实证主义抑或自然主义？

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英文题名：Positivism or Naturalism? 副题名：边沁法理学的理论基础研究 英文副题名：A Study of the Theoretical Basis of Jeremy Bentham's Jurisprudence 作者：张延祥 论文级别：博士 学科专业名称：法学理论 中文关键词：实证主义 ; 自然主义 ; 法理学 ; 边沁 ; 认识论 ; 本体论 英文关键词：Legal positivism ; naturalism ; jurisprudence ; Bentham ; epistemology 学位年度：2012 导师：王健 学科代码：030101 学位授予单位：吉林大学 论文提交日期：2012-04-01

摘要

在方法论与实体上，哈特都将边沁法理学界定为实证主义，将边沁本人认定为法律实证主义的巨人。学界接受了哈特以上论断，而且半个世纪过去了，哈特的论断仍是学界通行的权威之论。然而，在边沁研究群体内部，哈特的论断却遭到批判。波斯特马看到了边沁法理学的规范性基础，批判了哈特认为边沁的法律有效性的根据是专断的观点，而将边沁法理学界定为规范性实证主义。斯科菲尔德看到了边沁法理学的基础乃是其自然主义本体论，看到了痛苦与快乐在边沁思想中的根本性地位，看到了边沁思想的动态性，所以对哈特的法律实证主义之界定进行了彻底的批判：边沁既不是实体性法律实证主义，也不是方法论法律实证主义，而是自然主义。然而，斯科菲尔德并没有将边沁的法理学基础推进到边沁的认识论，也没有对边沁的思想来源以及相关思想传统进行探究，这使得他的论证让不充分，疑窦重重。本文致力于探究边沁法理学终极的智识根据以及思想来源，在思想史的背景下探究实证主义与自然主义的核心主张，以论证与确定边沁法理学的理论属性。
     除作为第1章的绪论和第6章的结语外，文章的主体分为四大部分，共5章。
     第1章的绪论对选题的确定与意义、选题研究的历史与现状、本文的研究方式与研究方法以及全文的论述结构进行了阐述。本文认为，对边沁法理学的理论基础进行深入研究，可以恢复这位被誉为英格兰法律思想史上最伟大的法学家终极的智识根据，挖掘其思想潜在的对当代与未来法律理论与法律哲学讨论的贡献，审视、批判与推动当今的法学理论研究。
     第2章探讨了贝克莱的认识论与法律哲学，以为探讨分析边沁的认识论，探讨分析实证主义与自然主义，提供智识根据与分析参照。贝克莱是遭到误解最严重的思想家之一，其所提出的“存在就是被感知”被普遍解读为否认外在物体的存在，但事实上他并非否认外在物体的存在，而是强调指出主观感知是第一位的，外在物体的存在仅仅是从主观感知所推断出来。贝克莱构建了一个上位知识引领驾御下位知识的知识层次体系，形而上学与神学是第一知识，自然哲学是体系中的下位知识。认知与情感是由不同的心理机理所产生的，具有内在的关联，但认知是为情感服务的。所以，贝克莱的认识论不是实证主义的，而是属于自然主义的。善就是快乐，恶就是痛苦。公共善乃是上帝的设定，人之道德善是上帝所定之自然法，是永恒的理性规则。为获得最大的快乐与善，自然法要求确定性，要求人们消极不反抗。但是绝对的、不受限制的消极顺从是有界限的，若暴虐的统治者戕害人民生命祸害人民命运，则人民有权利反抗，这也是自然法的要求。贝克莱的法律哲学是神学功利主义的。
     第3章探讨了法律实证主义、实证主义与自然主义的核心主张。法律实证主义的核心是事实与价值分离的学说，所以必须从认识论这一根本立场上来理解与界定，否则非但无法从根本上辨清法律实证主义，而且也无法解释法律实证主义与自然法的许多主张是相似甚或相同的。通常认为，法律实证主义主张法律的实体内容甚或法律的程序，若要成为法律，并不必须与某一套道德原则相一致，或法律并不因违反某一套道德原则，就丧失法律之合法性地位，或简单的说法律乃是事实。然而，确认法律存在，来区分法律与非法律，确认活动本身必然是有价值负载的。分离学说来源于G．E．摩尔界定自然主义谬误所依据的认知与情感是分离的原理，然而这乃是对休谟的是与应当区分学说的误解。休谟所区．分．出的是理性与情感，不但并未将两者分．离．开来，而且还坚定的主张理性是服从情感的，并不具有独立地位。在休谟看来，情感、意志和行为本身就是原始的事实或存在。认为休谟将事实与价值分离的实证主义解读，恰恰是将休谟哲学与休谟所批判的哲学，给颠倒了。休谟所谓的事实，并不是现代实证主义者所谓的客观的观察。休谟的‘是’或‘不是’命题与‘应当’或‘不应当’命题，所阐述的是两种截然不同的关系。‘是’或‘不是’命题对应的是理性，其对象指的是观念的实在关系或对实际存在和事实的符合或不符合关系。而‘应当’或‘不应当’命题指的是道德判断，道德来源于我们的情感。我们的情感、意志和行为是不能有那种符合或不符合关系的。它们是原始的事实或实在，本身圆满自足，并不参照其他的情感、意志和行为，更不可能从观念间的符合或不符合关系中推导出来。在休谟的认识论中，观念并不是全部内容，还有更为重要的先在的印象。理性的对象仅限于观念，观念之外，并无理性的用武之地。在情感以及以情感为基础的道德领域，理性不具有独立地位。理性是、并且也应该是情感的奴隶，除了服务和服从情感之外，再不能有任何其他的职务。所以休谟的认识论是自然主义的。遵循G．E．摩尔的事实与价值分离学说的哈特所创立的法律理论与其对自己理论的实证主义属性之界定是矛盾的，其所谓道德中立在认识论上不成立的，而仅仅算是常识上的实践理性。
     第4章探讨了边沁法理学的功利主义哲学原理。边沁的功利主义法理学是以其本体论与认识论为根据的。在其本体体系中，诸快乐与诸痛苦是其他所有存在体的基础，它们是唯一的实存体，其余的则以诸快乐与诸痛苦为基础而衍生出来的，是拟制体。追求快乐避免痛苦，是普适的人性。行为与情感这两个拟制体，相互对应，不可分离。没有无情感的行为，也没有无行为的情感，行为与情感不能独立存在，缺一不可。利益是任何思想与行为的源泉，而利益的实质就是渴望快乐与避开痛苦。任何行为都是以快乐或痛苦为原初的根本的元素的，继而理所当然，任何行为都是以价值追求为根本的构成的，道德中立或价值中立在边沁那里是根本不存在的，更是荒谬的。人类的任何智识活动也必定是负载价值的，即使是那些普通法与自然法理论家，即使他们宣称寻求公正与真理，但是他们与任何人一样，也难以逃脱利益追求的支配。痛苦与快乐是对与错的标准，是人类的主宰。边沁的本体论以及认识论乃是自然主义的，在他那里并不存在二十世纪所创立的事实与价值的分离。
     第5章与第6章在梳理出边沁法理学的理论基础研究史的基础上，挑拣出具有里程碑意义的研究进行集中而深入的分析与批判，以澄清对边沁根本思想的误解，推进笔者的边沁法理学理论基础研究，并顺便勾勒出边沁法理学理论基础研究总体的迁变路线。奥斯丁是边沁功利主义学说赤诚的门徒，其在《法理学讲演录》中对边沁的法理学进行了继承与批判，针对历史法学派的解读进行了解释与辩护，但那时奥斯丁并未明确的、有意识的对边沁的法理学之理论属性进行界定。对边沁的法理学理论基础的界定，抛开正确与否，哈特无疑是影响最大的。正是由于哈特，才使得边沁的法理学研究以及边沁论著整理项目获得了极大的深入与推进；正是由于哈特，才使得边沁获得了令法律思想史上任何一位思想家都艳羡的巨大学术声望。哈特认为边沁的法理学秉持三个学说，即法律与道德是分离的，对法律概念要进行道德中立的分析与描述，法律是命令。在哈特看来，边沁的法理学无论是在方法论上还是在实体内容上都是实证主义的。然而，根据边沁的功利主义认识论、本体论与语言学，哈特对边沁的功利主义哲学原理的把握是远远不够的，其理解是错误的。边沁的法理学根本没有采纳哈特所谓“实证主义的”构想方案。根据这个实证主义解读，哈特在对边沁最重要的法理学论著的编辑工作中犯了致命的错误，而这又给边沁研究带来了很大的不良影响。因为哈特是《论一般法律》的独任编辑，又由于其法理学上的权威地位，这不但使得整个学界认同哈特的法律实证主义之界定，甚至使边沁研究群体也对哈特的法律实证主义之界定被迫服从。哈特的法律实证主义之界定到目前为止已近半个世纪，但仍是学界公认的权威之论。与哈特认为边沁采用了哈特所谓的道德中立的语言分析不同，波斯特马强调指出了边沁的法理学的规范性维度，将边沁的法理学界定为规范性实证主义。