市场化改革环境下基于电力系统可靠性的协同监管问题研究
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摘要
摘要：在传统的垂直一体化电力体制中,电力系统的运营与监管都由政府主管部门负责,此时,电力系统监管以保证电力需求的安全稳定供应为首要目标。电力市场化改革的推进,扩展了电力产业的发展目标,即在满足安全运行要求的同时,还要实现提高经济效率、优化资源配置以及实现节能减排等目标。在此情况下,需要重新梳理当前的电力监管体系,协调电力市场经济改革、环境保护与系统可靠性等多方面监管要求。
对中国电力产业而言,如何确保系统可靠性的同时,将经济目标和环境目标纳入电力监管体系,完善中国电力监管构架,是面临的重要问题。为此,本文将以保证系统可靠性为论文研究的问题切入点,探究适合于当前中国电力监管特征的监管体系,避免出现美欧等国在市场化改革初期出现的重大可靠性危机,实现电力产业和谐稳定发展。具体而言,论文在分析国外电力市场化改革对系统可靠性造成的影响以及国外电力监管的基本现状与特点的基础上,立足中国电力产业和电力监管现状以及存在的问题,提出了考虑系统可靠性的电力监管的基本概念,并从电力投资、环境监管和多地区监管组织构架方面实现基于系统可靠性的协同监管：阐述了系统可靠性与电力投资协同监管问题,对系统可靠性的最优化投资进行探讨,在此基础上,通过构建可靠性投资模型,分析了竞争市场、垄断市场等多种市场情况下的可靠性投资问题；从环境监管与可靠性监管角度,建立考虑环境和电力系统可靠性的理论模型,分析了存在监管情况下、无监管情况下以及不考虑环境监管情况下的社会福利最优化问题,以探索电力可靠性与环境监管的协同,在一定程度上扩展了电力监管的内涵；从可靠性角度分析研究了存在多个地区输电系统组织结构的情况下,不同监管组织结构的监管有效性问题；结合中国电力产业发展的特殊性,对考虑系统可靠性的电力监管机制进行探讨,并提出了协同监管措施建议。研究表明,1)发电与输电投资规划的协同监管能有助于系统可靠性水平的提高,同时集中式的电力市场可靠性水平更高,为此,在市场化情况下更应注意对可靠性投资的监管；2)无论在何种市场环境情况下,可靠性与环境的协同监管又有助于在单一监管目标下实现更高的社会福利；3)对于存在多个地区输电系统组织结构的电力系统而言,在无监管偏好的情况下,协同监管组织结构更有利于监管目标的实现。
本文的创新之处体现在：1)对发电投资与电网投资的相关性进行了分析,并将与输电相关的控制系统、辅助服务、运营协议和容量等投资纳入到统一的大系统中,确定为系统可靠性。在此基础上,构建了可靠性投资优化模型,分别从社会福利情况、垄断情况、次优情况以及非合作情况等多个假设条件下,研究最优的电力可靠性投资管制体制。2)基于效用函数提出了考虑可靠性和环境污染的理论模型。该模型将电力污染物依据其污染特性和控制方法分为全球污染物和一般污染物两类,并分别研究在管制情况下和自由竞争情况下的社会福利最大化的解决方案,分析了在何种情况下能达到最优化的社会福利。3)在集中式的大型输电系统中,从系统可靠性角度,分析存在多地区输电系统情况下的最优监管组织结构及其有效协同的问题。在此基础上,从输电系统可靠性的互补性与替代性角度,对输电运行组织结构的优化问题进行了探讨。
ABSTRACT:In the traditional vertically integrated electric power system, the government department is the unique one who is responsible for the operation and regulation of power system. And under this circumstance, the primary goal of power system supervision is to ensure the supply of electricity safely and stability. With the continually reforming of electricity market, the goal of development is extended, that is, economic efficiency shall be improved, resources allocation shall be optimized, energy conservation shall be achieved, etc. while the requirement of safe operation is met. Thus, the current electric supervision system must be rearranged, system reliability, and market reformation、environment protection and system reliability and other targets must be coordinated.
