二战后美国行政官僚政治化倾向及总统应对策略
摘要
本文主要研究自第二次世界大战以后，美国行政官僚机构所发生的变化。美国行政制度的职能是用来执行国家法律法规，政策命令等。但二战结束以来，随着美国经济社会的飞速发展，美国行政官僚的职能发生了深刻的变化。行政官僚不再单纯以执行政策为职责，而是开始参与政策决策，越来越多的参与到政策决策过程中。这给美国的宪法体制以及整个政治制度造成了极大的冲击。甚至总统的权威也受到了严峻挑战。总统必须对这一倾向做出反应。为此，二战后总统们对行政官僚系统做出一系列的行政改革努力，但效果程度不一。
全文共分四大部分。第一部分主要介绍联邦行政官僚的政治化倾向及形成原因。行政官僚政治化的倾向主要表现为：与国会和利益集团组成“铁三角”，行政部门，国会中相关委员会和利益集团彼此配合，互相照应，共同左右政策的制订。它们的力量如此强大，以致于总统对“铁三角”也无能为力。分赃制重新抬头。1883年《彭德尔顿法》实行以来，功绩制一直作为美国行政系统的首要原则，并一直持续至今。由于政治庇护等某些政治因素，一直没能完全退出美国政治生活中。甚至在一定条件下还可能激化。总统为加强自己的力量，不可能不任用支持自己的人。二战以来，这一现象仍有发生。总统既想以功绩制选拔人才，又无力完全抛弃政治庇护，或政治分肥。虽然一些总统对政治庇护十分反感，但也不可能做出大的动作。行政官僚系统越发难以驾驭。行政官僚被大量的法律法规，规章制度束缚着。这使得他们缺乏活力，做事循规蹈矩，而且，当一项法令下达后，通常被淹没在行政的海洋里。总统对此也无可奈何。造成这一现象的原因是多方面的：一、政府更迭使总统和政治任命官员在任时间比行政官僚短，许多计划没有足够的时间执行，当总统换届时，上届总统的计划通常得不到继续执行，这就使得一些需要长时间的计划无法收效。二，行政官僚机构与国会中的相关委员会和利益集团组成“铁三角”，三，美国宪法在规定行政权力方面的模糊性使官僚机构处于“一仆二主”的地位，宪法没有明确是总统还是国会在领导联邦行政官僚上具有明确的最高权力。国会和总统都是行政官僚的主人。这使行政官僚有了较大的回旋余地。无论总统权力如何膨胀，也不可能完全控制住行政官僚系统。四，官僚机构在立法过程中的独特地位。实际上，国会的许多立法都是由行政官僚起草的。他们熟悉问题领域，具有自己的专业技能，国会不可能对一切领域都熟悉，许多情况下，都要求助于行政官僚。因此，虽然立法权在国会手中，但他们依靠行政官僚队伍的专业技能。这使得行政官僚处于有利的地位。五，行政官僚机构的多层化。行政官僚机构的组成复杂，层次众多。执行一项命令要按部就班，即使命令紧急也要如此。行政官僚政治化的现象不是短期出现的，造成它的原因也是深刻的，其相互关系错综复杂的。
第二部分介绍行政官僚政治化对总统的影响。这种影响涉及到总统行使权力的诸多方面，主要表现在以下几个方面：（一）总统的计划和命令实施难度加大，一个普遍政策得以贯彻到什么程度，通常取决于官僚对它的解释，以及他们实施该项政策的兴致和效率。同时，国家社会生活和政治生活中大量的裁决活动，也是由政府机构来完成的。由于功绩制和任期制的保护，总统无权解雇行政官僚，也没有别的办法施以惩罚，只能从总体上采取一些措施，（二）行政官僚与总统争夺政治任命官员。政治任命官员既是总统的助手，也是本部门的领导。因此，他既要在本部门员工面前代表总统，又要在总统面前代表行政官僚。这使政治任命官员陷入尴尬境地，也导致上下双方争夺政治任命官员的情况。不同的政治官员会采取不同的立场。（三）总统的制约因素增多。宪法确立的“三权分立”原则已经使总统有了两个强大制约因素，现在行政官僚系统的发展使总统又多了一个制约因素。对行政官僚的控制不力会直接影响本届政府政绩的好坏。（四）由于“铁三角”的形成，行政官僚的背景更加复杂，使总统更不容易对其有大的动作。“铁三角”彼此照应，关系密切，总统难以插手。这些影响使总统在其工作过程中面临着许多方面的障碍和困难，已经极大限制了总统行使权力。这也导致了总统采取了一系列的措施，维护自己的权力地位，遏制行政系统的膨胀。
第三部分着重讨论二战后几位美国总统控制行政官僚机构的努力，这是本文的中心部分。这一部分还分成两个小部分，一是二战后20世纪70年代这一阶段的改革成果。包括从杜鲁门到卡特的历届总统，他们大多采取了行政改组，人事，预算等几项改革措施。二是里根政府的行政改革措施及其效果。里根的改革相对于其前任比，既有一定的延续性，也有自己的特点。总的说来，里根信奉一种“新联邦主义”，即限制联邦政府的权力，而加强地方政府的自主权。大政府不是解决问题的办法，大政府本身就是问题。
最后一部分是结论，指出行政组织力量的过分强大对于民治政府的存在是危险的。为解决行政官僚的政治化给总统带来的冲击，总统们可谓费尽心机，同时还要解决诸如效率低下，人员臃肿，开支巨大，机构庞大这些问题。然而，总统在面对联邦官僚系统面前，权力显得十分有限。尽管总统进行
The main research of this text is from behind World War II, the administrative change taken place of system of U.S.A. The function of U.S.A.'s administrative system is to used for carrying out the national laws and regulations, the policy is ordered etc. But since World War II was over , with the development at full speed of the economic society of U.S.A., U.S.A.'s administrative bureaucrat's function has changed deeply. The administrative bureaucrat no longer regards pursuing a policy as the duty simply, but begin to participate in the policy to make policy, more and more participation gets in the policy decision-making process. This has caused great impact to constitution system and the whole political system of U.S.A. Even the president's authority has been challenged.The president must make a response to this trend . For this reason, all previous presidents make a series of administrations and reform efforts to the administrative bureaucrat's system after the war, but the result degree differs
The full text divides into four major parts .The first part introduces politicizing the phenomenon and forming the reason of union's administrative bureaucrat mainly. The phenomenon that the administrative bureaucrat politicizes is shown as mainly: Making up " the iron trigonometry " with the Congress and interest group, administrative department, relevant committee and interest group cooperate each other in the Congress, look after each other, the formulation of the policy that common about. Their strength is so strong, the president is powerless to the iron trigonometry . Divide the spoils and make resuming again. De Peng but since of bureaucrat system law implement, contribution make as U.S.A. administrative primary principle of system one year, and has been sustaining it so far all the time . But political asylum has been failing to totally withdraw from U.S.A.'s political life all the time because of some political factors. Even may also be sharpened under certain condition. The president can appoint and support one's own person in order to win over by any means and strengthen one's own strength. Since World War II, this phenomenon has taken place. The president is not only want to make and choose talents unable to totally abandon political asylum with the contribution but also, or divide booty in politics. Though some the presidents are very disgusted with political asylum, can not make great movements either. The administrative system is even more difficult to control. Administrative bureaucrat a large amount of laws and regulations, rules and regulations are fettered . This makes them lack vigor , do things and follow the beaten track , and, usually flooded in the administrative ocean after a decree is assigned. The president has no way out to this too. Reasons to cause this phenomenon are in many aspects: First, the government changes enabling the president and politics' appointing officers to assume office as time shorter than the professional bureaucrat, a lot of plans do not have enough time to carry out, as the president changes when the time coming, the last president's plan can not be usually continued carrying out, this makes some plans needed for a long time unable to produce effect . Second, the relevant committee and interest group in the institution and Congress make up " the iron trigonometry ". Third, American constitution getting fuzzy to make bureaucratic apparatus in status of " one servant 2 main fact ", it is clear to have clear supreme power at leading federal bureaucrat the president or Congress for constitution to have. The Congresses and the presidents are all administrative hosts. This makes administrative bureaucrat have greater room for maneuver. No matter how the president's power is to expand, can not totally control the administrative system either. Fourth, the unique position in the legislative course of bureaucratic apparatus. In fact, a lot of legislation of the Congress was drafted by the administrative bureaucrat. They are familiar with the question field, have one's own professional t
全文共分四大部分。第一部分主要介绍联邦行政官僚的政治化倾向及形成原因。行政官僚政治化的倾向主要表现为：与国会和利益集团组成“铁三角”，行政部门，国会中相关委员会和利益集团彼此配合，互相照应，共同左右政策的制订。它们的力量如此强大，以致于总统对“铁三角”也无能为力。分赃制重新抬头。1883年《彭德尔顿法》实行以来，功绩制一直作为美国行政系统的首要原则，并一直持续至今。由于政治庇护等某些政治因素，一直没能完全退出美国政治生活中。甚至在一定条件下还可能激化。总统为加强自己的力量，不可能不任用支持自己的人。二战以来，这一现象仍有发生。总统既想以功绩制选拔人才，又无力完全抛弃政治庇护，或政治分肥。虽然一些总统对政治庇护十分反感，但也不可能做出大的动作。行政官僚系统越发难以驾驭。行政官僚被大量的法律法规，规章制度束缚着。这使得他们缺乏活力，做事循规蹈矩，而且，当一项法令下达后，通常被淹没在行政的海洋里。总统对此也无可奈何。造成这一现象的原因是多方面的：一、政府更迭使总统和政治任命官员在任时间比行政官僚短，许多计划没有足够的时间执行，当总统换届时，上届总统的计划通常得不到继续执行，这就使得一些需要长时间的计划无法收效。二，行政官僚机构与国会中的相关委员会和利益集团组成“铁三角”，三，美国宪法在规定行政权力方面的模糊性使官僚机构处于“一仆二主”的地位，宪法没有明确是总统还是国会在领导联邦行政官僚上具有明确的最高权力。国会和总统都是行政官僚的主人。这使行政官僚有了较大的回旋余地。无论总统权力如何膨胀，也不可能完全控制住行政官僚系统。四，官僚机构在立法过程中的独特地位。实际上，国会的许多立法都是由行政官僚起草的。他们熟悉问题领域，具有自己的专业技能，国会不可能对一切领域都熟悉，许多情况下，都要求助于行政官僚。因此，虽然立法权在国会手中，但他们依靠行政官僚队伍的专业技能。这使得行政官僚处于有利的地位。五，行政官僚机构的多层化。行政官僚机构的组成复杂，层次众多。执行一项命令要按部就班，即使命令紧急也要如此。行政官僚政治化的现象不是短期出现的，造成它的原因也是深刻的，其相互关系错综复杂的。
第二部分介绍行政官僚政治化对总统的影响。这种影响涉及到总统行使权力的诸多方面，主要表现在以下几个方面：（一）总统的计划和命令实施难度加大，一个普遍政策得以贯彻到什么程度，通常取决于官僚对它的解释，以及他们实施该项政策的兴致和效率。同时，国家社会生活和政治生活中大量的裁决活动，也是由政府机构来完成的。由于功绩制和任期制的保护，总统无权解雇行政官僚，也没有别的办法施以惩罚，只能从总体上采取一些措施，（二）行政官僚与总统争夺政治任命官员。政治任命官员既是总统的助手，也是本部门的领导。因此，他既要在本部门员工面前代表总统，又要在总统面前代表行政官僚。这使政治任命官员陷入尴尬境地，也导致上下双方争夺政治任命官员的情况。不同的政治官员会采取不同的立场。（三）总统的制约因素增多。宪法确立的“三权分立”原则已经使总统有了两个强大制约因素，现在行政官僚系统的发展使总统又多了一个制约因素。对行政官僚的控制不力会直接影响本届政府政绩的好坏。（四）由于“铁三角”的形成，行政官僚的背景更加复杂，使总统更不容易对其有大的动作。“铁三角”彼此照应，关系密切，总统难以插手。这些影响使总统在其工作过程中面临着许多方面的障碍和困难，已经极大限制了总统行使权力。这也导致了总统采取了一系列的措施，维护自己的权力地位，遏制行政系统的膨胀。
第三部分着重讨论二战后几位美国总统控制行政官僚机构的努力，这是本文的中心部分。这一部分还分成两个小部分，一是二战后20世纪70年代这一阶段的改革成果。包括从杜鲁门到卡特的历届总统，他们大多采取了行政改组，人事，预算等几项改革措施。二是里根政府的行政改革措施及其效果。里根的改革相对于其前任比，既有一定的延续性，也有自己的特点。总的说来，里根信奉一种“新联邦主义”，即限制联邦政府的权力，而加强地方政府的自主权。大政府不是解决问题的办法，大政府本身就是问题。
最后一部分是结论，指出行政组织力量的过分强大对于民治政府的存在是危险的。为解决行政官僚的政治化给总统带来的冲击，总统们可谓费尽心机，同时还要解决诸如效率低下，人员臃肿，开支巨大，机构庞大这些问题。然而，总统在面对联邦官僚系统面前，权力显得十分有限。尽管总统进行
The main research of this text is from behind World War II, the administrative change taken place of system of U.S.A. The function of U.S.A.'s administrative system is to used for carrying out the national laws and regulations, the policy is ordered etc. But since World War II was over , with the development at full speed of the economic society of U.S.A., U.S.A.'s administrative bureaucrat's function has changed deeply. The administrative bureaucrat no longer regards pursuing a policy as the duty simply, but begin to participate in the policy to make policy, more and more participation gets in the policy decision-making process. This has caused great impact to constitution system and the whole political system of U.S.A. Even the president's authority has been challenged.The president must make a response to this trend . For this reason, all previous presidents make a series of administrations and reform efforts to the administrative bureaucrat's system after the war, but the result degree differs
The full text divides into four major parts .The first part introduces politicizing the phenomenon and forming the reason of union's administrative bureaucrat mainly. The phenomenon that the administrative bureaucrat politicizes is shown as mainly: Making up " the iron trigonometry " with the Congress and interest group, administrative department, relevant committee and interest group cooperate each other in the Congress, look after each other, the formulation of the policy that common about. Their strength is so strong, the president is powerless to the iron trigonometry . Divide the spoils and make resuming again. De Peng but since of bureaucrat system law implement, contribution make as U.S.A. administrative primary principle of system one year, and has been sustaining it so far all the time . But political asylum has been failing to totally withdraw from U.S.A.'s political life all the time because of some political factors. Even may also be sharpened under certain condition. The president can appoint and support one's own person in order to win over by any means and strengthen one's own strength. Since World War II, this phenomenon has taken place. The president is not only want to make and choose talents unable to totally abandon political asylum with the contribution but also, or divide booty in politics. Though some the presidents are very disgusted with political asylum, can not make great movements either. The administrative system is even more difficult to control. Administrative bureaucrat a large amount of laws and regulations, rules and regulations are fettered . This makes them lack vigor , do things and follow the beaten track , and, usually flooded in the administrative ocean after a decree is assigned. The president has no way out to this too. Reasons to cause this phenomenon are in many aspects: First, the government changes enabling the president and politics' appointing officers to assume office as time shorter than the professional bureaucrat, a lot of plans do not have enough time to carry out, as the president changes when the time coming, the last president's plan can not be usually continued carrying out, this makes some plans needed for a long time unable to produce effect . Second, the relevant committee and interest group in the institution and Congress make up " the iron trigonometry ". Third, American constitution getting fuzzy to make bureaucratic apparatus in status of " one servant 2 main fact ", it is clear to have clear supreme power at leading federal bureaucrat the president or Congress for constitution to have. The Congresses and the presidents are all administrative hosts. This makes administrative bureaucrat have greater room for maneuver. No matter how the president's power is to expand, can not totally control the administrative system either. Fourth, the unique position in the legislative course of bureaucratic apparatus. In fact, a lot of legislation of the Congress was drafted by the administrative bureaucrat. They are familiar with the question field, have one's own professional t
引文
Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell: Introducing Public Administration, Longman,
2000, P16
② Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer:The Higher Civil Service In The
nited States, Quest for Reform,P131.
Robert Maranto and David Schultz: A Short History of The United States Civil Service,P108.
David A. Schultz and Robert Maranto: The Politics of Civil Service Reform, P126.
David A. Schultz and Robert Maranto, The Politics of Civil Service Reform,P164.
⑥ （美）詹姆斯. Q .威尔逊著，张海涛、魏红伟、陈家林等译：《美国官僚政治，政府机构的行为及其动因》，中国社会科学出版社1995年版，第313页。
⑦ 同上，第331－332页。
（美）希尔斯曼著，曹大鹏译：《美国是如何治理的》，商务出版社1986年版，第217页。
⑨ 同上，第219-220页。
⑩（美）托马斯·戴伊、哈蒙·齐格勒：《民主的嘲讽》，世界知识出版社1991年，第292-293页。
同上，第292页。
Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer: The Higher Civil Service In The United States, Quest for Reform, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, P22
Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change,
eq \o\ac(○,14) Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell: Introducing Public Administration,P104.
Frederick C. Mosher: Democracy and the Public Service, P91
Robert Maranto: Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency, Careerists
and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, Greenwood Press, 1993,P33.
Robert Maranto: Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency, Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, P2.
eq \o\ac(○,18) Dennis D. Riley: Public Personnel Administration, P16.
Robert Maranto: Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency, Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, P2.
Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. P1
F.G.古德诺著，王元译：《政治与行政》，华夏出版社，1987年版，第50页。
参 考 文 献
1．阿尔蒙德、小鲍威尔著，曹沛霖、郑世平、公婷、陈峰译：《比较政治学：体系，过程和政策》，上海译文出版社1987年版。
2．古德诺著，王元译：《政治与行政》，华夏出版社1987年版。
3．（美）加里·沃塞曼著，陆震纶、何祚康、郑明哲、杨景厚译：《美国政治基础》，中国社会科学出版社1994年版。
4.（德）马克斯·韦伯著，林荣远译：《经济与社会》，下册，商务印书馆，1998年版。
5．李道揆著：《美国政府与美国政治》，商务印书馆1999年。
6. (美)麦克斯·J·斯基德摩、马歇尔·卡特·特里普著：《美国政府简介》，中国经济出版社1993年。
(美)史蒂文·凯尔曼著，商正译：《制定公共政策——美国政府的乐观前景》，商务印书馆1990年版。
8.（美）詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊著，张海涛、魏红伟、陈家林等译：《美国官僚政治，政府机构的行为及其动因》，中国社会科学出版社1995年。
9.（法）托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》，商务印书馆1993年版。
10. (美)托马斯·戴伊、哈蒙·齐格勒著：《民主的嘲讽》，世界知识出版社1991年。
11. 文森特·奥斯特罗姆著，毛寿龙译：《复合共和制的政治理论》，上海三联书店1999年版。
文森特·奥斯特罗姆著，毛寿龙译：《美国公共行政思想危机》，上海三联书店1999年版。
13. 文森特·奥斯特罗姆著，江峰等译：《美国行政管理危机》，北京工业大学出版社1994年版。
14.（美）希尔斯曼著，曹大鹏译：《美国是如何治理的》，商务印书馆1986年。
15.（美）詹姆斯·M·伯恩斯、杰克·W·佩尔塔森、托马斯·E·克罗宁著，陆震纶、郑明哲等译：《民治政府》，中国社会科学出版社1990年版。
16. William E·Benstein, C·Herman Pritchett,Henry A·Turner,
Dean Mann, Peter Merkl, American Democracy in World
Perspective, Harper & Row Publishers , New York, 1980.
