产业组织结构机制和信息影响企业行为与绩效的机理分析
|
摘要
一个产业是由市场连接起来的企业组成的一个系统。产业内企业的行为选择受到哪些因素的影响,企业行为的结果及其绩效又是由哪些因素透过什么过程或机理来确定,这是一个既具有理论意义又具有现实价值的研究课题。
凡系统必有结构,系统的结构决定着系统的功能,系统功能的实现程度即性能或绩效由系统的运行机制来决定。本文从系统科学的基本理念出发,重新审视和考察新产业组织理论。从理念上提出了产业的组织结构、产业组织的运行机制、企业拥有的私有信息、企业行为决策与绩效等若干方面相互影响相互关联的闭合的产业组织理论分析范式SCIMP,该范式综合了系统理论、决策分析、产业组织的微观分析等重要方面,为产业组织理论研究提供了更为有效的分析范式。并围绕上述方面展开研究,建立了若干产业组织理论的对局模型,求解和分析了其中的短期均衡结果,证实了本文提出的产业组织理论分析范式的合理性、适应性和针对性。
从产业组织结构入手,研究了横向产业组织即通常意义上的产业和纵向产业组织即线性供应链等两类线性结构的产业组织,建立和求解了其中任意N个企业行为优化选择的库诺特对局和三重线性供应链上价格-价格的斯塔克尔伯格对局两类模型,其中N个库诺特均衡结果的微观分析很好地解释了贝恩的传统横向产业组织的宏观分析结果,三重线性供应链的均衡结果发现了一个具有较强实用价值的结论：在一定的条件下,先行决策的企业比后行决策的企业多得到一倍的利润。这个结果很好地解释了铁矿石开采等资源性产业的定价行为,和大型连锁零售商的抢占和扩展终端网店以争夺话语权的行为。同时建立了非线性结构的一些典型性的产业组织,求解了其短期均衡,很好地解释了产品供应商在招商零售商加盟时的定价行为选择,以及产业组织结构与企业行为选择的互动,即柔性供应链上企业行为与绩效。
提出了以博弈规则表述的产业组织运行机制的概念,建立和求解了一条和两条即寡头和寡头垄断竞争的线性供应链上的上游先动和下游先动机制的短期均衡,结果分析表明不同的市场需求函数左右着其中的企业生产经营决策及其绩效的内在机理,即先发优势和后动优势存在的条件分别是线性的市场需求函数和幂次函数的市场需求函数,以及这种先发优势和/或后动优势的程度随着产业竞争激烈程度的加剧而减小。
建立和求解了政府补贴回收再制造行为营造的闭环供应链运行机制内生化与再制造商与回收商的最优激励契约设计模型,得到了政府政策营造的产业组织运行机制内生化是外生参数的最优结果的结论,给出了运行机制内生化研究的价值判断。
分析指出了企业拥有的私有信息在市场竞争中的重要的不可或缺的作用,对现实存在的企业私有信息如何影响企业行为和绩效的机理展开了一系列的研究。首先就比较简单的企业同时决策的产业组织运行机制进行研究,即针对横向产业组织结构,分别建立和求解了含有企业单位生产成本这一个私有信息的产销量优化决策的库诺特对局和产品价格优化决策的伯川德对局模型,结果分析揭示了该私有信息对企业经营决策行为及其绩效的重要影响,即不拥有优势成本私有信息的企业可以因此获得较大的市场绩效,所以有假冒的内在动机,得到了假冒行为得以付诸实施的斯潘塞条件。拥有优势成本信息的企业可能在竞争中遭受无妄之灾,所以有积极揭示自身优势成本信息的动机。其次研究了企业非同时决策的产业组织运行机制,即纵向产业组织结构。建立和求解了关于市场需求信息的信号传递对局和信息甄别对局模型,其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡揭示了其中企业私有信息的价值,及其对企业经营决策行为和绩效的影响。最后扩展到两条线性供应链之间的链间竞争策略优化问题,建立和求解了下游零售商私人拥有市场需求信息的不完全信息动态博弈,均衡结果的分析揭示了不确定信息影响复杂产业组织中企业行为及其绩效的机理。
An industry is a system composed of enterprises which are linked by the market. What factors affect the behavior choice of the enterprises in the industry, what factors determine the results and performance of the enterprises' behavior, which is the research topic that has the theoretical significance and the realistic value.
Every system must have structures, system structures decide the function of system, the system's function realization degree that the performance is determined by the operation mechanism of the system. This paper starts with the basic idea of system science, reviewing and examining the new theory of industrial organization. Putting forward from the concepts, the organization of industry, the movement mechanism of intra-industry, the private information owned by enterprises, the behavior decision and performance of enterprises and so on, which are influenced and related each other in many aspects, closed analysis paradigm SCIMP of industrial organization system, this paradigm combines system theory, decision analysis, the microscopic analysis of industrial organization and other important aspects, providing a more effective analysis for the study of the theory of industrial organization paradigm. We study around the above aspects, establish a number of industrial organization theory game models, solve and analyze the equilibrium results of the short-term market, confirm the analytical paradigm of industrial organization theory in this paper, which is rational, adaptive and targeted.
