对成功的主要原因,也是东方情境下一种内生意义上政治民主的社会过程。换句话说,如果本文的努力恰当的话,我们将证明如下主要逻辑结论。
第一,讨价还价制度改革具有效率性质。其经济原理在于,讨价还价的“交易”均衡具有帕累托改进的效率机制——“能够在不减少其他成员社会福利的同时,提高至少一人的效用水平”；而中国30多年经济发展的实践正由此印证。
第二,讨价还价制度改革具有公平性质。这是讨价还价博弈内在“既对抗、又合作”均衡的妥协逻辑决定的；为此,本文将围绕Binmore意义的讨价还价理论(包含广义交易政治理论),进行(国内第一次)系统、准确地陈述和深入分析。
第三,讨价还价制度改革包含了民主政治的本质逻辑、是现实民主政治的重要途径。由于讨价还价博弈本身内涵着“对抗不可避免、妥协是有价值的”的基本原理,这不同于传统博弈论关于对抗和合作行为的绝对划分,也不同于政治哲学关于民主投票的简化逻辑；充分体现了人类社会“理性对话”和“政治文明”的行为本质。这意味着中国当代的改革实践,本质上具有创新传统民主政治概念的理论内涵；这是本文结合中国实践致力于深化Binmore意义上讨价还价理论的核心所在。
更通俗地说,对于当代中国这种广义、具有民主性质的“讨价还价”制度改革逻辑,一种核心脚注,就是中国共产党一贯主张、并力图坚持的“实事求是’思想路线和原则。即本文的逻辑意味着：中国社会、政治、经济体制改革能否成功,关键在于改革过程是否坚持了“实事求是”的基本原则；而争取、或可能做到“实事求是”的唯一有效的途径,就是涉及改革的利益各方是否能达成非暴力讨价还价的博弈均衡。
由此可见,与发展战略理论(林毅夫等)、社会选择理论(樊纲)、二元结构增长理论(Sachs和Woo等)、国家集权最优宏观调控理论(斯蒂格利茨)、国家资本主义赶超模式(科兰兹克等)和新制度经济学理论(周其仁等)比较而言,本文关于中国经济现象及其制度改革机制的解释,在力图符合30年中国改革的现实的同时,也具有恰当的思想继承性和学术合法性。而传统理论关于制度改革进度、内容不同的争议,并非“激进”和“渐进”改革的本质差异；其实,渐进改革只是讨价还价博弈均衡的一种外在特征,核心在于讨价还价机制包容了不同利益主体的客观诉求。如此,既不同于传统理论关于中国改革的理论,同时又包含了其合理逻辑的成分,本文或可能为澄清国际学术界关于中国社会转型的偏见,乃至厘清关于中国改革理论的种种误解,提供一个统一、合法的理论基础。
具体地,本文第一章将围绕制度改革的交易性质和均衡分类等前置性问题,给出一个整体安排和逻辑结构的简介；第二章将从关于中国制度改革的理论综述出发,试图回答：为什么中国制度改革的核心是一个讨价还价的社会过程；第三章将通过对政治哲学的理论追溯,试图全面阐述讨价还价理论的社会科学价值、及其应用于制度改革的逻辑合法性；第四章,我们将围绕交易的核、竞争性均衡和讨价还价博弈三个经典的解概念,给出一种教科书式的陈述；第五章将讨论一种经济意义的制度表达,这是深入分析制度改革博弈及结构的前提；第六章将讨论一般制度改革博弈的讨价还价逻辑前提和条件；第七章将讨论中国情境下非暴力讨价还价的解概念和数理结构；第八章,我们给出本文核心模型的论证过程和两个讨价还价解概念；第九章是基于模型的自然推理,将讨论中国意义上制度改革实践的社会科学价值,这包括前述三个结论的具体证明和讨论；在第十章,我们将进一步讨论涉及中国改革逻辑的三个主要理论缺陷,当然,这是基于自然主义哲学语境而言的；如此,我们将在本文最后结尾的第十一章,试图围绕这种讨价还价的中国制度改革逻辑,给出一个自然主义哲学方法论的理论升华。
Inheriting the classical political economy tradition of Adam Smith's thought, the paper studies the institutional changes as the non-violent bargaining process in which the participants constantly adjust to the social contract. We try to focus on gradual reform of Chinese social changes since the opening to world, and thus present a unified logic explanation to it.