然而，波斯特马并没有明确意识到边沁功利主义哲学原理中的认识论与本体论，他的相关阐述是有欠缺的，他没有看到痛苦与快乐在边沁思想体系中的根本性地位，当然也没有看到这对边沁法理学所必然导致的影响。如此一来，波斯特马对边沁的认识论进行了一种纯粹的经验主义解读，将边沁思想中的功利主义部分与本体论和认识论部分分离开。这样一来，波斯特马认为边沁的法律是一个自足封闭的体系的观点是无法成立的。法律实证主义来源于功利主义，或道德考量，而这与实证主义之认识论上的道德中立是不相符合的，如果将法律实证主义看作是不同于认识论意义上实证主义，那么，这一界定就没有多大的意义，因为仅仅在法律的框架内，按照法律提供的参照计算功利肯定是远远不够的，因为这样其实已经设定了人们必须无条件服从法律的安排，而这种专断是边沁的功利主义所不接受的。斯科菲尔德的边沁研究，三十年如一日，其对边沁资料的把握，应当说在学界无人可望其项背；他重新发现了边沁功利主义基本哲学原理，加之他广阔的哲学视野与对基本哲学问题深刻的把握，这使他对通行的权威的错误解读进行了彻底的清理。这是边沁研究史上的重大突破与重大实质性进展，具有划时代的意义，即使在整个思想史上，也具有划时代的意义。斯科菲尔德主要是看到了作为边沁法理学基础的自然主义本体论，看到了痛苦与快乐在边沁思想中的根本性地位，看到了边沁思想的动态性。在斯科菲尔德看来，在边沁那里，不管是确认法律，还是研究法律，都必然受痛苦与快乐的支配，所以边沁决不是哈特所认定那样，边沁既不是实体性法律实证主义，也不是方法论法律实证主义，而是自然主义。然而，斯科菲尔德并没有将边沁的法理学基础推进到边沁的认识论，也没有对边沁的思想来源进行探究，这使得他的论证不充分不圆满，疑窦重重。从总体上看，边沁法理学的理论基础之界定，从奥斯丁的归纳功利法理学开始，经历了哈特的方法论法律实证主义与实体性法律实证主义，再到波斯特马的规范性法律实证主义，最后再到斯科菲尔德的自然主义。总体的情况似乎是，以哈特为界点，整个脉络大体是远离边沁，又重回边沁。哈特以来，研究者对边沁手稿的把握逐步全面而准确，对边沁思想的解读逐步贴近而令人信服。这个研究史也同样表明，研究者本人所秉持的思想决定了他的边沁研究，这恰好证明了富勒的三棱镜比喻，证明了哈特的道德中立的研究主张是行不通的。
     第7章作为结尾，在边沁法理学理论基础研究上，对研究方式与研究史脉络与迁变进行了归纳总结，重申了边沁法理学终极的智识根据即认识论是自然主义的。在边沁的思想体系中，痛苦与快乐居于主导地位，不管是确认法律，还是研究法律，都必然受痛苦与快乐的支配，所以无论是法律形式，还是法律内容，其价值负载都是内在的、必然的；二十世纪基于事实与价值分离而创立的法律实证主义在边沁那里是不存在的。边沁所独创的功利主义法理学是自然主义的。
H.L.A Hart defined Bentham’s jurisprudence as legal positivism, methodologicallegal positivism as well as substantivel legal positivism, and recoginized him as thegreat originator of legal positivism. The general academia has accepted H.L.A Hart’sthesis , and H.L.A Hart’s thesis still possesses the authority even if half a century haspast. However, within the Bentham study circle, H.L.A Hart’s thesis has encounteredchallenges. Gerald Postema，seeing the normative foundation of Bentham’sjurisprudence, criticized Hart’s position that the reason of legal validity is peremptory,and defined Bentham’s jurisprudence as normative positivism. Phillip Schofield caughtBentham’s naturalistic ontology , and took it as the basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence.He also saw that pain and pleasure are the unique fundamental element , and thatBentham’s thought is of dynamic character. All these contribute to a splendid critiqueof H.L.A Hart’s definition of legal positivism: Bentham’s jurisprudence is neithersubstantive legal positivism, nor methodological legal positivism; instead, it isnaturalism. However, unfortunately, Phillip Schofield’s argument is not complete andsufficient, because he did not advance to Bentham’s epistemology which is the mostfundamental basis, nor did he explore Bentham’s intellectual sources and theintellectual tradition to which he belonged. This dissertation is dedicated to accomplishthe theoretical basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence with a complete and sufficientargument by exploring Bentham’s ultimate intellectual basis and its sources and thecore claims of positivism and naturalism in light of the intellectual history.
     The main dissertatin consists of four parts of five chapters, in addition to theintroduction and epilogue.
     Chapter 1 , the introduction of the whole dissertation, consists of the confirmationof the subject, the history and status of the research, the research principle and methodwhich this dissertation will apply, and the framework of this dissertation. This dissertation points out that an in-depth study of the theoretical basis of Bentham’sjurisprudence will recover the ultimate intellectual basis of the greatest jurist ofEngland, discover its potential contribution to legal theory and philosophy, and pushforward the contemporary legal theory.