From the perspective of the structure of industrial organization, we study the horizontal industrial organization, that is usually in the sense of industry and vertical industry groups, namely, the linear supply chain etc and two classes of linear structure of industrial organization, establish and solve two kinds of models of N enterprises' behavior:The optimal selection behavior of Cournot game and Stackelberg game about price on the triple linear supply chain, in which the Cournot game's equilibrium results N of microeconomic analysis well explains the macroeconomic analysis results that the traditional industrial organization theory of the Bain, the equilibrium results of the triple linear supply chain find a conclusion that is strong and practical value: under certain conditions, the enterprises of leading decision get twice the profits than the enterprises that are after decision. It explains the pricing behavior of the resources of iron ore mining and other industries well, as well as the behavior of the large chain retailers that grab and extend terminal shop for the voice. At the same time, we study some typical industrial organization of the nonlinear structures and solve its short-term equilibrium, which is a good way to explain the choice behavior of pricing when the products supplier invest the retailers to join, especially for the interaction of the industrial organization structure and the enterprises' behavior choice, which is the enterprises'behavior and performance on the flexible supply chain.
We put forward the concept of the operating mechanism about industrial organization described by the game rules, moreover, we establish and solve the short-term equilibrium of the upstream and downstream to move first mechanism on the one and two linear supply chain as respectively, namely on the Linear oligopoly and monopoly competition linear supply chain, finding the internal mechanism that the enterprises'production and management decision and performance are affected by the different market demand functions, that is to say the existence condition of the first mover advantage and the late-mover advantage is the linear demand function and the exponential function of the market demand function, what's more, the degree of the first mover advantage and/or the late-mover advantage decreases when the competition of industry became fierce.
We also establish and solve the mechanism of remanufacturing and recycling behavior are subsidized by the government that is endogenous, the design model of optimal and incentive contract, which do with the remanufactures and recyclers, we conclude that the endogenous mechanism of government are the optimal results of exogenous parameter, which gives the value judgment of endogenous mechanism is researched.
We point out the important role of the enterprises'private information in the market competition, study how the enterprises'private information to affect the enterprises'behavior and performance in our real life. Firstly, we research for the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide at the same time, it is in view of the horizontal structure of industrial organization, establish the Cournot game with production optimization decision-making and the Stackelberg game with the products price optimized under the condition of the private information, namely the unit cost of the enterprises' products, which the equilibrium results fully show the private information makes the influence on the enterprises' management decision-making behavior and their performance, that is to say, the enterprises without cost advantages and private information have more market performance, so there are fake of intrinsic motivation, getting the fake Spencer conditions. The enterprises have the advantage of cost information may suffer from an accident in the competition, so they have a positive motivation to reveal their own advantages of cost information. Secondly, we study the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide not simultaneously, with the vertical structure of industrial organization, establishing and solving the information signaling game and screening game models about the market demand information, which the Bayesian Nash equilibrium shows the value of private information, also the influence on the enterprises' management decision-making behavior and their performance. Eventually, we extend to the problem of strategy optimization with the competition between the two linear chains, we establish and solve the dynamic games of incomplete information that the downstream retailers own the market demand information privately, the equilibrium results of analysis reveal that the uncertain information has an impact on the enterprises' behavior and performance in the complex industrial organization.
凡系统必有结构,系统的结构决定着系统的功能,系统功能的实现程度即性能或绩效由系统的运行机制来决定。本文从系统科学的基本理念出发,重新审视和考察新产业组织理论。从理念上提出了产业的组织结构、产业组织的运行机制、企业拥有的私有信息、企业行为决策与绩效等若干方面相互影响相互关联的闭合的产业组织理论分析范式SCIMP,该范式综合了系统理论、决策分析、产业组织的微观分析等重要方面,为产业组织理论研究提供了更为有效的分析范式。并围绕上述方面展开研究,建立了若干产业组织理论的对局模型,求解和分析了其中的短期均衡结果,证实了本文提出的产业组织理论分析范式的合理性、适应性和针对性。
从产业组织结构入手,研究了横向产业组织即通常意义上的产业和纵向产业组织即线性供应链等两类线性结构的产业组织,建立和求解了其中任意N个企业行为优化选择的库诺特对局和三重线性供应链上价格-价格的斯塔克尔伯格对局两类模型,其中N个库诺特均衡结果的微观分析很好地解释了贝恩的传统横向产业组织的宏观分析结果,三重线性供应链的均衡结果发现了一个具有较强实用价值的结论：在一定的条件下,先行决策的企业比后行决策的企业多得到一倍的利润。这个结果很好地解释了铁矿石开采等资源性产业的定价行为,和大型连锁零售商的抢占和扩展终端网店以争夺话语权的行为。同时建立了非线性结构的一些典型性的产业组织,求解了其短期均衡,很好地解释了产品供应商在招商零售商加盟时的定价行为选择,以及产业组织结构与企业行为选择的互动,即柔性供应链上企业行为与绩效。