If we see the civil spontaneous acts, such as the phenomenon of Xiaogang Village's land contract responsibility and the development of Wenzhou township enterprises, as an objective, broad strategic bargaining behavior, while the resulting changes of garvornment policy be seen as some kind of equilibrium of the bargaining game between the market and planning economics, the article will argue that the internal logic of the bargaining game requires the parties of bargaining have both to reach a compromise on the reform program of cooperation by trade, but also to conflict in the expected return to reform of the bargaining. Thus it makes the bargaining reform not only have cooperation efficiency, and also includes the fair value of confrontation. This "giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness" reforms have typical Chinese characteristics, and give two key meaning to the practice of Chinese reform. First, the potential economic development powers of the system have been liberated through the non-violent bargaining. Second is through the construction of market-oriented economic system, the reform objectives of "Washington Consensus", including competitive, market, and the property rights in resource allocation, have been realized.
Thus, the theme of the paper is purely theoretical research, the method is the combination of utilitarian thinking developed by J. Bucanann and the bargaining theory of K. Binmore, and at last it will give a political "Science rational "analysis. Of course, the bargaining reform in China is not the whole story of contemporary social change. In real cases, the latter is more likely a hybrid-down interaction, or even about the intrinsic process of repeated institutional change. However, the perspective of this study proposed that the core reason of China's social and economic development is precisely the mechanism discussed in terms of bargaining. And as a broad program of social reform, it is not only the reason lead to relative success of China's reform, but also an endogenous process of political democratic society under eastern situation. Namely, if effort of the paper is right, we will prove the following main logical conclusion.
First, the reform of bargaining is of efficiency. The relative economic principle is that bargaining "deal" with Pareto improvement of the efficiency "can improve the effectiveness of at least ones welfare level without reduction of other members of the society at the same time", and 30 years of China's economic development practice is the demonstration.
Second, the reform of bargaining has the nature of equality. This is given by the bargaining game itself in which the participants have to compromise from each other.
Thirdly, the bargaining reform contains the essence of democratic politics, and it is an important way to real democracy that the logic of bargaining game contains the logic that confrontation is inevitable, but compromise is valuable. And it is the basic principles of bargaining theory which is not just different from the traditional adversarial and cooperative behavior, but also from political philosophy of vote on the simplified logic of democracy. To some extent, it fully reflected the nature of "rational dialogue "and "political civilization" of Human society. This means that China's current reform practice, in essence, is an innovative concept of traditional democratic theory of political connotations.
More generally, a key footnote to the democratic nature of contemporary China's bargaining reform is the principles of "realistic" that Chinese Communist Party has always stood for, and try to adhere to. This means that the logic of it lies whether the reform process could adhere to the "realism", or say the only effective way likely to be "realistic" is whether all parties involved in the interests of reform can reach the equilibrium of the non-violent bargaining game.
In comparison, the paper on the reform of China's economy mechanism and its interpretation is not just trying to meet the reality of China's reform, but also is of the appropriate and academic legitimacy of traditional thinkings. Different theories of traditional disputes on the reform progress of "radical" and "progressive" process is not the essential differences between them. In fact, the gradual reform is only a special equilibrium of bargaining reform; the core of it is that the bargaining mechanisms can accommodate stakeholder's different objective demands. It is different from the traditional argument on the China's reform theory as well as to clarify the theory about the misconceptions of China's reform, and also it may provide a unified, legitimate theoretical basis.