     Chapter 2 provides an analysis of Berkeley’s epistemology and legal philosophy,in oder to provide a reference framework for an analysis of Bentham’s epistemology,positivism and naturalism. Berkeley is perhaps the philosopher who has been mostseverely misunderstood ever in history. Indeed, Berkeley puts forward this thesis“tobe, is to be perceived”, but actually he does not denign the existence of external bodies.What he wanted to emphasize is the fact that subjective perception is primary andexternal bodies are only the inferences from the subjective perceptions. Berkeleyprojected an institution of knowledges of different levels within which metaphysicsand theology are the first philosophy and natural philosophy lies in a lower level, andhigher level knowledge enlightens and governs the lower level knowledge. Cognitionand emotion are from different psychological faculties ,but cognition is subservient toemotion. Therefore Berkeley’s epistemology cannot be positivism, but is naturalism.Goodness is pleasure, and badness is pain. Public good is ordained by God, andhuaman being’s moral goodness is the natural law ordained by God and the eternalrules of reason. Natural law requires certainty and passive obedience in order toprocure the greatest pleasure and good. But the so-called absolute passive obediencedoes have implicit limits. When cruel tyrants are dangerous to life and fortune, thepeople have the right to resist. This is also the requirements of natural law. Berkeley’slegal philosophy is theological utiltarianism.
     Chapter 3 explores the core claims of legal positivism, positivism and naturalism.With the separation thesis of fact and value as its core, legal positivism must beunderstood and defined in the fundamental sense of epistemology, otherwise it will notresolve the problem that legal positivism and natural law have many similar or evensame claims. It is commonly held that legal positivism claims that in order to be lawthe substance of the law or its procedures are not necessarily conform to a particularset of moral principles; to wit, law is fact. However, it is necessarily value-laden to recognise law, to distingush between law and non-law. The separation thesis is derivedfrom G. E. Moore’s doctrine of the separation of cognition and emotion, whichcontributes to his naturalistic fallacy. G. E. Moore’s separation is the result of amisunderstanding of Hume’s thesis of is-ought which separates reason and emotion,not cognition and emotion. Hume firmly claimed that reason did not possess autonomy,and reason was and ought to be subservient to passion. In Hume’s view, passion,will,and action are original facts or existences. Hume’s fact is not the fact of the modernthinkers; it is not the objective observation. Hume pointed out clearly that thepropositions of is or is not and the propositions of ought or ought not expressed verydifferent relations, the former cooresponding to reason, and the later cooresponding tomorals. In Humean epistemology, idea which is empiricist is not the all, and theantecedent and original is impressiom which also produces passion. Humeanepistemology is naturalist. Following G. E. Moore’s doctrine of the separation ofcognition and emotion , H.L.A. Hart projected his legal positivism, but his claim ofmorally independent law and legal study is not sound in epistemology, only tantamountto practical reason.
     Chapter 4 explores the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham’s jurisprudence.Bentham’s jurisprudence takes his ontology and epistemology as its basis. Pleasuresand pains , the only real entities, are the basis of all the other entities which arefictitous entities. It is the universal human nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain.Action and emotion are fictitious entities, correspondent to each other and inseperable.There is no action without emotion.Interest is the source of thought and action,becauseInterest is to procure pleasue and avoid pain. Pleasure and pain are the originalfundamental elements of any action, and thus naturally, in Bentham’s view, morallyneutral or value-free actions cannot exist at all. Therefore, human’s intellectualactivities are necessarily morally laden and governed by interest, even if the activitiesof those common law jurists and natural law jurists who claim to pursue justice andtruth. Pleasure and pain are the standard of right and wrong, and the two sovereignmasters. Bentham’s ontology and epistemology are naturalistic, and according toBentham there is nothing like the separation of morals and fact created in 20th centuary.
     Chapter 5 and 6 provide a history of the study of the theoretical basis ofBentham’s jurisprudence, an in-depth and delicate analysis of the milestone studies ofJohn Austin, H.L.A Hart, Gerald Postema and Philip Schofield, and an outline of thepath of the development of the study of the theoretical basis of Bentham’sjurisprudence. As to Bentham’s jurisprudence, John Austin, an enthusiastic disciple ofBentham’s utilitarian principle, inherited and criticized Bentham, and explicated anddefended Bentham against the interpretation of historical school jurists. But then thetheoretical basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence was not clear and was not undetakenconsciously. Put aside the matter of right or wrong, Hart’s definition is no doudt themost influential one. It is just because of Hart that Bentham’s jurisprudence andBentham Project have made great progress , and it is just because of Hart that Benthamhas procured superb reputation which must be envied by any great thinker in history.According to Hart Bentham held three doctrines: the separation of law and morals; themorally neutral analysis of legal concepts; and the imperative theory of law. ThusBentham’s jurisprudence is positivism in methodology as well as substance. Howeverin light of Bentham’s epistemology , ontology and linguistics, Hart’s grasp ofBentham’s utilitarian philosophy is far from sufficient, and his interpretation is wrong.Bentham’s jurisprudence is not positivist at all. This misinterpretation lead to fatalmistakes in Hart’s edition of Bentham’s most important work Of Laws in General, andthis in turn brings bad consequences to Bentham studies. Even half a centuary has pastHart’s positivist defintion of Bentham’s jurisprudence still enjoys the authority. UnlikeHart’s recognition of Bentham’s morally neutral lingusitics, Postema emphasized thenormative dimension of Bentham’s jurisprudence, and defined it as normativepositivism. However, Postema did not see the fundamental position which pain andpleasure occupy in Bentham’s jurisprudence, because he did not have a sufficient graspof Bentham’s epistemology and ontology. This lead to a purely empiricistinterpretation with the separation of utilitarianism and epistemology. ConsequentiallyPostema’s recognition of a self -sufficient and and self-contained law in Bentham isnot Bentham’s law. According to Postema, Bentham’s project of positivism comesfrom utilitarianism, or moral considerations, if so, then Postema’s definition ofBentham’s legal posivism cannot agree with the positivism in epistemological sense.The recognition of legal positivism will not make any sense at all if it is regarded asvery different from the positivism in epistemology, because it is far from sufficient to calculate utility within the framework of law, for it has implicitly presupposed thatpeople must obey the law unconditionally. This peremptotriness, Bentham will neveraccept. With a deep understanding of the basic philosophical thesis, Philip Schofield isremoving the accepted positivist interpretation of Bentham’s juriprudence, based onhis discovery of Bentham’s utilitarian principle and his unrivalled grasp of Bentham’smanuscripts from thirty years of constant and whole-hearted Bentham study. His studyis a great contribution to and a milestone in Bentham studies .Phillip Schofield caughtBentham’s naturalistic ontology , and took it as the basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence.He also saw that pain and pleasure are the unique fundamental element , and thatBentham’s thought is of dynamic character. According to Schofield, whether it is therecognition of law or the study of law, it is necessarily governed by pain and pleasure,therefore, Bentham’s jurisprudence is neither substantive legal positivism, normethodological legal positivism; instead, it is naturalism. However, unfortunately,Phillip Schofield’s argument is not complete and sufficient, because he did not advanceto Bentham’s epistemology which is the most fundamental basis, nor did he exploreBentham’s intellectual sources and the intellectual tradition to which he belonged.Generally speaking, as to the theoretical basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence, it startedfrom Austin’s inductive utilitarian jurisprudence, through H.L.A Hart’s legalsubstantive legal positivism and methodological legal positivism, Gerald J Postema’snormative positivism, at last to Philip Schofield’s naturalism. It seems that H.L.AHart’s interpretation left far away from Bentham, and Gerald J Postema and PhilipSchofield have tried go back to Bentham with reference to Hart. This also shows thatthe researcher’s own thought determines his Bentham study, as justly demonstratesLon Fuller’s metaphor of prism and the impossiblity of morally neutral study.
     Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the whole dissertaton.It makes a summary of thehistory and the development of the study and resaerch methods, and reiterates that inBentham’s jurisprudencethe Bentham’s naturalistic epistemology occupies the ultimatebasis and therefore Bentham’s original utilitarian jurisprudence is naturalism.

引文

①边沁的生平主要参考根据了下列论著：J.R. Dinwiddy, Bentham: Selected Writings of John Dinwiddy, WilliamTwinning (ed.), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004; C.W. Everett, The Education of Bentham, New York:Columbia University Press, 1962; Wayne Morrison, Jurisprudence: from Greeks to Post-Modernism, London:Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1997, p.186; Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, J . H . Burns＆H .L . A. Hart (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. xxiv-xxv; John Macmurray, Some Makersof the Modern Spirit , London : Methuen＆Co . Ltd. , 1933, pp.125—137.
    ①Cf. William Twinning, Introduction, in J.R. Dinwiddy, Bentham: Selected Writings of John Dinwiddy, WilliamTwinning (ed.), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p.1.
    ②William Twinning, Introduction, in J.R. Dinwiddy, Bentham: Selected Writings of John Dinwiddy, WilliamTwinning (ed.), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p.1.
    ③Delivered in University College, London, on June 6th, 1932. London : Kegan Paul Trench＆Trubner, 1932.
    ④C.K.Ogden, Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, London: Routledge＆Kegan Paul, 1932, p.xxxi.
    ①J. M.凯利：《西方法律思想史》，王笑红译，法律出版社2002年版，第232页。
    ②笔者认为，边沁研究到目前为止所取得的重大突破与重大实质性进展，是由现任边沁文稿整理项目主任、《边沁全集》主编菲利浦斯科菲尔德教授所实现的，其标志是其刚刚完成的两篇论文，一篇是“杰里米边沁与H．L．A．哈特的‘法理学中的功利主义传统’”( Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A.Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167.)，这篇论文在法理学上必定会引起轩然大波，因为它推翻了在法理学领域一直占据着毫不受质疑的享有权威地位的哈特对边沁是法律实证主义者的界定，而认定边沁的法理学实际上是普通法理论与自然法理论的一个替代性理论；另一篇论文《西季威克论边沁：功利主义的“双重面相”》(Sidgwick on Bentham: the“Double Aspects”of Utilitarianism)，则推翻了一直占据着权威地位的西季威克对边沁功利主义的解读。这两篇论文在排除对边沁的重大误解与恢复本原的边沁上，必定会产生重大影响。
    ③无论是了解边沁还是深入研究边沁，都需要长时间的用功，比如，H.L.A哈特曾研究边沁近20年，其曾自信的说，自己是阅读边沁文字最多的人，阅读了300多万单词的边沁文稿。但是H.L.A哈特无论是在编辑还是在解读边沁上，都被指出存在着重大的错误。请参见Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: theNightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) , 297-327；Philip Schofield, JeremyBentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence ,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010),pp.147-167.
    ④迈克尔桑德尔的网络课堂http://http://www.justiceharvard.org/；参见Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What's theRight Thing to Do?, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, [EB/OL] (September 15, 2009)
    ①Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, Richard Hildreth( trans.) , C.K.Ogden, (ed .) , London: Kegan Paul,Trench, Trubner﹠Co . Ltd, 1931, p. 202.
    ②See H.L.A. Hart, Introduction, in Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, H.L.A. Hart ( ed.), London: AthlonePress, 1970, p.xxxi; W . Friedmann, Legal Theory (3rdEd.), London : Stevenson＆Sons ,1953 , p. 214.
    ①Friedrich Nietzsche,Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans.Thomas Common(New York: Boni and Liveright,Inc.1917,p.166.
    ②A.P. Martinich, Hobbes: A Biograhy, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.ix.
    ①Sydney Smith,Bentham’s Book of Fallacies,in Edinburgh Review, xlii(84)(1825) 367, Cf. H.L.A .Hart, Essays onBentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p.1.
    ①H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1961, P.viii.
    ②Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1963, P.95.
    ③Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167..
    ①贝克莱的《人类知识原理》于1710年出版，此后两年贝克莱一直在寻求英国学界对他的评论，但结果令人非常失望。有些人根本不做回应，而所得到的很少的回应，评论意见却令人极其沮丧。关于此点，比较详细的论述，请参见Alexander Campbell Fraser, George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, AlexanderCampbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901, pp.xxxi—xxxvi.
    ②[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第33页。对于贝克莱，笔者研读的是他的英文版著作，由于时间紧迫，也趁此学习与研究关文运先生对贝克莱的翻译，故直接引用的部分采用了关文运先生的译文。对于某些关键词的翻译与当下用法有所差异的，笔者皆在所引译文的后面用原文标示。
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第27页。
    ④[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第27页。
    ①[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第29页。
    ②[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第28页。
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第33页。
    ④George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, in The Works of George Berkeley,Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901, p.5.
    ⑤George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, in The Works of George Berkeley,Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901, p.6.
    ⑥[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第18页。
    ①[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第26页。
    ②[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第14、6页。
    ①George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, p. 34.
    ②George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, P. 71.
    ①George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, P. 42.
    ②Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. Ho.von Wright (eds.), trans. Denis Paul andG. E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, p.308.
    ③George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, pp. 42,34.
    ①George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, P. 71.
    ②George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, P. 34.
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第89页。
    ④[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第65页。笔者根据原文对译文进行了补充与修改。
    ⑤C.S.Peirce, Pragmatism, The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, The Peirce EditionProject,( ed. ) , Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998, p.402.
    ①[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第89页。
    ②[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第114页。
    ③George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, P. 63.
    ④贝克莱的《论运动》的主要内容，是通过其认识论中的经验主义原理，来论证运动的相对性，反驳抽象的绝对空间论与绝对运动论的。这些观点，贝克莱曾直接做出相关论断，读者可以重点阅读George Berkeley,An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,1901,PP. 58.59.63.67.
    ①Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigation,trans,G. E. M. Anscombe,: Macmillan, 1964 ;LudwigWittgenstein, On Certainty, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. Ho.von Wright (eds.), trans. Denis Paul andG. E. M.Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.
    ②[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第45页。
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第150页。
    ④[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第21页。
    ⑤George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, pp. 23
    ⑥George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, P. 34.
    ⑦[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第146页。
    ⑧Pleasures, Natural and Fantastical, in Guardian, No. 49, Thursday, May 7, 1713.
    ⑨[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第156页。
    ①Philip D. Cummins,Berkeley on Minds and Agency, Kenneth P. Winkler(ed.), Cambridge:The CambridgeCompanion to Berkeley ,2005, pp.190-2, 190-229.
    ②George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, p. 53.
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第3页。
    ①[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第20页。根据Fraser版本，对关文运的译文进行了修改。
    ②[英]尼古拉斯布宁，余纪元编著：《西方哲学英汉对照词典》，人民出版社2001年版，词条emotivism情感主义。
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第20页。
    ④[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第20页。
    ①请参见本文的2．2．2规则功利主义一节。
    ②Stephen Darwall, Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, Kenneth P. Winkler(ed.), Cambridge: TheCambridge Companion to Berkeley ,2005, p.322.