提出了以博弈规则表述的产业组织运行机制的概念,建立和求解了一条和两条即寡头和寡头垄断竞争的线性供应链上的上游先动和下游先动机制的短期均衡,结果分析表明不同的市场需求函数左右着其中的企业生产经营决策及其绩效的内在机理,即先发优势和后动优势存在的条件分别是线性的市场需求函数和幂次函数的市场需求函数,以及这种先发优势和/或后动优势的程度随着产业竞争激烈程度的加剧而减小。
建立和求解了政府补贴回收再制造行为营造的闭环供应链运行机制内生化与再制造商与回收商的最优激励契约设计模型,得到了政府政策营造的产业组织运行机制内生化是外生参数的最优结果的结论,给出了运行机制内生化研究的价值判断。
分析指出了企业拥有的私有信息在市场竞争中的重要的不可或缺的作用,对现实存在的企业私有信息如何影响企业行为和绩效的机理展开了一系列的研究。首先就比较简单的企业同时决策的产业组织运行机制进行研究,即针对横向产业组织结构,分别建立和求解了含有企业单位生产成本这一个私有信息的产销量优化决策的库诺特对局和产品价格优化决策的伯川德对局模型,结果分析揭示了该私有信息对企业经营决策行为及其绩效的重要影响,即不拥有优势成本私有信息的企业可以因此获得较大的市场绩效,所以有假冒的内在动机,得到了假冒行为得以付诸实施的斯潘塞条件。拥有优势成本信息的企业可能在竞争中遭受无妄之灾,所以有积极揭示自身优势成本信息的动机。其次研究了企业非同时决策的产业组织运行机制,即纵向产业组织结构。建立和求解了关于市场需求信息的信号传递对局和信息甄别对局模型,其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡揭示了其中企业私有信息的价值,及其对企业经营决策行为和绩效的影响。最后扩展到两条线性供应链之间的链间竞争策略优化问题,建立和求解了下游零售商私人拥有市场需求信息的不完全信息动态博弈,均衡结果的分析揭示了不确定信息影响复杂产业组织中企业行为及其绩效的机理。
An industry is a system composed of enterprises which are linked by the market. What factors affect the behavior choice of the enterprises in the industry, what factors determine the results and performance of the enterprises' behavior, which is the research topic that has the theoretical significance and the realistic value.
Every system must have structures, system structures decide the function of system, the system's function realization degree that the performance is determined by the operation mechanism of the system. This paper starts with the basic idea of system science, reviewing and examining the new theory of industrial organization. Putting forward from the concepts, the organization of industry, the movement mechanism of intra-industry, the private information owned by enterprises, the behavior decision and performance of enterprises and so on, which are influenced and related each other in many aspects, closed analysis paradigm SCIMP of industrial organization system, this paradigm combines system theory, decision analysis, the microscopic analysis of industrial organization and other important aspects, providing a more effective analysis for the study of the theory of industrial organization paradigm. We study around the above aspects, establish a number of industrial organization theory game models, solve and analyze the equilibrium results of the short-term market, confirm the analytical paradigm of industrial organization theory in this paper, which is rational, adaptive and targeted.
From the perspective of the structure of industrial organization, we study the horizontal industrial organization, that is usually in the sense of industry and vertical industry groups, namely, the linear supply chain etc and two classes of linear structure of industrial organization, establish and solve two kinds of models of N enterprises' behavior:The optimal selection behavior of Cournot game and Stackelberg game about price on the triple linear supply chain, in which the Cournot game's equilibrium results N of microeconomic analysis well explains the macroeconomic analysis results that the traditional industrial organization theory of the Bain, the equilibrium results of the triple linear supply chain find a conclusion that is strong and practical value: under certain conditions, the enterprises of leading decision get twice the profits than the enterprises that are after decision. It explains the pricing behavior of the resources of iron ore mining and other industries well, as well as the behavior of the large chain retailers that grab and extend terminal shop for the voice. At the same time, we study some typical industrial organization of the nonlinear structures and solve its short-term equilibrium, which is a good way to explain the choice behavior of pricing when the products supplier invest the retailers to join, especially for the interaction of the industrial organization structure and the enterprises' behavior choice, which is the enterprises'behavior and performance on the flexible supply chain.
We put forward the concept of the operating mechanism about industrial organization described by the game rules, moreover, we establish and solve the short-term equilibrium of the upstream and downstream to move first mechanism on the one and two linear supply chain as respectively, namely on the Linear oligopoly and monopoly competition linear supply chain, finding the internal mechanism that the enterprises'production and management decision and performance are affected by the different market demand functions, that is to say the existence condition of the first mover advantage and the late-mover advantage is the linear demand function and the exponential function of the market demand function, what's more, the degree of the first mover advantage and/or the late-mover advantage decreases when the competition of industry became fierce.
We also establish and solve the mechanism of remanufacturing and recycling behavior are subsidized by the government that is endogenous, the design model of optimal and incentive contract, which do with the remanufactures and recyclers, we conclude that the endogenous mechanism of government are the optimal results of exogenous parameter, which gives the value judgment of endogenous mechanism is researched.