Put concretely, the first chapter of the paper will focus on giving a logical structure of the overall arrangement and the introduction. Second chapter, from the theory of China's Reform Review, tries to answer "Why the core of China's reform is a social process of bargaining". The third chapter tries to give a comprehensive exposition of the value of social science of the bargaining theory, and applied to the logic of legitimacy of reform. InⅣ, we will focus on the core, competitive equilibriulm, and the three solution concept of classical bargaining game, gives a textbook presentation. Chapter V will discuss the expression of the institution in terms of economic significance. The logical premise and conditions of the general reform of bargaining are discussed in ChapterⅥ. ChapterⅦwill discuss the situation in China under the concept of non-violent solution of bargaining and mathematical structure. InⅧ, we give the demonstration of the core model and two bargaining solution concept; ChapterⅨ, is based on the model of natural reasoning, will discuss the social scientific value of the institutional reform of China's, including the concrete proof of the above three conclusions. In the tenth chapter, we will further discuss the logic of China's reform involved the three main theoretical flaw. In end of the final chapterⅪ, we will try to focus on the reform of China in terms of bargaining logic, giving a naturalistic philosophy and methodology discussion.
如果把类似于“小岗村”土地承包责任制、“温州”乡镇企业发展等自发的民间行为,看成一种客观、广义的讨价还价策略性行为,同时,把由此引起的国家政策变化,看成是某种市场与计划力量之间讨价还价博弈的均衡。本文将论证：由于讨价还价博弈的内在逻辑要求矛盾各方,既能就改革方案达成妥协的交易合作、又能就改革的预期收益进行讨价还价的博弈对抗；使得讨价还价博弈的制度改革均衡,不仅具有合作的效率、也同时包含对抗的公平价值观。这种“效率优先、兼顾公平”的中国特色改革,赋予中国改革以两个关键性实践内涵：一是通过非暴力讨价还价的制度调整,解放了与发展经济和提高生产力水平的制度约束；二是通过以市场为导向的经济运行体制改革,初步实现了“华盛顿共识”的改革目标——竞争、市场和产权配置资源的经济模式。
由此可见,本文主题是纯粹的制度改革理论研究,方法是通过将K.Binmore意义的讨价还价理论与J.Bucanann意义的功利主义思想相结合,致力于一种既涉及经济又关联政治的“科学理性”分析；考察社会制度是如何在人们社会行为的广义交易——讨价还价博弈——过程中发生、形成的。当然,讨价还价制度改革也并非中国当代社会变迁的全部故事,在现实情形下,后者,更像是一种混合的——上下互动、左右联动甚至内在反复——制度变迁过程。然而,本文的研究视角拟表明,中国社会经济发展的核心原因,恰恰是本文所讨论的讨价还价制度机制；这种广义讨价还价的社会改革程序,是中国制度改革取得相对成功的主要原因,也是东方情境下一种内生意义上政治民主的社会过程。换句话说,如果本文的努力恰当的话,我们将证明如下主要逻辑结论。
第一,讨价还价制度改革具有效率性质。其经济原理在于,讨价还价的“交易”均衡具有帕累托改进的效率机制——“能够在不减少其他成员社会福利的同时,提高至少一人的效用水平”；而中国30多年经济发展的实践正由此印证。
第二,讨价还价制度改革具有公平性质。这是讨价还价博弈内在“既对抗、又合作”均衡的妥协逻辑决定的；为此,本文将围绕Binmore意义的讨价还价理论(包含广义交易政治理论),进行(国内第一次)系统、准确地陈述和深入分析。
第三,讨价还价制度改革包含了民主政治的本质逻辑、是现实民主政治的重要途径。由于讨价还价博弈本身内涵着“对抗不可避免、妥协是有价值的”的基本原理,这不同于传统博弈论关于对抗和合作行为的绝对划分,也不同于政治哲学关于民主投票的简化逻辑；充分体现了人类社会“理性对话”和“政治文明”的行为本质。这意味着中国当代的改革实践,本质上具有创新传统民主政治概念的理论内涵；这是本文结合中国实践致力于深化Binmore意义上讨价还价理论的核心所在。
