公司治理情境影响下的经营者决策机制优化研究
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摘要
随着企业生存环境复杂化,公司治理范式经历了根本性发展,利益相关者相机治理相关研究逐渐兴起,建立与完善能够平衡企业利益相关者利益诉求的经营者决策机制成为企业发展的关键。现实表明,企业发展过程中遇到的诸多问题均与不科学决策相关。
已有理论虽然勾勒了公司治理能给企业带来的绩效优势与竞争优势,但对于其作用机理,尤其是如何通过经营者行为的分析,研究影响决策机制以及企业价值等一系列连贯问题的文献则较为缺乏。因此,在打开作用机理黑箱的基础上,研究优化经营者决策机制的办法,成为企业与其利益相关者合作共赢、长远健康发展的关键。
为了促进经营者决策机制的优化与完善,将企业利益相关者相机治理理念融入机制设计过程中,提高公司治理与决策机制的作用效力,实现企业价值的长远提升。本文围绕“公司治理情境如何影响经营者决策机制”这一基本问题展开研究,深入剖析利益相关者相机治理对经营者决策的重要影响,从而为我国企业如何构建科学的经营者决策机制提供理论和实务支持。
具体而言,本文将试图逐层深入地探究以下三个研究问题：(1)公司治理对经营者行为约束有何影响?作用机制是怎样的?(2)受企业利益相关者相机治理影响的经营者行为约束对决策机制有何影响?(3)公司治理情境影响下的经营者决策机制应该如何优化?
本文结合理论与实证研究,采用理论拓展、理论模型构建与分析、大规模问卷调查和案例分析等研究方法,基于浙江省176份企业有效调查问卷数据,以及来自于21家企业的30位中高层经营管理人员的访谈资料,通过以下三个子研究逐层深入地对上述研究问题进行论证。
(1)子研究一构建了经营者行为组合理论模型,并通过实证研究证实了利益相关者相机治理能够提高经营者行为约束性和公司治理效力。现有相关文献较少围绕经营者协调职能作出详细研究,本文将经营者利益协调行为视为生产努力行为的子行为之一,通过理论模型的研究分析,证实了对于某一经营者谋取私人收益水平,利益相关者相机治理比股东单边治理花费更少的监督成本,并且治理主体数量与激励监督效力成正向关系。
进而文章通过量表设计、变量删选、因子分析与指标计算等步骤,构建了公司治理效力指标,对理论模型的相关研究结果进行了实际验证,统计结果证明了利益相关者相机治理比股东单边治理获得更高的公司治理效力。此外,对控制变量的研究结果表明了企业性质和企业规模对公司治理效力的影响也不容忽视。
(2)子研究二构建了基于B-C指数的决策权力制衡理论模型,并通过实证研究证实了利益相关者相机治理能够提高经营者决策机制的决策效力与协调效力。现有研究较少基于公司治理情境对企业决策权配置与决策结果作出比较与判断,本文从利益相关者合作博弈的角度出发,研究决策者实际权力与决策权力之间的关系。理论模型研究证明了企业股权配置并没有直接与决策权力挂钩,同时发现权力内部制衡效应能提升企业治理效力,以及引入利益相关者相机治理能提高决策整体效力。
文章以经营者行为的两个重要属性出发,分别对决策与协调进行实证检验,旨在较为全面地把握公司治理对经营者决策机制的影响。实证研究通过因子分析、均值检验、指标计算等方式,对理论模型的相关结果进行验证,统计结果证明了利益相关者相机治理比股东单边治理获得更高的企业决策效力、利益协调效力和利益诉求满足程度,但是利益相关者综合影响程度在两种公司治理模式下不存在显著差异。此外,对控制变量的研究结果表明了企业规模大小与决策效力、利益协调效力之间成反向趋势；国有企业与上市公司的决策效力和协调效力不容乐观。笔者结合访谈资料,提供了可参考的解释,旨在为企业经营者提供理论指导与实务建议。
(3)子研究三构建了符合公司治理情境变化要求的经营者决策机制,通过仿真算例实验和案例研究的方法,对决策机制优化提供了理论与操作建议。现有决策项目评价文献大多基于股东主权范式,并且假定决策者完全理性。本文以有限度理性行为为前提,从公司治理情境化的角度,引入利益相关者满意度指标作为决策项目属性,构建了经营者多属性决策模型,基于TOPSIS方法对有限项目进行优劣排序,反映了利益诉求平衡原理。继而针对四类公司治理情境,较为系统和全面地仿真实验了决策机制的运用与分析过程。并且通过属性值的灵敏度分析,对决策机制进行了后优化的分析过程。
最后,根据为期6个月的案例研究,对浙江省杭州市两家制造业私营企业进行了跟踪式的访谈调研,以文章构建的经营者多属性决策模型为研究准绳,分别对比探讨了在不同公司治理情境下经营者决策行为与结果的差异。交叉案例分析证实了决策稳定性与经营者决策机制中涵盖的项目属性数量成正向关系,并且建议企业经营者可以通过了解项目属性值灵敏度来提高对决策结果的预见性。
纵观全文,文章基于对公司治理、利益相关者与经营者决策机制等相关理论的梳理与拓展,围绕公司治理情境如何影响经营者决策机制这一基本问题,在以下个方面进行了创新性研究。
(1)阐释了公司治理影响经营者决策机制的本质过程。建立了“公司治理——经营者行为——经营者决策机制”的逻辑链,深入挖掘了公司治理与企业决策之间的关系脉络,力图打开公司治理情境对决策机制的作用黑箱,补充和充实了现有企业决策研究内容。
(2)揭示了企业利益相关者相机治理对经营者决策机制优化的重要性。基于总结已有学者关于企业利益相关者相机治理与经营者决策的理论研究,拓展了相关的理论模型,结合实证研究,提出了企业利益相关者相机治理影响的不可忽视性。