    ①Lisa Downing, Berkeley’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Kenneth P. Winkler(ed.), Cambridge:The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley ,2005, pp. 190-229; [英]尼古拉斯布宁，余纪元编著：《西方哲学英汉对照词典》，人民出版社2001年版，词条：Instrumentalism，工具主义。
    ②[德]安德里斯·奥西安德尔：前言：与读者谈这部著作中的假设，载[波兰]尼古拉斯哥白尼：《天体运行论》，叶式辉译，易照华校，陕西人民出版社1999年版，第1-2页。
    ③[波兰]尼古拉斯哥白尼：原序给保罗三世教皇陛下的献词，载[波兰]尼古拉斯哥白尼：《天体运行论》，叶式辉译，易照华校，陕西人民出版社1999年版，第1-2页。
    ④Wilbur Applebaum, The Scientific Revolution and the Foundations of Modern Sciences,Westport: GreenwoodPress,2005, p. 110.
    ⑤Wilbur Applebaum, The Scientific Revolution and the Foundations of Modern Sciences,Westport: GreenwoodPress,2005, p.138.
    ①[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第105页。
    ②George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, p. 34.
    ①C.S.Peirce, Pragmatism, The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, The Peirce EditionProject,( ed. ) , Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp.398-9.
    ②C.S.Peirce, A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, in C.S.Peirce,The Essential Peirce : SelectedPhilosophical Writings, vol. 2, The Peirce Edition Project,( ed. ) , Bloomington and Indianapolis: IndianaUniversity Press, 1998, p.447.
    ③C.S.Peirce, Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley, in C.S.Peirce,The Essential Peirce : Selected PhilosophicalWritings, vol. 1, The Peirce Edition Project,( ed. ) , Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998,pp.83-105.
    ④C.S.Peirce, Pragmatism, The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, The Peirce EditionProject,( ed. ) , Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998, p.432.
    ⑤[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第31页。
    ⑥Lisa Downing, Berkeley’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Kenneth P. Winkler (ed.), Cambridge:The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, 2005, pp.190-229.
    ①Gerard Hinrichs, The Logical Positivism of Berkeley’s De Motu , in Review of Metaphysics, No. 3, 1950,pp.491-505.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901,n 2.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901,n 3.
    ④George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901,n,2
    ①George Berkeley, An Essay on Motion, in Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, p. 34.
    ②[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第146页。
    ③Pleasures, Natural and Fantastical, in Guardian, No. 49, Thursday, May 7, 1713.
    ④[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第156页。
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 7.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 6.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 5.
    ①John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, pp.8-38
    ①Pleasures, Natural and Fantastical, in Guardian, No. 49, Thursday, May 7, 1713.
    ②这一论断初次出现在《消极的顺从》中的第3小节，后来又原封不动的出现在26小节中。
    ③[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第31页。
    ④Pleasures, Natural and Fantastical, in Guardian, No. 49, Thursday, May 7, 1713.
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 15.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 8.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901,n 9.10.27.
    ④George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 25.
    ⑤George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 12.
    ①[爱尔兰]贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第30页。
    ②George Berkeley, An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, in The Works of George Berkeley, AlexanderCampbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901, p.147.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 11.12.27.
    ④George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 8.9.11.
    ⑤George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 12.
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 41.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 26.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 40.
    ④George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 28.
    ⑤George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 27.
    ⑥George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 27.
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901,n 31,41.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 19.
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 21.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 9.19.30.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901,n 28.
    ④比如George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.),Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901, n 23,25.
    ⑤在《论消极的顺从》中仅有一处即第26小节。
    ⑥George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 25.
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 21.
    ②George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 41.
    ③George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 47.
    ④George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 44.
    ⑤George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 49.
    ①George Berkeley, Passive Obedience, in The Works of George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press,1901, n 52。
    ①James Bernard Murphy, The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of Jurisprudence, Newhaven and London:Yale University Press, 2005, p.21.
    ②Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, inJurisprudence, ,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167.
    ②(SSteepphteamn bRer. , P2e0r0r9y), , Bppe.y3o1n1d- 3t2h5e. D关is于tin法ct律ion实b证etw主e义en，PSotesiptihvainsm R . and Non-positivism, Ratio Juris, vol.22, No.1LPoegsiatli vTishmeo, rCya, nTahdei aYna Jleo uLranwal Joofu Lrnaawl , &v oJlu.1ri1s1p,r u(2d0e0n2ce), ,p vpo.1l.795, 7N-1o8.P2e1,3 r(r.Jy Hu l的ayr,t其’1他著作包括：The Varieties of Legals9 M96), p.361; Method and Principle inPCroelsesm, 2a0n0 (1e,d p.)p, .3H1a1r-t3’s2 5P.ostscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Letahwo,d oOlxofgoicrda l :P Oosxiftoivrdis mU,n iinv eJruslietys
    ①Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, inJurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167.此文已被人翻译成中文，菲利普·斯科菲尔德，杰里米边沁与H．L．A．哈特的“法理学中的功利主义传统”，待刊于《台北大学法学论丛》第85期，2013年3月。后文中对这篇文章的引用，皆出自以上中文版本。
    ②笔者查阅统计《法律的概念》第二版中“实证主义”与“法律实证主义”出现的次数，“法律实证主义”出现大约13次，而“实证主义”一词答应出现45次。See H.L.A. Hart, Postscript, in The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994.
    ③Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2004, p.196-9.
    ①H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, Preface,pp.1-17,239.
    ②H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, Preface.
    ③Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2004, pp.142–5, 215–19.
    ④这主要指哈特遭到德沃金的批判和哈特与富勒的论战。
    ⑤关于第二版所增加内容nd的情况，请参见Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz, Editor’s Note , in H.L.A. Hart,The Concept of Law, 2edn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994.
    ①H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, p.242.
    ②Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986.
    ③Scandinavian Realism,
    ④H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, pp.186-7.
    ⑤H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1983, p.13.
    ①Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, p.13.
    ②Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, p.14.
    ③Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986.其中第二章的第一节标题就是“语义之刺”。
    ④Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986, p.34.
    ①See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994,pp.91-99；Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, pp.6-11,31-35.
    ②Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986, p.109.
    ③Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986, p.110.
    ④H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994,p.123.
    ⑤See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: ClarendonPress,1994,pp.272-276.
    ①Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, 37-39; RonaldDworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press , 1978, p.81.
    ②Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, inJurisprudence , ,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167.）
    ③G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993, p.62.
    ④G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993, p.58.
    ①G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993, p.72.
    ②G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993, pp.53-88, 232-273.
    ①G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993, p.90.“自然主义伦理学”与“享乐主义”分别是《伦理学原理》的第二、第三章。
    ②G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993, p.236.
    ③G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993, pp.237-238
    ①G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993, p.247.
    ①G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993, p.257.
    ②G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993,p.257.
    ①G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993, p.241.
    ②G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revised edn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,1993, p.68.
    ①[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第509-510页。对于休谟，笔者研读的是他的英文原作，由于时间紧迫，也趁此学习与研究关文运先生对休谟的翻译，故直接引用的部分采用了关文运先生的译文。笔者所研读的英文原作版本是David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,Selby-Bigge's (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press ,1888.
    ①See H.O. Mounce, Hume’s Naturalism, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p.1-2.
    ②托马斯里德（1710-1796），苏格兰哲学家，休谟的同龄人，苏格兰常识哲学派的奠基人，是苏格兰启蒙运动的核心人物。曾先后任阿伯丁（Aberdeen）大学和哥拉斯哥（Glasgow）大学教授。笔者根据H.O.蒙恩斯的索引提示，阅读了托马斯里德的以下著作：Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, A.D.Woozley
    (ed.), London: Macmillan,1941; Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1969; An Inquiryinto the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Chicago,University of Chicago Press, 1970.
    ③T.H.格林（Thomas Hill Green，1836-1882），英国哲学家，自1878年起直至逝世前任牛津大学哲学教授。他也是不列颠唯心主义运动的一分子，是社会自由主义哲学的倡导者之一，无论是当时，还是直到现在，他都有很大的影响力。
    ④T.H.格林在给他所编辑的《休谟哲学著作集》（The Philosophical Works of David Hume, ed. by T.H. Greenand T.H. Grose, 4 vol. (1882–86)).）写的导论中，阐述了他对休谟哲学的经验主义认定，并进行了批判。这个导论后来收录在T.H. Green, Hume and Locke, Gloucester MA: Peter Smith Pub , 1960.
    ⑤诺曼克姆普史密斯（1872—1958），苏格兰哲学家，曾任爱丁堡大学逻辑学与形而上学教授。他对康德的研究享有盛誉，比如他翻译的康德的《纯粹理性批判》，成为标准的英文译本。对于理解休谟，除去贝克莱，H.O.蒙恩斯对笔者的教益与启发最大，因为他解决了笔者长期以来以经验主义为指针研读休谟的困惑。
    ⑥H.O.蒙恩斯，现任斯望西大学（Swansea University）人文学院名誉研究员，他对维特根斯坦也有很深的研究。
    ⑦Norman Smith, The Naturalism of Hume I, Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 54 (Apr., 1905), pp. 149-173;Norman Smith , The Naturalism of Hume I I, Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 55 (Jul., 1905), pp. 335-347.
    ①Norman Kemp Smith,The Philosophy of David Hume, London, Macmillan, 1941.
    ②H.O.蒙恩斯在《休谟的自然主义》中，所解决的核心问题便是对休谟的经验主义与自然主义解读的矛盾。
    ③关于贝克莱的知识层次体系划分原理，请参见2．1贝克莱的认识论。
    ④[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第24-25页。
    ⑤[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第75页。
    ①[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第309页。
    ①[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第14页。
    ②[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第19页。
    ③[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第101页。
    ④[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第309页。
    ①[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第216页。
    ②[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第25页。
    ③[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第453页。
    ④Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, inJurisprudence , ,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010),pp.147-167.
    ⑤诺曼克姆普史密斯与H.O.蒙恩斯都没有采取本体体系的考察方法，所以，他们所阐释的休谟思想似乎缺少层次分明的感觉。
    ⑥[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第82页。
    ①[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第83页。
    ②[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第215页。
    ③关于对知觉与对象双重存在的批判，请参见休谟《人性论》第一卷《理解论》第四部分的第二、三、四节。
    ④[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第235页。
    ⑤[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第237页。
    ①[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第453页。
    ②[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第453页。
    ③笔者曾专注于思想发生的过程这一问题，这种理解方法的确认主要来源于笔者对认识论与科学哲学专门的研读。
    ④Norman Kemp Smith,The Philosophy of David Hume, London, Macmillan, 1941.
    ⑤See C.S.Peirce, Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction, in The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings,vol. 2, The Peirce Edition Project,( ed. ), Bloomington and Indianapolis: pp.226-241; What Pragmatism Is , inThe Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, The Peirce Edition Project,( ed. ) , Bloomingtonand Indianapolis: pp.331-345; Pragmatism, The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, ThePeirce Edition Project,( ed. ) , Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp.398-433.
    ⑥Knud Haakonssen, Introduction in David Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994,pp.xi-xxx; Paul Langford, The Eighteenth Century, in Kenneth O. Morgan(ed.),The Oxford History of Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001,pp.399-469.
    ①Knud Haakonssen, Introduction in David Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994,pp.xvii.
    ②[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，郑之骧校，商务印书馆1996年版，第498页。
    ①Thomas Baldwin, Introduction, in G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revisededn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.xviii.
    ②David Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.20.
    ①关于G．E．摩尔与西季威克的思想继承关系，托马斯鲍德温曾提供了一个简略的描述，请参见ThomasBaldwin, Introduction, in G.E.Moore,Principia Ethica, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), revisededn. ,Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 1993,p.xiii-xiv.
    ②此文先是作者在研讨论中公布于众，后被翻译成意大利文出版。Philip Schofield, Sidgwick on Bentham: the'double aspect' of utilitarianism, (Bucolo, P ; Bucolo, G (Trans.),In: Bucolo, P and Crisp, R and Schultz, B, (eds.),Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Henry Sidgwick: Ethics, Psychics, Politics, Catania:University ofCatania,2011, pp.412 - 469.
    ①4Se7,e5 0R,o5n4a-l5d5 ,D6w3o-6r5k.in, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, pp.
    ②J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, Proceedings of the Aristotlelian Society, 1956–7, pp. 1–30 at p. 8.
    ③See Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy, in Hans Sluga and David G. Stern,(eds.) TheCambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996,pp.34-58.
    ④Michael Kober, Certainties of A World-picture: The Epistemological Investigations of On Certainty, in HansSluga and David G. Stern,(eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge : Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996, p.429.
    ①Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, p.63.
    ②笔者查阅布莱维尔出版有限公司（Blackwell Publisher）电子版的《维特根斯坦全集》（The Collected Worksof Ludwig Wittgenstein），“生活形式”这一术语共出现过5次，仅出现在《哲学研究》与《论确定性》两部著作中，这几处分别是《哲学研究》第19、23、241小节与《论确定性》的第358小节。
    ①Ludwig Wittgenstein , The Blue and Brown Books, 2ndedn., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1969, p.87.
    ②Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, pp.69-70.
    ③Investigation Para. 66 Wittgenstein在其他论著中也提到了家族相似性，分别是Culture and value, GeorgHenrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman (eds.) , PeterWinch(trans.) , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p.21;Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, G. H. Vonwright, Heikki Nyman (eds.) , T C.G.Luckhardt andM.A.E.Aue(trans), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1980, pp.556,692.
    ①Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986, p.315.
    ①Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, inJurisprudence , ,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010),pp.147-167.
    ②H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, p.297.;Peter Winch，The Idea of Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy，2ndedn, London: Routledge, 1990.皮特古依温奇（Peter Guy Winch , 1926-1997)，对维特根斯坦深有研究，维特根斯坦也是他的主要思想来源之一。
    ③Peter Winch，The Idea of Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy，2ndedn, London: Routledge, 1990,p.92.
    ①Peter Winch，The Idea of Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy，2ndedn, London: Routledge, 1990，p.92.
    ②Peter Winch，The Idea of Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy，2ndedn, London: Routledge, 1990，p.1-3.
    ③H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, 125.
    ④H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, p.128.
    ①Stephan R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in Jules Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on thePostscript to The Concept of Law, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001, p.315.
    ②Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, inJurisprudence , ,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010),pp.147-167.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart
    (eds.), London,1977, p. 397.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Kitchener,2000, I, Chp I.
    ②Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford : Oxford UniversityPress, 2006, p3.