We point out the important role of the enterprises'private information in the market competition, study how the enterprises'private information to affect the enterprises'behavior and performance in our real life. Firstly, we research for the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide at the same time, it is in view of the horizontal structure of industrial organization, establish the Cournot game with production optimization decision-making and the Stackelberg game with the products price optimized under the condition of the private information, namely the unit cost of the enterprises' products, which the equilibrium results fully show the private information makes the influence on the enterprises' management decision-making behavior and their performance, that is to say, the enterprises without cost advantages and private information have more market performance, so there are fake of intrinsic motivation, getting the fake Spencer conditions. The enterprises have the advantage of cost information may suffer from an accident in the competition, so they have a positive motivation to reveal their own advantages of cost information. Secondly, we study the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide not simultaneously, with the vertical structure of industrial organization, establishing and solving the information signaling game and screening game models about the market demand information, which the Bayesian Nash equilibrium shows the value of private information, also the influence on the enterprises' management decision-making behavior and their performance. Eventually, we extend to the problem of strategy optimization with the competition between the two linear chains, we establish and solve the dynamic games of incomplete information that the downstream retailers own the market demand information privately, the equilibrium results of analysis reveal that the uncertain information has an impact on the enterprises' behavior and performance in the complex industrial organization.
引文
[1]简新华,魏珊.产业经济学[M].武汉大学出版社,2001：134-141.
[2]余东华.新产业组织理论及其新发展[J].中央财经大学学报,2004(2)：49-54.
[3]周振华.结构调整[M].上海人民出版社,1999,270.
[4]牛晓帆.西方产业组织理论的演化与新发展[J].经济研究.2004(3)：116-123.
[5]Cournot A A. Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses[M]. In libraire de sciences politiques et sociale. M. Riviere & Cie, Paris, 1838,189-231.
[6]Bertrand, J. Theorie methematique de la richesse sociate[J]. Journal des Savants, 1883,499-508.
[7]Lee H L. Pasmanabhan V, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chian:the bullwhip effect[J]. Management Science,1997,43(4):546-558.
[8]Tsay A, Lovejoy W. Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance [J]. Management Science,1999,1 (2):89-111.
[9]Donohue K. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes[J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411.
[10]Glannoccaro, Plerpaolo P. Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004,89:131-139.
[11]邵晓峰,黄培清,季建华.供应链中供需双方合作批量模型的研究[J].管理工程学报,2001,15(2)：54-57.
[12]Cachon,G. Supply chain coordination with contracts[M]. Supply Chain Management:Design, Coordination and Operation,2003,11:227-339.
[13]Bernstein F., Federgruen A.. Pricing and replenishment strategies in a distribution system with competing retailers [J]. Operations Research,2003,51(3):409-426.
[14]Jayashree Mahajan, Sonja Radas, Asoo J. Vakharia. Channel Strategies and Stocking Policies in Uncapacitated and Capacitated Supply Chains [J]. Decision Sciences,2002,33(2):191-222.
[15]Xuan Zhao. Coordinating a Supply Chain System with Retailers Under Both Price and Inventory Competition [J]. Production and Operations Management,2009, 17(5):532-542.
[16]励凌峰,黄培清,赵晓敏.供应链间的横向竞争与并购效应[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,14(6)：542-545.
[17]Cachon, G.P., Lariviere, M.A.. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations[J]. Management Science,2005,51 (1),30-44.
[18]Desheng Wu, Opher Baron, Oded Berman. Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2009,197(2): 548-556.
[19]Matthias Holweg, Frits K. Pil. Theoretical perspectives on the coordination of supply chains [J]. Journal of operational Management,2008,26:389-406.
[20]Tiaojun Xiao, Danqin Yang. Price and service competition of supply chains with risk-averse retailers under demand uncertainty [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2008,114(1):187-200.
[21]Z. Yao, Stephen C. H. Leung, K. K. Lai. Manufacturer's revenue-sharing contract and retail competition[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2008,186(2): 637-651.
[22]肖迪,黄培清,顾锋.需求不确定条件下供应链之间的库存竞争策略[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,42(9)：1511-1514.
[23]张庆一,李贵春,踪程.供应链企业竞争与合作的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2010(9)：174-176.
[24]许传永,苟清龙,周垂日,梁樑.两层双渠道供应链的定价问题[J].系统工程理论与实践.2010,30(10)：1741-1752.
[25]S. Chan Choi. Price Competition in a Duopoly Common Retailer Channel. Journal of Retailing[J].1996,72(2):117-134.
[26]王飞锋,李晓锦.零售商在供应链中地位的演化[J].商讯商业经济文荟,2004(6)：40-43.
[27]周勤,朱有为.中国制造业和商业关系演化：总量分析[J].中国工业经济,2005,(8)：50-55.
[28]王强,王吉吉.从供应链的角度分析我国商品流通主导权的演变[J].北方经贸,2005,(7)：76-77.
[29]倪跃峰,杨楠楠.家乐福渠道运行中零售商与供应商的关系管理[J].管理案例研究与评论,2009,2(3)：153-163.
[30]Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang. Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer [J].Marketing Science,2005,24(2):254-262.
[31]邹爱平,吴清烈.零售商主导供应链协调问题的博弈分析[J].商场现代化,2007,51：9-10.
[32]Tansev Geylani, Anthony J. Dukes, Kannan Srinivasan. Strategic Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(2):164-178.
[33]李长青,李寅龙,徐德生.博弈视角下零售商主导的二级供应链利益协调机制研究[J].天津商业大学学报,2009,29(4)：51-55.
[34]徐贤浩,聂思玥.零售商主导的短生命周期产品供应链订货策略[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(4)：83-92.