For China's electric power industry, how to take the economic and environmental goals into supervision system and perfect China's electricity regulatory framework, while how to ensure system reliability, is the important issue what faced now. Therefore, this paper will set the ensuring of system reliability as the breakthrough point, to explore a regulatory system suited the current China's electricity market, to avoid the happening of terrible reliability crises (just like what happened in United States, Europe etc. in the early stage of market reforming), and finally to realize a harmonious and stable development in electric power industry. Specifically, this paper firstly analyses the impacts of foreign power market reformation on system reliability and the current status at home and abroad and characteristics of foreign electricity regulation. Then, based on the status and problems existed in China's electricity industry and power supervision, the paper proposes the basic conception of electric power regulation considering system reliability. Secondly, the paper describes system reliability and synergistic regulation of power investment, and discusses the optimal investment of system reliability. Then, on this basis, the paper analyses reliability investment issues in different markets (such as competitive market, monopoly market, etc.) by building a reliability investment model. Thirdly, in order to explore synergistic regulation between environment and system reliability, social welfare optimization problem (under different circumstances:supervision, no supervision and without considering environment supervision) is analyzed by building a theoretical model considering environment and system reliability, from the perspective of environment supervision and system reliability regulation. Fourthly, from the viewpoint of reliability, the paper analyzes and studies the regulatory efficiency of different supervisory organization structure under the multiple regional transmission system. Finally, based on the specificity of China's electric power industry development, the paper discusses the mechanism of electric power supervision with considering system reliability, and proposes suggestions on synergistic regulation measures.
Research shows:1) Synergistic regulation of investment planning of generation and transmission could raise the level of system reliability; meanwhile, the reliability level of concentrate power market is higher. Therefore, in the case of the market, supervision on reliability investment should be paid more attention.2) No matter under what market conditions, regulation between reliability and environment would contribute to achieve higher social welfare under a single regulatory objective.3) For the power system with a multi-regional transmission structure, without regulatory preferences, synergistic regulatory structure is more advantageous to the realization of the supervisory target.
The innovations of this paper are:1) The correlation between grid investment and power generation investment is analyzed. What's more, control system, auxiliary services, operation agreement, capacity, etc. which are relevant to transmission are considered into the united system to identify system reliability. On this basis, reliability investment optimization model is built to study the optimal investment control system of power reliability, respectively from the hypothesis of social welfare, monopoly, sub-optimal, non-cooperation, etc.2) Theoretical model based on the utility function and considered reliability and pollution is proposed. In this model, electric pollutants are classified into two types:global pollutants and general pollutants, according to pollution features and pollution control methods. And the solutions of social welfare optimization are studied under the different circumstances of control and free competition separately, and in what circumstance the social welfare is optimal is discussed.3) In the large concentrated transmission system, optimal supervisory organization structure existing multi-regional transmission system and its effective coordination issues are analyzed from the viewpoint of reliability. And on this basis, optimization of transmission operation organization structure is discussed from the perspective of the reliability and alternative of transmission system.
对中国电力产业而言,如何确保系统可靠性的同时,将经济目标和环境目标纳入电力监管体系,完善中国电力监管构架,是面临的重要问题。为此,本文将以保证系统可靠性为论文研究的问题切入点,探究适合于当前中国电力监管特征的监管体系,避免出现美欧等国在市场化改革初期出现的重大可靠性危机,实现电力产业和谐稳定发展。具体而言,论文在分析国外电力市场化改革对系统可靠性造成的影响以及国外电力监管的基本现状与特点的基础上,立足中国电力产业和电力监管现状以及存在的问题,提出了考虑系统可靠性的电力监管的基本概念,并从电力投资、环境监管和多地区监管组织构架方面实现基于系统可靠性的协同监管：阐述了系统可靠性与电力投资协同监管问题,对系统可靠性的最优化投资进行探讨,在此基础上,通过构建可靠性投资模型,分析了竞争市场、垄断市场等多种市场情况下的可靠性投资问题；从环境监管与可靠性监管角度,建立考虑环境和电力系统可靠性的理论模型,分析了存在监管情况下、无监管情况下以及不考虑环境监管情况下的社会福利最优化问题,以探索电力可靠性与环境监管的协同,在一定程度上扩展了电力监管的内涵；从可靠性角度分析研究了存在多个地区输电系统组织结构的情况下,不同监管组织结构的监管有效性问题；结合中国电力产业发展的特殊性,对考虑系统可靠性的电力监管机制进行探讨,并提出了协同监管措施建议。研究表明,1)发电与输电投资规划的协同监管能有助于系统可靠性水平的提高,同时集中式的电力市场可靠性水平更高,为此,在市场化情况下更应注意对可靠性投资的监管；2)无论在何种市场环境情况下,可靠性与环境的协同监管又有助于在单一监管目标下实现更高的社会福利；3)对于存在多个地区输电系统组织结构的电力系统而言,在无监管偏好的情况下,协同监管组织结构更有利于监管目标的实现。
本文的创新之处体现在：1)对发电投资与电网投资的相关性进行了分析,并将与输电相关的控制系统、辅助服务、运营协议和容量等投资纳入到统一的大系统中,确定为系统可靠性。在此基础上,构建了可靠性投资优化模型,分别从社会福利情况、垄断情况、次优情况以及非合作情况等多个假设条件下,研究最优的电力可靠性投资管制体制。2)基于效用函数提出了考虑可靠性和环境污染的理论模型。该模型将电力污染物依据其污染特性和控制方法分为全球污染物和一般污染物两类,并分别研究在管制情况下和自由竞争情况下的社会福利最大化的解决方案,分析了在何种情况下能达到最优化的社会福利。3)在集中式的大型输电系统中,从系统可靠性角度,分析存在多地区输电系统情况下的最优监管组织结构及其有效协同的问题。在此基础上,从输电系统可靠性的互补性与替代性角度,对输电运行组织结构的优化问题进行了探讨。