(3)系统剖析了经营者决策机制的公司治理情境化模型构建与实际运用问题。通过对决策项目属性与决策情境状态变量的把握,构建了符合不同公司治理情境要求的经营者决策机制,体现了利益相关者利益诉求平衡原理。通过仿真算例的实验方式与案例研究的实证方式,对构建的多属性决策模型进行了全景式的系统研究与分析,旨在为企业提供可参考的理论支持与政策建议。
In the complex business environment, corporate governance paradigm has undergone a fundamental development, and stakeholder contingent-governance research has also emerged. Establishing the decision-making mechanism which can balance the corporate stakeholder's interests is considered as the key to enterprise development. The reality shows that unscientific decision-making system would lead to many problems. Although theories have been outlined corporate governance brought about corporate performance advantage and competitive advantage, its action mechanism research, especially the operator's act as an intermediary variable, still need to study in a deep-going way. Therefore, this research will open the mechanism black box and optimize the approach to operator's decision-making mechanism, so as to make the enterprise and its stakeholders lead win-win cooperation in the long-term healthy development.
In order to facilitate optimization and improvement of the decision-making mechanism, stakeholder contingent government concept is brought into the mechanism design process, improving the effect of corporate governance and decision-making and enhancing the long-term enterprise value. This research focuses on the issue of "corporate governance context how to affect the decision-making mechanism", and conducts an in-depth analysis of stakeholder governance how to influence the decision-making, in order to provide theoretical and practical support for operators. In particular, this paper will attempt to explore the following research questions:(1) How does stakeholder contingent government influence the operator's behavior? What is the mechanism? (2) What is the relationship between the decision-making mechanism and operator's behavior constrained by the contingent government? (3) How to optimize the decision-making mechanism under the situation of contingent government?
Theoretical research and empirical research are used in this paper, methodologies consist of theory expansion, theoretical model analysis, large-scale surveys and case analysis, covering 176 valid questionnaire data and 30 middle and senior management personnel from 21 enterprises in Zhejiang Province. Three sub-study in depth to demonstrate the above-mentioned research questions.
