规模扩张和效率损失：政治关联对中国民营企业发展的影响研究
|
摘要
尽管中国的经济转型已走过三十多个年头,但广大的民营企业一直处在资源分配体制性主从次序的底端,企业的成长仍然面临严重的制度性障碍。民营企业纷纷与政府建立紧密联系,通过政治关联来获取关键资源、突破发展瓶颈。企业的政治关联现象引起了学界的浓厚兴趣和高度关注。但现有研究普遍从源于政府理论的“扶持之手—掠夺之手”经典视角出发来做分析,关注的重点仍在于“政治关联给企业带来了什么”,而对于政治关联给企业行为决策造成的影响、政治关联在企业运行和发展中所扮演的角色以及政治关联影响企业价值的微观作用机制,我们还知之甚少。
为了探索这些理论研究上的未知与疑惑,本研究从政治关联的资源效应入手,构建一个以企业为主体的政治关联分析框架,我们称之为“规模扩张效应—效率减损效应”分析视角,重点剖析建立政治关联之后民营企业的行为与决策将会发生哪些变化,以及这些变化又会给企业的运行和发展带来何种影响。分析表明：
政治关联具有资源效应,能够给民营企业带来发展所需的关键资源：一是有利于企业获取资金支持,缓解融资约束；二是有利于企业突破准入壁垒,进入到高盈利行业。政治关联的资源效应会深刻改变民营企业的行为和决策,进而显著影响企业的运行和发展,主要表现为规模扩张效应和效率减损效应两个方面。方面,政治关联帮助企业进入到高利润行业,且为企业提供了资金保障,有利于企业扩大投资、做大规模,此即规模扩张效应；另一方面,建立和维持政治关联会挤占企业家用于生产性活动的时间和精力,同时还会抑制企业创新并加重企业的政策性负担,有损于企业的生产经营效率,此即效率减损效应。
政治关联对于民营企业价值的影响机制可被归纳为规模扩张效应和效率减损效应这一正一负两种效应。规模扩张效应会增进价值,而效率减损效应则会损害价值。政治关联究竟是提高还是降低企业价值,取决于上述两种效应中何者占据主导。分析表明,由于政府仍在资源配置中起主导作用,规模扩张效应对企业价值的正向影响要超过效率减损效应的负向影响,因此企业家具有强烈的争夺资源的动机,不惜损失效率也要做大规模。
在随后的实证研究中,我们以中国民营上市公司为样本,通过细致严谨的计量分析,为本研究基于“规模扩张效应—效率减损效应”政治关联分析视角得出的理论结论提供可靠的经验证据。首先,我们利用基于现金—现金流敏感度的融资约束识别策略,通过对政治关联缓解企业融资约束的微观作用机制的识别,确认了政治关联的资源效应；其次,我们通过对政治关联与企业投资、政治关联与企业成长的多方位考察,验证了政治关联的规模扩张效应；第三,我们基于资本生产率、劳动生产率以及SFA生产效率分析框架等多个维度,就政治关联与企业生产经营效率之间的关系进行考察,验证了政治关联的效率减损效应；此外,我们还利用事件研究法确认了民营企业建立政治关联的经济合理性；最后,作为“规模扩张效应—效率减损效应”分析视角的一个应用,我们提供了政治关联负向影响企业绩效ROA和ROE的确凿经验证据,并指出这是政治关联企业重规模轻效率发展模式的直接后果,这有助于澄清学界关于政治关联如何影响企业绩效的争论。
中国的民营企业竞相把政治战略作为重要的企业战略,倾向于借助政治关联,廉价地获取各种稀缺资源,通过规模的快速扩张来提高企业价值,而不是通过管理和技术创新来提高企业的核心竞争力。这是企业家在当前中国商业环境之下的务实选择,也是无奈之举。不可否认,政治关联对于民营企业成长起到了相当大的积极作用,但也应当看到,政治关联在客观上扭曲了企业行为,负面影响不容小视。长此以往,民营企业的核心竞争力就无从谈起,效率优势也将丧失殆尽,最终被锁定在依赖于关系和资源的发展道路上。无论是从企业良性发展的微观视角来看,还是从民营经济乃至国民经济健康平稳运行的宏观视角来看,这一发展模式都是不可持续的。
造成企业行为扭曲的根本原因在于,政府过多干预微观经济活动、行政力量过深介入资源配置,民营企业因其所有制属性而受到严重的不公平对待。要从根本上扭转上述局面,实现民营企业的良性健康发展,就必须加强制度建设,尽快为民营企业成长提供更为健全的正式制度保障,特别是要给予所有企业同等的资源获取机会。构建公平市场环境、消解政策性歧视,关键是要厘清政府和市场的边界,真正让市场机制在资源配置中发挥基础性作用。
Althogh more than30years has been past since the1978economic reform, the private enterprises in China are still at the bottom of the "political pecking order" of resource allocation, and therefore facing harsh institutional obstacles in terms of firm growth. In order to gain access to resources which are of vital importance to firm growth, private enterprises choose to establish intimate tics with the government. This phenomenon has attracted great attention of scholars. However, under the commonly employed "helping hand or grabbing hand" classic analytical framework, which originated from government theory, the major focus of current literature is "what benefits or costs would political connecetion bring to the enterprises". As to (1) how would political connection reshape firms' decision-making behaviors,(2) what role does a political connection play in firms' management and development, and (3) the mechanism through which political connection influences firm value, we have merely limited knowledge.
In order to answer these questions, this dissertation builds up an enterprise perspective analysis framework, named "size-expansion effect—efficiency-impairment effect" framework. Taking that political connection would bring private enterprises more resources as granted, our analysis focus on firms'endogenous reaction to political connection's resource effect, ie what changes would happen to firm behaviors once political connection is established. The theoretical conclusions are as follows:
There are mainly two channels that contribute to political connection's resource effect. Firstly, political connection could facilitate enterprises'ability to obtain financial support and thus relieve their financing constraints. Secondly, political connection could help enterprises break through barriers to entry and thus get into industries with high profits. Given its resource effect, political connection would profoundly reshape firms' decision-making behavior, and therefore significantly affect firms' management strategy and development, which has two distinct manifestations. The first one is what we described as size-expansion effect:by getting enterprises involved in more profitable business and ensuring them of plenty funds, political connection benefit enterprises with increased investment and firm size. The second one is what we described as the efficiency-impairment effect: political connection would lead to the loss of firms'production efficiency. The reason is that attention and energy that entrepreneurs devoted to productive activities would be queezed out by the connection building and maintenance, the innovation incentive would be weakened, and the policy burden will be aggravated.
The mechanism that political connection influences firm value could be attributed to the mentioned two opposite effects:the size expansion effect and the efficiency effect, respectively. The size-expansion effect will increase firm value while the efficiency-impairment effect will decrease firm value. Whether political connection will increase or decrease firm value depends on which effect is taking the dominant place. Our analysis reveals that the size-expansion effect dominates the efficiency-impairment one, owing to the fact government still plays a decisive role in allocation of resources. Entrepreneurs are strongly motivated to compete for resources, and would like to enlarge firm size even at the cost of efficiency.
In the subsequent empirical study, by using a unique unbalanced panel dataset of accounting and political connection data for listed Chinese private companies and taking advantage of rigorous econometric methods, we provide sound empirical evidence for the aforementioned "size-expansion effect-efficiency-impairment effect" analytical framework. Firstly, by applying the "cash flow sensitivity of cash" financing constraints identification strategy, we figure out the mechanism that political connection relieves firms' financing constraints, and therefore confirm the resource effect of political connection. Secondly, through the investigation of the influence of political connection on firm investment and firm growth, we verify the size-expansion effect of political connection. Thirdly, within capital productivity, labor productivity and SFA productivity measurement framework, we check how political connection affects firms' productivity efficiency, and therefore prove the efficiency-impairment effect of political connection. We also validate that the size-expansion effect indeed dominates the efficiency-impairment one, so it is rational for private enterprises to establish political connection. Furthermore, as an extension of the "size-expansion effect—efficiency-impairment effect" framework, we provide conclusive empirical evidence that political connection actually reduces firm performance, measured by ROA and ROE, which is the immediate consequence of the politically connected enterprises'developing strategy which overemphasize size-expansion, rather than efficiency-enhancing. This helps to clarify the debate about whether political connection improves or depresses firm performance.
As for private enterprises in China, the political strategy is now over extensively adopted as a business strategy. Due to resource effect of political connection, private enterprises would rather enhance firm value through size expansion than improve the core competitiveness through management and technical innovation. This is a pragmatic choice for entrepreneurs in China's current business environment. There is no denying that political connection has played considerable positive impact on private enterprises'growth, but its negative influence on enterprises'behavior distortion should by no means be neglected. In the long run, the private enterprises will not only fail to build up core competitiveness, their original efficiency advantage will also be lost, and finally be locked in a path of development which is heavily relationship and resource dependent. Such a distorted business strategy is definitely unsustainable, neither viewed from the microscopic perspective of enterprises' development, nor from the macroscopic perspective of private economy growth and even the national economy growth.
Enterprises' behavior distortion ultimately lies in the deeply government's excessive intervention in the micro economic operation and resource allocation, so that private enterprises have been treated severely unequally. In order to reverse those distortion, the authority should strengthen the system construction, create a better performing institutional background for private enterprises, particularly, provide all the enterprises equal access to resources. To build fair market environment and eliminate policy discrimination, the foremost task is to clarify the boundary of the government and the market and let market mechanism plays the fundamental role in resource allocation.
为了探索这些理论研究上的未知与疑惑,本研究从政治关联的资源效应入手,构建一个以企业为主体的政治关联分析框架,我们称之为“规模扩张效应—效率减损效应”分析视角,重点剖析建立政治关联之后民营企业的行为与决策将会发生哪些变化,以及这些变化又会给企业的运行和发展带来何种影响。分析表明：
政治关联具有资源效应,能够给民营企业带来发展所需的关键资源：一是有利于企业获取资金支持,缓解融资约束；二是有利于企业突破准入壁垒,进入到高盈利行业。政治关联的资源效应会深刻改变民营企业的行为和决策,进而显著影响企业的运行和发展,主要表现为规模扩张效应和效率减损效应两个方面。方面,政治关联帮助企业进入到高利润行业,且为企业提供了资金保障,有利于企业扩大投资、做大规模,此即规模扩张效应；另一方面,建立和维持政治关联会挤占企业家用于生产性活动的时间和精力,同时还会抑制企业创新并加重企业的政策性负担,有损于企业的生产经营效率,此即效率减损效应。
政治关联对于民营企业价值的影响机制可被归纳为规模扩张效应和效率减损效应这一正一负两种效应。规模扩张效应会增进价值,而效率减损效应则会损害价值。政治关联究竟是提高还是降低企业价值,取决于上述两种效应中何者占据主导。分析表明,由于政府仍在资源配置中起主导作用,规模扩张效应对企业价值的正向影响要超过效率减损效应的负向影响,因此企业家具有强烈的争夺资源的动机,不惜损失效率也要做大规模。
在随后的实证研究中,我们以中国民营上市公司为样本,通过细致严谨的计量分析,为本研究基于“规模扩张效应—效率减损效应”政治关联分析视角得出的理论结论提供可靠的经验证据。首先,我们利用基于现金—现金流敏感度的融资约束识别策略,通过对政治关联缓解企业融资约束的微观作用机制的识别,确认了政治关联的资源效应；其次,我们通过对政治关联与企业投资、政治关联与企业成长的多方位考察,验证了政治关联的规模扩张效应；第三,我们基于资本生产率、劳动生产率以及SFA生产效率分析框架等多个维度,就政治关联与企业生产经营效率之间的关系进行考察,验证了政治关联的效率减损效应；此外,我们还利用事件研究法确认了民营企业建立政治关联的经济合理性；最后,作为“规模扩张效应—效率减损效应”分析视角的一个应用,我们提供了政治关联负向影响企业绩效ROA和ROE的确凿经验证据,并指出这是政治关联企业重规模轻效率发展模式的直接后果,这有助于澄清学界关于政治关联如何影响企业绩效的争论。
中国的民营企业竞相把政治战略作为重要的企业战略,倾向于借助政治关联,廉价地获取各种稀缺资源,通过规模的快速扩张来提高企业价值,而不是通过管理和技术创新来提高企业的核心竞争力。这是企业家在当前中国商业环境之下的务实选择,也是无奈之举。不可否认,政治关联对于民营企业成长起到了相当大的积极作用,但也应当看到,政治关联在客观上扭曲了企业行为,负面影响不容小视。长此以往,民营企业的核心竞争力就无从谈起,效率优势也将丧失殆尽,最终被锁定在依赖于关系和资源的发展道路上。无论是从企业良性发展的微观视角来看,还是从民营经济乃至国民经济健康平稳运行的宏观视角来看,这一发展模式都是不可持续的。
造成企业行为扭曲的根本原因在于,政府过多干预微观经济活动、行政力量过深介入资源配置,民营企业因其所有制属性而受到严重的不公平对待。要从根本上扭转上述局面,实现民营企业的良性健康发展,就必须加强制度建设,尽快为民营企业成长提供更为健全的正式制度保障,特别是要给予所有企业同等的资源获取机会。构建公平市场环境、消解政策性歧视,关键是要厘清政府和市场的边界,真正让市场机制在资源配置中发挥基础性作用。
Althogh more than30years has been past since the1978economic reform, the private enterprises in China are still at the bottom of the "political pecking order" of resource allocation, and therefore facing harsh institutional obstacles in terms of firm growth. In order to gain access to resources which are of vital importance to firm growth, private enterprises choose to establish intimate tics with the government. This phenomenon has attracted great attention of scholars. However, under the commonly employed "helping hand or grabbing hand" classic analytical framework, which originated from government theory, the major focus of current literature is "what benefits or costs would political connecetion bring to the enterprises". As to (1) how would political connection reshape firms' decision-making behaviors,(2) what role does a political connection play in firms' management and development, and (3) the mechanism through which political connection influences firm value, we have merely limited knowledge.