[35]H.Lee, S.Whang. Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply:Chains Incentives and Information[J]. Management Science,1999,45(5):633-640.
[36]Lee, et al. The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain[J]. Management Science,2000,46(5):123-145.
[37]Cachon, G., M. Fisher. Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information[J]. Management Science,2000,(46):1032-1048.
[38]Cachon, G., M. Lariviere. Contracting to assure supply:How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain[J]. Management Science,2001,(47):629-646.
[39]H.T.Zhang. Vertical information exchange in a supply chain with duopoly retailers[J]. Production and Operations Management,2002,11(4):531-546.
[40]毛薇,金俊武.供应链管理中信息共享的模型及其优化[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(z1)：389-393.
[41]郑欣,张诚,凌鸿.评估供货量信息的共享在供应链管理中的价值[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(3)：23-29.
[42]翟运开,董芹芹.基于敏捷性的供应链信息交流密度与利润之间关系的研究[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(10)：435-439.
[43]A.Angulo, et al. Supply Chain Information Sharing In a Vendor Managed Inventory Partnership[J]. Journal of Business Logistics,2004,25(1):101-120.
[44]王瑛.供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(5)：61-66.
[45]刘开军,张子刚.需求信息可部分观察时供应链中的信息汇聚效应[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(2)：83-89.
[46]刘震宇,宁钰.双向信息流共享对供应链绩效的影响[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(10)：413-419.
[47]Ozer, O., W. Wei. Strategic commitment for optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information[J]. Management Science,2006,(52):1238-1257.
[48]Zhongsheng Hua, Sijie Li. Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation[J].Omega,2008,36(5): 697-714.
[49]Kebing Chen, Tiaojun Xiao. Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2009,197(2):225-234.
[50]Albert Y. Ha, Shilu Tong. Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition[J]. Management Science,2008,54(4):701-715.
[51]Xuan Zhao,ChunmingShi. Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains[J]. International Journal of Production Economics.2011,134(2):434-446.
[52]Xuan Zhao. Coordinating a Supply Chain System with Retailers Under Both Price and Inventory Competition[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009,17(5):532-542.
[53]Jian-Cai Wang, Hon-Shiang Lau, Amy Hing Ling Lau.When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research.,2009,197(1):266-286.
[54]Chung-Chi Hsieh and Cheng-Han Wu. Coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2009,196(1):25-28.
[55]Chen Kebing, Xiao Tiaojun. Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2009, 197(1):225-234.
[56]申成霖,侯文华,张新鑫.基于信息共享视角的时间竞争型供应链决策[J].系统工程理论与实践.,2010.30(2)：257-263.
[57]胡宪武,滕春贤.供应链企业关系稳定机制的竞合博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2010(22)：173-175.
[58]Boyaci, T., G. Gallego. Supply chain coordination in a market with customer service competition[J]. Production Operations Management,2004,13(1):3-22.
[59]Mingming Leng,Mahmut Parlar. Allocation of Cost Savings in a Three-Level Supply Chain with Demand Information Sharing:A Cooperative-Game Approach[J]. Oprations research,2009,57(1):200-213.
[60]Ha A.Y., S. Tong,H. Zhang. Sharing imperfect demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies[J].Management science,2010,57(3) 566-581.
[61]Partha Priya Datta,Martin G. Christopher.Information Sharing and Coordination Mechanisms for Managing Uncertainty in Supply Chains:A Simulation Study[J].International Journal of Production Research,2011,49(3):765-803.
[62]Wei-Hsi Hung,Chin-Fu Ho,Jau-Jeng Jou,Yi-Ming Tai. Sharing information strategically in a supply chain:antecedents, content and impact[J]. International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications,2011,14(2):111-133.
[63]Noam Shamir. Strategic information sharing between competing retailers in a supply chain with endogenous wholesale price[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2012,136(2):352-365.
[64]Jianghua Wu,Ananth Iyer,Paul V. Preckel,Xin Zhai. Information sharing across multiple buyers in a supply chain[J]. Asia-Pacific Journal of Operation Research, 2012,29(1).
[65]Peter Meindl. Supply chain management:strategy, planning and operation[M]. Peking.Tsinghun University Publiser,2001.
[66]Jagmohan Raju, John Zhang. Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer[J].Marketing Science,2005,24(2):254-262.
[67]Tansev Geylani, Anthony J. Dukes, Kannan Srinivasan. Strategic Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(2):164-178.
[68]Anil Arya. Friction in Related-Party Trade When a Rivals Also a Customer[J]. Management Science,2008,54(11):1850-1860.
[69]Cachon, G. Stock wars:Inventory competition in a two-echelon supply chain with multiple retailers[J]. Operation Research,2001,49 (5):658-674.
[70]Aldo Montesano. Price Collusion with Free Entry:the Parasitic Competition [J].International Review of Economics,2012,59(1):41-65.
[71]Micha(?) Krol. Product Differentiation Decisions under Ambiguous Consumer Demand and Pessimistic Expectations [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2012,30(6):593-604.
[72]David A. Miller. Robust Collusion with Private Information [J].Review of Economic Studies,2012,79(2):778-811.