更通俗地说,对于当代中国这种广义、具有民主性质的“讨价还价”制度改革逻辑,一种核心脚注,就是中国共产党一贯主张、并力图坚持的“实事求是’思想路线和原则。即本文的逻辑意味着：中国社会、政治、经济体制改革能否成功,关键在于改革过程是否坚持了“实事求是”的基本原则；而争取、或可能做到“实事求是”的唯一有效的途径,就是涉及改革的利益各方是否能达成非暴力讨价还价的博弈均衡。
由此可见,与发展战略理论(林毅夫等)、社会选择理论(樊纲)、二元结构增长理论(Sachs和Woo等)、国家集权最优宏观调控理论(斯蒂格利茨)、国家资本主义赶超模式(科兰兹克等)和新制度经济学理论(周其仁等)比较而言,本文关于中国经济现象及其制度改革机制的解释,在力图符合30年中国改革的现实的同时,也具有恰当的思想继承性和学术合法性。而传统理论关于制度改革进度、内容不同的争议,并非“激进”和“渐进”改革的本质差异；其实,渐进改革只是讨价还价博弈均衡的一种外在特征,核心在于讨价还价机制包容了不同利益主体的客观诉求。如此,既不同于传统理论关于中国改革的理论,同时又包含了其合理逻辑的成分,本文或可能为澄清国际学术界关于中国社会转型的偏见,乃至厘清关于中国改革理论的种种误解,提供一个统一、合法的理论基础。
具体地,本文第一章将围绕制度改革的交易性质和均衡分类等前置性问题,给出一个整体安排和逻辑结构的简介；第二章将从关于中国制度改革的理论综述出发,试图回答：为什么中国制度改革的核心是一个讨价还价的社会过程；第三章将通过对政治哲学的理论追溯,试图全面阐述讨价还价理论的社会科学价值、及其应用于制度改革的逻辑合法性；第四章,我们将围绕交易的核、竞争性均衡和讨价还价博弈三个经典的解概念,给出一种教科书式的陈述；第五章将讨论一种经济意义的制度表达,这是深入分析制度改革博弈及结构的前提；第六章将讨论一般制度改革博弈的讨价还价逻辑前提和条件；第七章将讨论中国情境下非暴力讨价还价的解概念和数理结构；第八章,我们给出本文核心模型的论证过程和两个讨价还价解概念；第九章是基于模型的自然推理,将讨论中国意义上制度改革实践的社会科学价值,这包括前述三个结论的具体证明和讨论；在第十章,我们将进一步讨论涉及中国改革逻辑的三个主要理论缺陷,当然,这是基于自然主义哲学语境而言的；如此,我们将在本文最后结尾的第十一章,试图围绕这种讨价还价的中国制度改革逻辑,给出一个自然主义哲学方法论的理论升华。
Inheriting the classical political economy tradition of Adam Smith's thought, the paper studies the institutional changes as the non-violent bargaining process in which the participants constantly adjust to the social contract. We try to focus on gradual reform of Chinese social changes since the opening to world, and thus present a unified logic explanation to it.
If we see the civil spontaneous acts, such as the phenomenon of Xiaogang Village's land contract responsibility and the development of Wenzhou township enterprises, as an objective, broad strategic bargaining behavior, while the resulting changes of garvornment policy be seen as some kind of equilibrium of the bargaining game between the market and planning economics, the article will argue that the internal logic of the bargaining game requires the parties of bargaining have both to reach a compromise on the reform program of cooperation by trade, but also to conflict in the expected return to reform of the bargaining. Thus it makes the bargaining reform not only have cooperation efficiency, and also includes the fair value of confrontation. This "giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness" reforms have typical Chinese characteristics, and give two key meaning to the practice of Chinese reform. First, the potential economic development powers of the system have been liberated through the non-violent bargaining. Second is through the construction of market-oriented economic system, the reform objectives of "Washington Consensus", including competitive, market, and the property rights in resource allocation, have been realized.