(1) The first sub-study built an operator's behavioral portfolio model, and confirmed stakeholder contingent governance can improve the effectiveness of the operator behavior constraint and corporate governance through empirical study. There was not many existing literature studying on the function of coordination. This article explored the operator's coordinating action as a sub-act of production, and confirmed that for a given level of seeking private benefits, stakeholder contingent governance spent less monitoring costs than the shareholder's unilateral governance, and there was a positive relationship between the number of governance body and the effectiveness incentives and monitor. This paper then designed the corporate governance index; selected variable by factor analysis and index calculation, and results showed that stakeholder contingent governance could achieve higher corporate governance effectiveness than the shareholder's unilateral governance. In addition, the results of control variables research showed that the enterprise nature and firm size has also impacted on corporate governance effectiveness.
(2) The second sub-study built a decision-making theoretical model based of B-C index which could balancing the decision power, and confirmed stakeholder contingent governance can improve the effectiveness of decision-making and coordination through empirical study. There was not many existing literature studying on comparison of decision-making power configuration and decision-making results according to governance context, this article compared real power and decision-making power in the perspective of cooperative game. Studies have shown that there was no direct link between equity allocation and decision-making authority, also found internal power balance could improve corporate governance effectiveness, and the introduction of stakeholder governance could enhance the decision-making effectiveness. According to the two important properties of operator behaviors, namely decision-making and coordination, this paper conducted an empirical research of decision-making mechanism through factor analysis, mean testing, and indicator calculation. Results showed that stakeholder contingent governance could achieve higher level of decision-making effectiveness, coordination effectiveness, and interest satisfaction than the shareholder's unilateral governance. However, there is no significant difference of stakeholder combined influence between the two. In addition, the control variables study showed that these is negative relationship between enterprise size and the effectiveness of decision-making and coordination, while the effectiveness of decision-making and coordination in state-owned enterprises and listed companies were not optimistic. This paper provided explanation, theoretical and practical suggestions reference to interview contents.
(3) The third sub-study built a situational decision-making mechanism, through simulation experiments and case study, provided theory and action suggestions. Existing decision-making literature was mainly based on shareholder sovereignty paradigm, and with the assumption of fully rational policy-maker, while the premise in this paper was limited degree of rational behavior. From the corporate governance context perspective, stakeholder satisfaction indicators were introduced as decision-making project attributes, based on TOPSIS method, the operator's multiple attribute decision model was built to reflect the equilibrium of interests. For the four categories of corporate governance context, this paper conducted a decision-making mechanism simulation in systematic and comprehensive way. Sensitivity analysis of property values was the process of post-optimization. Finally, according to the case study during 6 months, two manufacturing industries in Hangzhou were chose; the operator's multiple attribute decision models were tested and discussed in different corporate governance contexts. Cross-case analysis confirmed there was a positive relationship between the decision-making stability the item number of decision-making project attribute, and suggested operators could improve the predictability of decision-making by sensitivity analysis.
Based on theories of corporate governance, stakeholder and decision-making mechanism, this paper focused on the question of how does corporate governance context affect the decision-making mechanism, three innovative research summarized in the following.
(1) Illustrated the process of corporate governance influencing operator's decision-making mechanism. This paper established a logic chain of "corporate governance-management behavior-operator decision-making mechanism", and in-depth explored the relationship between the corporate governance and business decision-making, tried to open the black box, in order to enrich the research content of existing business decisions.
(2) Revealed the importance of stakeholder contingent governance to operator's decision-making mechanism. This paper expanded existing decision-making theory and relevant theoretical model, combined with empirical research, put forward that the impact of the stakeholder contingent governance could not be ignored.