In order to answer these questions, this dissertation builds up an enterprise perspective analysis framework, named "size-expansion effect—efficiency-impairment effect" framework. Taking that political connection would bring private enterprises more resources as granted, our analysis focus on firms'endogenous reaction to political connection's resource effect, ie what changes would happen to firm behaviors once political connection is established. The theoretical conclusions are as follows:
There are mainly two channels that contribute to political connection's resource effect. Firstly, political connection could facilitate enterprises'ability to obtain financial support and thus relieve their financing constraints. Secondly, political connection could help enterprises break through barriers to entry and thus get into industries with high profits. Given its resource effect, political connection would profoundly reshape firms' decision-making behavior, and therefore significantly affect firms' management strategy and development, which has two distinct manifestations. The first one is what we described as size-expansion effect:by getting enterprises involved in more profitable business and ensuring them of plenty funds, political connection benefit enterprises with increased investment and firm size. The second one is what we described as the efficiency-impairment effect: political connection would lead to the loss of firms'production efficiency. The reason is that attention and energy that entrepreneurs devoted to productive activities would be queezed out by the connection building and maintenance, the innovation incentive would be weakened, and the policy burden will be aggravated.
The mechanism that political connection influences firm value could be attributed to the mentioned two opposite effects:the size expansion effect and the efficiency effect, respectively. The size-expansion effect will increase firm value while the efficiency-impairment effect will decrease firm value. Whether political connection will increase or decrease firm value depends on which effect is taking the dominant place. Our analysis reveals that the size-expansion effect dominates the efficiency-impairment one, owing to the fact government still plays a decisive role in allocation of resources. Entrepreneurs are strongly motivated to compete for resources, and would like to enlarge firm size even at the cost of efficiency.
In the subsequent empirical study, by using a unique unbalanced panel dataset of accounting and political connection data for listed Chinese private companies and taking advantage of rigorous econometric methods, we provide sound empirical evidence for the aforementioned "size-expansion effect-efficiency-impairment effect" analytical framework. Firstly, by applying the "cash flow sensitivity of cash" financing constraints identification strategy, we figure out the mechanism that political connection relieves firms' financing constraints, and therefore confirm the resource effect of political connection. Secondly, through the investigation of the influence of political connection on firm investment and firm growth, we verify the size-expansion effect of political connection. Thirdly, within capital productivity, labor productivity and SFA productivity measurement framework, we check how political connection affects firms' productivity efficiency, and therefore prove the efficiency-impairment effect of political connection. We also validate that the size-expansion effect indeed dominates the efficiency-impairment one, so it is rational for private enterprises to establish political connection. Furthermore, as an extension of the "size-expansion effect—efficiency-impairment effect" framework, we provide conclusive empirical evidence that political connection actually reduces firm performance, measured by ROA and ROE, which is the immediate consequence of the politically connected enterprises'developing strategy which overemphasize size-expansion, rather than efficiency-enhancing. This helps to clarify the debate about whether political connection improves or depresses firm performance.
As for private enterprises in China, the political strategy is now over extensively adopted as a business strategy. Due to resource effect of political connection, private enterprises would rather enhance firm value through size expansion than improve the core competitiveness through management and technical innovation. This is a pragmatic choice for entrepreneurs in China's current business environment. There is no denying that political connection has played considerable positive impact on private enterprises'growth, but its negative influence on enterprises'behavior distortion should by no means be neglected. In the long run, the private enterprises will not only fail to build up core competitiveness, their original efficiency advantage will also be lost, and finally be locked in a path of development which is heavily relationship and resource dependent. Such a distorted business strategy is definitely unsustainable, neither viewed from the microscopic perspective of enterprises' development, nor from the macroscopic perspective of private economy growth and even the national economy growth.
Enterprises' behavior distortion ultimately lies in the deeply government's excessive intervention in the micro economic operation and resource allocation, so that private enterprises have been treated severely unequally. In order to reverse those distortion, the authority should strengthen the system construction, create a better performing institutional background for private enterprises, particularly, provide all the enterprises equal access to resources. To build fair market environment and eliminate policy discrimination, the foremost task is to clarify the boundary of the government and the market and let market mechanism plays the fundamental role in resource allocation.
引文
①新华社北京2003年1月22日电。
②State Sector,包括国有经济和国家党政机构,参见吴敬琏和马国川(2013)。
①参见《坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进为全面建成小康社会而奋斗——在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告》,人民出版社,2012年。
①亚当·斯密：《国富论》,商务印书馆1981年版。
①引自中译本：詹姆士·布坎南,《寻求租金和寻求利润》,载于《经济社会体制比较》1988年第6期。
②安德烈·施莱弗和罗伯特·维什尼：《掠夺之手——政府病及其治疗》,赵红军译,北京：中信出版社,2004,前勒口。
③参见全国工商联于2012年8月发布的《中国民营企业500强调研分析报告》。
②参见2009年9月25日《钱江晚报》。
①参见周其仁(2005)。
②原广东科龙集团董事长潘宁语,参见周其仁(2005)。
[1]Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Kermani, A.; Kwak, J. and Mitton, T. The Value of Political Connections in the United States [R]. Working Paper,2010.
[2]Adhikari, A.; Derashid, C. and Zhang, H. Public Policy, Political Connections, and Effective Tax Rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2006,25(5):574-595.
[3]Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C.R. Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role? [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2001,44(1):179-198.
[4]Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C.R. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31(3):377-397.
[5]Aidt, T.S. Economic Analysis of Corruption:A Survey [J]. Economic Journal, 2003,113(491):632-652.
[6]Aigner, D.; Lovell, C.A.K. and Schmidt, P. Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models [J]. Journal of Econometrics, 1977,6(1):21-37.
[7]Aivazian, V.A.; Ge, Y. and Qiu, J. Can Corporatization Improve the Performance of State-owned Enterprises Even without Privatization? [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(5):791-808.
[8]Allen, F.; Qian, J. and Qian, M. Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[9]Almeida, H.; Campello, M. and Weisbach, M.S. The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash [J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[10]Alti, A. How Sensitive Is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing Is Frictionless? [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(2):707-722.
[11]Amihud, Y. Illiquidity and Stock Returns:Cross-section and Time-series Effects [J]. Journal of Financial Markets,2002,5(1):31-56.
[12]Amihud, Y; Mendelson, H. and Lauterbach, B. Market Microstructure and Securities Values:Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997,45(3):365-390.
[13]Anderson, T. and Hsiao, C. Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components [J]. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1981,76:598-606.
[14]Andvig, J.C. The Economics of Corruption:A Survey [J]. Studi Economici,1991, 43:57-94.
[15]Arellano, M. and Bond, S. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte-Carlo Evidence and An Application to Employment Equations [J]. Review of Economic Studies,1991,38:277-297.
[16]Arellano, M. and Bover, O. Another Look at Instrumental-variable Estimation of Error-components Models [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1995,68:29-52.
[17]Arellano, M. Panel Data Econometrics [M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2003.
[18]Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1985,67(4):648-660.
[19]Atkinson, A.B. and Stiglitz, J.E. Lectures on Public Economics [M]. London: McGraw-Hill,1980.
[20]Bai, C.; Lu, J. and Tao, Z. Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans [J]. Economics of Transition,2006,14(4):611-628.
[21]Bain, J.S. Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge [M]. MA:Harvard University Press,1956.
[22]Banfield, E. Corruption as a Feature of Government Organization [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1975,17:587-605.
[23]Battese, GE. and Coelli, T.J. A model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in A Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data [J]. Empirical Economics,1995,20:325-332.
[24]Battese, GE. and Coelli, T.J. Frontier Production Functions, Technical Efficiency and Panel Data:With Application to Paddy Farmers in India [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,1992,3:153-169.
[25]Baum, R.J.; Locke, E.A. and Smith, K.G A Multidimensional Model of Venture Growth [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2001,44:292-303.
[26]Baumol, W.J. Entrepreneurship:Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive [J] Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(5):893-921.
[27]Beck, P.J. and Maher, M.W. A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets [J]. Economics Letters,1986,20(1):1-5.
[28]Beck, T. and Levine, R. Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth:Panel Evidence [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2004,28(3):423-442.
[29]Becker, GS. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Group for Political Influence [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,98(3):371-400.
[30]Becker, G.S. and Stigler, GJ. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers [J]. Journal of Legal Studies,1974,3:1-19.
[31]Bertrand, M.; Kramaraz, F.; Schoar, A. and Thesmar, D. Politicians, Firms and the Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France [R]. Working Paper, University of Chicago,2007.
[32]Besley, T. and Burgess, R. Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119(1):91-134.
[33]Bhagwati, J.N. Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1982,90(5):988-1002.
[34]Bharath, S.T.; Pasquariello, P. and Wu, G Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions? [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8): 3211-3243.
[35]Binder, J.J. On the Use of the Multivariate Regression Model in Event Studies [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1985,23(1):370-383.
[36]Blundell, R. and Bond, S. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:115-143.
[37]Boisot, M. and Child, J. From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,41(4):600-628.
[38]Bond, S. and Meghir, C. Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's Financial Policy [J]. Review of Economic Studies,1994,61(2):197-222.
[39]Bond, S. Dynamic Panel Data Models:A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice [J]. Portuguese Economic Journal,2002,1(2):141-162.
[40]Bottasso, A. and Sembenelli, A. Market Power, Productivity and the EU Single Market Program:Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms [J]. European Economic Review,2001,45(1):167-186.
[41]Boubakri, N.; Cosset, J. and Saffar, W. Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(5):654-673.
[42]Boubakri, N.; Cosset, J. and Saffar, W. Politically Connected Firms:An International Event Study [R]. SSRN Working Paper,2009.
[43]Boubakri, N.; Guedhami, O.; Mishra, D.R. and Saffar, W. Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital [R]. SSRN Working Paper,2010.
[44]Boycko, M.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. An Theory of Privatization [J]. Economic Journal,1996,106:309-319.
[45]Brainard, W.C. and Tobin, J. Pitfalls in Financial Model Building [J]. American Economic Review,1968,58(2):99-122.
[46]Brennan, M. and Subrahmanyam, A. Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,41:441-464.
[47]Broadbent, J.P. Social Capital and Labor Politics in Japan:Cooperation or Cooptation? [J]. Policy Sciences,2000,33(3):307-321.
[48]Broadman, H.G. Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry [R]. World Bank Working Paper,2000.
[49]Brown, S. and Warner, J. Measuring Security Price Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1980,8:205-258.
[50]Brown, S. and Warner, J. Using Daily Stock Returns:The Case of Event Studies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1985,14:3-31.
[51]Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. The Calculus of Consent:The Logical Foundation of Constitutional Democracy [M]. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,1962.(中译本,[美]詹姆斯·布坎南和戈登·塔洛克：《同意的计算：立宪民主的逻辑基础》,陈光金译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,2000.)