    ③H.L.A. Hart, Bentham and Beccaria, in Essays on Bentham, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1982,pp.40-52.
    ①Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.195.
    ②以上这些文献主要是：Chrestomathia, M.J. Smith and W.H. Burston (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983；Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, Amnon Goldworth( ed.),Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983；Of Laws in General, H.L.A. Hart (ed. ), London:The Athlone Press, 1970；Rights,Representation, and Reform -Nonsense upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution, Philip Schofield,Catherine Pease-Watkin and Cyprian Blamires(eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002；A Comment on theCommentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (eds.), London, The Athlone Press,1977；An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Kitchener, 2000.
    ③J.H. Burns,“Bentham and Blackstone: A Lifetime's Dialectic,”Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 1989,22-40.
    ④Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Oxford University Press,1986.
    ①Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2006, p.9.
    ②Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2006.
    ①Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.195.
    ①Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.195.
    ②Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.),viii, p.196.
    ③Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.288.
    ④Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.197.
    ⑤Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.197.
    ⑥Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.197.
    ⑦Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.206.
    ①Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.195.
    ②Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.),viii, p.1965.
    ③Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.288.
    ④Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.195.
    ①Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford : Oxford UniversityPress, 2006, p. 27.
    ②Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.202.
    ③[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，商务印书馆1996年版，第56页。
    ④[英]休谟：《人性论》，关文运译，商务印书馆1996年版，第26页。
    ①[英]乔治贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，北京：商务印书馆1973年版，第18页。
    ②Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.197.
    ③Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.321.
    ①Jeremy Bentham,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.197.
    ②[英]乔治贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，北京：商务印书馆1973年版，第35页。
    ③[英]乔治贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，北京：商务印书馆1973年版，第35页。
    ④[英]乔治贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，北京：商务印书馆1973年版，第89页。
    ⑤贝埃特（James Beattie），1735-1803，苏格兰哲学家。
    ①James Boswell, Boswell’s Life of Johnson,Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901,p.333.
    ②Cf. Alexander Campbell Fraser , Introduction, in George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, AlexanderCampbell Fraser(ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,1901,p.xxxv.
    ③[英]乔治贝克莱：《人类知识原理》，关文运译，商务印书馆1973年版，第2页。
    ④“Editor’s Preface to Alciphron”, in The Works of George Berkeley ii,p.17.
    ①George Berkeley, Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clarke (ed.),Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,2008, p.194.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring,(ed.), viii, p.196.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism,Amnon Goldworth (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 5-115.
    ②Jeremy Bentham , Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism,Amnon Goldworth (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 79-86.
    ③笔者曾撰文专门考察过边沁法律思想中的价值序列体系，但并未对这一图表进行考察。
    ④Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper＆Row, Publishers,1954, pp.35-104.
    ①C.S.Peirce, A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, in The Essential Peirce: Selected PhilosophicalWritings ( Vol.I), Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds.) , Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana UniversityPress, P.438.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring (ed.), 1843 ,viii, pp.279-280
    ③Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring (ed.), 1843, viii, p.201.
    ④Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring (ed.), 1843, viii, p.204.
    ⑤Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring (ed.), 1843, viii, p.203.
    ①Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.199.
    ②C.K.Ogden, Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, London: Routledge＆Kegan Paul, 1932, pp.xxix-xxx.
    ③W. V. O. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1969,P.72.
    ①See John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New York: Dover Publications,Inc., 1894.
    ②“fictitious entity”是对拉丁原文的翻译，参见Stephen C. Tornay, Ockham: Studies and Selections, La Salle,IL: Open Court, 1938.
    ③Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.249.
    ④Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.232.
    ⑤Ogden, C.K. Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, Routledge＆Kegan Paul, 1932, pp.xxix-xxx.边沁在其驳杂庞大的论著中，涉及到语言的很多，其专门论述语言的主要在The Works of Jeremy Bentham的第8卷中：Essayon Language, pp.424-503; Fragment on Universal Grammar, pp.504-542.还有关系极为紧密的是Appendix. No.IV.:Essay on Nomenclature and Classification, pp.50-133; Essay on Logic, pp.276-424.
    ⑥Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.429..
    ⑦Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.487.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, A Table of the Springs of Action , in Jeremy Bentham, Deontology Together with A Table of theSprings of Action and the Article on Utilitarianism, Amnon Goldworth (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p.1.
    ②Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.479。
    ③[英]霍布斯：《利维坦》，黎思复，黎廷弼译，商务印书馆1985年版，第18页。
    ④[英]霍布斯：《利维坦》，黎思复，黎廷弼译，商务印书馆1985年版，第22页。
    ①Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.197.
    ②W.V.O. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press,1969 , pp.71-72.
    ③W. V. O. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1969, P.72.
    ④See Jeremy Bentham, A Table of the Springs of Action , in Jeremy Bentham, Deontology Together with A Table ofthe Springs of Action and the Article on Utilitarianism, Amnon Goldworth (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983,p.101-102.
    ⑤Jeremy Bentham, A Table of the Springs of Action , in Jeremy Bentham, Deontology Together with A Table of theSprings of Action and the Article on Utilitarianism, Amnon Goldworth (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p.1.
    ①Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.197.
    ②Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, p.197.
    ③Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart
    (eds.), London,1977, p..495.
    ④W.V. Quine, Theories and Things, Cambridge, Mass and London : The Belknap Press of Harvard UniversityPress,1981.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart
    (eds.), London,1977, pp. 346-47.
    ②John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch(ed. ),Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975.
    ③Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, pp.246-247.
    ①Jeremy Bentham ,The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring, (ed.), 1843 , viii, pp. 247.
    ②参见本文第三章。
    ①Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford : Oxford University Press,2004.
    ②Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford : Oxford University Press,2004, p.4.
    ③Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford : Oxford University Press,2004, p.197.
    ①H.L.A .Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1983,pp.21-48 ; Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream,Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2004, p.156-157.
    ②Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford : Oxford University Press,2004, p.155.
    ③Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford : Oxford University Press,2004, p.196-9.
    ④H.L.A .Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, inin Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,Oxford: Oxford University Press,1983,p.50.
    ⑤H.L.A .Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,Oxford: Oxford University Press,1983,p.55.
    ⑥H.L.A .Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 21–48 at 26–7,33–5 (1983).
    ①H.L.A .Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 164.
    ②H.L.A .Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982,p.110.
    ③H.L.A .Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,Oxford: Oxford University Press,1983,p.57.
    ④H.L.A .Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.105.
    ①H.L.A .Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.108.
    ②H.L.A .Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.17-19.
    ③笔者以上阐述，得益于斯科菲尔德的分析，参见Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence, Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), p.147-149.
    ①H.L.A .Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982,p.18.
    ②John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell
    (ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911,p.679.
    ①H.L.A .Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982,pp.239–40.
    ②See Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.164-165.
    ③Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), p.150.
    ①H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994, Preface,pp.18-25.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, p.495.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, H.L.A. Hart .ed. London: Athlone Press, 1970.1.
    ②Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), p.159.
    ③Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, p. 397.
    ④J.H. Burns, Bentham and Blackstone: A Lifetime's Dialectic, Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies,1989,24-26.
    ①Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., Oxford: 1765-9, iv.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, p. 202.
    ③Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, p. 346.
    ④Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, pp. 397-98.
    ⑤Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167.
    ⑥Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.147-167.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, p. 404.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London, 1977, p. 399.
    ③J.H. Burns ,Bentham and Blackstone: A Lifetime's Dialectic, Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 1989, 26.