(3) Systematically analyzed the application of optimized decision-making mechanism. By grasping of project attributes and the decision-making contexts, different operator's decision-making models were established, reflecting the balance of stakeholder interests. Through approaches of simulation examples and case study, this article conducted systematic research and analysis of the multiple attribute decision model in a panoramic view way, and provided policy recommendations.
已有理论虽然勾勒了公司治理能给企业带来的绩效优势与竞争优势,但对于其作用机理,尤其是如何通过经营者行为的分析,研究影响决策机制以及企业价值等一系列连贯问题的文献则较为缺乏。因此,在打开作用机理黑箱的基础上,研究优化经营者决策机制的办法,成为企业与其利益相关者合作共赢、长远健康发展的关键。
为了促进经营者决策机制的优化与完善,将企业利益相关者相机治理理念融入机制设计过程中,提高公司治理与决策机制的作用效力,实现企业价值的长远提升。本文围绕“公司治理情境如何影响经营者决策机制”这一基本问题展开研究,深入剖析利益相关者相机治理对经营者决策的重要影响,从而为我国企业如何构建科学的经营者决策机制提供理论和实务支持。
具体而言,本文将试图逐层深入地探究以下三个研究问题：(1)公司治理对经营者行为约束有何影响?作用机制是怎样的?(2)受企业利益相关者相机治理影响的经营者行为约束对决策机制有何影响?(3)公司治理情境影响下的经营者决策机制应该如何优化?
本文结合理论与实证研究,采用理论拓展、理论模型构建与分析、大规模问卷调查和案例分析等研究方法,基于浙江省176份企业有效调查问卷数据,以及来自于21家企业的30位中高层经营管理人员的访谈资料,通过以下三个子研究逐层深入地对上述研究问题进行论证。
(1)子研究一构建了经营者行为组合理论模型,并通过实证研究证实了利益相关者相机治理能够提高经营者行为约束性和公司治理效力。现有相关文献较少围绕经营者协调职能作出详细研究,本文将经营者利益协调行为视为生产努力行为的子行为之一,通过理论模型的研究分析,证实了对于某一经营者谋取私人收益水平,利益相关者相机治理比股东单边治理花费更少的监督成本,并且治理主体数量与激励监督效力成正向关系。
进而文章通过量表设计、变量删选、因子分析与指标计算等步骤,构建了公司治理效力指标,对理论模型的相关研究结果进行了实际验证,统计结果证明了利益相关者相机治理比股东单边治理获得更高的公司治理效力。此外,对控制变量的研究结果表明了企业性质和企业规模对公司治理效力的影响也不容忽视。
(2)子研究二构建了基于B-C指数的决策权力制衡理论模型,并通过实证研究证实了利益相关者相机治理能够提高经营者决策机制的决策效力与协调效力。现有研究较少基于公司治理情境对企业决策权配置与决策结果作出比较与判断,本文从利益相关者合作博弈的角度出发,研究决策者实际权力与决策权力之间的关系。理论模型研究证明了企业股权配置并没有直接与决策权力挂钩,同时发现权力内部制衡效应能提升企业治理效力,以及引入利益相关者相机治理能提高决策整体效力。
文章以经营者行为的两个重要属性出发,分别对决策与协调进行实证检验,旨在较为全面地把握公司治理对经营者决策机制的影响。实证研究通过因子分析、均值检验、指标计算等方式,对理论模型的相关结果进行验证,统计结果证明了利益相关者相机治理比股东单边治理获得更高的企业决策效力、利益协调效力和利益诉求满足程度,但是利益相关者综合影响程度在两种公司治理模式下不存在显著差异。此外,对控制变量的研究结果表明了企业规模大小与决策效力、利益协调效力之间成反向趋势；国有企业与上市公司的决策效力和协调效力不容乐观。笔者结合访谈资料,提供了可参考的解释,旨在为企业经营者提供理论指导与实务建议。
(3)子研究三构建了符合公司治理情境变化要求的经营者决策机制,通过仿真算例实验和案例研究的方法,对决策机制优化提供了理论与操作建议。现有决策项目评价文献大多基于股东主权范式,并且假定决策者完全理性。本文以有限度理性行为为前提,从公司治理情境化的角度,引入利益相关者满意度指标作为决策项目属性,构建了经营者多属性决策模型,基于TOPSIS方法对有限项目进行优劣排序,反映了利益诉求平衡原理。继而针对四类公司治理情境,较为系统和全面地仿真实验了决策机制的运用与分析过程。并且通过属性值的灵敏度分析,对决策机制进行了后优化的分析过程。
最后,根据为期6个月的案例研究,对浙江省杭州市两家制造业私营企业进行了跟踪式的访谈调研,以文章构建的经营者多属性决策模型为研究准绳,分别对比探讨了在不同公司治理情境下经营者决策行为与结果的差异。交叉案例分析证实了决策稳定性与经营者决策机制中涵盖的项目属性数量成正向关系,并且建议企业经营者可以通过了解项目属性值灵敏度来提高对决策结果的预见性。
纵观全文,文章基于对公司治理、利益相关者与经营者决策机制等相关理论的梳理与拓展,围绕公司治理情境如何影响经营者决策机制这一基本问题,在以下个方面进行了创新性研究。
(1)阐释了公司治理影响经营者决策机制的本质过程。建立了“公司治理——经营者行为——经营者决策机制”的逻辑链,深入挖掘了公司治理与企业决策之间的关系脉络,力图打开公司治理情境对决策机制的作用黑箱,补充和充实了现有企业决策研究内容。
(2)揭示了企业利益相关者相机治理对经营者决策机制优化的重要性。基于总结已有学者关于企业利益相关者相机治理与经营者决策的理论研究,拓展了相关的理论模型,结合实证研究,提出了企业利益相关者相机治理影响的不可忽视性。
(3)系统剖析了经营者决策机制的公司治理情境化模型构建与实际运用问题。通过对决策项目属性与决策情境状态变量的把握,构建了符合不同公司治理情境要求的经营者决策机制,体现了利益相关者利益诉求平衡原理。通过仿真算例的实验方式与案例研究的实证方式,对构建的多属性决策模型进行了全景式的系统研究与分析,旨在为企业提供可参考的理论支持与政策建议。
In the complex business environment, corporate governance paradigm has undergone a fundamental development, and stakeholder contingent-governance research has also emerged. Establishing the decision-making mechanism which can balance the corporate stakeholder's interests is considered as the key to enterprise development. The reality shows that unscientific decision-making system would lead to many problems. Although theories have been outlined corporate governance brought about corporate performance advantage and competitive advantage, its action mechanism research, especially the operator's act as an intermediary variable, still need to study in a deep-going way. Therefore, this research will open the mechanism black box and optimize the approach to operator's decision-making mechanism, so as to make the enterprise and its stakeholders lead win-win cooperation in the long-term healthy development.
In order to facilitate optimization and improvement of the decision-making mechanism, stakeholder contingent government concept is brought into the mechanism design process, improving the effect of corporate governance and decision-making and enhancing the long-term enterprise value. This research focuses on the issue of "corporate governance context how to affect the decision-making mechanism", and conducts an in-depth analysis of stakeholder governance how to influence the decision-making, in order to provide theoretical and practical support for operators. In particular, this paper will attempt to explore the following research questions:(1) How does stakeholder contingent government influence the operator's behavior? What is the mechanism? (2) What is the relationship between the decision-making mechanism and operator's behavior constrained by the contingent government? (3) How to optimize the decision-making mechanism under the situation of contingent government?
Theoretical research and empirical research are used in this paper, methodologies consist of theory expansion, theoretical model analysis, large-scale surveys and case analysis, covering 176 valid questionnaire data and 30 middle and senior management personnel from 21 enterprises in Zhejiang Province. Three sub-study in depth to demonstrate the above-mentioned research questions.
(1) The first sub-study built an operator's behavioral portfolio model, and confirmed stakeholder contingent governance can improve the effectiveness of the operator behavior constraint and corporate governance through empirical study. There was not many existing literature studying on the function of coordination. This article explored the operator's coordinating action as a sub-act of production, and confirmed that for a given level of seeking private benefits, stakeholder contingent governance spent less monitoring costs than the shareholder's unilateral governance, and there was a positive relationship between the number of governance body and the effectiveness incentives and monitor. This paper then designed the corporate governance index; selected variable by factor analysis and index calculation, and results showed that stakeholder contingent governance could achieve higher corporate governance effectiveness than the shareholder's unilateral governance. In addition, the results of control variables research showed that the enterprise nature and firm size has also impacted on corporate governance effectiveness.
(2) The second sub-study built a decision-making theoretical model based of B-C index which could balancing the decision power, and confirmed stakeholder contingent governance can improve the effectiveness of decision-making and coordination through empirical study. There was not many existing literature studying on comparison of decision-making power configuration and decision-making results according to governance context, this article compared real power and decision-making power in the perspective of cooperative game. Studies have shown that there was no direct link between equity allocation and decision-making authority, also found internal power balance could improve corporate governance effectiveness, and the introduction of stakeholder governance could enhance the decision-making effectiveness. According to the two important properties of operator behaviors, namely decision-making and coordination, this paper conducted an empirical research of decision-making mechanism through factor analysis, mean testing, and indicator calculation. Results showed that stakeholder contingent governance could achieve higher level of decision-making effectiveness, coordination effectiveness, and interest satisfaction than the shareholder's unilateral governance. However, there is no significant difference of stakeholder combined influence between the two. In addition, the control variables study showed that these is negative relationship between enterprise size and the effectiveness of decision-making and coordination, while the effectiveness of decision-making and coordination in state-owned enterprises and listed companies were not optimistic. This paper provided explanation, theoretical and practical suggestions reference to interview contents.
(3) The third sub-study built a situational decision-making mechanism, through simulation experiments and case study, provided theory and action suggestions. Existing decision-making literature was mainly based on shareholder sovereignty paradigm, and with the assumption of fully rational policy-maker, while the premise in this paper was limited degree of rational behavior. From the corporate governance context perspective, stakeholder satisfaction indicators were introduced as decision-making project attributes, based on TOPSIS method, the operator's multiple attribute decision model was built to reflect the equilibrium of interests. For the four categories of corporate governance context, this paper conducted a decision-making mechanism simulation in systematic and comprehensive way. Sensitivity analysis of property values was the process of post-optimization. Finally, according to the case study during 6 months, two manufacturing industries in Hangzhou were chose; the operator's multiple attribute decision models were tested and discussed in different corporate governance contexts. Cross-case analysis confirmed there was a positive relationship between the decision-making stability the item number of decision-making project attribute, and suggested operators could improve the predictability of decision-making by sensitivity analysis.
Based on theories of corporate governance, stakeholder and decision-making mechanism, this paper focused on the question of how does corporate governance context affect the decision-making mechanism, three innovative research summarized in the following.
(1) Illustrated the process of corporate governance influencing operator's decision-making mechanism. This paper established a logic chain of "corporate governance-management behavior-operator decision-making mechanism", and in-depth explored the relationship between the corporate governance and business decision-making, tried to open the black box, in order to enrich the research content of existing business decisions.
(2) Revealed the importance of stakeholder contingent governance to operator's decision-making mechanism. This paper expanded existing decision-making theory and relevant theoretical model, combined with empirical research, put forward that the impact of the stakeholder contingent governance could not be ignored.
(3) Systematically analyzed the application of optimized decision-making mechanism. By grasping of project attributes and the decision-making contexts, different operator's decision-making models were established, reflecting the balance of stakeholder interests. Through approaches of simulation examples and case study, this article conducted systematic research and analysis of the multiple attribute decision model in a panoramic view way, and provided policy recommendations.
引文
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