ABSTRACT:In the traditional vertically integrated electric power system, the government department is the unique one who is responsible for the operation and regulation of power system. And under this circumstance, the primary goal of power system supervision is to ensure the supply of electricity safely and stability. With the continually reforming of electricity market, the goal of development is extended, that is, economic efficiency shall be improved, resources allocation shall be optimized, energy conservation shall be achieved, etc. while the requirement of safe operation is met. Thus, the current electric supervision system must be rearranged, system reliability, and market reformation、environment protection and system reliability and other targets must be coordinated.
For China's electric power industry, how to take the economic and environmental goals into supervision system and perfect China's electricity regulatory framework, while how to ensure system reliability, is the important issue what faced now. Therefore, this paper will set the ensuring of system reliability as the breakthrough point, to explore a regulatory system suited the current China's electricity market, to avoid the happening of terrible reliability crises (just like what happened in United States, Europe etc. in the early stage of market reforming), and finally to realize a harmonious and stable development in electric power industry. Specifically, this paper firstly analyses the impacts of foreign power market reformation on system reliability and the current status at home and abroad and characteristics of foreign electricity regulation. Then, based on the status and problems existed in China's electricity industry and power supervision, the paper proposes the basic conception of electric power regulation considering system reliability. Secondly, the paper describes system reliability and synergistic regulation of power investment, and discusses the optimal investment of system reliability. Then, on this basis, the paper analyses reliability investment issues in different markets (such as competitive market, monopoly market, etc.) by building a reliability investment model. Thirdly, in order to explore synergistic regulation between environment and system reliability, social welfare optimization problem (under different circumstances:supervision, no supervision and without considering environment supervision) is analyzed by building a theoretical model considering environment and system reliability, from the perspective of environment supervision and system reliability regulation. Fourthly, from the viewpoint of reliability, the paper analyzes and studies the regulatory efficiency of different supervisory organization structure under the multiple regional transmission system. Finally, based on the specificity of China's electric power industry development, the paper discusses the mechanism of electric power supervision with considering system reliability, and proposes suggestions on synergistic regulation measures.
Research shows:1) Synergistic regulation of investment planning of generation and transmission could raise the level of system reliability; meanwhile, the reliability level of concentrate power market is higher. Therefore, in the case of the market, supervision on reliability investment should be paid more attention.2) No matter under what market conditions, regulation between reliability and environment would contribute to achieve higher social welfare under a single regulatory objective.3) For the power system with a multi-regional transmission structure, without regulatory preferences, synergistic regulatory structure is more advantageous to the realization of the supervisory target.
The innovations of this paper are:1) The correlation between grid investment and power generation investment is analyzed. What's more, control system, auxiliary services, operation agreement, capacity, etc. which are relevant to transmission are considered into the united system to identify system reliability. On this basis, reliability investment optimization model is built to study the optimal investment control system of power reliability, respectively from the hypothesis of social welfare, monopoly, sub-optimal, non-cooperation, etc.2) Theoretical model based on the utility function and considered reliability and pollution is proposed. In this model, electric pollutants are classified into two types:global pollutants and general pollutants, according to pollution features and pollution control methods. And the solutions of social welfare optimization are studied under the different circumstances of control and free competition separately, and in what circumstance the social welfare is optimal is discussed.3) In the large concentrated transmission system, optimal supervisory organization structure existing multi-regional transmission system and its effective coordination issues are analyzed from the viewpoint of reliability. And on this basis, optimization of transmission operation organization structure is discussed from the perspective of the reliability and alternative of transmission system.
引文
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