17. Anna Marie Schuh, Timing Successful Policy Change, Lessons from the Civil Service, University Press of America, 2000.
18. Burns,Jaw Peltason, Thomase Cronin, Government by the People, Prentice—Hall,New Jersey,1984.
19. Charles H. Levine, The Unfinished Agenda for Civil Service Reform Implications of the Grace Commission Report ,The Brooking Institution Washington D.C.1985.
20. Charles V·Hamilton, American Government, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982.
21. David A. Schultz and Robert M The Politics of Civil Service Reform, Peter Lang 1998.
22. Dennis D. Riley, Public Personnel Administration, Longman Publishers, 2002.
23. Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, Oxford University Press, 1982.
Groverstarling, Understanding American Politics, The Dorsey Press Homewood, 1982.
Irish and Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, Prentice—Hall, 1965.
James G. Benze, JR. Presidential Power and Management Techni-
ques, Greenwood Press, 1987.
27. James Q·Wilson, American government:Institutions and
Policies, D·C·Heath and Company,1980.
28. Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell, Introducing Public
Administration, Longman, 2000.
John L. Palmer, Perspectives on the Reagan Years, The Urban
Institute Press. 1986.
Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer, The Higher Civil
Service In The United States, Quest for Reform, University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1995.
Robert Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern
Presidency, Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, Greenwood Press, 1993.
Robert Maranto and David Schultz, A Short History of The
United States Civil Service , University Press of America, 1984.
Roger Hilsman, To Govern America, Harper & Row, Publishers,
1979.
Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil
Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. The university of Chicago press, 1994.
Stephen E. Condrey and Robert Maranto, Radical Reform of
the Civil Service, Lexington Books, 2000.
Timothy Conlan, New Federalism, Intergovernmental Reform
from Nixon to Reagan.The Brookings Institution Washington D.C., 1988.
WaterE·Volkomer,American Government, Appleton—Century
—Crofts, New York, 1972.
Walter F·Murphy Michael N·Danielson,American Democracy,
The Dryden Press, 1977.
39. 李德志：《人事行政学》，高等教育出版社2001年，第187页。
2000, P16
② Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer:The Higher Civil Service In The
nited States, Quest for Reform,P131.
Robert Maranto and David Schultz: A Short History of The United States Civil Service,P108.
David A. Schultz and Robert Maranto: The Politics of Civil Service Reform, P126.
David A. Schultz and Robert Maranto, The Politics of Civil Service Reform,P164.
⑥ （美）詹姆斯. Q .威尔逊著，张海涛、魏红伟、陈家林等译：《美国官僚政治，政府机构的行为及其动因》，中国社会科学出版社1995年版，第313页。
⑦ 同上，第331－332页。
（美）希尔斯曼著，曹大鹏译：《美国是如何治理的》，商务出版社1986年版，第217页。
⑨ 同上，第219-220页。
⑩（美）托马斯·戴伊、哈蒙·齐格勒：《民主的嘲讽》，世界知识出版社1991年，第292-293页。
同上，第292页。
Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer: The Higher Civil Service In The United States, Quest for Reform, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, P22
Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change,
eq \o\ac(○,14) Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell: Introducing Public Administration,P104.
Frederick C. Mosher: Democracy and the Public Service, P91
Robert Maranto: Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency, Careerists
and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, Greenwood Press, 1993,P33.
Robert Maranto: Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency, Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, P2.
eq \o\ac(○,18) Dennis D. Riley: Public Personnel Administration, P16.
Robert Maranto: Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency, Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, P2.
Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. P1
F.G.古德诺著，王元译：《政治与行政》，华夏出版社，1987年版，第50页。
参 考 文 献
1．阿尔蒙德、小鲍威尔著，曹沛霖、郑世平、公婷、陈峰译：《比较政治学：体系，过程和政策》，上海译文出版社1987年版。
2．古德诺著，王元译：《政治与行政》，华夏出版社1987年版。
3．（美）加里·沃塞曼著，陆震纶、何祚康、郑明哲、杨景厚译：《美国政治基础》，中国社会科学出版社1994年版。
4.（德）马克斯·韦伯著，林荣远译：《经济与社会》，下册，商务印书馆，1998年版。
5．李道揆著：《美国政府与美国政治》，商务印书馆1999年。
6. (美)麦克斯·J·斯基德摩、马歇尔·卡特·特里普著：《美国政府简介》，中国经济出版社1993年。
(美)史蒂文·凯尔曼著，商正译：《制定公共政策——美国政府的乐观前景》，商务印书馆1990年版。
8.（美）詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊著，张海涛、魏红伟、陈家林等译：《美国官僚政治，政府机构的行为及其动因》，中国社会科学出版社1995年。
9.（法）托克维尔著：《论美国的民主》，商务印书馆1993年版。
10. (美)托马斯·戴伊、哈蒙·齐格勒著：《民主的嘲讽》，世界知识出版社1991年。
11. 文森特·奥斯特罗姆著，毛寿龙译：《复合共和制的政治理论》，上海三联书店1999年版。
文森特·奥斯特罗姆著，毛寿龙译：《美国公共行政思想危机》，上海三联书店1999年版。
13. 文森特·奥斯特罗姆著，江峰等译：《美国行政管理危机》，北京工业大学出版社1994年版。
14.（美）希尔斯曼著，曹大鹏译：《美国是如何治理的》，商务印书馆1986年。
15.（美）詹姆斯·M·伯恩斯、杰克·W·佩尔塔森、托马斯·E·克罗宁著，陆震纶、郑明哲等译：《民治政府》，中国社会科学出版社1990年版。
16. William E·Benstein, C·Herman Pritchett,Henry A·Turner,
Dean Mann, Peter Merkl, American Democracy in World
Perspective, Harper & Row Publishers , New York, 1980.
17. Anna Marie Schuh, Timing Successful Policy Change, Lessons from the Civil Service, University Press of America, 2000.
18. Burns,Jaw Peltason, Thomase Cronin, Government by the People, Prentice—Hall,New Jersey,1984.
19. Charles H. Levine, The Unfinished Agenda for Civil Service Reform Implications of the Grace Commission Report ,The Brooking Institution Washington D.C.1985.
20. Charles V·Hamilton, American Government, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982.
21. David A. Schultz and Robert M The Politics of Civil Service Reform, Peter Lang 1998.
22. Dennis D. Riley, Public Personnel Administration, Longman Publishers, 2002.
23. Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, Oxford University Press, 1982.
Groverstarling, Understanding American Politics, The Dorsey Press Homewood, 1982.
Irish and Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, Prentice—Hall, 1965.
James G. Benze, JR. Presidential Power and Management Techni-
ques, Greenwood Press, 1987.
27. James Q·Wilson, American government:Institutions and
Policies, D·C·Heath and Company,1980.
28. Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell, Introducing Public
Administration, Longman, 2000.
John L. Palmer, Perspectives on the Reagan Years, The Urban
Institute Press. 1986.
Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer, The Higher Civil
Service In The United States, Quest for Reform, University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1995.
Robert Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern
Presidency, Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, Greenwood Press, 1993.
Robert Maranto and David Schultz, A Short History of The
United States Civil Service , University Press of America, 1984.
Roger Hilsman, To Govern America, Harper & Row, Publishers,
1979.
Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil
Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. The university of Chicago press, 1994.
Stephen E. Condrey and Robert Maranto, Radical Reform of
the Civil Service, Lexington Books, 2000.
Timothy Conlan, New Federalism, Intergovernmental Reform
from Nixon to Reagan.The Brookings Institution Washington D.C., 1988.
WaterE·Volkomer,American Government, Appleton—Century
—Crofts, New York, 1972.
Walter F·Murphy Michael N·Danielson,American Democracy,
The Dryden Press, 1977.
39. 李德志：《人事行政学》，高等教育出版社2001年，第187页。