Thus, the theme of the paper is purely theoretical research, the method is the combination of utilitarian thinking developed by J. Bucanann and the bargaining theory of K. Binmore, and at last it will give a political "Science rational "analysis. Of course, the bargaining reform in China is not the whole story of contemporary social change. In real cases, the latter is more likely a hybrid-down interaction, or even about the intrinsic process of repeated institutional change. However, the perspective of this study proposed that the core reason of China's social and economic development is precisely the mechanism discussed in terms of bargaining. And as a broad program of social reform, it is not only the reason lead to relative success of China's reform, but also an endogenous process of political democratic society under eastern situation. Namely, if effort of the paper is right, we will prove the following main logical conclusion.
First, the reform of bargaining is of efficiency. The relative economic principle is that bargaining "deal" with Pareto improvement of the efficiency "can improve the effectiveness of at least ones welfare level without reduction of other members of the society at the same time", and 30 years of China's economic development practice is the demonstration.
Second, the reform of bargaining has the nature of equality. This is given by the bargaining game itself in which the participants have to compromise from each other.
Thirdly, the bargaining reform contains the essence of democratic politics, and it is an important way to real democracy that the logic of bargaining game contains the logic that confrontation is inevitable, but compromise is valuable. And it is the basic principles of bargaining theory which is not just different from the traditional adversarial and cooperative behavior, but also from political philosophy of vote on the simplified logic of democracy. To some extent, it fully reflected the nature of "rational dialogue "and "political civilization" of Human society. This means that China's current reform practice, in essence, is an innovative concept of traditional democratic theory of political connotations.
More generally, a key footnote to the democratic nature of contemporary China's bargaining reform is the principles of "realistic" that Chinese Communist Party has always stood for, and try to adhere to. This means that the logic of it lies whether the reform process could adhere to the "realism", or say the only effective way likely to be "realistic" is whether all parties involved in the interests of reform can reach the equilibrium of the non-violent bargaining game.
In comparison, the paper on the reform of China's economy mechanism and its interpretation is not just trying to meet the reality of China's reform, but also is of the appropriate and academic legitimacy of traditional thinkings. Different theories of traditional disputes on the reform progress of "radical" and "progressive" process is not the essential differences between them. In fact, the gradual reform is only a special equilibrium of bargaining reform; the core of it is that the bargaining mechanisms can accommodate stakeholder's different objective demands. It is different from the traditional argument on the China's reform theory as well as to clarify the theory about the misconceptions of China's reform, and also it may provide a unified, legitimate theoretical basis.
Put concretely, the first chapter of the paper will focus on giving a logical structure of the overall arrangement and the introduction. Second chapter, from the theory of China's Reform Review, tries to answer "Why the core of China's reform is a social process of bargaining". The third chapter tries to give a comprehensive exposition of the value of social science of the bargaining theory, and applied to the logic of legitimacy of reform. InⅣ, we will focus on the core, competitive equilibriulm, and the three solution concept of classical bargaining game, gives a textbook presentation. Chapter V will discuss the expression of the institution in terms of economic significance. The logical premise and conditions of the general reform of bargaining are discussed in ChapterⅥ. ChapterⅦwill discuss the situation in China under the concept of non-violent solution of bargaining and mathematical structure. InⅧ, we give the demonstration of the core model and two bargaining solution concept; ChapterⅨ, is based on the model of natural reasoning, will discuss the social scientific value of the institutional reform of China's, including the concrete proof of the above three conclusions. In the tenth chapter, we will further discuss the logic of China's reform involved the three main theoretical flaw. In end of the final chapterⅪ, we will try to focus on the reform of China in terms of bargaining logic, giving a naturalistic philosophy and methodology discussion.
引文
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