[73]Kre s imir Z igic. Stackelberg Leadership with Product Differentiation and Endogenous Entry:Some Comparative Static and Limiting Results[J]. Journal of Economics,2012,106(3):221-232.
[74]郭福利,陈菊红,李赛赛.2-2可替代产品供应链的渠道选择及均衡分析[J].工业工程与管理,2011,16(2)：103-108.
[75]朱立龙,尤建新.非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1)：109-118.
[76]方海燕,达庆利.基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(3)：166-172.
[77]李红霞,陈绍刚.基于差异化竞争的集团内转移定价研究[J].统计与决策,2012,(4)：58-61.
[78]闫森,吴文清.考虑经营者合谋的激励机制研究[J].管理学报,2013,10(4)：524-527.
[79]綦勇,李凯,刘智慧.买方抗衡势力对上游企业竞争策略的影响----基于讨价还价均衡的分析[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(5)：217-222.
[80]刘智慧,李凯,苏慧清.下游竞争、买方谈判能力与上游产品差异化[J].产经评论,2013,(2)：59-68.
[81]A.Michael Spence. Job Market Signaling[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973,87(3):355-374.
[82]A.Michael Spence. Market Signaling:the informational structure of job market and related phenomena[D]. Harvard University Press,1972.
[83]A.Michael Spence. Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(1):51-74.
[84]A.Michael Spence.Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets [J]. The American Economic Review,2002,92(3):434-459.
[85]Brian L. Connelly,et. Signaling Theory:A Review and Assessment[J]. Journal of Management,2011,37:39-67.
[86]Timothy Perri.Spence Revisited:Signaling and the Allocation of Individuals to Jobs[J].Department of Economics,2011:D82.
[87]丁越兰,罗瑞强.基于信号传递模型的劳动力市场就业行为分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,9(3)：66-70.
[88]Rothchild,M. and J,Stiglitz.Equilibrium in Competitive Insuraance Market:An Essay on the Economics of Imferfect Information[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1976,90:629-649.
[89]Harrington, Scott E..Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market[J]. Liability:perspectives and policy,1988.
[90]Cachon G. P., Harker P. T..Competition and outsourcing with scale economics[J]. Management Science,2002,48(10):1314-1333.
[91]程源,杨湘玉.外包决策与核心能力的提升：模型构造与理论解释[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,9：133-137.
[92]Buehler S., Haucap J.. Strategic outsourcing revisited[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior& Organization,2006,61:325-338.
[93]Anil Arya,Brian Mittendorf, David E.M. Sappington.The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier[J].Management Science,2008,54(10):1747-1758.
[94]Van Long, N. Outsourcing and technology spillovers[J].International Review of Economics & Finance,2005,14(3):297-304.
[95]Spiegel,Y.Horizontal subcontracting[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1993, 24(4):570-590.
[96]Shy, O., R. Stenbacka.Strategic outsourcing[J].Journal of Economic Behavior& Organization,2003,50(2):203-224.
[97]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海人民出版社,2004.
[98]让·梯若儿.产业组织理论[M].中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[2]余东华.新产业组织理论及其新发展[J].中央财经大学学报,2004(2)：49-54.
[3]周振华.结构调整[M].上海人民出版社,1999,270.
[4]牛晓帆.西方产业组织理论的演化与新发展[J].经济研究.2004(3)：116-123.
[5]Cournot A A. Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses[M]. In libraire de sciences politiques et sociale. M. Riviere & Cie, Paris, 1838,189-231.
[6]Bertrand, J. Theorie methematique de la richesse sociate[J]. Journal des Savants, 1883,499-508.
[7]Lee H L. Pasmanabhan V, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chian:the bullwhip effect[J]. Management Science,1997,43(4):546-558.
[8]Tsay A, Lovejoy W. Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance [J]. Management Science,1999,1 (2):89-111.
[9]Donohue K. Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes[J]. Management Science,2000,46(11):1397-1411.
[10]Glannoccaro, Plerpaolo P. Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2004,89:131-139.
[11]邵晓峰,黄培清,季建华.供应链中供需双方合作批量模型的研究[J].管理工程学报,2001,15(2)：54-57.
[12]Cachon,G. Supply chain coordination with contracts[M]. Supply Chain Management:Design, Coordination and Operation,2003,11:227-339.
[13]Bernstein F., Federgruen A.. Pricing and replenishment strategies in a distribution system with competing retailers [J]. Operations Research,2003,51(3):409-426.
[14]Jayashree Mahajan, Sonja Radas, Asoo J. Vakharia. Channel Strategies and Stocking Policies in Uncapacitated and Capacitated Supply Chains [J]. Decision Sciences,2002,33(2):191-222.
[15]Xuan Zhao. Coordinating a Supply Chain System with Retailers Under Both Price and Inventory Competition [J]. Production and Operations Management,2009, 17(5):532-542.
[16]励凌峰,黄培清,赵晓敏.供应链间的横向竞争与并购效应[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,14(6)：542-545.
[17]Cachon, G.P., Lariviere, M.A.. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations[J]. Management Science,2005,51 (1),30-44.
[18]Desheng Wu, Opher Baron, Oded Berman. Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2009,197(2): 548-556.