[52]Buchanan, J.M. Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking [M]. in:Buchanan, J.M.; Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. eds, Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society, College Station:Texas A&M University Press,1980.(中译本,[美]詹姆斯·布坎南,《寻求租金和寻求利润》,载于《经济社会体制比较》1988年第6期.)
[53]Bunkanwanicha, P. and Wiwattanakantang, Y. Big Business Owners in Politics [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2133-2168.
[54]Business International Corporation. Introduction to the Country Assessment Service [M]. New York:Business International Corporation,1984.
[55]Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. Microeconometrics Using Stata[M]. Texax: Stata Press,2009.
[56]Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2005.
[57]Carhart, M. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997,52:57-82.
[58]Carkovic, M. and Levine, R. Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth? [M]. in Moran, T.H.; Graham, E.M. and Blomstrom, M. eds., Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and Center for Global Development,2005.
[59]Caudill, S.B. and Ford, J.M. Biases in Frontier Estimation Due to Heteroskedasticity [J]. Economics Letters,1993,41:17-20.
[60]Chaney, P.K.; Faccio, M.and Parsley, D. The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011, 51(1-2):58-76.
[61]Chang, E.C. and Wong, S.M.L. Political Control and Performance in China's Listed Firms [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32(4):617-636.
[62]Charumilind, C.; Kali, R. and Wiwattanakantang, Y. Connected Lending: Thailand before the Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Business,2006,79(1): 181-218.
[63]Che, J. and Qian, Y. Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance:Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1998,14(1):1-23.
[64]Che, J. and Qian, Y. Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance:Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1998,14(1):1-23.
[65]Chen, S.; Sun, Z.; Tang, S. and Wu, D. Government Intervention and Investment Efficiency:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2): 259-271.
[66]Cheung, Y.-L.; Rau, P.R. and Stouraitis, A. Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms [J]. Review of Finance,2010,14(4):669-694.
[67]Chirinko, R.S. Business Fixed Investment Spending:Modeling Strategies, Empirical Results, and Policy Implications [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1993,31(4):1875-1911.
[68]Claessens, S. and Tzioumis, K. Measuring Finns'Access to Finance [R]. World Bank Working Paper,2006.
[69]Claessens, S.; Feijen, E. and Laeven, L. Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):554-580.
[70]Cleary, S. The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):673-692.
[71]Coase, R.H. The Nature of the Firm [J]. Economica,1937,4(16):386-405.
[72]Coase, R.H. The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1960,3:1-44.
[73]Colander, D. ed., Neoclassical Political Economy——The Analysis of Rent-seeking and DUP Activities [M].1984.
[74]Cull, R. and Xu, L.C. Institutions, Ownership, and Finance:The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment among Chinese Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005,77(1):117-146.
[75]Cummins, J.C.; Hassett, K.A. and Oliner, S.D. Investment Behavior, Observable Expectations, and Internal Funds [J]. American Economic Review,2006,96(3): 796-810.
[76]Davidsson, P. and Wiklund, J. Conceptual and Empirical Challenges in the Study of Firm Growth [M]. In: Sexton, D. and Landstrom, H. eds. The Blackwell Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Oxford:Blackwell,2000,.
[77]Delmar, F.; Davidsson, P. and Gartner, W. Arriving at the High-growth Firm [J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2003,18,189-216.
[78]Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. Law, Finance, and Firm Growth [J]. Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):2107-2137.
[79]Demsetz, H.. Barriers to Entry [J]. American Economic Review,1982,72: 47-57.
[80]Dey, K. and Ray, P. VRS and Its Effect on Productivity and Profitability of a Firm [J]. Indian Journal of Industrial Relations,2003,39(1):33-57.
[81]Dinc, I.S. Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in Emerging Markets [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 77(2): 453-479.
[82]Domar, E.D.; Eddie, S.M.; Herrick, B.H.; Hohenberg, P.M.; Intriligator, M.D.and Miyamoto, I. Economic Growth and Productivity in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan in the Post-War Period [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1964, 46(1): 33-40.
[83]Dombrovsky, V. Campaign Contributions and Firm Performance: The "Latvian Way" [R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2010.
[84]Dombrovsky, V. Do Political Connections Matter? Firm-Level Evidence from Latvia [R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2011.
[85]Easley, D.; Kiefer, N.M. and O'Hara, M. Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing? The Curious Role of Purchased Order Flow [J]. Journal of Finance, 1996,51(3): 811-833.
[86]Eckbo, B.E.; Maksimovic, V. and Williams, J. Consistent Estimation of Cross-Sectional Models in Event Studies [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1990, 3(3): 343-365.
[87]Epstein, E. The Corporation in American Politics [M]. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
[88]Erickson, T. and Whited, T.M. Measurement Error and the Relationship Between Investment and q [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 108,1027-1057.
[89]Evans, D.S. Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1987, 95(4): 657-674.
[90]Faccio, M. and Parsley, D.C. Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2009, 44(03): 683-718.
[91]Faccio, M. Politically Connected Firms [J]. American Economic Review, 2006, 96(1): 369-386.
[92]Faccio, M. The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms [R]. Working Paper, Purdue University, 2007.
[93]Faccio, M.; Masulis, R.W. and McConnell, J.J. Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts [J]. Journal of Finance, 2006, 61(6): 2597-2635.
[94]Fama, E. and French, K. Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1993, 33: 3-56.
[95]Fama,E.F.;Fisher, L.; Jensen, M.C. and Roll, R. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information [J]. International Economic Review,1969,10(1): 1-21.
[96]Fan, J.P.H.; Rui, O.M. and Zhao, M. Public Governance and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008, 36(3): 343-364.
[97]Fan, J.P.H.; Wong, T.J. and Zhang, T. Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 84(2): 330-357.
[98]Fazzari, S.; Hubbard, G., Petersen, B. Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment [J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988, 1, 141-195.
[99]Ferguson, T. and Voth, H.-J. Betting on Hitler—— the Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008, 123(1): 101-137.
[100]Firth, M.; Fung, P. and Rui, O.M. Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2006, 43(6): 1289-1330.
[101]Firth, M.; Lin, C; Liu, P. and Wong, S.M.L. Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit Allocation in China's Private Sector [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, 33(6): 1144-1155.
[102]Fisman, D.; Fisman, R.; Galef, J. and Khurana, R. Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney [R]. Working Paper, 2006.
[103]Fisman, R. and Svensson, J. Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm Level Evidence [J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 83(1): 63-75.
[104]Fisman, R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections [J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91(4): 1095-1102.
[105]Francis, B.B.; Hasan, I. and Sun, X. Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China [J]. Journal of International Money and Finance, 2009, 28(4): 696-719.
[106]Fraumeni, B.M. and Jorgenson, D.W. Rates of Return by Industrial Sector in the United States, 1948-76 [J]. American Economic Review, 1980, 70(2): 326-330.
[107]Frye, T. and Shleifer, A. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand [J]. American Economic Review, 1997, 87(2): 354-358.
[108]George, T.; Kaul, G and Nimalendran, M. Estimation of the Bid-Ask Spread and its Components: A New Approach [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1991, 4(4): 623-656.623-656.
[109]Gilbert, B.A.; McDougall, P.P. and Audretsch, D.B. New Venture Growth:A Review and Extension [J]. Journal of Management,2006,32:926-950.
[110]Goldman, E.; Rocholl, J.and So, J. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2331-2360.
[111]Goldman, E.; So, J. and Rocholl, J. Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts [R]. SSRN Working Paper,2008.
[112]Gould, D.J. and Amaro-Reyes, J.A. The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance [R]. World Bank Staff Working Paper no.580, Washington, D.C.: World Bank,1983.
[113]Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. Outsourcing in a Global Economy [J]. Review of Economic Studies,2005,72(1):135-159.
[114]Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. Special Interest Politics [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,2001.(中译本,[美]格罗斯曼、[以]赫尔普曼：《特殊利益政治学》,朱保华等译,上海：上海财经大学出版社,2009.)
[115]Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D. The Cost and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94: 691-719.
[116]Harberger, A.C. Monopoly and Resource Allocation [J]. American Economic Review,1954,44:77-87.
[117]Harberger, A.C. Using the Resources at Hand More Effectively [J]. American Economic Review,1959,49:136-146.
[118]Hasbrouck, J. Empirical Market Microstructure:The Institutions, Economics and Econometrics of Securities Trading [M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2007.
[119]Hayashi, F. Econometrics [M]. NJ Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.
[120]Hayashi, F. Tobin's Marginal q and Average q:A Neoclassical Interpretation [J]. Econometrica,1982,50(1):213-224.
[121]Hillman, A.L. and Katez, E. Risk-averse Rent-seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power [J]. Economic Journal,1984,94:104-110.
[122]Hitt, L.M. and Brynjolfsson, E. Productivity, Business Profitability, and Consumer Surplus:Three Different Measures of Information Technology Value [J]. MIS Quarterly,1996,20(2):121-142.
123] Houston, J.F.; Jiang, L.; Lin, C. and Ma, Y. Political Connections and the Cost of Borrowing [R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2011.
[124]Hoy, F.; McDougall, P.P. and Dsouza, D.E. Strategies and environments of high growth firms [J]. In: Sexton, D.L. and Kasarda, J.D. eds., The State of the Art of Entrepreneurship. Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing, 1992.
[125]Huang, Y. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[126]Huang, Y. Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. (中译本,[美]黄亚生：《改革时期的外国直接投资》,钱勇和王润亮译,北京：新星出版社,2005.)
[127]Hubbard, R.G Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1998, 36, 193-225.
[128]Huntington, S.P. Political Order in Changing Societies [M]. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
[129]Huselid, M.A. The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices on Turnover, Productivity, and Corporate Financial Performance [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1995, 38(3): 635-672.
[130]Jain, A.K. Corruption: A Review [J]. Journal of Economic Surveys, 2001, 15(1): 71-121.
[131]Jayachandran, S. The Jeffords Effect [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 2006, 49(2): 397-425.
[132]Jensen, M.C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers [J]. American Economic Review, 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[133]Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3:305-360.
[134]Johnson, S. and Mitton, T. Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 67(2): 351-382.
[135]Kaplan, S. and Zingales, L. Do Financing Constraints Explain Why Investment is Correlated with Cash Flow? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112, 169-216.
[136]Khwaja, A.I. and Mian, A. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005,120(4):1371-1411.
[137]Kim, C.; Mauer, D. and Sherman, A. The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1998, 33:335-359.
[138]Kim, J.-S. and Frees, E.W. Fixed Effects Estimation in Multilevel Models [R]. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin,2005.
[139]Klitgaard, R. Controlling Corruption [M]. Berkely:University of California Press,1988.
[140]Klitgaard, R. Gifts and Bribes [M]. in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy of Choice. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,1991.
[141]Knight, B. Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2006,90(4-5):751-773.
[142]Kothari, S. and Warner, J. Measuring Long-horizon Security Price Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997,43:301-339.
[143]Kothari, S. and Warner, J., The Econometrics of Event Studies [M]. In:Eckbo, B.E. ed., Handbook of Corporate Finance:Empirical Corporate Finance, Volume 1 (Chapter 1), North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,2007.
[144]Krueger, A.O. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society [J]. American Economic Review,1974,64(3):291-303.
[145]Kumbhakar, S.C. and Lovell, C.A.K. Stochastic Frontier Analysis [M]. Cambridge, Mass:Cambridge University Press,2000.
[146]Kumbhakar, S.C. Production Frontiers, Panel Data, and Time-varying Technical Inefficiency [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1990,46:201-211.
[147]Lambsdorff, J.G. How Corruption Affects Productivity [J]. Kyklos,2003,56(4): 457-474.
[148]Lang, L.; Ofek, E. and Stulz, R. Leverage, Investment, and Firm Growth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(1):3-29.
[149]Lee, Y.H. and Schmidt, P. A Production Frontier Model with Flexible Temporal Variation in Technical Inefficiency [M]. in Fried, H.O.; Lovell, C.A.K. and Schmidt, S.S. eds, The Measurement of Productive Efficiency:Techniques and Application, New York:Oxford University Press,1993.
[150]Leff, N. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption [J]. American Behavioral Scientist,1964,8:8-14.
[151]Leibenstein, H. Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency"[J]. American Economic Review,1966,56(3):392-415.
[152]Leuz, C. and Oberholzer-Gee, F. Political Relationships, Global Financing, and Corporate Transparency:Evidence from Indonesia [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(2):411-439.
[153]Li, H.; Meng, L. and Zhang, J. Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China [J]. Economic Inquiry,2006,44(3):559-578.
[154]Li, H.; Meng, L.; Wang, Q. and Zhou, L.-A. Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms [J]. Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(2):283-299.