    ④Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London, 1977, p. 440.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London, 1977, p. 346.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London, 1977, p. 484.
    ③[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第88页。
    ④[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第89--90页。
    ⑤[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第93—95页。
    ⑥[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第96—97页。
    ①[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第98—100页。
    ②J·M凯利：王笑红译，《西方法律思想史》，法律出版社2002年版，第265页。
    ③[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第109页。
    ④[英]吉米·边沁：李贵方等译，《立法理论》，中国人民公安大学出版社2004年版，第109—110页。
    ①Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A .Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, Oxford : Oxford University Press,2004, p.311-312.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, Philip Schofield ( ed.), Oxford : OxfordUniversity Press, 2010.
    ②Cf. William Twinning, Introduction, in J.R. Dinwiddy, Bentham: Selected Writings of John Dinwiddy, WilliamTwinning(ed.),Stanford: Stanford University Press,2004, p.1.
    ③See J.R. Dinwiddy, Bentham: Selected Writings of John Dinwiddy, William Twinning(ed.),Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press,2004; Frederick Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill, London and New York:Routledge,2003.
    ①Wifrid E. Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, London and Dover, The Athlone Press,1985, pp.15-19.
    ②H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2ndedn., P. Bulloch and J. Raz (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994.
    ③James Bernard Murphy, The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of Jurisprudence, Newhaven and London:Yale University Press, 2005,pp.169-170.
    ④菲利浦斯科菲尔德在彻底否定将边沁的法理学界定为法律实证主义时，似乎是额外增加了一个注释，提醒读者说，对于奥斯丁的法理学是否为哈特所界定的法律实证主义，去参阅詹姆斯伯纳德墨菲对奥斯丁的讨论。参见James Bernard Murphy, The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of Jurisprudence, Newhavenand London: Yale University Press, 2005,pp.169-211.
    ②John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.679.
    ①戴维哈特莱（1705-1757），英格兰哲学家，虔诚的基督徒，医生，心理学联想学说的创立者。他主要著作是两卷本的《人类观察：人的组织结构、人的职责与人的期望》，第一卷是《人类观察：人体与心智的组织结构和人体与心智的相互关联与影响》，第二卷是《人类职责与期望观察》。David Hartley, Observationson Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, Woodstock Books, Poole and Washington D .C. 1998.
    ①John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911,p.163-164.
    ②Wayne Viney, D. Brett King, History of Psychology: Ideas and Context,3rdEdt, Pearson, 2003, P.125.
    ③JW, Introduction, in David Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations,Woodstock Books, Poole and Washington D .C. 1998.
    ①John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911,p.81-82.笔者在此引述原文，主要与下文论证也密切相关，否则实无必要。
    ②John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.215.
    ③John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, pp.171.175.
    ④Sarah Austin, Preface , in John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn,Robert Campbell (ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.12.
    ①John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.86-87.
    ②John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.84.
    ③John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.214.
    ④John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.172.
    ⑤John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.216.
    ①John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.174.
    ②John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.215.
    ③John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.215.
    ④John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.216.
    ⑤See Hans Kelsen,Pure Theory of Law,trans.Max Knight, California : California University Press,1967, pp.1-107;Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wederberg,Massachusetts: Harvard UniversityPress, 1949.
    ⑥笔者愿意事先承认，奥斯丁的方法论问题，笔者有些模糊，没有确实把握。
    ①H.L.A. Hart,“Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy，Oxford: Clarendon Press,1982, p. 49.
    ②John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.91.
    ③John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.173.
    ④John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.167.
    ⑤John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.1086.
    ⑥John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.101.
    ⑦John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.163.
    ①John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell
    (ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.1087.
    ①由于笔者对边沁研究文献，必要探寻到研究者本人研究、分析与评判的思想根据，所以，笔者询问波斯特马教授，除此之外，还有那些著作能集中反映他的法律哲学思想，教授曾赠阅许多论著，谨此致谢。比如Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, vol.2, No.2,(Winter, 2002),pp.155-180; Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), Oxford University CommonwealthLaw Journal ,vol.3,No.1,(Summer, 2003), pp.1-28.
    ①John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.214.
    ②Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p.viii.
    ③Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p.vii.
    ④Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p.viii.
    ③John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law,5thedn, Robert Campbell(ed.),Rev.,London: John Murray, 1911, p.214.
    ④Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.302-304.
    ⑤Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.304.
    ①Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.305.
    ②Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.308.
    ①Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.308-313.
    ②Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.317.
    ③Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.308-317.
    ①Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.324.
    ②Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp. 317-328.
    ③Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p. 328.
    ④Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p. 331.
    ①波斯特马的《边沁与普通法传统》的一大贡献是在学术史上第一次详细的探讨了休谟法理学，他用了60多页的篇幅将休谟法理学展示了出来。波斯特马认为，休谟法理学是为普通法辩护的法理学。这也体现在结构安排上，波斯特马将休谟法理学部分与普通法理论放在《边沁与普通法传统》的第一部分。参见GeraldJ. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, pp.81-146;关于波斯特马对维特根斯坦的后期哲学的认同，参见Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford :Oxford University Press,1986, pp. 67n, 96n, 98n, 99,116, 132.
    ②Michael Kober, Certainties of A World-picture: The Epistemological Investigations of On Certainty, in HansSluga and David G. Stern,(eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge : Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996, p.429.
    ③Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p.328-336.
    ①Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford : Oxford University Press,1986, p. 331.
    ①Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, I, Chapter I.
    ②Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart(eds.), London,1977, pp. 397-98.
    ①Jeremy Bentham, First Principles preparatory to Constitutional Code, Philip Schofield (ed.), (The CollectedWorks of Jeremy Bentham), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
    ①A.J. Ayer, The Principle of Utility, in G.W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger(eds.), Jeremy Bentham and theLaw:A Symposium , London: Athlone Press, 1948, pp. 245–8; P.J.Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice:Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
    ①Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford : Oxford UniversityPress, 2006, pp.v-vii.
    ①此文先是作者在研讨论中公布于众，后被翻译成意大利文出版。Philip Schofield, Sidgwick on Bentham: the'double aspect' of utilitarianism, (Bucolo, P; Bucolo, G (Trans.),In: Bucolo, P and Crisp, R and Schultz, B, (eds.),Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Henry Sidgwick: Ethics, Psychics, Politics, Catania:University ofCatania,2011, pp.412 - 469.
    ②Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1, No. 2,(2010), at p.151, pp.147-167.
    ①Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford : Oxford UniversityPress, 2006, pp.1-27.
    ①Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), at.p.151, p.152.
    ②这封信被斯科菲尔德编辑在《“世界立法者”：论法典化、教育与法律》中的最开始，第1-35页。参见JeremyBentham,‘Legislator of the World': Writings on Codification, Education, and Law , Philip Schofield andJonathan Harris (ed.), (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1998.
    ①Letters to Count Toreno, on the proposed Penal Code, delivered in by the Legislation Committee of the SpanishCortes, April 25th, 1821, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham. viii. 487–554 at 530 , John Bowring (ed.), 11 vols,1843.
    ①Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.151,155.
    ①Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.151-155.
    ②William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., Oxford: 1765-9.
    ①Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1986.
    ①Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), pp.157-159.
    ②Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s‘utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence’, in Jurisprudence,Vol.1,No. 2,(2010), p.167.
    ①Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and Common Law Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press,1986,p.x.
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