[19]Matthias Holweg, Frits K. Pil. Theoretical perspectives on the coordination of supply chains [J]. Journal of operational Management,2008,26:389-406.
[20]Tiaojun Xiao, Danqin Yang. Price and service competition of supply chains with risk-averse retailers under demand uncertainty [J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2008,114(1):187-200.
[21]Z. Yao, Stephen C. H. Leung, K. K. Lai. Manufacturer's revenue-sharing contract and retail competition[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2008,186(2): 637-651.
[22]肖迪,黄培清,顾锋.需求不确定条件下供应链之间的库存竞争策略[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,42(9)：1511-1514.
[23]张庆一,李贵春,踪程.供应链企业竞争与合作的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2010(9)：174-176.
[24]许传永,苟清龙,周垂日,梁樑.两层双渠道供应链的定价问题[J].系统工程理论与实践.2010,30(10)：1741-1752.
[25]S. Chan Choi. Price Competition in a Duopoly Common Retailer Channel. Journal of Retailing[J].1996,72(2):117-134.
[26]王飞锋,李晓锦.零售商在供应链中地位的演化[J].商讯商业经济文荟,2004(6)：40-43.
[27]周勤,朱有为.中国制造业和商业关系演化：总量分析[J].中国工业经济,2005,(8)：50-55.
[28]王强,王吉吉.从供应链的角度分析我国商品流通主导权的演变[J].北方经贸,2005,(7)：76-77.
[29]倪跃峰,杨楠楠.家乐福渠道运行中零售商与供应商的关系管理[J].管理案例研究与评论,2009,2(3)：153-163.
[30]Jagmohan Raju, Z. John Zhang. Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer [J].Marketing Science,2005,24(2):254-262.
[31]邹爱平,吴清烈.零售商主导供应链协调问题的博弈分析[J].商场现代化,2007,51：9-10.
[32]Tansev Geylani, Anthony J. Dukes, Kannan Srinivasan. Strategic Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(2):164-178.
[33]李长青,李寅龙,徐德生.博弈视角下零售商主导的二级供应链利益协调机制研究[J].天津商业大学学报,2009,29(4)：51-55.
[34]徐贤浩,聂思玥.零售商主导的短生命周期产品供应链订货策略[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(4)：83-92.
[35]H.Lee, S.Whang. Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply:Chains Incentives and Information[J]. Management Science,1999,45(5):633-640.
[36]Lee, et al. The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain[J]. Management Science,2000,46(5):123-145.
[37]Cachon, G., M. Fisher. Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information[J]. Management Science,2000,(46):1032-1048.
[38]Cachon, G., M. Lariviere. Contracting to assure supply:How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain[J]. Management Science,2001,(47):629-646.
[39]H.T.Zhang. Vertical information exchange in a supply chain with duopoly retailers[J]. Production and Operations Management,2002,11(4):531-546.
[40]毛薇,金俊武.供应链管理中信息共享的模型及其优化[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(z1)：389-393.
[41]郑欣,张诚,凌鸿.评估供货量信息的共享在供应链管理中的价值[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(3)：23-29.
[42]翟运开,董芹芹.基于敏捷性的供应链信息交流密度与利润之间关系的研究[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(10)：435-439.
[43]A.Angulo, et al. Supply Chain Information Sharing In a Vendor Managed Inventory Partnership[J]. Journal of Business Logistics,2004,25(1):101-120.
[44]王瑛.供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(5)：61-66.
[45]刘开军,张子刚.需求信息可部分观察时供应链中的信息汇聚效应[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(2)：83-89.
[46]刘震宇,宁钰.双向信息流共享对供应链绩效的影响[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(10)：413-419.
[47]Ozer, O., W. Wei. Strategic commitment for optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information[J]. Management Science,2006,(52):1238-1257.
[48]Zhongsheng Hua, Sijie Li. Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation[J].Omega,2008,36(5): 697-714.
[49]Kebing Chen, Tiaojun Xiao. Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2009,197(2):225-234.
[50]Albert Y. Ha, Shilu Tong. Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition[J]. Management Science,2008,54(4):701-715.
[51]Xuan Zhao,ChunmingShi. Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains[J]. International Journal of Production Economics.2011,134(2):434-446.
[52]Xuan Zhao. Coordinating a Supply Chain System with Retailers Under Both Price and Inventory Competition[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009,17(5):532-542.
[53]Jian-Cai Wang, Hon-Shiang Lau, Amy Hing Ling Lau.When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research.,2009,197(1):266-286.
[54]Chung-Chi Hsieh and Cheng-Han Wu. Coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2009,196(1):25-28.
[55]Chen Kebing, Xiao Tiaojun. Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2009, 197(1):225-234.
[56]申成霖,侯文华,张新鑫.基于信息共享视角的时间竞争型供应链决策[J].系统工程理论与实践.,2010.30(2)：257-263.
[57]胡宪武,滕春贤.供应链企业关系稳定机制的竞合博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2010(22)：173-175.
[58]Boyaci, T., G. Gallego. Supply chain coordination in a market with customer service competition[J]. Production Operations Management,2004,13(1):3-22.
[59]Mingming Leng,Mahmut Parlar. Allocation of Cost Savings in a Three-Level Supply Chain with Demand Information Sharing:A Cooperative-Game Approach[J]. Oprations research,2009,57(1):200-213.