[155]Liao, G.; Chen, X.; Jing, X. and Sun, J.. Policy Burdens, Firm Performance, and Management Turnover [J]. China Economic Review,2009,20:15-28.
[156]Lin, J.; Cai, F. and Li, Z. Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-owned Enterprise Reform [J]. American Economic Review,1998,88:422-427.
[157]Lintner, J. The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1965,47:13-37.
[158]Lu, Y. Political Connections and Trade Expansion [J]. Economics of Transition, 2011,19(2):231-254.
[159]Lui, F.T. An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(4):760-781.
[160]Lyon, J.; Barber, B. and Tsai, C. Improved Methods of Tests of Long-horizon Abnormal Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:165-201.
[161]MacKinlay, A.C. Event Studies in Economics and Finance [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1997,35(1):13-39.
[162]Magee, S.P.; Brock, W.A. and Young, L. Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Cambridge University Press,1989.
[163]Mann, M.H. Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries,1950-1960 [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1966,48: 296-307.
[164]Mauro, P. Corruption and Growth [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995, 110:681-712.
[165]Meeusen, W. and van Den Broeck, J. Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas Production Functions with Composed Error [J]. International Economic Review, 1977,18(2):435-444.
[166]Meon, P.-G. and Sekkat, K. Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth? [J]. Public Choice,2005,122(1-2):69-97.
[167]Mobarak A.M. and Purbasari, D.P. Corrupt Protection for Sale to Firms: Evidence from Indonesia [R]. Working Paper,2006.
[168]Morck, R.; Wolfenzon, D. and Yeung, B. Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2005,43(3): 655-720.
[169]Mueller, D.C. Public Choice II [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Cambridge University Press,1989. (中译本,[美]丹尼斯·缪勒：《公共选择理论(第二版)》,杨春学等译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999.)
[170]Murphy, K.M.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991,106(2): 503-530.
[171]Murphy, K.M.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? [J]. American Economic Review,1993,83(2):409-414.
[172]Musgrave, R.A. The Theory of Public Finance [M]. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1959.
[173]Myers, S.C. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5:147-175.
[174]Nickell, S. Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects [J]. Econometrica, 1981,49:1417-1426.
[175]Nitzan, S. Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests [J]. European Journal of Political Economy,1994,10(1):41-60.
[176]North, D.C. Structure and Change in Economic History [M]. New York:Norton,1981.(中译本,[美]道格拉斯·诺思：《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994.)
[177]Olson, M.J. The Logic of Collective Action [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard Univeristy Press,1965.(中译本,[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森：《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁、郭宇峰、李崇新译,上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995.)
[178]Olson, M.J. The Rise and Decline of Nations [M]. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,1982. (中译本,[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森：《国家的兴衰》,李增刚译,上海：上海人民出版社,2007.)
[179]Opler, T.; Pinkowitz, L.; Stulz, R. and Williamson, R. The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999,52:3-46.
[180]Palepu, K. Diversification Strategy, Profit Performance and the Entropy Measure [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1985,6(3):239-255.
[181]Pastor, L. and Stambaugh, R.F. Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(3):642-685.
[182]Peltzman, S. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1976,19:211-240.
[183]Peng, M.W. and Luo, Y. Managerial Ties and Firm Performance in a Transition Economy:The Nature of a Micro-Macro Link [R]. Working Paper,1998.
[184]Peng, M.W.; Sun, S.L.; Pinkham, B. and Chen, H. The Institution-based View as a Third Leg for a Strategy Tripod [J]. Academy of Management Perspectives, 2009,23(3):63-81.
[185]Peng, M.W.; Wang, D.Y.L. and Jiang, Y. An Institution-based View of International Business Strategy:A focus on Emerging Economies [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2008,39(5):920-936.
[186]Posner, R.A. The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1975,83:807-827.
[187]Pralahad, C.K. and Hamel, G. Core Competence of the Corporation [J]. Harvard Business Review,1990,3:79-91.
[188]Pushner, G.M. Equity ownership structure, leverage, and productivity:Empirical evidence from Japan [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,1995,3(2-3):241-255.
[189]Rajan, R.G and Zingales, L. Financial Dependence and Growth [J]. American Economic Review,1998,88(3):559-586.
[190]Ramalho, R. The Effects of an Anti-corruption Campaign:Evidence from the 1992 Presidential Impeachment in Brazil [R]. Working Paper, MIT, Cambridge, MA.,2004.
[191]Richardson, S. Over-investment of Free Cash Flow [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2):159-189.
[192]Roberts, B.E. A Dead Senator Tells No Lies:Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits [J]. American Journal of Political Science,1990,34(1):31-58.
[193]Rock, M.T. and Bonnett, H. The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment [J]. World Development,2004,32(6):999-1017.
[194]Rogerson, W.P. The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation:A Game-theroetic Analysis [J]. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1982,13:391-401.
[195]Roodman, D. How to do xtabond2:An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata [J]. Stata Journal,2009,9(1):86-136.
[196]Rose-Ackerman, S. Corruption:A Study of Political Economy [M]. New York: Academic Press,1978.
[197]Rose-Ackerman, S. The Economics of Corruption [J]. Journal of Public Economics,1975,4:187-203.
[198]Rosen, S. Authority, Control and the Distribution of Earnings [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13:311-323.
[199]Ross, S.A. The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing [J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1976,13(3):341-60.
[200]Rumelt, R.P. Diversification Strategy and Profitability [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1982,3(4):359-369.
[201]Sapienza, P. "The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72(2):357-384.
[202]Sappington, D. and Stiglitz, J. Information and Regulation [M]. In Bailey, E. ed., Public Regulation:New Perspective on Institutions and Polices. Cambridge: MIT Press,1987.
[203]Schmidt, P. and Sickles, R.C. Production Frontiers and Panel Data [J]. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,1984,2(4):367-374.
[204]Schoar, A. Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity [J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2379-2403.
[205]Sharpe, W. Capital Asset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk [J]. Journal of Finance,1964,19:425-442.
[206]Sharpe, W. Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets [M]. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1970.
[207]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Corruption [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993,108(3):599-617.
[208]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Politicians and Firms [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4):995-1025.
[209]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and Their Cures [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1998.(中译本,安德烈·施莱弗和罗伯特·维什尼：《掠夺之手——政府病及其治疗》,赵红军译,北京：中信出版社,2004.)
[210]Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations [M]. London:W. Strahan and T. Cadell. Reprinted, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1976.(中译本,[英]亚当·斯密：《国富论》,北京：商务印书馆,1981.)
[211]Stein, J.C. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment [M]. In Constantinides, G.M.; Harris, M. and Stulz, R. eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance:Corporate Finance, Volume 1. Amsterdam:Elsevier,2003.
[212]Stigler, G.J. The Organization of Industry [M]. Irwin:Homewood,1968.
[213]Stigler, G.J. The Theory of Economic Regulation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,2:3-21.
[214]Stiglitz, J.E. Markets, Market Failures, and Development [J]. American Economic Review,1989b,79:197-203.
[215]Stiglitz, J.E. On the Economic Role of the State [M]. in Heertje, A. ed., The Economic Role of the State, Oxford:Blackwell,1989a.
[216]Storey, D.J. Understanding the Small Business Sector [J]. London:Routledge, 1994.
[217]Stulz, R. Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(1):3-27.
[218]Tan, J.J. and Litschert, R.J. Environment-strategy Relationship and Its Performance Implications:An Empirical Atudy of the Chinese Electronics Industry [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1994,15:1-20.
[219]Teece, D.J. Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,1980,1(3):223-247.
[220]Tirole, J. The Theory of Corporate Finance [M], New Jersey:Princeton University Press,2006.
[221]Tobin, J. A General Equilibrium Approach To Monetary Theory [J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1969,1(1):15-29.
[222]Tollision, R.D. and Congleton, R.D.1995, The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking [M]. Aldershot:Edward Elgar Publishing Company.
[223]Tollison, R.D. Rent Seeking [M]. in Mueller, B.C. ed., Perspectives on Public Choice:A Handbook, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press,1997.
[224]Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index [M]. Berlin,1998.
[225]Tsang, E.W.K. Can guanxi Be a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage for Doing Business in China? [J]. Academy of Management Executive,1998,12(2): 64-73.
[226]Tullock, G. Competing for Aid [J]. Public Choice,1975,21:41-52.
[227]Tullock, G. Efficient Rent-seeking [M]. in:Buchanan, J.M.; Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. eds, Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society, College Station: Texas A&M University Press,1980.
[228]Tullock, G. More on the Welfare Cost of Transfers [J]. Kyklos,1974,27: 378-381.
[229]Tullock, G. Rent-seeking [M]. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Company,1994.(中译本,[美]戈登·塔洛克：《寻租——对寻租活动的经济学分析》,李政军译,成都：西南财经出版社,1999.)
[230]Tullock, G. The Cost of Transfers [J]. Kyklos,1971,24:629-643.
[231]Tullock, G. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft [J]. Western Economic Journal,1967,5(3):224-232.
[232]United Nations. Corruption in Government [M]. New York:United Nations, 1989.
[233]Van Biesebroeck, J. Robustness of Productivity Estimates [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics,2007,55(3):529-569.
[234]Variyam, J.N. and Kraybill, D.S. Empirical Evidence on Determinants of Firm Growth [J]. Economics Letters,1992,38,31-36.
[235]Vogt, S.C. The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship:Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firms [J]. Financial Management,1994,23(2):3-20.
[236]Walder, A.G. Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy [J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1995,101:263-301.
[237]Wan, H. and Zhu, K. Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity a Good Measure of Financial Constraints? [J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2011,4(4): 254-270.
[238]Wang, H.-J. and Schmidt, P. One-Step and Two-Step Estimation of the Effects of Exogenous Variables on Technical Efficiency Levels [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,2002,18:129-144.
[239]Wang, H.-J. Heteroscedasticity and Non-Monotonic Efficiency Effects of a Stochastic Frontier Model [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,2002,18(3): 241-253.
[240]Wedeman, A. Development and Corruption:the East Asian Paradox [J]. In Gomez, E.T. ed., Political Business in East Asia. London:Routledge,2002.
[241]Windmeijer, F. A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient Two-step GMM Estimators [J]. Journal of Econometrics,2005,126(1):25-51.
[242]Wooldridge, J.M. Econometrics Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data [M]. Massachusetts:MIT Press,2002.
[243]Wu, W., Wu, C., Zhou, C. and Wu, J. Political Connections, Tax Benefits and Firm Performance:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2012,31(3):277-300.
[244]Wu, W.; Wu, C. and Rui, O.M. Ownership and the Value of Political Connections:Evidence from China [J]. European Financial Management, Article first published online:May 2010.
[245]Xu, H. and Zhou, J. The Value of Political Connections:Chinese Evidence [J]. SSRN Working Paper,2008.
[246]Xu, N.; Xu X. and Yuan, Q. Political Connections, Financing Friction, and Corporate Investment:Evidence from Chinese Listed Family Firms [J]. European Financial Management, Article first published online:May 2011.
[247][英]戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺(主编)：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》(中译本修订版),邓正来主译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2002.《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》(中译本)是Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought 《布莱克维尔政治思想百科全书》和Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political of Institutions《布莱克维尔政治制度百科全书》的合成之作.
[248]白重恩、路江涌和陶志刚.中国私营企业银行贷款的经验研究[J].经济学(季刊),2005,2：605-622.
[249]陈任如和赖煜.高管政治背景与民营企业盈利能力的实证研究[J].南方经济,2010,5：60-68.
[250]陈爽英、井润田、龙小宁和邵云飞.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].管理世界,2010,1：88-97.
[251]陈晓、秦跃红.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界,2003,3：28-33.
[252]陈信元、江峰.事件模拟与非正常收益模型的检验力——基于中国A股市场的经验检验[J].会计研究,2005,7：25-31.
[253]陈钊、陆铭和何俊志.权势与企业家参政议政[J].世界经济,2008,6,39-49.
[254]邓建平、曾勇.政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗[J].中国工业经济,2009,2：98-108.
[255]邓新明.我国民营企业政治关联、多元化战略与公司绩效[J].南开管理评论,2011,4：4-15.
[256]杜兴强、郭剑花和雷宇.政治联系方式与民营企业捐赠：度量方法与经验证据[J].财贸研究,2010,1：89-99.
[257]杜兴强、郭剑花和雷宇.政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩：“政府干预”抑或“关系”?[J].金融研究,2009b,11：158-173.
[258]杜兴强、雷宇和郭剑花.政治联系、政治联系方式与民营上市公司的会计稳健性[J].中国工业经济,2009a,7：87-97.
[259]渡边真理子、柳川范之.商业信用合同的履行概率,其外部性及现金需求——中国案例[J].金融研究,2009,7：25-37.
[260]冯天丽、井润田.制度环境与私营企业家政治联系意愿的实证研究[J].管理世界,2009,8：81-91.
[261]冯延超.中国民营企业政治关联与税收负担关系的研究[J].管理评论,2012,6： 167-176.
[262]高勇强、何晓斌和李路路.民营企业家社会身份、经济条件与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2011,12：111-123.
[263]郭剑花.制度环境、政治联系与政策性负担——基于民营上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2011,7：33-40.
[264]郝项超、张宏亮.政治关联关系、官员背景及其对民营企业银行贷款的影响[J].财贸经济,2011,4：55-61.
[265]胡旭阳、史晋川.民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资——以中国民营企业500强为例[J].中国工业经济,2008,4：5-14.
[266]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006,5：107-113.
[267]黄亚生. “中国模式”到底有多独特?[M].北京：中信出版社,2011.
[268]贾明和张喆.高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗?[J].管理世界,2010,4：99-113.
[269]江雅雯、黄燕和徐雯.政治联系、制度因素与企业的创新活动[J].南方经济,2011,11：3-15.
[270]雷光勇、李书锋和王秀娟.政治关联、审计师选择与公司价值[J].管理世界,2009,7：145-155.
[271]李稻葵.大胆改革,破解民营经济“老三难”[J].新财富,2010,7：40-41.
[272]李捷瑜、江舒韵.市场价值、生产效率与上市公司多元化经营：理论与证据[J].经济学(季刊),2009,3：1047-1064.
[273]李金、李仕明和熊小舟.我国上市公司投资—现金流敏感度实证研究[J].管理学报,2007,6：824-828.
[274]李胜兰、周林杉和汪耿东.我国民营企业产权法律保护实证研究：以广东民营企业产权纠纷案件为例[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2010.
[275]李维安、邱艾超和古志辉.双重公司治理环境、政治联系偏好与公司绩效——基于中国民营上市公司治理转型的研究[J].中国工业经济,2010,6：85-95.
[276]李新春、张书军.家族企业：组织、行为与中国经济[M].上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2005.
[277]李悦、熊德华、张峥和刘力.中国上市公司如何制定投资决策[J].世界经济,2009,2：66-76.
[278]李志赟.银行结构与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2002,6：38-45.
[279]连玉君、程建.投资—现金流敏感性：融资约束还是代理成本?[J].财经研究,2007,2：37-46.
[280]梁建、陈爽英和盖庆恩.民营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠[J].管理世界,2010,7：109-118.
[281]梁莱歆、冯延超.民营企业政治关联、雇员规模与薪酬成本[J].中国工业经济,2010,10：127-137.
[282]梁莱歆、冯延超.政治关联与企业过度投资——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2010,12：56-62.
[283]廖冠民.政府干预、社会性负担与上市公司高管更换[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.
[284]廖理、沈红波和郦金梁.股权分置改革与上市公司治理的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008,5,99-108.
[285]林毅夫、李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2001,1,10-18.
[286]刘慧龙、张敏、王亚平和吴联生.政治关联、薪酬激励与员工配置效率[J].经济研究,2010,9：109-121.
[287]刘伟.政府不能屡犯"pick winners"的错误[M].收录于单忠东主编：未名湖畔看民营经济,北京：经济科学出版社,2009.
[288]陆铭、潘慧.政企纽带——民营企业家成长与企业发展[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2009.
[289]罗党论、黄琼宇.民营企业的政治关系与企业价值[J].管理科学,2008,6：21-28.
[290]罗党论、刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,5：97-106.
[291]罗党论、唐清泉.中国民营上市公司制度环境与绩效问题研究[J].经济研究,2009a,2：106-118.
[292]罗党论、唐清泉.政治关系、社会资本与政策资源获取：来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].世界经济,2009b,7：84-96.
[293]罗党论、甄丽明.民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2008,12：164-178.
[294]马连福、赵颖.国外非财务信息披露研究评述[J].当代财经,2007,7,123-129.
[295]潘红波、夏新平和余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,4：41-52.
[296]潘越、戴亦一和李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助——来自中国ST公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,5：6-17.
[297]平新乔、李自然.上市公司再融资资格的确定与虚假信息披露[J].经济研究,2003,2：55-63.
[298]钱颖一.克鲁格模型与寻租理论[J].经济社会体制比较,1988,5：17-18.
[299]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[300]邵敏、包群.政府补贴与企业生产率-—基于我国工业企业的经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2012,7：70-82.
[301]石晓乐和许年行.公司财务与政治关联研究进展[J].经济学动态,2009,11：104-109.
[302]孙铮、刘凤委和李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,5：52-63.
[303]谭松涛、江萍、李涛和詹毅强.政治关联、外部融资约束与企业投资：基于地级市政府换届数据的研究[R].第十一届中国青年经济学者论坛,2011.
[304]田志龙、高勇强和卫武.中国企业政治策略与行为研究[J].管理世界,2003,12：98-106.
[305]汪伟、史晋川.进入壁垒与民营企业的成长——吉利集团案例研究[J].管理世界,2005,4：132-140.
[306]王庆文和吴世农.政治关系对公司业绩的影响——基于中国上市公司政治影响力指数的研究[R].中国第七届实证会计国际研讨会,2008.
[307]王一江.国家与经济[J].比较,2005,18：1-26.
[308]王永进.政治关联与企业契约实施环境的所有制差异[R].中国经济学学术资源网工作论文,2010.
[309]王志强、陈培昆.深市买卖价差逆向选择成分的估算与分析[J].证券市场导报,2006,3：65-70.
[310]卫武、田志龙和刘晶.我国企业经营活动中的政治关联性研究[J].中国工业经济,2004,4：67-75.
[311]邬爱其、金宝敏.个人地位、企业发展、社会责任与制度风险：中国民营企业家政治参与动机的研究[J].中国工业经济,2008,7：141-150.
[312]巫景飞、何大军、林炜和王云.高层管理者政治网络与企业多元化战略：社会资本视角——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,8：107-118.
[313]吴敬琏、马国川.重启改革议程：中国经济改革二十讲[M].北京：三联书店,2013.
[314]吴军、白云霞.我国银行制度的变迁与国有企业预算约束的硬化——来自1999-2007年国有上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2009,10：179-192.
[315]吴文锋、吴冲锋和刘晓薇.中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值[J].经济研究,2008,7：130-141.
[316]吴文锋、吴冲锋和芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009,3：134-142.
[317]吴晓波.大败局Ⅱ[M].杭州：浙江人民出版社,2007.
[318]徐莉萍、辛宇和陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,1：90-100.
[319]徐龙炳、李科.政治关系如何影响公司价值：融资约束与行业竞争的证据[J].财经研究,2010,10：60-69.
[320]杨其静、杨继东.政治联系、市场力量与工资差异——基于政府补贴的视角[J].中国人民大学学报,2010,2：69-77.
[321]杨其静.企业成长：政治关联还是能力建设?[J].经济研究,2011,10：54-66.
[322]杨其静.政治关联与企业成长[J].教学与研究,2010,6：38-43.
[323]于蔚、钱彦敏.转型经济中宏观冲击与公司融资决策——基于资本结构动态调整框架的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2011,10：24-30.
[324]于蔚、汪淼军和金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束：信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012a,9：125-139.
[325]于蔚、金祥荣和钱彦敏.宏观冲击、融资约束与公司资本结构动态调整[J].世界经济,2012b,3：24-47.
[326]余明桂、回雅甫和潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010,3：65-77.
[327]余明桂、潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008,8：9-21.
[328]袁敏著.资信评级的功能检验与质量控制研究[M].上海：立信会计出版社,2007.
[329]张纯、吕伟.信息环境、融资约束与现金股利[J].金融研究,2009,7：81-94.
[330]张建君、张志学.中国民营企业家的政治战略[J].管理世界,2005,7：94-105.
[331]张敏、张胜、王成方和申慧慧.政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010,11：143-153.
[332]张维迎.企业寻求政府支持的收益、成本分析[J].新西部,2001,8：55-56.
[333]张文魁.国企需要新一轮改革[J].中国经济报告,2013,1：50-53.
[334]张祥建、农卫东.中国民营企业政治关联的成本、收益与社会效率[J].天津社会科学,2011,3：67-71.
[335]张学勇、廖理.股权分置改革、自愿性信息披露与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,4：28-39.
[336]郑京海、胡鞍钢和Arne Bigsten.中国的经济增长能否持续?——一个生产率视角[J].经济学(季刊),2008,3：777-808.
[337]钟宏武、张旺和张蒽.中国上市公司非财务信息披露报告(2011)[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2011.
[338]周其仁.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”[J].经济研究,1997,5：31-42.
[339]周其仁.可惜了,科龙[N],经济观察报,2005年8月8日.
②State Sector,包括国有经济和国家党政机构,参见吴敬琏和马国川(2013)。
①参见《坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进为全面建成小康社会而奋斗——在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告》,人民出版社,2012年。
①亚当·斯密：《国富论》,商务印书馆1981年版。
①引自中译本：詹姆士·布坎南,《寻求租金和寻求利润》,载于《经济社会体制比较》1988年第6期。
②安德烈·施莱弗和罗伯特·维什尼：《掠夺之手——政府病及其治疗》,赵红军译,北京：中信出版社,2004,前勒口。
③参见全国工商联于2012年8月发布的《中国民营企业500强调研分析报告》。
②参见2009年9月25日《钱江晚报》。
①参见周其仁(2005)。
②原广东科龙集团董事长潘宁语,参见周其仁(2005)。
[1]Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Kermani, A.; Kwak, J. and Mitton, T. The Value of Political Connections in the United States [R]. Working Paper,2010.
[2]Adhikari, A.; Derashid, C. and Zhang, H. Public Policy, Political Connections, and Effective Tax Rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2006,25(5):574-595.
[3]Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C.R. Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role? [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,2001,44(1):179-198.
[4]Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C.R. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31(3):377-397.
[5]Aidt, T.S. Economic Analysis of Corruption:A Survey [J]. Economic Journal, 2003,113(491):632-652.
[6]Aigner, D.; Lovell, C.A.K. and Schmidt, P. Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models [J]. Journal of Econometrics, 1977,6(1):21-37.
[7]Aivazian, V.A.; Ge, Y. and Qiu, J. Can Corporatization Improve the Performance of State-owned Enterprises Even without Privatization? [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11(5):791-808.
[8]Allen, F.; Qian, J. and Qian, M. Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[9]Almeida, H.; Campello, M. and Weisbach, M.S. The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash [J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[10]Alti, A. How Sensitive Is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing Is Frictionless? [J]. Journal of Finance,2003,58(2):707-722.
[11]Amihud, Y. Illiquidity and Stock Returns:Cross-section and Time-series Effects [J]. Journal of Financial Markets,2002,5(1):31-56.
[12]Amihud, Y; Mendelson, H. and Lauterbach, B. Market Microstructure and Securities Values:Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997,45(3):365-390.
[13]Anderson, T. and Hsiao, C. Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components [J]. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1981,76:598-606.
[14]Andvig, J.C. The Economics of Corruption:A Survey [J]. Studi Economici,1991, 43:57-94.
[15]Arellano, M. and Bond, S. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte-Carlo Evidence and An Application to Employment Equations [J]. Review of Economic Studies,1991,38:277-297.
[16]Arellano, M. and Bover, O. Another Look at Instrumental-variable Estimation of Error-components Models [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1995,68:29-52.
[17]Arellano, M. Panel Data Econometrics [M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2003.
[18]Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1985,67(4):648-660.
[19]Atkinson, A.B. and Stiglitz, J.E. Lectures on Public Economics [M]. London: McGraw-Hill,1980.
[20]Bai, C.; Lu, J. and Tao, Z. Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans [J]. Economics of Transition,2006,14(4):611-628.
[21]Bain, J.S. Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge [M]. MA:Harvard University Press,1956.
[22]Banfield, E. Corruption as a Feature of Government Organization [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1975,17:587-605.
[23]Battese, GE. and Coelli, T.J. A model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in A Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data [J]. Empirical Economics,1995,20:325-332.
[24]Battese, GE. and Coelli, T.J. Frontier Production Functions, Technical Efficiency and Panel Data:With Application to Paddy Farmers in India [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,1992,3:153-169.
[25]Baum, R.J.; Locke, E.A. and Smith, K.G A Multidimensional Model of Venture Growth [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2001,44:292-303.
[26]Baumol, W.J. Entrepreneurship:Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive [J] Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(5):893-921.
[27]Beck, P.J. and Maher, M.W. A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets [J]. Economics Letters,1986,20(1):1-5.
[28]Beck, T. and Levine, R. Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth:Panel Evidence [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2004,28(3):423-442.
[29]Becker, GS. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Group for Political Influence [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,98(3):371-400.
[30]Becker, G.S. and Stigler, GJ. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers [J]. Journal of Legal Studies,1974,3:1-19.
[31]Bertrand, M.; Kramaraz, F.; Schoar, A. and Thesmar, D. Politicians, Firms and the Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France [R]. Working Paper, University of Chicago,2007.
[32]Besley, T. and Burgess, R. Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119(1):91-134.
[33]Bhagwati, J.N. Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1982,90(5):988-1002.
[34]Bharath, S.T.; Pasquariello, P. and Wu, G Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions? [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8): 3211-3243.
[35]Binder, J.J. On the Use of the Multivariate Regression Model in Event Studies [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1985,23(1):370-383.
[36]Blundell, R. and Bond, S. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:115-143.
[37]Boisot, M. and Child, J. From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,41(4):600-628.
[38]Bond, S. and Meghir, C. Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's Financial Policy [J]. Review of Economic Studies,1994,61(2):197-222.
[39]Bond, S. Dynamic Panel Data Models:A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice [J]. Portuguese Economic Journal,2002,1(2):141-162.
[40]Bottasso, A. and Sembenelli, A. Market Power, Productivity and the EU Single Market Program:Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms [J]. European Economic Review,2001,45(1):167-186.
[41]Boubakri, N.; Cosset, J. and Saffar, W. Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008,14(5):654-673.
[42]Boubakri, N.; Cosset, J. and Saffar, W. Politically Connected Firms:An International Event Study [R]. SSRN Working Paper,2009.
[43]Boubakri, N.; Guedhami, O.; Mishra, D.R. and Saffar, W. Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital [R]. SSRN Working Paper,2010.
[44]Boycko, M.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. An Theory of Privatization [J]. Economic Journal,1996,106:309-319.
[45]Brainard, W.C. and Tobin, J. Pitfalls in Financial Model Building [J]. American Economic Review,1968,58(2):99-122.
[46]Brennan, M. and Subrahmanyam, A. Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,41:441-464.
[47]Broadbent, J.P. Social Capital and Labor Politics in Japan:Cooperation or Cooptation? [J]. Policy Sciences,2000,33(3):307-321.
[48]Broadman, H.G. Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry [R]. World Bank Working Paper,2000.
[49]Brown, S. and Warner, J. Measuring Security Price Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1980,8:205-258.
[50]Brown, S. and Warner, J. Using Daily Stock Returns:The Case of Event Studies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1985,14:3-31.
[51]Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. The Calculus of Consent:The Logical Foundation of Constitutional Democracy [M]. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,1962.(中译本,[美]詹姆斯·布坎南和戈登·塔洛克：《同意的计算：立宪民主的逻辑基础》,陈光金译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,2000.)
[52]Buchanan, J.M. Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking [M]. in:Buchanan, J.M.; Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. eds, Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society, College Station:Texas A&M University Press,1980.(中译本,[美]詹姆斯·布坎南,《寻求租金和寻求利润》,载于《经济社会体制比较》1988年第6期.)
[53]Bunkanwanicha, P. and Wiwattanakantang, Y. Big Business Owners in Politics [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2133-2168.
[54]Business International Corporation. Introduction to the Country Assessment Service [M]. New York:Business International Corporation,1984.
[55]Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. Microeconometrics Using Stata[M]. Texax: Stata Press,2009.
[56]Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2005.
[57]Carhart, M. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997,52:57-82.
[58]Carkovic, M. and Levine, R. Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth? [M]. in Moran, T.H.; Graham, E.M. and Blomstrom, M. eds., Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics and Center for Global Development,2005.
[59]Caudill, S.B. and Ford, J.M. Biases in Frontier Estimation Due to Heteroskedasticity [J]. Economics Letters,1993,41:17-20.
[60]Chaney, P.K.; Faccio, M.and Parsley, D. The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011, 51(1-2):58-76.
[61]Chang, E.C. and Wong, S.M.L. Political Control and Performance in China's Listed Firms [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32(4):617-636.
[62]Charumilind, C.; Kali, R. and Wiwattanakantang, Y. Connected Lending: Thailand before the Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Business,2006,79(1): 181-218.
[63]Che, J. and Qian, Y. Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance:Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1998,14(1):1-23.
[64]Che, J. and Qian, Y. Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance:Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1998,14(1):1-23.
[65]Chen, S.; Sun, Z.; Tang, S. and Wu, D. Government Intervention and Investment Efficiency:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2): 259-271.
[66]Cheung, Y.-L.; Rau, P.R. and Stouraitis, A. Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms [J]. Review of Finance,2010,14(4):669-694.
[67]Chirinko, R.S. Business Fixed Investment Spending:Modeling Strategies, Empirical Results, and Policy Implications [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1993,31(4):1875-1911.
[68]Claessens, S. and Tzioumis, K. Measuring Finns'Access to Finance [R]. World Bank Working Paper,2006.
[69]Claessens, S.; Feijen, E. and Laeven, L. Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):554-580.
[70]Cleary, S. The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):673-692.
[71]Coase, R.H. The Nature of the Firm [J]. Economica,1937,4(16):386-405.
[72]Coase, R.H. The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1960,3:1-44.
[73]Colander, D. ed., Neoclassical Political Economy——The Analysis of Rent-seeking and DUP Activities [M].1984.
[74]Cull, R. and Xu, L.C. Institutions, Ownership, and Finance:The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment among Chinese Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005,77(1):117-146.
[75]Cummins, J.C.; Hassett, K.A. and Oliner, S.D. Investment Behavior, Observable Expectations, and Internal Funds [J]. American Economic Review,2006,96(3): 796-810.
[76]Davidsson, P. and Wiklund, J. Conceptual and Empirical Challenges in the Study of Firm Growth [M]. In: Sexton, D. and Landstrom, H. eds. The Blackwell Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Oxford:Blackwell,2000,.
[77]Delmar, F.; Davidsson, P. and Gartner, W. Arriving at the High-growth Firm [J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2003,18,189-216.
[78]Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. Law, Finance, and Firm Growth [J]. Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):2107-2137.
[79]Demsetz, H.. Barriers to Entry [J]. American Economic Review,1982,72: 47-57.
[80]Dey, K. and Ray, P. VRS and Its Effect on Productivity and Profitability of a Firm [J]. Indian Journal of Industrial Relations,2003,39(1):33-57.
[81]Dinc, I.S. Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in Emerging Markets [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 77(2): 453-479.
[82]Domar, E.D.; Eddie, S.M.; Herrick, B.H.; Hohenberg, P.M.; Intriligator, M.D.and Miyamoto, I. Economic Growth and Productivity in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan in the Post-War Period [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1964, 46(1): 33-40.
[83]Dombrovsky, V. Campaign Contributions and Firm Performance: The "Latvian Way" [R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2010.
[84]Dombrovsky, V. Do Political Connections Matter? Firm-Level Evidence from Latvia [R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2011.
[85]Easley, D.; Kiefer, N.M. and O'Hara, M. Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing? The Curious Role of Purchased Order Flow [J]. Journal of Finance, 1996,51(3): 811-833.
[86]Eckbo, B.E.; Maksimovic, V. and Williams, J. Consistent Estimation of Cross-Sectional Models in Event Studies [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1990, 3(3): 343-365.
[87]Epstein, E. The Corporation in American Politics [M]. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
[88]Erickson, T. and Whited, T.M. Measurement Error and the Relationship Between Investment and q [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 108,1027-1057.
[89]Evans, D.S. Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1987, 95(4): 657-674.
[90]Faccio, M. and Parsley, D.C. Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2009, 44(03): 683-718.
[91]Faccio, M. Politically Connected Firms [J]. American Economic Review, 2006, 96(1): 369-386.
[92]Faccio, M. The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms [R]. Working Paper, Purdue University, 2007.
[93]Faccio, M.; Masulis, R.W. and McConnell, J.J. Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts [J]. Journal of Finance, 2006, 61(6): 2597-2635.
[94]Fama, E. and French, K. Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1993, 33: 3-56.
[95]Fama,E.F.;Fisher, L.; Jensen, M.C. and Roll, R. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information [J]. International Economic Review,1969,10(1): 1-21.
[96]Fan, J.P.H.; Rui, O.M. and Zhao, M. Public Governance and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008, 36(3): 343-364.
[97]Fan, J.P.H.; Wong, T.J. and Zhang, T. Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2007, 84(2): 330-357.
[98]Fazzari, S.; Hubbard, G., Petersen, B. Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment [J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988, 1, 141-195.
[99]Ferguson, T. and Voth, H.-J. Betting on Hitler—— the Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008, 123(1): 101-137.
[100]Firth, M.; Fung, P. and Rui, O.M. Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2006, 43(6): 1289-1330.
[101]Firth, M.; Lin, C; Liu, P. and Wong, S.M.L. Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit Allocation in China's Private Sector [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2009, 33(6): 1144-1155.
[102]Fisman, D.; Fisman, R.; Galef, J. and Khurana, R. Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney [R]. Working Paper, 2006.
[103]Fisman, R. and Svensson, J. Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm Level Evidence [J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 83(1): 63-75.
[104]Fisman, R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections [J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91(4): 1095-1102.
[105]Francis, B.B.; Hasan, I. and Sun, X. Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China [J]. Journal of International Money and Finance, 2009, 28(4): 696-719.
[106]Fraumeni, B.M. and Jorgenson, D.W. Rates of Return by Industrial Sector in the United States, 1948-76 [J]. American Economic Review, 1980, 70(2): 326-330.
[107]Frye, T. and Shleifer, A. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand [J]. American Economic Review, 1997, 87(2): 354-358.
[108]George, T.; Kaul, G and Nimalendran, M. Estimation of the Bid-Ask Spread and its Components: A New Approach [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1991, 4(4): 623-656.623-656.
[109]Gilbert, B.A.; McDougall, P.P. and Audretsch, D.B. New Venture Growth:A Review and Extension [J]. Journal of Management,2006,32:926-950.
[110]Goldman, E.; Rocholl, J.and So, J. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(6):2331-2360.
[111]Goldman, E.; So, J. and Rocholl, J. Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts [R]. SSRN Working Paper,2008.
[112]Gould, D.J. and Amaro-Reyes, J.A. The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance [R]. World Bank Staff Working Paper no.580, Washington, D.C.: World Bank,1983.
[113]Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. Outsourcing in a Global Economy [J]. Review of Economic Studies,2005,72(1):135-159.
[114]Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. Special Interest Politics [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,2001.(中译本,[美]格罗斯曼、[以]赫尔普曼：《特殊利益政治学》,朱保华等译,上海：上海财经大学出版社,2009.)
[115]Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D. The Cost and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94: 691-719.
[116]Harberger, A.C. Monopoly and Resource Allocation [J]. American Economic Review,1954,44:77-87.
[117]Harberger, A.C. Using the Resources at Hand More Effectively [J]. American Economic Review,1959,49:136-146.
[118]Hasbrouck, J. Empirical Market Microstructure:The Institutions, Economics and Econometrics of Securities Trading [M]. New York:Oxford University Press,2007.
[119]Hayashi, F. Econometrics [M]. NJ Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.
[120]Hayashi, F. Tobin's Marginal q and Average q:A Neoclassical Interpretation [J]. Econometrica,1982,50(1):213-224.
[121]Hillman, A.L. and Katez, E. Risk-averse Rent-seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power [J]. Economic Journal,1984,94:104-110.
[122]Hitt, L.M. and Brynjolfsson, E. Productivity, Business Profitability, and Consumer Surplus:Three Different Measures of Information Technology Value [J]. MIS Quarterly,1996,20(2):121-142.
123] Houston, J.F.; Jiang, L.; Lin, C. and Ma, Y. Political Connections and the Cost of Borrowing [R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2011.
[124]Hoy, F.; McDougall, P.P. and Dsouza, D.E. Strategies and environments of high growth firms [J]. In: Sexton, D.L. and Kasarda, J.D. eds., The State of the Art of Entrepreneurship. Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing, 1992.
[125]Huang, Y. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[126]Huang, Y. Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. (中译本,[美]黄亚生：《改革时期的外国直接投资》,钱勇和王润亮译,北京：新星出版社,2005.)
[127]Hubbard, R.G Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1998, 36, 193-225.
[128]Huntington, S.P. Political Order in Changing Societies [M]. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
[129]Huselid, M.A. The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices on Turnover, Productivity, and Corporate Financial Performance [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1995, 38(3): 635-672.
[130]Jain, A.K. Corruption: A Review [J]. Journal of Economic Surveys, 2001, 15(1): 71-121.
[131]Jayachandran, S. The Jeffords Effect [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 2006, 49(2): 397-425.
[132]Jensen, M.C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers [J]. American Economic Review, 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[133]Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3:305-360.
[134]Johnson, S. and Mitton, T. Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 67(2): 351-382.
[135]Kaplan, S. and Zingales, L. Do Financing Constraints Explain Why Investment is Correlated with Cash Flow? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112, 169-216.
[136]Khwaja, A.I. and Mian, A. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005,120(4):1371-1411.
[137]Kim, C.; Mauer, D. and Sherman, A. The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1998, 33:335-359.
[138]Kim, J.-S. and Frees, E.W. Fixed Effects Estimation in Multilevel Models [R]. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin,2005.
[139]Klitgaard, R. Controlling Corruption [M]. Berkely:University of California Press,1988.
[140]Klitgaard, R. Gifts and Bribes [M]. in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy of Choice. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,1991.
[141]Knight, B. Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2006,90(4-5):751-773.
[142]Kothari, S. and Warner, J. Measuring Long-horizon Security Price Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997,43:301-339.
[143]Kothari, S. and Warner, J., The Econometrics of Event Studies [M]. In:Eckbo, B.E. ed., Handbook of Corporate Finance:Empirical Corporate Finance, Volume 1 (Chapter 1), North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,2007.
[144]Krueger, A.O. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society [J]. American Economic Review,1974,64(3):291-303.
[145]Kumbhakar, S.C. and Lovell, C.A.K. Stochastic Frontier Analysis [M]. Cambridge, Mass:Cambridge University Press,2000.
[146]Kumbhakar, S.C. Production Frontiers, Panel Data, and Time-varying Technical Inefficiency [J]. Journal of Econometrics,1990,46:201-211.
[147]Lambsdorff, J.G. How Corruption Affects Productivity [J]. Kyklos,2003,56(4): 457-474.
[148]Lang, L.; Ofek, E. and Stulz, R. Leverage, Investment, and Firm Growth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(1):3-29.
[149]Lee, Y.H. and Schmidt, P. A Production Frontier Model with Flexible Temporal Variation in Technical Inefficiency [M]. in Fried, H.O.; Lovell, C.A.K. and Schmidt, S.S. eds, The Measurement of Productive Efficiency:Techniques and Application, New York:Oxford University Press,1993.
[150]Leff, N. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption [J]. American Behavioral Scientist,1964,8:8-14.
[151]Leibenstein, H. Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency"[J]. American Economic Review,1966,56(3):392-415.
[152]Leuz, C. and Oberholzer-Gee, F. Political Relationships, Global Financing, and Corporate Transparency:Evidence from Indonesia [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(2):411-439.
[153]Li, H.; Meng, L. and Zhang, J. Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China [J]. Economic Inquiry,2006,44(3):559-578.
[154]Li, H.; Meng, L.; Wang, Q. and Zhou, L.-A. Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms [J]. Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(2):283-299.
[155]Liao, G.; Chen, X.; Jing, X. and Sun, J.. Policy Burdens, Firm Performance, and Management Turnover [J]. China Economic Review,2009,20:15-28.
[156]Lin, J.; Cai, F. and Li, Z. Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-owned Enterprise Reform [J]. American Economic Review,1998,88:422-427.
[157]Lintner, J. The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1965,47:13-37.
[158]Lu, Y. Political Connections and Trade Expansion [J]. Economics of Transition, 2011,19(2):231-254.
[159]Lui, F.T. An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(4):760-781.
[160]Lyon, J.; Barber, B. and Tsai, C. Improved Methods of Tests of Long-horizon Abnormal Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:165-201.
[161]MacKinlay, A.C. Event Studies in Economics and Finance [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1997,35(1):13-39.
[162]Magee, S.P.; Brock, W.A. and Young, L. Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Cambridge University Press,1989.
[163]Mann, M.H. Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries,1950-1960 [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1966,48: 296-307.
[164]Mauro, P. Corruption and Growth [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995, 110:681-712.
[165]Meeusen, W. and van Den Broeck, J. Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas Production Functions with Composed Error [J]. International Economic Review, 1977,18(2):435-444.
[166]Meon, P.-G. and Sekkat, K. Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth? [J]. Public Choice,2005,122(1-2):69-97.
[167]Mobarak A.M. and Purbasari, D.P. Corrupt Protection for Sale to Firms: Evidence from Indonesia [R]. Working Paper,2006.
[168]Morck, R.; Wolfenzon, D. and Yeung, B. Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2005,43(3): 655-720.
[169]Mueller, D.C. Public Choice II [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Cambridge University Press,1989. (中译本,[美]丹尼斯·缪勒：《公共选择理论(第二版)》,杨春学等译,北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999.)
[170]Murphy, K.M.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991,106(2): 503-530.
[171]Murphy, K.M.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? [J]. American Economic Review,1993,83(2):409-414.
[172]Musgrave, R.A. The Theory of Public Finance [M]. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1959.
[173]Myers, S.C. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5:147-175.
[174]Nickell, S. Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects [J]. Econometrica, 1981,49:1417-1426.
[175]Nitzan, S. Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests [J]. European Journal of Political Economy,1994,10(1):41-60.
[176]North, D.C. Structure and Change in Economic History [M]. New York:Norton,1981.(中译本,[美]道格拉斯·诺思：《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994.)
[177]Olson, M.J. The Logic of Collective Action [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard Univeristy Press,1965.(中译本,[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森：《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁、郭宇峰、李崇新译,上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995.)
[178]Olson, M.J. The Rise and Decline of Nations [M]. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,1982. (中译本,[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森：《国家的兴衰》,李增刚译,上海：上海人民出版社,2007.)
[179]Opler, T.; Pinkowitz, L.; Stulz, R. and Williamson, R. The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999,52:3-46.
[180]Palepu, K. Diversification Strategy, Profit Performance and the Entropy Measure [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1985,6(3):239-255.
[181]Pastor, L. and Stambaugh, R.F. Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(3):642-685.
[182]Peltzman, S. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1976,19:211-240.
[183]Peng, M.W. and Luo, Y. Managerial Ties and Firm Performance in a Transition Economy:The Nature of a Micro-Macro Link [R]. Working Paper,1998.
[184]Peng, M.W.; Sun, S.L.; Pinkham, B. and Chen, H. The Institution-based View as a Third Leg for a Strategy Tripod [J]. Academy of Management Perspectives, 2009,23(3):63-81.
[185]Peng, M.W.; Wang, D.Y.L. and Jiang, Y. An Institution-based View of International Business Strategy:A focus on Emerging Economies [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2008,39(5):920-936.
[186]Posner, R.A. The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1975,83:807-827.
[187]Pralahad, C.K. and Hamel, G. Core Competence of the Corporation [J]. Harvard Business Review,1990,3:79-91.
[188]Pushner, G.M. Equity ownership structure, leverage, and productivity:Empirical evidence from Japan [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,1995,3(2-3):241-255.
[189]Rajan, R.G and Zingales, L. Financial Dependence and Growth [J]. American Economic Review,1998,88(3):559-586.
[190]Ramalho, R. The Effects of an Anti-corruption Campaign:Evidence from the 1992 Presidential Impeachment in Brazil [R]. Working Paper, MIT, Cambridge, MA.,2004.
[191]Richardson, S. Over-investment of Free Cash Flow [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2):159-189.
[192]Roberts, B.E. A Dead Senator Tells No Lies:Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits [J]. American Journal of Political Science,1990,34(1):31-58.
[193]Rock, M.T. and Bonnett, H. The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment [J]. World Development,2004,32(6):999-1017.
[194]Rogerson, W.P. The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation:A Game-theroetic Analysis [J]. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1982,13:391-401.
[195]Roodman, D. How to do xtabond2:An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata [J]. Stata Journal,2009,9(1):86-136.
[196]Rose-Ackerman, S. Corruption:A Study of Political Economy [M]. New York: Academic Press,1978.
[197]Rose-Ackerman, S. The Economics of Corruption [J]. Journal of Public Economics,1975,4:187-203.
[198]Rosen, S. Authority, Control and the Distribution of Earnings [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13:311-323.
[199]Ross, S.A. The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing [J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1976,13(3):341-60.
[200]Rumelt, R.P. Diversification Strategy and Profitability [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1982,3(4):359-369.
[201]Sapienza, P. "The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72(2):357-384.
[202]Sappington, D. and Stiglitz, J. Information and Regulation [M]. In Bailey, E. ed., Public Regulation:New Perspective on Institutions and Polices. Cambridge: MIT Press,1987.
[203]Schmidt, P. and Sickles, R.C. Production Frontiers and Panel Data [J]. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,1984,2(4):367-374.
[204]Schoar, A. Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity [J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2379-2403.
[205]Sharpe, W. Capital Asset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk [J]. Journal of Finance,1964,19:425-442.
[206]Sharpe, W. Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets [M]. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1970.
[207]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Corruption [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993,108(3):599-617.
[208]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Politicians and Firms [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4):995-1025.
[209]Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and Their Cures [M]. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1998.(中译本,安德烈·施莱弗和罗伯特·维什尼：《掠夺之手——政府病及其治疗》,赵红军译,北京：中信出版社,2004.)
[210]Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations [M]. London:W. Strahan and T. Cadell. Reprinted, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1976.(中译本,[英]亚当·斯密：《国富论》,北京：商务印书馆,1981.)
[211]Stein, J.C. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment [M]. In Constantinides, G.M.; Harris, M. and Stulz, R. eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance:Corporate Finance, Volume 1. Amsterdam:Elsevier,2003.
[212]Stigler, G.J. The Organization of Industry [M]. Irwin:Homewood,1968.
[213]Stigler, G.J. The Theory of Economic Regulation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,2:3-21.
[214]Stiglitz, J.E. Markets, Market Failures, and Development [J]. American Economic Review,1989b,79:197-203.
[215]Stiglitz, J.E. On the Economic Role of the State [M]. in Heertje, A. ed., The Economic Role of the State, Oxford:Blackwell,1989a.
[216]Storey, D.J. Understanding the Small Business Sector [J]. London:Routledge, 1994.
[217]Stulz, R. Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(1):3-27.
[218]Tan, J.J. and Litschert, R.J. Environment-strategy Relationship and Its Performance Implications:An Empirical Atudy of the Chinese Electronics Industry [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1994,15:1-20.
[219]Teece, D.J. Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,1980,1(3):223-247.
[220]Tirole, J. The Theory of Corporate Finance [M], New Jersey:Princeton University Press,2006.
[221]Tobin, J. A General Equilibrium Approach To Monetary Theory [J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1969,1(1):15-29.
[222]Tollision, R.D. and Congleton, R.D.1995, The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking [M]. Aldershot:Edward Elgar Publishing Company.
[223]Tollison, R.D. Rent Seeking [M]. in Mueller, B.C. ed., Perspectives on Public Choice:A Handbook, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press,1997.
[224]Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index [M]. Berlin,1998.
[225]Tsang, E.W.K. Can guanxi Be a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage for Doing Business in China? [J]. Academy of Management Executive,1998,12(2): 64-73.
[226]Tullock, G. Competing for Aid [J]. Public Choice,1975,21:41-52.
[227]Tullock, G. Efficient Rent-seeking [M]. in:Buchanan, J.M.; Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. eds, Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society, College Station: Texas A&M University Press,1980.
[228]Tullock, G. More on the Welfare Cost of Transfers [J]. Kyklos,1974,27: 378-381.
[229]Tullock, G. Rent-seeking [M]. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Company,1994.(中译本,[美]戈登·塔洛克：《寻租——对寻租活动的经济学分析》,李政军译,成都：西南财经出版社,1999.)
[230]Tullock, G. The Cost of Transfers [J]. Kyklos,1971,24:629-643.
[231]Tullock, G. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft [J]. Western Economic Journal,1967,5(3):224-232.
[232]United Nations. Corruption in Government [M]. New York:United Nations, 1989.
[233]Van Biesebroeck, J. Robustness of Productivity Estimates [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics,2007,55(3):529-569.
[234]Variyam, J.N. and Kraybill, D.S. Empirical Evidence on Determinants of Firm Growth [J]. Economics Letters,1992,38,31-36.
[235]Vogt, S.C. The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship:Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firms [J]. Financial Management,1994,23(2):3-20.
[236]Walder, A.G. Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy [J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1995,101:263-301.
[237]Wan, H. and Zhu, K. Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity a Good Measure of Financial Constraints? [J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2011,4(4): 254-270.
[238]Wang, H.-J. and Schmidt, P. One-Step and Two-Step Estimation of the Effects of Exogenous Variables on Technical Efficiency Levels [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,2002,18:129-144.
[239]Wang, H.-J. Heteroscedasticity and Non-Monotonic Efficiency Effects of a Stochastic Frontier Model [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,2002,18(3): 241-253.
[240]Wedeman, A. Development and Corruption:the East Asian Paradox [J]. In Gomez, E.T. ed., Political Business in East Asia. London:Routledge,2002.
[241]Windmeijer, F. A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient Two-step GMM Estimators [J]. Journal of Econometrics,2005,126(1):25-51.
[242]Wooldridge, J.M. Econometrics Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data [M]. Massachusetts:MIT Press,2002.
[243]Wu, W., Wu, C., Zhou, C. and Wu, J. Political Connections, Tax Benefits and Firm Performance:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2012,31(3):277-300.
[244]Wu, W.; Wu, C. and Rui, O.M. Ownership and the Value of Political Connections:Evidence from China [J]. European Financial Management, Article first published online:May 2010.
[245]Xu, H. and Zhou, J. The Value of Political Connections:Chinese Evidence [J]. SSRN Working Paper,2008.
[246]Xu, N.; Xu X. and Yuan, Q. Political Connections, Financing Friction, and Corporate Investment:Evidence from Chinese Listed Family Firms [J]. European Financial Management, Article first published online:May 2011.
[247][英]戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺(主编)：《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》(中译本修订版),邓正来主译,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2002.《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》(中译本)是Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought 《布莱克维尔政治思想百科全书》和Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political of Institutions《布莱克维尔政治制度百科全书》的合成之作.
[248]白重恩、路江涌和陶志刚.中国私营企业银行贷款的经验研究[J].经济学(季刊),2005,2：605-622.
[249]陈任如和赖煜.高管政治背景与民营企业盈利能力的实证研究[J].南方经济,2010,5：60-68.
[250]陈爽英、井润田、龙小宁和邵云飞.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].管理世界,2010,1：88-97.
[251]陈晓、秦跃红.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界,2003,3：28-33.
[252]陈信元、江峰.事件模拟与非正常收益模型的检验力——基于中国A股市场的经验检验[J].会计研究,2005,7：25-31.
[253]陈钊、陆铭和何俊志.权势与企业家参政议政[J].世界经济,2008,6,39-49.
[254]邓建平、曾勇.政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗[J].中国工业经济,2009,2：98-108.
[255]邓新明.我国民营企业政治关联、多元化战略与公司绩效[J].南开管理评论,2011,4：4-15.
[256]杜兴强、郭剑花和雷宇.政治联系方式与民营企业捐赠：度量方法与经验证据[J].财贸研究,2010,1：89-99.
[257]杜兴强、郭剑花和雷宇.政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩：“政府干预”抑或“关系”?[J].金融研究,2009b,11：158-173.
[258]杜兴强、雷宇和郭剑花.政治联系、政治联系方式与民营上市公司的会计稳健性[J].中国工业经济,2009a,7：87-97.
[259]渡边真理子、柳川范之.商业信用合同的履行概率,其外部性及现金需求——中国案例[J].金融研究,2009,7：25-37.
[260]冯天丽、井润田.制度环境与私营企业家政治联系意愿的实证研究[J].管理世界,2009,8：81-91.
[261]冯延超.中国民营企业政治关联与税收负担关系的研究[J].管理评论,2012,6： 167-176.
[262]高勇强、何晓斌和李路路.民营企业家社会身份、经济条件与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2011,12：111-123.
[263]郭剑花.制度环境、政治联系与政策性负担——基于民营上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2011,7：33-40.
[264]郝项超、张宏亮.政治关联关系、官员背景及其对民营企业银行贷款的影响[J].财贸经济,2011,4：55-61.
[265]胡旭阳、史晋川.民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资——以中国民营企业500强为例[J].中国工业经济,2008,4：5-14.
[266]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006,5：107-113.
[267]黄亚生. “中国模式”到底有多独特?[M].北京：中信出版社,2011.
[268]贾明和张喆.高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗?[J].管理世界,2010,4：99-113.
[269]江雅雯、黄燕和徐雯.政治联系、制度因素与企业的创新活动[J].南方经济,2011,11：3-15.
[270]雷光勇、李书锋和王秀娟.政治关联、审计师选择与公司价值[J].管理世界,2009,7：145-155.
[271]李稻葵.大胆改革,破解民营经济“老三难”[J].新财富,2010,7：40-41.
[272]李捷瑜、江舒韵.市场价值、生产效率与上市公司多元化经营：理论与证据[J].经济学(季刊),2009,3：1047-1064.
[273]李金、李仕明和熊小舟.我国上市公司投资—现金流敏感度实证研究[J].管理学报,2007,6：824-828.
[274]李胜兰、周林杉和汪耿东.我国民营企业产权法律保护实证研究：以广东民营企业产权纠纷案件为例[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2010.
[275]李维安、邱艾超和古志辉.双重公司治理环境、政治联系偏好与公司绩效——基于中国民营上市公司治理转型的研究[J].中国工业经济,2010,6：85-95.
[276]李新春、张书军.家族企业：组织、行为与中国经济[M].上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2005.
[277]李悦、熊德华、张峥和刘力.中国上市公司如何制定投资决策[J].世界经济,2009,2：66-76.
[278]李志赟.银行结构与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2002,6：38-45.
[279]连玉君、程建.投资—现金流敏感性：融资约束还是代理成本?[J].财经研究,2007,2：37-46.
[280]梁建、陈爽英和盖庆恩.民营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠[J].管理世界,2010,7：109-118.
[281]梁莱歆、冯延超.民营企业政治关联、雇员规模与薪酬成本[J].中国工业经济,2010,10：127-137.
[282]梁莱歆、冯延超.政治关联与企业过度投资——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2010,12：56-62.
[283]廖冠民.政府干预、社会性负担与上市公司高管更换[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.
[284]廖理、沈红波和郦金梁.股权分置改革与上市公司治理的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008,5,99-108.
[285]林毅夫、李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2001,1,10-18.
[286]刘慧龙、张敏、王亚平和吴联生.政治关联、薪酬激励与员工配置效率[J].经济研究,2010,9：109-121.
[287]刘伟.政府不能屡犯"pick winners"的错误[M].收录于单忠东主编：未名湖畔看民营经济,北京：经济科学出版社,2009.
[288]陆铭、潘慧.政企纽带——民营企业家成长与企业发展[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2009.
[289]罗党论、黄琼宇.民营企业的政治关系与企业价值[J].管理科学,2008,6：21-28.
[290]罗党论、刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,5：97-106.
[291]罗党论、唐清泉.中国民营上市公司制度环境与绩效问题研究[J].经济研究,2009a,2：106-118.
[292]罗党论、唐清泉.政治关系、社会资本与政策资源获取：来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].世界经济,2009b,7：84-96.
[293]罗党论、甄丽明.民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2008,12：164-178.
[294]马连福、赵颖.国外非财务信息披露研究评述[J].当代财经,2007,7,123-129.
[295]潘红波、夏新平和余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,4：41-52.
[296]潘越、戴亦一和李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助——来自中国ST公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,5：6-17.
[297]平新乔、李自然.上市公司再融资资格的确定与虚假信息披露[J].经济研究,2003,2：55-63.
[298]钱颖一.克鲁格模型与寻租理论[J].经济社会体制比较,1988,5：17-18.
[299]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[300]邵敏、包群.政府补贴与企业生产率-—基于我国工业企业的经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2012,7：70-82.
[301]石晓乐和许年行.公司财务与政治关联研究进展[J].经济学动态,2009,11：104-109.
[302]孙铮、刘凤委和李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,5：52-63.
[303]谭松涛、江萍、李涛和詹毅强.政治关联、外部融资约束与企业投资：基于地级市政府换届数据的研究[R].第十一届中国青年经济学者论坛,2011.
[304]田志龙、高勇强和卫武.中国企业政治策略与行为研究[J].管理世界,2003,12：98-106.
[305]汪伟、史晋川.进入壁垒与民营企业的成长——吉利集团案例研究[J].管理世界,2005,4：132-140.
[306]王庆文和吴世农.政治关系对公司业绩的影响——基于中国上市公司政治影响力指数的研究[R].中国第七届实证会计国际研讨会,2008.
[307]王一江.国家与经济[J].比较,2005,18：1-26.
[308]王永进.政治关联与企业契约实施环境的所有制差异[R].中国经济学学术资源网工作论文,2010.
[309]王志强、陈培昆.深市买卖价差逆向选择成分的估算与分析[J].证券市场导报,2006,3：65-70.
[310]卫武、田志龙和刘晶.我国企业经营活动中的政治关联性研究[J].中国工业经济,2004,4：67-75.
[311]邬爱其、金宝敏.个人地位、企业发展、社会责任与制度风险：中国民营企业家政治参与动机的研究[J].中国工业经济,2008,7：141-150.
[312]巫景飞、何大军、林炜和王云.高层管理者政治网络与企业多元化战略：社会资本视角——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,8：107-118.
[313]吴敬琏、马国川.重启改革议程：中国经济改革二十讲[M].北京：三联书店,2013.
[314]吴军、白云霞.我国银行制度的变迁与国有企业预算约束的硬化——来自1999-2007年国有上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2009,10：179-192.
[315]吴文锋、吴冲锋和刘晓薇.中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值[J].经济研究,2008,7：130-141.
[316]吴文锋、吴冲锋和芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009,3：134-142.
[317]吴晓波.大败局Ⅱ[M].杭州：浙江人民出版社,2007.
[318]徐莉萍、辛宇和陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,1：90-100.
[319]徐龙炳、李科.政治关系如何影响公司价值：融资约束与行业竞争的证据[J].财经研究,2010,10：60-69.
[320]杨其静、杨继东.政治联系、市场力量与工资差异——基于政府补贴的视角[J].中国人民大学学报,2010,2：69-77.
[321]杨其静.企业成长：政治关联还是能力建设?[J].经济研究,2011,10：54-66.
[322]杨其静.政治关联与企业成长[J].教学与研究,2010,6：38-43.
[323]于蔚、钱彦敏.转型经济中宏观冲击与公司融资决策——基于资本结构动态调整框架的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2011,10：24-30.
[324]于蔚、汪淼军和金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束：信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012a,9：125-139.
[325]于蔚、金祥荣和钱彦敏.宏观冲击、融资约束与公司资本结构动态调整[J].世界经济,2012b,3：24-47.
[326]余明桂、回雅甫和潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010,3：65-77.
[327]余明桂、潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008,8：9-21.
[328]袁敏著.资信评级的功能检验与质量控制研究[M].上海：立信会计出版社,2007.
[329]张纯、吕伟.信息环境、融资约束与现金股利[J].金融研究,2009,7：81-94.
[330]张建君、张志学.中国民营企业家的政治战略[J].管理世界,2005,7：94-105.
[331]张敏、张胜、王成方和申慧慧.政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010,11：143-153.
[332]张维迎.企业寻求政府支持的收益、成本分析[J].新西部,2001,8：55-56.
[333]张文魁.国企需要新一轮改革[J].中国经济报告,2013,1：50-53.
[334]张祥建、农卫东.中国民营企业政治关联的成本、收益与社会效率[J].天津社会科学,2011,3：67-71.
[335]张学勇、廖理.股权分置改革、自愿性信息披露与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,4：28-39.
[336]郑京海、胡鞍钢和Arne Bigsten.中国的经济增长能否持续?——一个生产率视角[J].经济学(季刊),2008,3：777-808.
[337]钟宏武、张旺和张蒽.中国上市公司非财务信息披露报告(2011)[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2011.
[338]周其仁.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”[J].经济研究,1997,5：31-42.
[339]周其仁.可惜了,科龙[N],经济观察报,2005年8月8日.