[60]Ha A.Y., S. Tong,H. Zhang. Sharing imperfect demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies[J].Management science,2010,57(3) 566-581.
[61]Partha Priya Datta,Martin G. Christopher.Information Sharing and Coordination Mechanisms for Managing Uncertainty in Supply Chains:A Simulation Study[J].International Journal of Production Research,2011,49(3):765-803.
[62]Wei-Hsi Hung,Chin-Fu Ho,Jau-Jeng Jou,Yi-Ming Tai. Sharing information strategically in a supply chain:antecedents, content and impact[J]. International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications,2011,14(2):111-133.
[63]Noam Shamir. Strategic information sharing between competing retailers in a supply chain with endogenous wholesale price[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2012,136(2):352-365.
[64]Jianghua Wu,Ananth Iyer,Paul V. Preckel,Xin Zhai. Information sharing across multiple buyers in a supply chain[J]. Asia-Pacific Journal of Operation Research, 2012,29(1).
[65]Peter Meindl. Supply chain management:strategy, planning and operation[M]. Peking.Tsinghun University Publiser,2001.
[66]Jagmohan Raju, John Zhang. Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer[J].Marketing Science,2005,24(2):254-262.
[67]Tansev Geylani, Anthony J. Dukes, Kannan Srinivasan. Strategic Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(2):164-178.
[68]Anil Arya. Friction in Related-Party Trade When a Rivals Also a Customer[J]. Management Science,2008,54(11):1850-1860.
[69]Cachon, G. Stock wars:Inventory competition in a two-echelon supply chain with multiple retailers[J]. Operation Research,2001,49 (5):658-674.
[70]Aldo Montesano. Price Collusion with Free Entry:the Parasitic Competition [J].International Review of Economics,2012,59(1):41-65.
[71]Micha(?) Krol. Product Differentiation Decisions under Ambiguous Consumer Demand and Pessimistic Expectations [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2012,30(6):593-604.
[72]David A. Miller. Robust Collusion with Private Information [J].Review of Economic Studies,2012,79(2):778-811.
[73]Kre s imir Z igic. Stackelberg Leadership with Product Differentiation and Endogenous Entry:Some Comparative Static and Limiting Results[J]. Journal of Economics,2012,106(3):221-232.
[74]郭福利,陈菊红,李赛赛.2-2可替代产品供应链的渠道选择及均衡分析[J].工业工程与管理,2011,16(2)：103-108.
[75]朱立龙,尤建新.非对称信息供应链质量信号传递博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1)：109-118.
[76]方海燕,达庆利.基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(3)：166-172.
[77]李红霞,陈绍刚.基于差异化竞争的集团内转移定价研究[J].统计与决策,2012,(4)：58-61.
[78]闫森,吴文清.考虑经营者合谋的激励机制研究[J].管理学报,2013,10(4)：524-527.
[79]綦勇,李凯,刘智慧.买方抗衡势力对上游企业竞争策略的影响----基于讨价还价均衡的分析[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(5)：217-222.
[80]刘智慧,李凯,苏慧清.下游竞争、买方谈判能力与上游产品差异化[J].产经评论,2013,(2)：59-68.
[81]A.Michael Spence. Job Market Signaling[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973,87(3):355-374.
[82]A.Michael Spence. Market Signaling:the informational structure of job market and related phenomena[D]. Harvard University Press,1972.
[83]A.Michael Spence. Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90(1):51-74.
[84]A.Michael Spence.Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets [J]. The American Economic Review,2002,92(3):434-459.
[85]Brian L. Connelly,et. Signaling Theory:A Review and Assessment[J]. Journal of Management,2011,37:39-67.
[86]Timothy Perri.Spence Revisited:Signaling and the Allocation of Individuals to Jobs[J].Department of Economics,2011:D82.
[87]丁越兰,罗瑞强.基于信号传递模型的劳动力市场就业行为分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2009,9(3)：66-70.
[88]Rothchild,M. and J,Stiglitz.Equilibrium in Competitive Insuraance Market:An Essay on the Economics of Imferfect Information[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1976,90:629-649.
[89]Harrington, Scott E..Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market[J]. Liability:perspectives and policy,1988.
[90]Cachon G. P., Harker P. T..Competition and outsourcing with scale economics[J]. Management Science,2002,48(10):1314-1333.
[91]程源,杨湘玉.外包决策与核心能力的提升：模型构造与理论解释[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,9：133-137.
[92]Buehler S., Haucap J.. Strategic outsourcing revisited[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior& Organization,2006,61:325-338.
[93]Anil Arya,Brian Mittendorf, David E.M. Sappington.The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier[J].Management Science,2008,54(10):1747-1758.
[94]Van Long, N. Outsourcing and technology spillovers[J].International Review of Economics & Finance,2005,14(3):297-304.
[95]Spiegel,Y.Horizontal subcontracting[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1993, 24(4):570-590.
[96]Shy, O., R. Stenbacka.Strategic outsourcing[J].Journal of Economic Behavior& Organization,2003,50(2):203-224.
[97]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海人民出版社,2004.
[98]让·梯若儿.产业组织理论[M].中国人民大学出版社,2006.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |